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(i) 
A B S T R ACT 
This work is first and foremost intended to be a reasonably 
comprehensive social history of the Chinese community which attempts 
to treat the subject from the perspective of the Chinese community. 
This has been, at least in part, accomplished by extensive attention 
to the development of organisational structures within the community. 
A considerable body of literature on overseas Chinese communities 
has focused on the matrix of associational activity which is an aspect 
of the overseas community. This was important, as Willmott noted in 
1969 for it facilitated the beginning of attempts through sociological 
analysis to produce generalisations about overseas Chinese communities 
which could form the basis of future comparative work (Willmott, 1969: 
282). This present study is intended to be complementary to and 
an extension of that work building specifically on the analyses 
provided by Freedman (1967), Crissman (1967), Willmott (1969) and 
Wickberg (1979). The particular aim is to trace the changes and 
persistence in the associational structure of the New Zealand Chinese 
community by locating its history within the complex milieu which 
persistently confronted its development. Through this it is possible 
to indicate how the organisational structure of the community, acting 
as a variable, is capable of innovation, fragmentation and collective 
action depending on the particular situations that influence its existence. 
(ii) 
This analysis takes Crissman's model of the segmentary structure which 
he derives from synchronic analysis and applies it in a diachronic 
fashion. The results of this confirm that while the derivation of 
the segmentary structure may be traced to historic urban adaptations 
in China,its development through time in the overseas community is a 
reflection of changing contexts. It is argued here that not only does 
interaction within and external to the Chinese, create the necessity 
for persistence and change in the segmentary structure, but that the 
structure itself provides the most efficacious means through which the 
Chinese community governs itself as well as articulating its needs 
and mediating external demands. Consequently, the segmentary structure 
constitutes, as part of the culture of an overseas Chinese community, 
what Cohen refers to as a 'universe(s) of ... formally non-political 
formations and activities that are politicized in the course of social 
action' (Cohen, 1974:xvi), - in brief a case of political ethnicity. 
This social history maintains that the New Zealand Chinese community 
through the emergence of political ethnicity exemplified by the change 
and persistence in the segmentary structure of the community has 
ensured its survival and integrity. 
FRONTISPIECE 
Translation: 'Under the plUm tree do not put your 
cap straight; nor in a Irelon patch 
lace your shoes' 
Note: The a.J:x:)ve proverb was recorded by Reverend Alexander' Don 
(iii) 
who had heard i t given as advice to a recent Chinese iImnigrant 
to New Zealand in 1894. Don added his own proverb which 
according to him described how the Chinese coped with New 
Zealand: 
'The Chinese suspects and expects to be suspected' , 
(see Annual Up-Country Tour ArrDng Otago Chinese, 1894-95:18. 
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1. 
PAR T I 
2. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE FRAMEWORK, METHOD AND THE FOCUS 
The subject of this thesis is the Chinese community in New 
Zealand, a topic with a rather too well trodden path before it, 
including three books, thirty-one theses and, at last count, twenty-
five assorted articles. It is therefore with some humility, and fear 
that I add yet another work to this plethora of material which from 
all accounts, especially the Chinese themselves, has explored the 
topic to its full. However with a persistence characteristic of 
the people of whom I write I have tried to add some sociological 
insight to the history of the Chinese community. It is a social 
history which if it is doing its job properly should, as regards 
overseas Chinese communities, satisfy three requirements defined by 
Wickberg (1965) when he describes the challenge overseas Chinese 
communities in Asia present to the historian: 
The existence of these communities presents the 
historian with the important task of identifying 
periods of significant change in their 
institutional lives and in their relations with 
both their host societies and their "mother 
country", China. 
(Wickberg, 1965:viii) 
3. 
The task I have set myself is to identify (using the key 
points Wickberg highlights) what I consider the development of 
political ethnicity in a Chinese community. In order to do this it 
is necessary to discuss the development of organisations within this 
community and to trace the history of these organisations as they 
respond and change according to the influence of more complex changes 
in New Zealand society and China. Unlike other writers however, I 
have not been able to discuss this process as one that conforms to 
the gradual and inexorable assimilation of a minority into the 'greater 
New Zealand culture' (Greif 1974:xiii) nor am I happy to try and 
evaluate the history of the New Zealand Chinese using Park's stages of 
contact, competition, accommodation and assimilation eNg 1959:7-10). 
This theoretical position, while ideologically embedded in New Zealand's 
past, invariably evaluates an ethnic minority from the perspective of 
how it should develop and not as a historic community which has developed 
through time. Granted, Park's stages allow for some historic development 
and change but these are deemed to be'progressive and irreversible' 
rather than having their own dynamic. If anything it is the concepts 
of Park's which are useful but they hardly conform to a neat 
developmental pattern. 
The assumptions this study is based on essentially come from 
three sets of ideas which encompass, as much as possible, the kinds of 
questions I have asked about the New Zealand Chinese and the changes 
that have occurred in their community. 
The three sets of ideas are covered under the terms framework, 
method and focus. The first, framework, deals with the way one 
conceptualizes the milieu in which the Chinese community has developed 
through time. This study operates under the assumption that the 
development of the Chinese community can be viewed from the perspective 
of various relationships the community encounters as part of its 
4. 
total social relations. Largely these are sets of relationships 
originating from three interrelated spheres of activity. The 
more obvious spheres would include New Zealand society in the midst 
of which the Chinese community lives and China, the homeland or 
place of national origin from which they came or to which they trace 
their origin. The former provides a context of hostility mellowed 
by later tolerance while the other in the midst of its own political 
turmoils goes from total neglect to close scrutiny of its overseas 
population. Both of these contexts supply sets of relationships and 
problems for the developing Chinese community which force the community 
to organize, in order to maintain its integrity and survival. Since 
both contexts constantly change the Chinese community is also forced 
to periodically re-articulate its position through mobilizing sets of 
social relationships to face the threats and pressures it confronts. 
While these are the two obvious spheres of activity, the 
reaction to them gives rise to a third context which suffers the 
unintended consequences of action taken in regard to the other 
spheres of activity. The third area of concern is the social 
relations of the Chinese community itself which in the course of 
organising and reorganising creates the basis for internal cohesion 
and fragmentation. The very nature of collective effort to confront 
pressures from the other contexts leads invariably to new alignments 
and these in turn result in dissension within the community, 
arguments over authority, and organisational fragmentation, a unique 
quality of overseas Chinese communities which will be discussed later. 
Alternatively the tendency of units in the Chinese community to value 
their autonomy leads to new difficulties in the functional 
organisation of collective activity. 
5. 
The three contexts provide a basic framework in which to 
place the history of the Chinese community and adequately isolate 
the influence of three interrelated sets of social relations which 
together provide a way of analysing the development of the Chinese 
community. 
Two sets of arguments,however, emerge from the framework, 
one having to do with content or the history of the Chinese in New 
Zealand and the other with the way one analyses the history from the 
perspective of social relations within the Chinese community. The 
organisation of the thesis attempts to encompass both sets of 
arguments by providing sufficient historic data to answer questions 
about content and probe the analytical points which have to do with 
the nature and extent of political ethnicity in the Chinese community. 
The analytical problem is to uncover the kinds of external 
and internal relationships of the Chinese community that lead to 
ethnic loyalties and customs being organised and articulated for 
specific purposes. The specific purposes and organisation have to do 
with the distribution of power and authority in the Chinese community 
and the way it is brought to bear on making decisions about 
political action. 
The second set of ideas has to do with the matching of the 
historical and analytical problems with a method of doing research. 
Essentially there were two methods, one having to do with documentary 
evidence which could be brought to bear on problems of historic 
content and the other having to do with the exploration of the kinds 
of interconnections discussed previously. The documentary evidence to 
elucidate the relationship between the Chinese community and New 
Zealand society was a matter of collecting and reading a mass of data, 
6. 
but the evidence to enable an understanding of the social organisation 
of the Chinese community required field work which used individual 
biographies as the key to the kinds of relationships that existed. 
In approaching the problem from this perspective the study 
relies heavily on Mill's (1970) important statements about the nature 
of the sociological imagination. The data, therefore, was collected 
through the recording of individual biography but the questions that 
informed the structure of this biography were designed to link the 
individual to the social organisation of which he or she was an 
integral part. 
Finally, the focus of the study is simply the attempt to 
take a set of problems, the analytic questions that arise, the answers 
that are derived from them and develop an explanation of how and why 
a Chinese community was able to articulate its autonomy and survive in 
a context which at times would seem to deny this possibility. The 
explanation used two sets of ideas, one derived from the literature on 
the unique types of social organisation which are ubiquitous in 
overseas Chinese communities and provide a range of idioms under which 
the community may combine its resources to articulate its needs, and 
the other from the notion of political ethnicity. Since the Chinese 
community in its history has organised into interest groups and 
mobilised resources to confront various problems with which it is 
faced,and since this organisation regardless of its internal or 
external orientation to the Ch~riese community has to do with the 
struggle for power and the authority and the right to use that power, 
then it is maintained that political ethnicity is an accurate 
description of the process. 
7. 
The framework was initially derived from an examination of 
available resources both popular and academic. In order to indicate 
the sets of problems and questions that emerge the existing studies 
on the New Zealand Chinese community or aspects relating to have 
been divided into five categories largely on the basis of their 
approach, extent of coverage and focus. 
The first category and earliest writing of the New Zealand 
Chinese dealt almost ostensibly with the gold fields activity of early 
Chinese immigrants to New Zealand which spanned a period from 1865 
11 the turn of the century. It was largely descriptive, relying 
almost entirely on information gleaned from the Presbyterian Church 
whose missionary activity at one time focused on Chinese gold miners 
in Otago. 
One of the earliest and most important contributions on the 
Chinese in the goldfields was provided by Reverend Alexander Don who 
was missioner to the Chinese in Otago in 1886 till 1908 and made 
annual trips, by foot, around the various gold mining settlements of 
the Chinese (see Map IV). Don's annual reports were published in 
The New Zealand and the separate issues of 
--------------------~------ ~------~ 
Tours but are as meticulous in their detail as his diary in which he 
recorded the names, village and country of origin, years of schooling, 
number of visits home and place of residence in New Zealand of most of 
the Chinese he met. While Don's evangelical success was dubious amongst 
his mining friends, his feeling for their lives was immense,only 
wavering slightly when he found their ways wanting and their 
resistance to Christianity strong. Don's understanding of the 
community grew with time and he pieced together much information which 
allows the reader to understand that the mining groups, despite 
separation and isolation were not only tied together but also still 
8. 
linked to their homeland. This latter point, while perhaps not 
foremost in Don's mind initially, definitely became significant as 
the Presbyterian Church decided to open the Canton Missions in the 
home countries of some of the New Zealand Chinese. 
Don's major contribution, however, was in his description of 
the gold ld's communities and groups of miners, their recreation, 
associational activity and their relationship individually to their 
families in China. Don's observations present a picture of Chinese 
settlement that is more than lonely groups of miners spread out all 
over the gold fields. Instead they are linked by various social 
relations, including their local Chinese merchant network, their 
attempts at organisation, the conflicts that arose between groups 
and the problems of confrontation with European society. 
Of equal importance is the material that can be gleaned 
about the influence of such a person as himself working amongst the 
Chinese. The reaction to the Church and Don is manifest at both 
individual and group level as they either decide to accept or reject 
his teaching, encourage their own religious activity or attempt to 
enlist his help as a mediator between themselves and the European 
society. This latter role is one that developed during his career and 
persisted with the aid of like-minded people in the Presbyterian 
Church who had compassion for the Chinese. It was, perhaps, these 
people working with the Chinese who first realised the of 
constraints the Chinese faced. Because of this they fulfilled a 
unique role at periodic times assisting the Chinese to confront the 
stereotyped attitudes they faced and the government which took eighty 
three years to accept the idea of a Chinese community complete with 
f "I" 1 aml les. 
9. 
This contribution by the Presbyterian Church as both a 
spokesperson and historian of the Chinese community has continuously 
provided researchers with an initial introduction to the Chinese 
community, but unfortunately these same researchers did not exhaust 
the vast material produced nor attempt to go beyond the recorded 
events piecing them together into a complete picture. 
One descendant of both the Presbyterian Church and those who 
used these materials was Jean McNeur. Miss McNeur wrote one of the 
earliest history theses on the Chinese community in 1930. She was 
born in Canton, the daughter of a Presbyterian missionary~ Reverend 
McNeur , who " besides Don, probably knew more about the Chinese 
community in the period from the 1890's to the late 1904's than any 
other European. Miss McNeur's thesis presented a picture of Chinese 
peasant miners who were superstitious, frugal, hardy and willing 
survivors in a none too pleasant environment. Her study is informed 
by the church's involvement with the Chinese and government immigration 
restrictions against them, but only sparingly with knowledge of the 
Chinese community which is defined largely in terms of the more 
renowned and professional Chinese people within it. McNeur also, 
however, alluded to a process: 
. . .. the types of Chinese in New Zealand has 
changed from the gold digger of former days 
to the more assured and better educated 
young man who has entered the country under 
the Immigration Restriction Laws. 
(McNeur 1930:92) 
For McNeur, the Chinese population had changed from being 
almost an entirely superstitious group of peasants to a more 
sophisticated group of materialists but the dynamics of this process 
including reference to the internal structure of the Chinese community 
are absent. 
10. 
The second category includes work on immigration restrictions, 
legislative activity and the results of these as it the 
population of Chinese in New Zealand. These through time have gone 
from a mere recounting of legislation to more sophisticated works 
which attempt to explain the context in which this legislation emerges 
but few have attempted a sociological explanation. 
By far the most often quoted source for those who have dealt 
exclusively with legislation, outside direct reference to Hansard, are 
Dr Scholefield and T.D.H. Hall who wrote predominantly in the period 
from 1927 till 1936 as a contribution to the Wellington Group of 
Institute of Pacific Relations. Hall was Clerk of the Dominion 
Parliament and Dr Scholefield was Parliamentary Librarian so both had 
the of being close to records and the people who had created 
them. Their first effort was a monograph in 1927 entitled Asiatic 
into New Legislative Control and Historical 
Survey, a largely factual excursion through the myriad of restrictions 
from 1881 till 1923. The account they provide is objective, lacking 
any evaluation until the very end, when they provide two important 
insights. The first describes the history of Chinese in New Zealand 
according to the politicians: 
There is recognition by the bulk of our leading 
men in political circles :ofthe real nature of 
the problem, the necessity of maintaining racial 
purity and standards of living. Sweeping 
condemnations of the Chinese race on moral and 
other grounds, the attribution of inferiority, 
low civilization, and the denial of culture 
receive no support from competent judges, and 
thinkers. Nevertheless, in the formation of 
public opinion and in securing the driving 
power for new and more stringent legislation the 
commonest method has been that of abuse and the 
playing upon the fears and self of 
sections of the community. A fresh agitation is 
arising. It remains to be seen whether the sound 
and responsible views that have been expressed by 
leading men in all parties will sufficient 
support to enable the matter to be dealt with 
without offence to the rising nationalist 
consciousness of the East. 
Four points emerge from the above which summarise the context of 
Asiatic immigration restrictions. Firstly there were fears by New 
Zealand labour that they would be swamped by the onrush of cheap 
Chinese labour from China. Secondly, that the 'condemnations' and 
'agitation' were groundless, but nevertheless apparent if not 
purposefully created, evidenced by their monotonous sporadic 
appearances. Thirdly that racial purity became and continued to be 
a preoccupation in New Zealand. Fourthly that there had been no 
attempt to acknowledge the national feelings of those who faced 
1 . 2 exc USlon. 
For later writers the above statements have become part of a 
general explanation for the existence of immigration restrictions: 
First, and dominant, was working class fear of 
cheap labour depressing an already uncertain 
income level that reflected the instability of a 
primary producing economy dependent on world markets 
with fluctuating prices. Secondly there were middle 
class fears of similar competition in the sphere of 
retail business, reinforced by a belief that the 
presence of non-Europeans was in some way a threat to 
bourgeois respectability particularly in the area of 
sexual mores. Thirdly, politicians - some of whom 
appear to have had strong racist attitudes and 
expressed them with vigour of conviction - were quite 
prepared to make political capital of public fears, 
and even to reinforce those fears if they showed 
signs of waning. Fourthly, there was the ubiquitous 
existence of a hostile stereotype within the 
condemnatory blanket judgement of foreigners. 
(Roy, 1970:16) 
The predominant tendency is to rely on periods of racism which are 
explained by either the racist predisposition of politicians or 
middle class and working class fears of entrepreneurial skills and 
cheap labour (see also Ng in Otago Daily Times 22 and 29 July 
1972).3 While one cannot deny that these were all influential the 
level of generality ignores the more important aspects of colonial 
11. 
politics, namely dependency and internal conflict between economic 
groups represented in the New Zealand government. The point here 
was made clearly and concisely by Scholefield and Hall in 1927: 
although never laid out as the focus of their description: 
Prom the New Zealand point of view, it is 
interesting to note the part played by the 
immigration question in settling one of the 
difficult problems of the relationship between 
New Zealand and the Home Country. On the one 
side, there has been the recognition of our 
right to decide our destinies and, on the 
other side, the greater recognition by the 
Dominion of its place and responsibility in a 
world system. 
(Scholefield and Hall, ~927:16)4 
12. 
In the same year the above authors rewrote their earlier piece, this 
time free from the constraints imposed by their writing for the 
Institute, adding 'inferences from the facts' which they considered 
worthy of 'attention and study' (Hall, 1927:228). The inferences 
were noteworthy, but generated a widespread outcry in New Zealand 
(see Ponton, 1946:73). The most important ones for the purposes 
of this work were as follows: (1) that periods of economic 
downturn seemed to heighten the intensity of the racial purity issue 
in New Zealand; (2) that the whole argument of Asiatic immigration 
restrictions was used as part of a struggle between a conservative 
lative Council and a more radical House of Representatives; 
(3) that the outcome of this struggle and its resultant agitation and 
legislation led to the creation of 'racial consciousness'; (4) that 
New Zealand dealt with the Asiatic immigration as a problem that 
concerned only herself without regard to China or Britain; (5) that if 
Chinese lived in particular areas together it was perhaps more the 
result of the 'public feeling of the white population (than) any desire 
on the part of Asiatics to herd together', and (6) that if the Chinese 
were to remain in New Zealand they should receive 'sympathetic 
treatment' which could only come by 'the gradual elimination of 
13. 
racial consciousness' (Hall, 1927:234-236). The salient points 
Scholefield and Hall made in 1927 formed the basis for the way I have 
thought about the relationship between the Chinese community and New 
Zealand. Specifically, I borrowed their emphasis on economic context, 
intra-governmental conflict, and colonial-imperial relations as a 
context in which to place a description of immigration restriction 
which has, as they predicted, far more explanatory power than reliance 
on individual racism or class antagonism as the only contributing 
factors. Of perhaps more importance for an understanding of the 
Chinese community itself, however, is their analytic point which 
suggests that the surrounding structure in the dominant society, in 
fact, helped create the very phenomenon which allowed hostility to be 
perpetuated. The structure which created antagonism and restriction 
also unintentionally helped create a Chinese community and the 
unintended consequence of antagonism and restriction was reaction 
from the institutional framework within this Chinese community. 
Three other works deserve mention not only because they 
contain considerable data but because they brought some rigorous 
analysis to aspects of immigration restrictions. F.A. Ponton wrote 
his thesis 'Immigration Restriction in New Zealand' in 1946 and this 
represented the first attempt to explore the relationship between the 
New Zealand government and the Colonial Office while at the same time 
examining the operation of the Customs Department through access to 
their files. S Ponton carefully traced the changing nexus of power 
that was responsible for immigration matters and noted the 
appropriation of this right finally by Cabinet after 1920. While the 
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historic information and presentation is exact and objective there 
are slight hints that Ponton holds little sympathy for any party who 
had been the subject of immigration restriction. 
On the opposite side at least in terms of sympathy, is 
O'Connor (1968), who has covered the legislative period reviewed by 
Ponton, but with a focus on racial prejudice in the period 1908 till 
1920 when the smouldering 'white New Zealand' policy came to the fore 
d d 1 1 · 6 an was expresse overt y as po lCy. As O'Connor notes, the major 
New Zealand history books exclude this aspect of New Zealand from 
their discussion and his work remedies this deficiency with a 
particularly detailed recounting of the wave of anti-Asiatic feeling 
that swept the country after World War 1 and the New Zealand 
government's ability to finally find a formula for restriction that 
would avoid confrontation at home, with England or with other powers. 
O'Connor's major point is that New Zealand history has effectively 
covered up this aspect or it has been overshadowed by the discussion 
of Pakeha-Maori relations which have not drawn heavy criticism 
historically and that it is time this incompleteness in New Zealand's 
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self image was rectified (O'Connor 1968:65). 
The third work is a thesis by Rachagan (1971) which links 
the immigration restrictions to New Zealand society through the medium 
of local press. Rachagan examines the context of government 
activity as reflected in the press from 1865 to 1947. ThEL 
significance of this work is that it firmly shows the excessive extent 
of anti-Chinese coverage in the press until at least 1946. 
(\ 
~achagan's careful scrutiny of the press goes a considerable way to 
supporting O'Connor's call for an uncovering of what has taken place 
in regard to anti-Asiatic feeling, but without providing any 
explanation or any more than a minimum description of its effects on 
the Chinese community. 
The third category of work discusses aspects of the first 
two categories but more importantly proceeds to discuss specific 
aspects of the Chinese community in detail. The most elaborate 
example 8 in this category, one that has remained largely the 
prerogative of Chinese writers, is an M.A. thesis by Lawrence Wong 
entitled 'Chinese Youth in Wellington'. 
The focus of Wong's thesis is on young Chinese people, 
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predominantly those from sixteen to nineteen, whom he notes, despite 
Westernisation from all outward appearances are actually an 
homogeneous group, who prefer Chinese company, although they are New 
Zealand citizens. 9 ~hey have, according to Wong, synthesised 
cultural patterns of both contexts. The central question in the 
thesis is to ask why this situation prevails and why they have 
resisted total assimilation. Wong isolates two important aspects as 
the contributing factors; racism on the parts of the dominant 
society (a point he shares with Ng, 1959:118) and the 'resilient and 
adaptive nature of the Chinese institutions, including family and 
social organizations in Wellington and the rest of New Zealand, with 
the Chinese family as the most powerful unifying factor' (Wong,1973:2).lO 
The thesis then proceeds after an historic discussion to 
deal with the influence of restrictive immigration legislation as 
reflecting racism and the influence of the changing family and social 
structure on the Wellington community. The important observation 
Wong makes is that it is impossible to discuss youth without 
examining the 'context of the Chinese milieux' but immediately 
restricts the context by maintaining that: 
No reliable research has been undertaken on the 
political attitude of the New Zealand Chinese and 
the writer believes that research in a field which 
is sensitive would be unprofitable. 
(Wong, 1973:28) 
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Luckily, the author does not conform to his own assertion and does 
discuss the evolution of political organisation and demographic 
imbalance,both as an outcome of immigration restriction. 
Unfortunately, the former relationship is couched in general terms 
and used mainly to contrast with the period post 1936 which he 
describes in terms of liberalized immigration policy and 
'administrative discrimination' (Wong 1973:70). While the context 
has changed, Wong notes that the associations which existed in the 
Chinese community still remain and in fact became the basis for some 
complex developments in the 1960's and 70's. The real focus of the 
thesis becomes the nature of internal conflict over who has the right 
in the Chinese community to lead collective action, a situation 
reminiscent of the Chinese community during the war years. Wong 
recounts the chronology of the conflict but the use of context 
disappears in the explanation. The irony of the work is that conflict 
has to do with the competitive development of community halls to 
provide recr~ation, cultural and spiritual guidance and education for 
all the community but particularly the younger members. Yet, as Wong 
notes in the end, they are no part of the issue, being excluded from 
the area in which the conflict takes place (Wong 1973:47). 
While the thesis returns to the issues of Chinese youth the 
fundamental contribution Wong makes is to show clearly that the 
historical aspects of social structure have influenced the shape of 
the Chinese community and the individuals within it. 
However, it is also clear that in fact there are two 
contexts of social organisation; one which is part of European dominant 
society with its institutions and organisations and the other, an 
attribute of the Chinese community. The former, at least implicitly 
in Wong's analysis, has helped bring about the existence of the 
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organisation in the Chinese community (see Wong 1972:59) and these 
in turn have influenced the response of individuals, in this specific 
1 h d . . 11 case, young peop e, to t e omlnant soclety. This much is clear 
but the final explanation for the organisational conflict in the 
community and the re-emergence of associational activity in Wong's 
opinion hinges on the personalities of two men who seem to both want 
a community hall but have differing ideas about the organisations 
which will actually commence the activity (Wong 1972:146).12 The 
only qualification of this view is his suggestion that the Ambassador, 
one of the personalities, used the hall issue as a means of stimulating 
a 'strong pro-Nationalist China backing in Wellington' (Wong 
1972:144). 
The Ambassador, as Wong notes, communicated news of a fund 
sponsored by one organisation to a Taiwan newspaper where the 
event was incorrectly reported and in fact credited to another 
organization - one supported by the Ambassador. The point is clear 
in this instance but this kind of connection is absent when Wong 
evaluates the historic development of social organisation in the 
Chinese community. It seems evident from research that external 
events affected both the social organisation in the Chinese community 
and the response of New Zealand to the Chinese presence. New 
Zealand's external relations with Britain seem to have influenced her 
immigration policy and political changes in China in conjunction with 
New Zealand's anti-Chinese fervour directly or indirectly produced 
the kinds of organisations that emerge within the Chinese community. 
Wong's work extremely important for he is the first 
researcher to go beyond the limitations imposed by the use of 
assimilation,acknowledging the presence of conflict, a social 
organisation which has existed through time and the importance of the 
context in which the Chinese community has survived. 13 
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The fourth category includes a small number who have 
chosen a demographic view of the Chinese community. Again this 
approach has started with immigration restriction and has developed 
stages of the Chinese communities history which reflects the changes 
in population dynamics and residence patterns. 
The best example of this approach is Taher (1970) who 
divided the history of Chinese immigration to New Zealand into 
phases: 1866-1920 the phase of legislative restrictions and 
increasing population; 1921-1945 a permit system phase with a 
decreasing Chinese population and finally a post 1945 phase marked 
by an increasing population and controlled immigration (Taher 
1970:38-41). The demographic periods that corresponded to the above 
phases include 1866-1900, a period of 'concentration'; 1901-1920, 
a period of 'dispersion' and 1920-1961, a period of 'reconcentration' 
(Taher 1970:46-60). Again, while the information is useful at a 
general level, the phases and periods described are not. Legislative 
activity didn't begin till 1881 and certainly didn't end in 1920. and 
the period from 1866 till 1920 cannot aptly be described as either 
one of population concentration or dispersion but perhaps more 
correctly as characterized by both simultaneously. Taher does 
discuss some aspects of the Chinese community but there is no real 
attempt to relate legislative restriction and population dynamics 
other than through over-all population numbers, nor any attempt to 
explain why residence patterns changed other than to note the 
influence of community and prejudice which pulled people together and 
'economic activities occupational status and efficient intra-urban 
transportation' which separate them. (Taher 1970:57). 
The fifth category, and perhaps the most significant, 
includes those who, while acknowledging all the above approaches, have 
also attempted to discuss the history of the entire Chinese community. 
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The most significant work in the fifth category is The 
Chinese in New Zealand (1959), by Ng Bickleen Fong, an extension of 
her M.A. thesis written four years earlier. Primarily the book 
addressed itself to the problem of how 'fellow countrymen are fitting 
into New Zealand life' by using assimilation as a desired end and 
trying to evaluate the position and status of first and second 
generation Chinese in New Zealand (Ng 1959:1, 11-12 and 40-49). Ng 
used Park as her point of departure, but only cursorily discusses 
the history of contact and competition preferring to develop a 
typology of the generations in terms of their relative assimilation 
of acculturation. 
Ng's view of the Chinese in New Zealand, of necessity, 
given her theoretical stance, is synchronic, lapsing only 
occasionally into a diachronic view in the discussion of immigration 
and early history. The result of this is a sketch of the extent of 
legislation and discrimination, but never a discussion of why they 
existed. Similarly one gets glimpses of historic changes in the 
structure of the community, for instance in the four paragraph 
discussion of political institutions, but it is only a brief 
incomplete framework without historic depth (see Ng 1959:50-51). 
Ng describes the state of 'social institutional life' as being in a 
'state of disorganisation' without attempting to explain why this is 
the case (ibid:50) and further describes the community as politically 
inactive as far as both China and New Zealand are concerned, 
partially explained by exclusion and partially by cultural habits or 
remaining aloof from politics (ibid.). There is a sense in which 
the reader begins to feel that the author is ashamed of her own 
community for in several places mention is made of the point that the 
New Zealand Chinese, because of their lack of education and 
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background, are not able to transmit the 'best characteristics of 
Chinese civilization' an opinion that was very close to those 
expressed repeatedly in the endless debates over immigration 
restrictions Ng, 1959:8, 35 and 121). 
Despite shortcomings, however, the book has some fundamental 
insights which echoed Hall (1927), although this work was apparently 
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not used. Ng firmly maintains that the structural impositions 
placed on the Chinese in New Zealand in the areas of immigration 
restriction, naturalisation, voting and the contingent effect of 
this on employment, education and welfare has created the kind of 
community she described in 1959 eNg, 1959:127). Ng maintains that: 
The immi restrictions against the 
Chinese have been one of the main factors 
hindering the acculturation and 
assimilation of the Chinese in this 
country. 
eNg, 1959:118) 
Furthermore, Ng asserts that when second generation New Zealand-
born Chinese face discrimination it tends to make them 'race 
conscious' and more Chinese than those born in China . :47) . In 
the first instance if one removes the desired ideals of acculturation 
and assimilation from the equation then one is led to ask what effect 
discrimination had on the first generation Chinese in New Zealand and 
particularly on their political organisation. 
Essentially Ng provided, from her syncronic view, a way of 
thinking ·about the history of the Chinese community which coincided 
with some of the suggestions that emerged from Hall. The 
questions that remained unanswered were those which would have asked 
about activity in the Chinese community which, from all accounts, 
merely endured without action or re-action. 
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The one work which has been done since Ng completed her book 
and which purported to include both a social history and a survey 
of the local Chinese is The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand by Greif.15 
Greif completed his work in 1972 after four years research which 
would have enabled him to interview a number of older men who were 
still able to recall the politics of their own community from the 
turn of the century. The book, however, while setting out to reveal 
political opinions of the New Zealand Chinese ends up assess 
attitudes, values and the degree of assimilation: 
and 
... one is struck by the degree to which the 
have been assimilated into New 
Zealand life and culture. 
The public opinion poll reveals an overall desire 
and ability on the part of almost all Chinese 
under 40 to assimilate almost completely. 
(Greif, 1974:161) 
One is led to believe at the onset that Greif is concerned with the 
historic development of political life amongst the Chinese in New 
Zealand, but his conclusions deny that it existed: 
If complete cultural assimilation is in the 
offering, how does this affect the political 
life of the New Zealand Chinese? The answer 
lies in the historical background of the 
Chinese in New Zealand. Having come from 
peasant stock in search of money to buy land, 
often fleeing the anarchy of China in the 
1850's and 60's, the Chinese of New Zealand 
had little experience involvement ... . Only 
when their basic goals were challenged did they 
speak out, and almost always through friendly 
Europeans ... 
(Greif 1974:162) 
The confusion that emerges from Greif's study is that it seems 
to start with a notion of Chinese politics and power within the 
community but ends up evaluating political activity as defined by 
participation in New Zealand politics. According to Greif both 
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forms of political participation are the prerogative of individuals 
and that group political activity is thwarted by conservatism. In 
the end the Chinese are described as: 
... rapidly and usually happily becoming average 
or perhaps above-average New Zealanders whose 
race happens to be Chinese. 
(Greif 1974: 163) 
which could be marred by 'an unsatisfactory solution to the 
immigration question and the recognition of Communist China' .16 In 
essence Greif uses a set of questions which are intended to isolate 
values and attitudes. Having done this the values and at~itudes are 
then used as a basis for the description of the Chinese community 
which makes a discussion of social organisation or political activity 
irrelevant since attitudes and values form the basis of both content 
and analysis. 
While the above discussion by no means exhausts all the 
sources noted at the beginning it does provide enough examples to 
clarify the contexts and analytic points upon which this study is 
based. 
The starting point of this work then is to extrapolate from 
what has been written a number of contexts and analytic questions 
which would provide a framework to be used in thinking about the 
Chinese community. These contexts and questions, it seemed to me, 
had to satisfy a fundamental requirement of sociological research 
which I believe is consistent with the kinds of expectations 
Wickberg set out when he described the task before the researcher 
(op.cit:l). The questions and their answers then had to link 
biography, with social structure and history. In this specific 
instance they must link individuals in the relevant communities 
discussed to the social structure and these in turn must be related 
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to the historic context in which they have existed. In drawing 
attention specifically to these aspects and the relationship between 
them I am doing little more than attempting to satisfy Mill's 
requirement for an adequate social study, in that it must deal with 
the 'problems of biography, of history and of their intersections 
within a society' (Mills 1970:12). Further to this, Mills 
maintained that to manifest some semblance of a sociological 
imagination which was apparent in the 'classic social analysis' one 
must ask three sorts of questions: 
1) What is the structure of this particular society as 
a whole? What are the essential components, and 
how are they related to one another? How does it 
differ from other varieties of social order? Within 
it, what is the meaning of any particular feature 
for its continuance and for its change? 
2) Where does this society stand in human history? What 
are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its 
place within and its meaning for the development of 
humanity as a whole? How does any particular 
feature we are examining affect, and how is it 
affected by, the historical period in which it moves? 
And this period - what are its essential features? 
How does it differ from other periods? What are its 
characteristic ways of history making? 
3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this 
society and in this period? And what varieties are 
corning to prevail? In what ways are they selected 
and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive 
and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are 
revealed in the conduct and character we observe in 
this society in this period? And what is the meaning 
for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the 
society we are examing? 
(Mills 1970: 13) 
While there is no argument with the extent of the questions posed, 
there is with Mill's notion of the relationship between the aspects 
of society upon which he bases his analysis. Contrary to Mill there 
is no substantiation of what I believe to be his determinant role of 
history and social structure. In order to argue that biography is an 
adequate source for uncovering the linkages between individuals, 
social structure and history one has to view them as existing in 
some kind of dynamic relationship with each having the ability to 
assume at anyone time a deterministic role. Of more immediate 
importance, however, are the particular questions which can be 
generated from Mill's more general ones which would be pertinent to 
this study. 
For , which individuals, which social structure and 
which history or historic context was pertinent to the study. The 
answer was provided by previous researchers who have explicitly in 
some cases, implicitly in others, made assumptions, omissions or 
insights which provided the necessary clues. 
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To explain this more clearly it is necessary to take the,three 
variables of biography, social structure and history and re-evaluate 
the five of works previously discussed. 
If one proceeds with history it is clear that all five 
categories have covered various aspects of history but the history 
is particulari All works, in one form or another, acknowledge 
immigration restriction as important and invariably link them to the 
biography of particular politicians. However, it is only when one 
examines Scholefield and Hall (1927), Hall (1927), O'Connor (1968) and 
Rachagan (1971) together that one finds a much broader historic context 
in which to place immigration restriction and New Zealand history, 
Scholefield and Hall suggest a crucial link between economic context, 
intra-governmental tension and colonial dependency, They also suggest 
that if one wants to see a reflection of this in the public political 
sphere then one should examine the creation of 'racial consciousness' 
which in turn is harnessed to justify the institution of harsher 
immigrant restrictions. O'Connor, in addition argues that the 
racial consciousness created has an institutional component 
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based on national racial purity (excluding the issue of the Maori) 
and exclusion those who would interfere with this ideal. 
Rachagan (1971) examines the reflection of this activity in the media 
as it responds to the above. The important insight that Scholefield, 
Hall, O'Connor and Rachagan explicitly emphasize in regard to the 
issue of Chinese immigration is that the effort expended in New 
Zealand on anti-Asiatic activity far exceeds the demographic 
magnitude of the problem. In their opinion it an aspect of New 
Zealand history which is not only problematic but also submerged in a 
pervasive assumption that New Zealand's concern with race relations 
have to do with the Maori only. 
It is not enough, however, to see these sorts of questions as 
providing an adequate description of historic context, for while 
they admit a relationship to and influence on the Chinese community 
they omit the history of the local Chinese community and its 
1 'h' Ch' h' 17 re atlons lp to lnese lstory. Understandably, those who have 
dealt almost entirely with immigration restriction would find this 
beyond their interests. However, those who have written in part or 
whole about Chinese community have tended to discuss only these two 
areas and the relationship between them in terms of specific events. 
This leads to an interpretation of the Chinese community as a 
structure-less, inactive, apolitical group who manage to survive 
being totally passive to their environment. made this 
generalization, however, it is necessary to quickly qualify it with 
the observation that if one takes these researchers collectively the 
kind of view of the Chinese community is altered. For instance Ng 
(1959) while to some degree ignoring social structure in the Chinese 
community clearly sees the relationship between it and the kind of 
historic context the New Zealand Chinese have lived in. If 
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Scholefield and Hall could see how government had created 'racial 
consciousness' in European New Zealand, Ng could see how the 
government had inadvertently made the local Chinese 'race conscious' . 
Similarly, Wong (1974), while asking questions about assimilation of 
young Chinese, avoiding by choice a discussion of the politics of the 
community, presents something far more important than individual 
biography. most important question is to ask why social 
organisation has survived in the Chinese community and in answering 
this he analyses the particular relationship between the New Zealand 
government, the Chinese associations and Taiwan through their 
diplomatic representative. The interplay of these variables, although 
finally reduced to the interplay of individual personalities gives a 
view of the Chinese community which is alive, active and responsive. 
Given these sort of insights and relationships made by previous 
researchers I have come up with a set of assumptions which have 
provided not only a complementary set of questions, but also 
particular ways of looking at the Chinese community in New Zealand. 
The assumptions are as follows: 
1. That a social organisation has existed historically 
(in the gold fields) and has persisted in the 
Chinese community of New Zealand and that its 
configuration, activity and existence must be seen 
not purely as derivative of their culture but as 
the product of the historic context in which they 
lived and do live (China their overseas communities 
and New Zealand). 
2. That the influence of these relationships (within 
their own communites and New Zealand) caused 
qualitatively different types of responses but 
involved the same collectivities. 
3. That the response of China and of New Zealand to 
the local Chinese community must be seen in the light 
of international relations and that New Zealand's 
activity in particular must be evaluated in terms of 
initially its colonial status and later its role 
in an international setting. 
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The way of thinking about the Chinese community, therefore, has 
involved the consideration of all three of these assumptions and 
the structure of the discussion uses a diachronic perspective. The 
key focus of the work is to establish the existence, persistence 
and change of social organisation in the Chinese community and to 
explain this phenomenon as a manifestation of political ethnicity or 
the politics of survival. 
In taking this position I am attempting to bring together the 
basic ideas present in Yancey et al. (1976) Cohen (1969, 1974) and 
Crissman (1967). The contribution of Yancey, Erickson and Julian 
(1976) is their reformulation of the notion of persistent ethnicity. 
Their position succinctly summarized in the of the article: 
In contrast to the traditional emphasis on the 
transplanted cultural heritage as the principle 
antecedent and defining characteristic of 
ethnic groups, we suggest that the development 
and persistence of ethnicity is dependent upon 
structural conditions characterizing American 
ci and position of groups in American social 
structure. Attention is focused on the question: 
under what conditions does ethnic culture emerge? 
Specifically, what social forces promote the 
crystalization and development of ethnic 
solidarity and identification? 
(Yancey et al. 1976: 391) 
Yancey et al., using evidence of other studies make the following 
observations: 
a) each immigrant group and their descendants face 
differing structural conditions and will 
consequently respond differently despite the 
fact that they may come from the same cultural 
background (ibid: 391-932). 
b) Each immigrant group and their descendants enter 
the occupational structure at different points 
which reflect the types of opportunity available 
and the particular economy that is operating. 
c) Given(b) one would expect to find residence 
affected similarily. 
d) Given a particular residence pattern and 
economic structure one would expect to see 
varying types of ethnic solidarity and 
institutional response (395-396). 
In brief: 
We suggest that a more parsimonious explanation of ethnic 
and community behaviour (other than relying on portable 
heritage) will be found in the relationship of the ethnic 
community to the larger macroscopic structure of the 
society - particularly in the constraints of occupation, 
residence and institutional affiliation. 
(Yancey et al. 19716: 399)1 
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While Yancey et ~., clearly provided the kind of perspective which I 
would argue is appropriate for the subject of this work the 
substantive examples they use come from a different context, namely 
America, and deal with permanent settlement of immigrants whose 
presence condoned not welcomed and whose ties with their 
homeland are not mediated by obligations at both a personal and 
institutional level. 
Also, there is a sense in which Yancey et al. present ethnicity 
as a phenomenon arising from the top-down imposition of social 
structure whereas this study argues that it is produced by interaction 
between the immigrant group and the particular context with which they 
are confronted. In this instance it is more of a process which views 
emergent ethnicity as the. periodic result of vacillating pressures 
from interaction. 
The emphasis or direction I wish to take in regard to the 
Chinese case, rather than concentrating on how the various contexts 
impose constraint on, for instance, employment and housing, is to 
examine in 1 the kinds of more general organisational responses 
they have made through time to counteract the kind of impositions they 
have faced. Ethnicity in this case is a product of interaction not 
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constraint. In order to accomplish this, as already noted, it is 
necessary to historically link sets of relationships with spheres of 
activity which, interconnected, influenced individual biographies 
and social organisation in the Chinese community, and produced, 
contemporaneously, alternative responses. In listic terms the 
Chinese in New Zealand have responded historically to conditions in 
their local community, in New Zealand society and in China and 
similarily New Zealand has responded to the Chinese community in its 
midst in response to its relationship to Britain, its own socio-economic 
make-up and to China. 
Turning now to the nature of the response, Yancey et al. 
suggests that it is in the form of 'ethnic culture' and 'ethnic 
solidarity' (institutional) (Yancey et al. 1976:391-396), which in 
turn produce what they call emergent ethnicity. Given the context and 
groups Yancey et al. use to illustrate this phenomenon it is easy to 
see the response as essentially cultural bUill in, what I would argue 
is a more complex situation with differing sets of structural conditions 
the response seems more aptly described as political. 
Here I agree with Cohen when he maintains: 
Ethnicity ... basically a political and not a 
cultural phenomenon, and it operates with 
contemporary political contexts and is not an 
archaic survival arrangement carried over into 
the present by conservative people. 
(Cohen 1969:190) 
Clearly there is no issue between Yancey et al. and the latter part of 
Cohen's statement for they too are unwilling to accept an explanation 
of ethnicity based purely on cultural heritage or conservatism. 
Ethnicity in both cases is a variable (see Cohen 1974:xv). 
Ethnicity as a political phenomenon, however, is a different matter 
and is used by Cohen in his Study Customs and Politics in Urban Africa 
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(1969) to describe the process whereby the Hausa have achieved 
monopoly over the cattle and Kola trade in Nigeria despite opposition 
from Yoruba groups and individuals. In this situation the Yoruba 
are the majority but the Hausa, a minority, are able to organise 
themselves effectively for political action. The Hausa through this 
organisation maintain the integrity of their community within an 
urban context by building effective means of 'communication, 
decision making, authority, administration and sanctions' (Cohen 
19'69: 184). Prior to the appearance of party politics, a nationalist 
movement and finally independence in the 1950's the Hausa were able 
to maintain their control over trade and expand it since their 
organisation was not only effective but recognised by the indirect 
rule under British colonial administration. Once independence came, 
however, their official recognition was removed and their ethnic 
exclusiveness, political organisation and economic base were under 
threat. They tried to halt the process by involvement in national 
party politics, but found it unsuccessful and counter-productive 
which led to the search for new ways to articulate their interests. 
The Hausa's final solution was to adopt the Tijaniyya religious 
order which as part of Hausa 'cultural baggage' was already available 
as a possible strategy or pattern of behaviour. In fact as Cohen 
points out Tijaniyya has appeared once before in Sabo but had not been 
able to a foothold (Cohen 1969:152). However, within a milieux 
of unsatisfactory representation in volatile national politics, the 
possibility of increased collusion between Yoruba and Hausa and their 
joint effect in undermining Hausa exclusiveness in their trade, the 
context was ripe for its revival: 
The adoption of the Tijaniyya by the Quarter brought 
about processes which halted the disintegration of 
the bases of the exclusiveness and identity of Sabo. 
The reorganization of the Quarter's religion was at 
the same time a reorganization of the Quarter's 
political organization. 
(Cohen 19~9:l85) 
As Cohen succinctly states in another place: 
The cultures of ethnic groups are universes of such 
formally non-political formulations and activities 
that are politicized in the course of social 
action. 
(Cohen 1974:xvi) 
In the context of the Hausa living in Sabo it is not so much the 
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existence of Tijaniyya itself which is political but the context of 
the struggle for their existence with the dominant Yoruba makes it so. 
Following on from this Cohen argues that there are two ways in 
which groups can articulate its organisation, one formally and the 
other informally. The former according to Cohen is the most 
efficient and effective and the most evident in industrial society 
having clear cut aims, rationally planned functions and a bureaucratic 
organisation (Cohen 1974:xvii). However, given a particular context 
which makes this type of organisation impossible, a group will have to 
articulate its organisation along informal lines using kinship, 
friendship, ritual and 'other symbolic activities that are implicit 
in what is known as 'style of life' (ibid.).l8 They will use 'whatever 
cultural mechanisms are available in order to articulate the 
organisation of their grouping' (ibid:xviii), and this, in Cohen's 
opinion, when 'politicalethnicity comes into being' ibid.). 
In both the case of the Hausa of Sabo and the Chinese in New 
Zealand, the possibility of articulating an organisation, along formal 
32. 
lines in the way Cohen defines it, is ineffective or unacceptable. 
In the Hausa example the means are available and tried by the Hausa 
but the cost is too high to them and in the Chinese case it is quite 
clearly opposed by the dominant society at the outset and even when 
possible is faced with extreme scepticism and never fully accepted. 
As an alternative in both situations, informal means are 
adopted to articulate their organisation, in the Hausa case with the 
Tijaniya order and in the Chinese case with what Crissman (1967) has 
called a 'segmentary system'. 
Crissman's basic assumption is that all overseas Chinese 
communities have a similar segmentary organisation which uses, as 
the basis of its divisions, certain ascribed criteria which have to 
do with the way overseas Chinese make distinctions among themselves 
(see Crissman, 1967:185-189). These distinctions constitute 
'relevant ethnicity' and their use is defined by the situation in 
which the Chinese find themselves (ibid. :189). Crissman sees the 
segmentary structure in the overseas Chinese community, therefore as 
a set of alternative ways by which the community can divide and organise 
for particular interests but the pattern of segmentation, he maintains, 
is unique in each case. 
The fundamental criteria by which Chinese make distinctions 
between themselves include speech group, surname and locality. 
While speech group is important amongst New Zealand Chinese it is not 
of the same order as the generally referred to five major speech groups 
of overseas Chinese, but more a variation within Cantonese which 
distinguishes two localities from which Chinese have emigrated to New 
Zealand. It is not, therefore, a criterion for division or 
organisation as such but a means of informal differentiation. A 
surname, likewise, is not used in New Zealand since with a relatively 
small population its most viable use would lead only to the 
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identification of the smallest unit of locality, the village, as 
the core of the organisation. While locality is the fundamental 
unit of organisation among New Zealand Chinese it is at the level of 
county and district that it becomes significant and it has been 
locality associations representing various counties, or districts 
that were the first to appear. More importantly, when the next 
higher level of the segmentary system - which will be discussed 
below has potential conflicts or problems threatening its 
persistence there is an immediate resorting to the former level of 
organisation, namely the county or district association. 
Above these organisations, as already mentioned, are what 
Crissman refers to as the 'community organisation' or voluntary 
organi sat ions . Crissman's listing includes, benevoLent societies, 
funeral associations, surname temples, provincial clubs, merchant 
and craft guilds, chambers of commerce and secret societies 
(Crissman 1967:194). He maintains that they have a duality to, 
them, their primary role is as 'administrative organs of the 
communities from which their membership is drawn' but their secondary 
role is reflected in the fact that they have 'names and stated 
purposes which are sometimes chosen more with an eye toward official 
government regulations' than their real interests : 194). 
To return to Cohen's distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' 
ways of articulating organisation and particularly his point about 
some organisations. having aspects of both, one would seem to find 
. d 1 . h h . .. 19 Th ,. f 1 ' an 1 ea case Wlt t e communlty organlsatlon. e ln orma 
aspect would include the fact that membership is largely based on 
ascribed characteristics which can often incorporate the next level 
down in the segmentary system. The organi$ation articulates by 
using aspects of ascribed status as its base, legitimizing its 
existence to its, community and its membership. However, the group 
also articulates the organisation in a 'formal' sense. The 
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community organisation will have a formal constitution, with 
executive committees, secretaries, sub-committees and treasurers, and 
membership, while nominally including all people that fulfill the 
ascribed characteristics will also formally involve the payment of 
dues and registration. This formal process legitimises the 
organisation to the larger environment especially when this 
organisation acts as mediator between the Chinese community and the 
government and has control over it. 20 In addition, the community 
organisation will conduct the business of the community specifically 
coordinating efforts to collect money for local activities or 
support of China (Crissman, 1967: 197) under the guidance of a 'small 
group that holds all the power' (Crissman, 1967:197). The executive 
of these organisations, according to Crissman ' ... are rather like the 
board of directors of a large stock company where the directors 
control and represent large blocks of shareholders (ibid.), and are 
usually wealthy and able to make substantial financial contributions 
themselves. Crissman emphasises wealth and bilingual capabilities as 
two main assets necessary for those who seek power and prestige 
through community organisations. 
The segmentary structure, therefore, in the Chinese community 
provides through its organisations, according to Crissman, a means 
whereby it governs itself without having 'noticeable governmental 
insti tutions' (Crissman, 1967: 200). The system achieves what he calls 
a 'presentative political system and a hierarchical administrative 
system' (ibid.). When it comes to explaining the existence of this 
system in the overseas context, however, Crissman maintains that it 
has direct parallels with the conditions that would have prevailed in 
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cities during the Ch'ing dynasty. The context they faced 
when migrating to an urban situation in China was mirrored in the 
overseas community and 'the organisational superstructure of their 
segmentary social structure' provided the same kinds of functions as 
Crissman maintains they performed in the overseas context 
While it may be accurate to make this cultural linkage 
between the overseas community and urban China it does not solve the 
problem of change or persistence in a new context. It is useful to 
argue that the possible ways the Chinese community can articulate 
organisations conform to Crissman's model especial since within 
the segmentary system change is an inbuilt quality and there are at 
least three levels in the hierarchy which can operate. Given this, 
however, and the history of a small Chinese community :that has changed 
modes of articulation several times it is necessary to suggest 
that other variables influence these modes of articulation. While 
one may explain the existence of the segmentary system as a remnant of 
in China, explanation of its continual reproduction in the 
overseas situation requires reference to other variables. For this 
reason it is argued that changes in the articulation of the segmentary 
system are not only the result of changes in China and the overseas 
milieux but also the internal dynamics of the Chinese community. 
In brief this work is an application and extension of 
model suggesting that given a set of vacillating contexts ( 
Cohen's Hausa situation) through time one can discover how the 
sman's 
to 
community is able to articulate the segmentary system, to meet 
their needs. 
Before proceeding to the discussion on method, however, it 
would seem there is other literature on overseas Chinese which 
compliments and supports the focus adopted here. 
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One of the seminal articles that has dealt with, cularly, 
the development of Chinese associations in a colonial overseas 
context is one by Freedman (1967) when he describes the associational 
activity in nineteenth century Singapore. Freedman in his discussion 
develops a continuum along which he intends one to place various 
overseas communities in terms of their associational simplicity or 
complexity. At the simple end he uses the example of Tuin:s work on 
the Chinese in Sarawak, !a relatively small scale overseas settlement! 
with few associations, whereas he locates Singapore at the other 
extreme with its intricate network of association (Freedman, 1967:44). 
The continuum, while attractive as a model, has problems when one 
tries to apply it in other colonial contexts for the crucial 
variables of population size and heterogeneity can be sholffi to be 
eclipsed by others that become much more significant. 
Willmott (1969) for instance has taken issue with 
Freedman's model using his own work from Cambodia. The case of 
phnom Penh is problematic, for in terms of Freedman!s vari 
should at the complex end of the continuum but Willmott maintains 
that the contrary is true and he argues this is so because of the context 
in which the Chinese exist, that is, under a system of indirect rule. 
Under French rule the community organised into five speech groups, 
congregations, headed by a particular chef chosen by the Chinese who 
was in turn responsible to the French. This system, as Willmott 
explains, effectively restricted the development of other 
associations. The point is also made, however, that if one does not 
restrict the period of discussion but takes a more longitudinal view 
in a context free from external political interference then 
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segmentation will occur in the community. Increasing numbers of 
associations will develop and participate in the political structure 
of the Chinese oommunity (Willmott 1969:290). This is the case 
for not only phnom Penh but Sin;~apore, .Java and Thailand, but here 
again Willmott singles out an anomaly. Phnom Penh's development 
came con~iderab1y later than th,= others, in the 1950's, which is 
attributed to the fact that indirect rule had not fully eroded 
until thi s time. However, in the other cases the end of indirect 
rule is not a sufficient explanation and as Willmott points out, 
IDne must look to external influences outside the particular host 
countries. This leads to an evaluation of the influences of China 
and particularly the nationalist fervour which spread from the 
homeland after the turn of the century. Returning to Freedman, the 
continuum, therefore, has problems as a model since its application 
within a confined time period makes it a dubious tool given a 
longer view. However, it would be wrong to discard it entirely, for 
while the continuum may have nc utility as a model it may have as a 
cyclical process. I would argue that there are degrees of 
simplicity and complexity wi thi n the associationa1 complex of a 
Chinese ,:ommuni ty and that it is not an undirectiona1 movement but one 
that may go back and forth depending on the kinds of influence a 
Chinese ':ommuni ty faces. This then may result in cycles of 
simplici ty and complexity artieula ted informall y or formally under the 
influence of the variables Willmott isolates in his critique of 
Freedman. Put another way, the organisational configuration, 
complex or simple, should be treated as a variable changing over time 
and/or by context. 
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In order to explain this further it is necessary to turn to 
a context which has closer affinities to the New Zealand situation, 
that is a place historically related to Britain as a colony and 
contemporaneously part of the Commonwealth with a Chinese population 
that is almost exclusively Cantonese and a historic depth that is 
similar. The most obvious example with the necessary data is Canada. 
In 1974 Sedzwick and Willmott attempted to evaluate the 
evolution of community structure amongst Chinese Canadians. The 
assumptions are fundamentally the same as already emphasized from 
other studies, namely that changes in government policy towards the 
Chinese community and events in China produce structural changes in 
the overseas Chinese community (Sedgwick and Willmott 1974:8). 
The structural changes, in turn, are most accurately reflected in 
associational activity which provide the basis of 'fragmentation and 
consolidation and forms the venue for leadership within the 
community' (ibid.). The authors then isolate five periods that reflect 
associational development, although not in all communities in Canada, 
and trace the structural change using a dual typology of associations. 21 
The typology includes traditionist associations which are directed 
towards the 'preservation of traditional Chinese values within the 
community' and modernist associations which are 'more concerned with 
relations between the Chinese and the dominant host community' (ibid.). 
Basically, the history of the various Chinese communities in 
Canada can be described as one that had mainly traditionist associations 
prior to 1950 with the emergence of modernist leaders if not 
associations post 1950. However, to state this is to immediately gloss 
the subtleties of the situation. Clearly as evidenced by the initial 
discussions of the early merchant elite in a situation without 
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associations there are elements of the traditionist and modernist in 
all periods. Furthermore, while not emphasised, the order of 
appearance of various types of associations differs for each 
locality. For instance, in Victoria the order moves from locality 
to clan, fraternal and then community organisation, whereas in 
Vancouver locality is preceeded by a community organisation with clan 
associations following this development. In addition it is also clear 
that political factions in the community not only change the structure 
but also tend to stimulate an appeal to the more fundamental 
collectivities of the segmentary system as noted in 1914 when the 
executive of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association was 
reconstituted in Victoria and later Vancouver (CBA) to include 
representatives from locality associations. The community at the time 
was divided between support for the KMT and the CKT. During the war 
years, despite difficulties with the Canadian government, there is 
virtual unity wi thin the community suspending antagonism between 
factions, but given the removal of this influence and even relaxed 
immigration laws the conflict and fragmentation re-emerges. In this 
situation with the emergence of a new modernist elite there is also 
the existence of an ageing elite and their traditionist allegiance. 
The important points, it seems to me, that can be gleaned 
from this history which would be useful in a similar situation are 
that there is no identifiable clear move from simple to complex. Each 
si tua tion can only be evaluated, as such, in terms of the issues; and 
contexts that are pertinent at anyone time and not entirely in terms 
of the absolute numbers of associations. This point was made clearly 
by Wickberg (1979) who argued that size and complexity were not 
adequate variables to explain the absence or presence of certain 
organisations in four Chinese communities in Canada. He maintains 
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that to explain the kinds of organisation he chooses to discuss, 
the external relations of the particular Chinese community, that is 
the cultural links with China, Canadian government policy and 
social discrimination are far more useful variables to consider than 
size and complexity of the Chinese community.22 He concludes: 
In the Canadian case, as long as the majority of 
politically-minded Chinese were concerned with 
the politics of China and as long as Chinese and 
white attitudes encouraged continued Chinese 
preoccupation with Chinese culture, then 
political and cultural trends in China would 
have a major role in shaping Chinese organizational 
development in Canada. 
(Wickberg 1979:97) 
For Wickberg organis,ational complexity or simplicity are a function 
of a Chinese community's contextual needs and not merely a function 
of the size and compos.ition of the community. 
In this study it is the segmentary system which meets these 
contextual needs and articulates the interests of the Chinese 
community having the unique capability to move either towards 
increasing fragmentation (complexity?) or towards cohesion 
(simplicity?) . Similarly, the dichotomy between traditional and 
modernist is equally hard to distinguish clearly but general 
trends seem to rely more heavily on one type in some periods than 
others. To explain further. The period from 1879 till 1937 is 
one where, in the traditionist idiom, there is increasing complexity 
in the social structure as the number of associations increases and 
the issues become more complicated. During the war, however, with 
an intense collection campaign, a simple configuration is apparent 
and conflict generated in the previous period is sublimated. 
However, once this collective effort is terminated the previously 
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existing complex situation re-emerges. More contemporaneously given 
a changed context and a new elite more united action is evident 
under the guidance of more modernist organisations but still 
elements of traditionist organisations influence policy. 
It has been useful in the New Zealand context to be aware of 
the above changes for some have been duplicated as they were in 
many overseas communities; particularly the types of activity that 
coped with change in China and extensive immigration restriction. 
However, there are differences and perhaps these should be noted 
briefly. The Chinese population in New Zealand has always been 
relatively small when compared to Canada but the extent of 
immigration restriction has been similar with virtual exclusion 
legislated in the 1920s in both countries. However, in Canada, the 
government knew considerably more about the Chinese than it ever did 
in New Zealand. Government investigations to collect substantive 
data were fairly frequent and done in cooperation with 
of the Chinese community which meant that the financial position was 
fairly well known. Of course the wealth, especially that of the 
merchants, was greater than in the New Zealand context so it was 
much more visible. As already noted associational activity and the 
organisation of the Chinese community took place in both contexts but 
the population in Canada and its significance as an overseas Chinese 
community led to more intense activity and a contact with 
Ch " 23 lna. Consequently the conflicts have lasted longer and been more 
pronounced but like New Zealand largely contained within the Chinese 
community. One pronounced difference was the role of the church in New 
Zealand. Presbyterian especially, but also Anglican and Baptist 
churches have had a continuous interest in the community and have 
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maintained this interest in each large centre. More importantly 
the Presbyterians formed an important link for some Chinese between 
New Zealand and China through their overseas mission activity and 
also lobbied effectively on behalf of the Chinese after the war. 
This did not occur in Canada although various denominations did play 
significant roles within local communites. 
Finally there is one important similarity and ~hat concerns the 
direction of the community in the post war period. The emergence of a 
younger active elite in the Chinese communities of both countries has 
meant a changed profile for the Chinese community. 
While there is considerable variation in the kinds of analytical 
points derived from a discussion of overseas Chinese organisational 
development there is no dispute over its significance as an indicator 
of change within the community. For this reason it is used here for 
the same purpose. But in addition it is also perceived as the medium 
through which political ethnicity manifests itself and is articulated 
to represent the interests of the community or segments within it. 
Two things remain to be done in this chapter. One is to show 
precisely how the chapters reflect the ideas in the above, and 
secondly to briefly discuss the method of research. 
The latter point has already been alluded to in discussing the 
relevance of Mills (1970) and his notion of the sociological 
imagination. The quotes already provided influenced this work not 
only in terms of the questions asked about the Chinese in New Zealand, 
but also concerning the method of doing research. 
As already mentioned, the material, other than documentary 
evidence from government or other researchers, was provided solely by 
interviews. The interviews predominantly set out to trace individual 
and family life history, trying to tease out facts and explanations 
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for decisions that went beyond what has commonly been assumed as 
adequate. For example, there is a certain amount of frustration 
built into a situation when both Europeans and Chinese make the same 
response to a question. Questions about the occupations of Chinese 
invariably yielded statements from Europeans and Chinese alike that 
they/we worked in the gold fields then laundries and market gardening 
and fruit and vegetable shops. Endlessl~ general questions led to 
simplicity as if there was no community, no structure, no change and 
in fact little to discuss. In fact histories written by local 
Chinese for their own consumption portray this simplicity~as 
evidenced by the brief translated text below: 
The History of the Auckland Chinese 
Since the late Ch'ing dynasty there have been Chinese 
migrating to New Zealand in order that they make a Ii ving. 
At the very beginning most of them went to the South 
Island because it was the place where there were gold 
mines. That is the reason New Zealand was called 'New 
Gold Mountain'. In a later period the Chinese in New 
Zealand had moved north because the gold mines were taken 
over by the government. Because of the mild weather and 
good transportation Auckland gradually became the largest 
community of overseas Chinese in New Zealand. 
The occupations of the overseas Chinese here are mostly 
fruit shops, market gardens, laundries and restaurants. 
There are some import and export businesses and also some 
which deal entirely in Chinese groceries. 
Because of hard work the Chinese businesses increased. 
Moreover we have observed the local regulations and laws 
making us highly respected by local people. Even though 
there have been a lot of scientific changes in business 
including mechanization in some, the Chinese have faced 
little difficulty in adapting. During the First and Second 
World War the Chinese growers helped to provide food. This 
has been highly appreciated by the local government. 
When the father of China (Sun Yat-sen) advocated 
revolution, our friends here donated a significant 
amount of money. After that droughts and floods in 
China also stimulated donations to help. When the 
time of the anti-Japanese war came, all overseas 
Chinese in New Zealand organized the New Zealand 
Overseas Chinese Association of which the headquarters 
are in Wellington, the capital of New Zealand. The 
purpose of the organization was to get together the 
will and means to help the government with money and 
manpower. The Chinese here were the first to respond 
to such ideas. Meanwhile an Auckland Branch was set 
up. During the eight years of the war of resistance 
the donations totalled more than $100,000. 
Before the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese usually 
came alone to New Zealand but after the war broke out a 
number of Chinese became refugees in Hong Kong. Since 
New Zealand was an ally of China during the war 
immigration restrictions were amended to allow Chinese 
to migrate here as refugees. Since then the number of 
Chinese here has been increasing. During the last 
twenty years the number of locally born Chinese children 
number half the adult population. Chinese education 
here is becoming an important problem that has caused 
some concern.. These children were born and brought up 
here and educated in the local language. Their 
occupations have changed and improved compared to the 
last generation. In addition to market gardening and 
fruit shops there are Chinese who are doctors, architects, 
accountants, nurses, engineers and draftsmen. It is 
that the contribution of the Chinese here will be 
much greater in .ten years to come. 
(Auckland Chinese Hall 1961:69 
translated from the Chinese) 
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Questions about associations, newspapers, conflict,the influence of 
China or their home country were met with vague almost disinterested 
repl There were no newspapers, I was told,associations existed 
but didn't do anything; there had never been any conflict and they 
did not have much contact with horne. Clearly the problem was the 
wrong questions, for although they were informed by other overseas 
Chinese communities they were not specific enough to elicit 
responses relevant to New Zealand. The attempt to at 
al structure and history directly failed and there was no 
al that actually spelled out the kind of detail one needed. 
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only option was to try and just record life histories and see if 
any organisational material emerged. It was only after two years of 
interviews that Chinese social relations could be sparingly sketched 
out, complete with organisations, newspapers, conflict and external 
influence. In every case where organisational information emerged 
was because the person was actually directly involved. The 
icity expected from the description in the literature and the 
relatively small population was anything but an accurate assessment 
as the complexity of the situation in all respects increased. The 
complexity came when I would be asked to recount what I knew about the 
history of the Chinese and market gardening, about ripening bananas, 
about the Chong Wah Wui Koon or the Chee Kung Tong and having done 
this would be introduced to things I did not know. The point I learned 
with Some difficulty was that it was only by making a connection 
between social structure, history and the individual life history that 
one learned about the former. It was as if one had to reconstruct the 
people and events for the people one talked to and in turn you would be 
led on to others. The key, therefore, was individuals, it was who you 
knew of, and about, that was important initially. While organisation 
either nationally or in localised communities is never denied,neither 
it blatantly made apparent other than through those individuals who 
are significant within the organisation or who know about it. Unless 
one knew the important individuals by name, unless one could sit down 
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and identi forty delegates to the Fifth National All-Representatives 
Conference there was no point in asking what happened. There was 
no point in asking about fruit shops, restaurants, gardens, unless 
you knew the person involved. 
The method, therefore, is one in which Chinese people whom I 
have met and talked with have taught me about the people who live and 
have lived in New Zealand and I in turn, have tried to take all those 
individuals and their interactions with social organisation and 
history and reconstruct the social organisation in the Chinese 
community. The result, therefore, is not isolated snippets from 
hundreds of interviews but a composite picture in which I try to 
account for the most general situation and the most unique. Looking 
back I can see no other way I could have learned enough to ask 
questions which made sense to the people who have through the 
answers,for was only then we could argue about the nature of the 
answers and their interpretation. The lesson from Mills (1974) is that 
one has to be taught the context of the sociological imagination 
before form can be provided by the researcher. 
In this method there was no methodical set of interviews, no 
selected informants, no sample, just endless interviews, vi 
re-visits, letters and more questions. There were no xed hypotheses 
but only a set of hunches that had to do with the survival of a 
Chinese community. There was no one community of which one could write 
and se for the whole, but many Chinese communities all with 
their own histories, organisations and individuals. 
The final task in this chapter is to try and show how the 
framework of the thesis reflects the kinds of questions and concerns 
previously cussed. In the review of the literature it was 
suggested that each particular category into which the writing had 
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been divided either suggested certain relationships or neglected 
others by omission. The organisation of chapters in this thesis is 
intended to expand or fill in these omissions, while at the same time 
tracing the survival of the Chinese community in New Zealand through the 
articulation of political ethnicity. 
The narrative of the thesis starts at a time before the arrival 
of the Chinese in New Zealand and proceedsto discuss particular events 
which foreshadow types of social action which would follow. It was 
clear prior to the arrival of the Chinese that it was an issue over 
which sides would be taken. In the early years of Chines~ settlement 
the respective positions were manifest in the Report of the Select 
Committee (1871) and again in the debacle over the employment of 
Chinese labour on Public Works (1872-73). The first event was. decided in 
favour of those who would tolerate Chinese immigration and the latter 
terminated the use of Chinese labour in New Zealand. Of more 
importance in terms of the latter episode was, however, the first 
evidence of conflict, caused partially by Chinese middlemen and 
partially by European employers. The conflict itself was played out in 
a European Court as Chinese labourers laid their case against the 
Chinese labour contractor and his European employers. 
A third event initiated the type of response the Chinese, once 
organised, would use till at least 1908 attempting through merchant 
leadership to manipulate or confront aspects of European social 
structure. The event was a set of accusations by Chirtese in the gold 
fields laid against a European Judge for his supposed bias by using a 
petition against him. 
Chapter 3 sees the initiation of three types of action, that of 
government; of the Chinese community when confronted with internal 
problems and that of the same community when confronted by external 
pressures which influence or restrict their disposition. 
The following chapter pursues these same ideas, but in the 
context of the gold fields population. Out of the earlier period 
emerges a myriad of Chinese camps and communities apparently 
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scattered and isolated but in reality connected. Rather than simple 
social organisation, the use of Alexander Don's records unfolds a 
complex network of relationships which bind men together in camps and 
in turn connect them not only to local communities but also to large 
centres and finally to their villages in China. Shared interests 
amongst this population require organisation and leadership but when 
gold mining, as the foundation of their presence, declined choices had 
to be made. Those who were committed to a longer period of residence 
overseas were forced to move and diversify their activity while others 
returned to China or retired in New Zealand to a life of solitude. 
Unfortunately the social context for those who moved but stayed in New 
Zealand was to become counter-productive to their continued stence. 
Party politics, a depression, organised labour and fabricated public 
opinion responded to the urban Chinese population which now, removed 
from the mining camps of Otago, was visible. The result was the 
development of racial consciousness amongst European New Zealanders 
agitated and promulgated by a refusal to understand the Chinese or 
gather information about the Chinese community. The Chinese for their 
part, in order to survive, responded through a merchant elite and 
various organisations. The former tried, through the medium of 
petitions, to manipulate the increasingly inflexible position of 
government over the Chinese presence and the latter articulated the 
interests of the Chinese within their o\m community with the exception 
of the Ch'eung Shin Tong which tried to do both. 
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The legacy of the last period forms the core of the next 
chapter which traces in necessary detail the context and substance of 
anti-Chinese immigration till 1920. 
The justification for the detail in an area already well 
documented is to pursue a number of points mentioned in the review of 
the relevant literature. The primary aim was to provide enough 
evidence to show that the subject of continued Chinese immigration in 
a context which seemed to want absolute,:exclusion was being used as a 
variable to influence internal and external political relations of New 
Zealand. In internal politics it was used by political parties to 
manipulate its electorate and it was used in Parliament as ammunition 
by an Upper and Lower House against each other as they fought to 
maintain their vested interests. As regards external politics, it was 
used as a lever by a dependent colony to wrest autonomy from British 
imperial hegemony. Of concern is the parallel developments in the 
recurrent fervour for a white New Zealand matched with a public 
outcry which coincided with several waves of legislative activity and 
fluctuations in New Zealand's economic conditions. 
While this whole episode is played out a Chinese community 
persists and reacts. The economic base is diversified and a leadership 
emerges, again merchants, using the petition to articulate their needs and 
with distaste for the increasing constraint of legislation. The 
unintended consequences of anti-Chinese legislation was organisation in 
the Chinese community which eventually coincided with China modifying 
its stand on their overseas population. Unrepresented by diplomatic 
representation for forty years the Chinese were vulnerable, but in 1909 
the situation changed. 
so. 
Finally, the issue of immigration was resolved in 1920 which 
satisfied or exhausted political interest within New Zealand and 
escaped the manipulation of Britain. It also removed, for all future 
time, the topic of immigration restriction from public and 
Parliamentary debate, delegating the matter almost entirely to 
government bureaucracy and Cabinet. 
While the Chinese community had representation and New Zealand 
could determine who came to her shores, other external events were to 
introduce complexity to both situations. New Zealand with a changed 
political economy and emergent nationalism had to re-evaluate its 
attitude to the Chinese within its boundaries and New Zealand 
Chinese re-evaluated their own existence as events changed rapidly in 
China. 
The following five chapters trace the interaction of these 
variables as they begin to emerge from the period prior to diplomatic 
representation. The primary concern in these chapters is to explore 
the notion of political ethnicity by investigating the ways the 
Chinese community has articulated its various interests. Specifically, 
the interests referred to focus on immigration restrictions, the 
profile of its own community in the New Zealand context, changing 
events in China and handling of factions within the community. Three 
types of evidence are used here as a guide to the shifting interests. 
Initially petitions represent the various interests articulated and are 
promulgated by a merchant elite with support from various co-opted 
individuals within and outside the community, but these way to 
diplomatic representation and a segmentary structure within the 
Chinese community. 
In the period from the l880s till 1907 the with new 
communities and restructured economic activity after the decline of 
goldmining,attempts through petitions,to halt repressive immigration 
legislation, 
adjust the publ 
diplomatic representation and at the very least 
profile of the Chinese community. While its 
activity is largely directed towards residence in New Zealand, 
associational activity emerges again in the community after its 
demise in the gold fields. The appearance, however, is aimed 
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largely at articulating the interests of a segment of the community 
towards events in China. In the period from 1909 till T928 tension 
emerges as associational activity and segmentation increases. The 
pattern is cyclical initiated by groups representing factions which 
are purposefully overshadowed by the first community organisation 
(Chong Wah Wui Koon) which, in turn, becomes embroiled in the political 
factions giving rise to locality associations which avoid politics or 
public reaction to the context of New Zealand or China and concern 
themselves with the internal security of their respective collectivities. 
This situation prevails until a national community organisation is 
needed again as the community comes under threat in New Zealand. 
Another community-wide organisation is organised, representing all the 
separate interests that have emerged. The interests articulated by this 
group are both directed towards New Zealand and responsive to changes 
in China. By definition they attempt to maintain cohesion. In the years 
1928 till 1944 this association matures into a national organisation 
whic~rather than representing sectional interests, represents all 
Chinese and co-ordinates a national collection to help China in her war 
with Japan. It is not clear, however, that this collective action is 
united in support of one political leader in China, nor that the 
headquarters of this association is able to maintain power over 
co-operative effort. The result then is the re-emergence of factions 
but the factions are so diffuse that they cannot appeal to any previously 
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organised segments and there is a tendency for effort to be directed 
, 
primarily towards family organisation and, secondly, towards ones 
local community, with the exception of youth organisations which 
continue. 
The war, despite its devastation in China and the following 
civil war that re-emerged, brought an issue of morality and 
internationalism to New Zealand politics which in the final result 
allowed a Chinese community to be re-constituted in New Zealand during 
and after the war. Wives and children joined husbands and were 
eventually allowed to remain in New Zealand with addition~l provisions 
being allowed for others, who remained in China,to come. The result 
was local Chinese communities with families and with these 
communities came concern for local well being. 
This post-war era is dealt with in the last substantive 
chapter, which follows the re-emergence of a more covert bureaucratic 
form of immigration restriction aimed at exclusion, a more alienated 
feeling of the Chinese to their homeland after 1949 manifested by 
the founding of the New Zealand Anti-Communist Union and arguments over 
which government the local community should recognise and consequently 
a diminished role for the Consulate. 
The immigration restriction made access for spouses difficult 
for the community; the general feeling about Communism in the 1950s 
made the internal and external relations of the local community uneasy 
and the arguments over which government should be recognised by the New 
Zealand Chinese and the New Zealand government presented further 
dilemmas. The New Zealand Chinese Association, already in difficulties 
over remaining funds from the war collection and implications of other 
activity that surrounded the war executive, made it ineffectual as a 
national body. The locality associations and the Chinese church 
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however, remained intact, as did the Chinese market gardener's 
association which, with the advent of its own publication in 1949, 
gradually achieved the status of a national association with a journal 
which most Chinese read. Its special interest in market gardening was 
matched with detailed news of changes in China, Taiwan and New Zealand 
until such time as its overseas news was defined as unnecessary by the 
New Zealand government. While the association persists,its role 
during the 1950's and 1960's and its journal are no longer extant. 
The market gardening activity had declined, New Zealand recognized the 
People's Republic of China in 1972 and most Chinese communities had 
evolved to a situation where local interests took precedence over 
national or international relations. Again locality associations, 
church organisations and the newly re-organised local branches of the 
Chinese association and newly furmed cuI tural associations are the 
segmentary system's response as the interests that need to be 
articulated reflect a new position of the Chinese community in New 
Zealand. The attempt to formulate collective activity out of this 
fragmen ta tion, however, brought to the surface agenda inherited from the 
war years till the present. Conflict emerged on two fronts, but both 
had to do with the legitimate right to co-ordinate local community 
activity. The one front had to do with dynamics of the Chinese community 
and the allocation of power and authority internally to seek collective 
support and the other had to do with who had the right to procure 
resources from government and local bodies in New Zealand. The 
resolution of these conflicting interests was the cultural organ~,ations 
and clubs that appeared representing both the interests of traditionist 
and modernist within the community, although sometimes in an uneasy 
truce. 
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Organisations with the exception of a few, now accept young 
people as part of the organisation, unknown in previous years, but it 
is questionable as to whether or not they are actually privy to the 
politics of internal conflict that may exist. 
This view briefly outlines the direction of the thesis, the way 
the data has been organised and presented and the focus of discussion. 
It will remain for the conclusion to draw out the salient features 
which in fact support the assertions made and the existence and use of 
political ethnicity. It is sufficient to add at this point that the 
Chinese community has persisted and survived in New Zealand and this 
thesis is about the politics of survival. 
55. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
1. This refers to the concerted effort by the Chinese community 
and the Presbyterian Church to allow the war refugees to 
remain in New Zealand after 1948 and to re-establish the right 
to naturalisation for the Chinese which had been removed in 
1908 (see Chapter 6). 
2 Dr. James Ng suggested in 1972 that the Chinese themselves 
felt they were being subjected to the discrimination because 
they lacked 'diplomatic protection'. (Ng, Otago Daily 
Times 22 and 29 July 1972). Clearly this facilitated the 
implementation of legislation but it does not explain why the 
arguments were made against the Chinese in the first place. 
Roy (1966) makes a similar point when he states tha~ 'there is 
ample evidence that a restrictive immigration policy affects 
adversely the relations of the state practising it with states 
whose nationals are prospective immigrants', and then proceeds 
to examine the history of Asiatic legislation as an example 
(Roy 1966:35;40). His explanation blames the phenomenon 
partly on the White British New Zealand policy and partly on 
New Zealand's dependance on Britain which meant that she had 
not really developed independent foreign policy until after 
World War II (ibid: 35-36 and 38). 
3 Bernardelli (1952) is a particularly strong advocate for the 
position that the Chinese presence constituted a real threat to 
the New Zealand labour force. His argument is based on the 
assumptions that the Chinese, unlike European immigrants did 
not have to sever their connections with their homeland, were 
unencumbered with dependants and could replenish. their numbers 
at will despite immigration restrictions. The evidence would 
suggest that, to the contrary, the Chinese had no comparative 
advantage but rather suffered comparable disadvantages to those 
of their European counterparts. 
4 The specific focus of their article was a historical discussion 
of Asiatic immigration and the relevant legislation in New 
Zealand. The quote formed the last paragraph of their 
'General Conclusion' . 
5 As far as I have been able to ascertain, Ponton was the last 
person to see the C33 series files of the Customs Department 
before they were destroyed in a fire. This is confirmed also by 
O'Connor (1968). 
6 As O'Connor notes this policy has its origins well before 1908 
which is discussed in careful detail by N. Harrison's very 
competent thesis 'The Formation of the White New Zealand 
Immigration Policy between 1890-1907'. Harrison's interpretation 
of the White New Zealand policy lin~s the need to implement 
policy on the part of politicians to their use of this issue to 
create favourable public opinions. This is particularly the case, 
as Harrison's work shows, between Liberal members of Parliament 
and Trades and Labour Councils and unions. 
7 O'Connor's fears are well founded, as exemplified by the 
absence of any discussion concerning this aspect of New 
Zealand history in the most recent work on New Zealand, 
Oliver and Williams (eds) (1981) The Oxford of New 
Zealand. 
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8 Another important, brief, but succinct overview of the Chinese 
in New Zealand was provided by Dr. James Ng in 1972. The 
article he wrote was published in the Otago Daily Times in 
response to the first television programme in New Zealand on 
the Chinese community. The press reviews of programme 
suggested that the media slant had indicated strong interest 
by the New Zealand Chinese in China (see Tablet 26 July 1972 
and Otago Daily Times 15 July 1972). The innuendo was clear 
and Dr. Ng took issue with this interpretation and maintained 
that while local Chinese gave 'primary and national loyalties' 
to New Zealand, in order to be a complete person they 'must be 
aware and proud of their Chinese ancestral history and 
culture' (Ng 1972 in Otago Daily Times 29 July 1972). 
9 Wong's fundamental observations here closely approximate those 
of Ng 0.972) who maintained that the Chinese, while participating 
to a large extent in New Zealand society, also have a strong 
t in their historical and cultural background. Ng, 
however, unlike Wong, sees no hindrance or reaction to complete 
assimilation, although there is still a 'spectrum of progress 
in assimilating' (Ng, 1972). It is interesting to note that 
non-Chinese writers have tended to maintain the reverse. For 
instance Fabia-Nair (1976) to confirm the extent of assimilation 
maintained that: 
The Chinese do not even have a religious or ethical 
motivation to identify and conserve themselves as a 
separate community from the host society. 
(Fabia-Nair, 1976:62) 
Greif (1974) expresses very similar opinions to this (see 
following pages). 
10 It interesting to contrast this view of social structure with 
that fourteen years earlier by Ng who maintained that: 
Although these institutional organisations and other 
means of social control are in the process of 
collapsing, there are few evidences of the unfavourable 
symptoms which are often associated with cultural change 
and adjustment in a minority group. 
(Ng 1959a: 296) 
11 Another more recent thesis which starts with the same assumptions 
as Wong is one by Lian (1980). While Wong's explanation of the 
organizational conflict rely on interpersonal politics Lian IS 
explanation relies on interpretation of the same events as 
evidence conflict resulting from competing strategies to 
raise ethnic consciousness and identity, one in a more 
traditional idiom (ACC) and the other within the framework 
of dual identity (WCS CC). 
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12 Ng also commented on conflict and competition in the community 
at the time of her writing in 1959. She maintained that: 
... there is intragroup rivalry and competition between 
the members as well as between the groups stemming from 
the three districts of Kwang Tung province. Each group 
seeks to outdo the other in showing "progress" and 
adaptation to New Zealand culture through exhibiting 
material objects and the pursuit of such leisure time 
as horse racing, football, parties, movies 
and so on. 
CNg 1959a: 297) 
While she does not elaborate on this comment it seems implicit 
that the economic base of the community which had changed 
(quoted page l7)had affected the nature of Chinese organisations 
and she interpreted this as acculturation and integration into 
New Zealand society (ibid:298). 
13 It is curious that Greif (1974) carried research out during the 
same period as Wong yet their conclusions and views of the 
Chinese community are so different. 
14 Ng did not for some reason have access to Ponton (1946) either. 
15 The survey consisted of 136 questions put to a Tandom' sample of 
ninety Chinese, one percent of the Chinese population (12,818) 
over the age of sixteen. The fundamental problem is that there 
are far too few respondents to some questions to make predictions 
or offer explanations. For a complete critique of the 
methodology see Willmott, W.E. Review of The OVerseas Chinese in 
New Zealand, 'Pacific Affairs', Vol. 49, No 2, 1976:382-385. 
16 New Zealand recognized the People's Republic of China on 
December 22 1972, and Greif included an logue in which he 
described feelings about this act and its relationship to the 
previous Ambassador from Taiwan, but does not speculate on how 
he sees it affecting the local Chinese community. 
17 Don and McNeur (previously mentioned) do bridge this gap in that 
they explicitly relate the situation in China to the status of 
the New Zealand Chinese but they wrote nothing of the organisat-
ional structure of the Chinese community, its response to 
restriction nor the effect of immigration restriction on their 
community. They did, however, act on behalf of the Chinese and 
in so doing altered the structure of the Chinese community. 
18 Cohen admits that the term 'informal' is highly ambiguous and 
unfortunately linked to the meaning of 'formal structure' (Cohen 
1974:xviii). He also notes the distinction between them is 
sometimes a 'matter of degree' some starting off as one type and 
gradually becoming the other or having characteristics of both 
at their inception. 
19 Crissman maintains that community organisations can be formal 
or informal but the difference is unclear. The formal type 
however seems to conform to Cohen's description of a formal 
organisation (see page 27). 
20 This is particularly the case for what Crissman calls the 
'high level community organisation' which is the relevant 
example for the New Zealand context. 
21 The typology was developed by Willmott in his work on 
Cambodia (see Willmott 1970:115-116). 
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22 Wickberg examines the significant organisational developments 
in Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary in a fifteen year period 
(1923-1937) when their respective populations remained stable. 
He asks '(1) Why, contrary to theory, were there Chinese 
Benevolent Associations in some of the smaller Chinese 
communities but not in some of the largest ones; (2) why did 
so many new Chinese schools appear in the interwar period, 
despite the absence of a large "second generation"; (3) why 
did theatrical groups proliferate during the same period, 
despite stability in community sizes and compositions; 
(4) why, under the same conditions, did so many new organisations 
of all types develop, contrary to theoretical expectations? 
23 The Chinese population in Canada went from just over 9,000 in 
1891 to 17,312 by 1901. By 1941 it was double the 1901 
population and by 1961 had reached 58,197. 
CHAPTER 2 
CHINA, KWANGTUNG AND NEW ZEALAND: A 
BRIEF VIEW OF LOCALITY 
area of China where the New Zealand Chinese came from is 
located in the districts surrounding the southeastern city of 
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Kwangchou (Canton) which is the capital of Kwangtung province, one of 
twenty-two provinces in China. Kwangtung itself, during the late l800s 
and early nineteen hundreds was divided into seventy-nine of 
which twelve were important as the homelands of early Chinese migrants 
to New Zealand. These districts included those listed in Table 1. 
While it is impossible to show with any accuracy the actual proportions 
from district either in the l800s or for that matter in the 
contemporary population, the proportions represented in Don's gures, 
according to informants is fairly accurate for much of the period with 
the exception that there are increased numbers of Seyip people in the 
current population as well as Malaysian and Singaporean Chinese. The 
six counties with the larger number of representatives overseas have 
tended to dominate the New Zealand population including people from 
Poon Yu (Sam Yap), Toy San and Sun Wui (Seyip) as well as the districts 
adjacent to Sam Yap including Tshang Sheng (Jung Sing), Tung Goon and 
Fa Yuen Map 1).1 
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TABLE 1: and Surnames of the New Zealand Chinese. l 
District County Villages Surnames people 
Sun Dak 17 12 31 
Sam Pun Yu 165 46 2104 
Nam Hoy 17 14 19 
TOTAL 199 72 2154 
Toy San 241 47 345 
Yun Ping 2 2 
Seyip 
Hoy Ping 29 16 33 
San Wui 13 11 23 
TOTAL 285 76 401 
Jung Sing 42 432 
Tung Goon 17 15 26 
Fa Yuen 17 50 
Hawk San 72 
Sun On 12 11 24 
88 26 604 
TOTAL 572 No Total Possible 3159 
lStatistics include all people listed in Don's Diary from 1896 
to 1919 and does not take into account departures during that 
period. Therefore, it is impossible to determine which areas 
had more sojourners returning to their native villages in the 
early years of migration. 
KWANGTUNG PROVINCE 
District Origin of 
New Zealand Chinese Immigrants 
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MAP 1 
Reproduced with kind permission of Lawrence Wong. 
two general areas where these districts are located 
according to informants are geographically different. The 
north of Kwangchou (Poon Yu, Jung Sing, Tung Goon and Fa Yuen) 
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are surrounded, as one moves further north, with ranges of high hills, 
which way on the Kwangchou side to the other areas where Toy San 
and Sun Wui are located in the broad river dissected plain of the 
delta 
While both areas may differ geographically the village and 
market town configuration is much the same. The areas are literally 
studded with hundreds of villages some with populations of between 
100 and one thousand while others may exceed 20,000 (see Map 2). The 
map (2) was sketched by Don in the early 1900s and shows, according 
to informants an accurate presentation of the districts included, 
predominantly that of Poon Yu. 
It significant that the features of the landscape singled 
out in this map by the Presbyterian missionaries who needed information 
about the area to enable an efficient missionary activity, coincided 
with features that would have been equally significant to the local 
albeit for other reasons. The waterways and market towns for 
instance, were important and of common interest to both missionaries 
and Chinese, but the former needed them particularly to follow their 
in order to proseltize, while to the Chinese they were the 
fundamental mode of transport and the key to trade networks in the area. 
The villages, in particular Poon Yu, were described by many 
of the missionaries including Mawson. Mawson described the houses in 
the nucleated villages as low, windowless, constructed of sun dried 
and fired bricks held together with a mixture of sand, and clay 
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(Mawson 1926:12). The floors were either of clay or large tiles 
while the roof was of light tiles laid on pine rafters. There was, 
according to Mawson, little wood used in construction due to the 
damage that could be caused to it by ants. Two-storied buildings 
were according to Mawson, forbidden by clan elders who would not 
tolerate roof levels violating custom by being higher than the 
ancestral hall. However according to informants, wealthier Chinese, 
who had made enough overseas to rebuild their homes often built two-
storied buildings with balconies both as a display of wealth and 
status but also to act as watchtowers for their vulnerable villages. 
The villages themselves were populated by lineages and clans; 
the lineage being made up of families who trace their descent through 
the male line back to a common ancestor; the clan on the other hand, 
is defined by surname. The lineage is related to other lineages and 
in this way draws people into a large kinship system while the clan 
is a unit of exogamy specifying who one mayor may not marry. While 
both these aspects are crucial to social organisation in China because 
lineages rarely migrate overseas in total, the clan becomes the 
significant unifying and differentiating characteristic overseas, 
provided the population is large enough to merit its use. In New 
Zealand clan has never been the fundamental unit around which 
organisation takes place, whereas in Vancouver, Canada,Willmott 
recorded the existence of twenty-three clan organizations (Willmott, 
1964:34). 
In New Zealand the only exception would be the instances where 
single surnames dominate locality or community associations in 
particular communities, or instances where two families happen to be in 
conflict with each other. In these situations they will be described as 
clan factions but they are usually no larger than a single family. 
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The fundamental unit of identification in New Zealand is the 
county, or combination of counties from which one came originally. 
Therefore the locality associations which developed, represented 
these groupings including Poon Yu and Fa Yuen (Poon Fa Association) 
Jung Sing and Tung Goon (Tung Jung Association), Toy San and Sun Wui 
(Seyip Association). It is out of this matrix, once it appears, that 
fundamental bases for alignment and fragmentation occur but this is 
a far too simplistic view as later chapters will argue. 
The villages, from which the New Zealand Chinese came from, 
populated by single or multiple lineages invariably had ancestral 
halls which would contain a history of the lineage in the form of 
tablets dedicated to the male ancestors who had died in China and 
overseas. Attached to this building was often the village school 
which, prior to 1911, specifically provided for male children who 
would receive a basic education, provided they were wealthy enough. 
Many of the early migrants, however, who would come overseas had to 
forfeit the opportunity but in later years, once families had become 
established and gold mining had given way to more settled pursuits, 
young were often repatriated to attend the local schools in order to 
receive a basic education particularly in their native language. 
This was very significant for the overseas populatio~ for not only 
did it provide fundamental education, but also a cultural experience 
in .an appropriate milieux with the benefit of older generations present 
who had time to inculcate appropriate values. Family overseas, part-
icularly fathers and uncles who would be responsible for young members 
seldom had the time, patience, money or facilities in the early years 
to provide the same training. The consequence of this repatriation 
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being terminated by war, shipping interruptions and finally the change 
in government in 1949 meant that the overseas population had to take 
lity for this training which became the center of 
considerable concern in later years. 
The focal point of business and trade activity in local 
village areas of the districts was the market town which one can see 
clearly marked on Don's map (see Map 2). These market towns were a 
conglomeration of shops and places for traders where commodities were 
bought and sold. Each of the market towns had a regular number of 
market days which were alternated between market towns in~such a way 
as to avoid clashes between adjacent towns. Markets were therefore 
run according to the lunar calendar and held on every fth day so 
that one town for instance may have its market days in the 1st, 6th, 
llth,16th,21st and 26th while another would have them on the 2nd, 7th, 
l2th,17tn,22nd and 27th. Still another market town would have different 
days so that anyone living in the area would have the opportunity to 
go to a market every day of the month. Mawson noted that was 
always possible to tell which town was having a market day for the 
people would all be going in one direction, which meant as Skinner was 
to note some years later, that information travels the route of the 
market cycle within what he called the 'standard market community' 
(Mawson 1926:11 and Skinner, 1964) . 
... first hand knowledge of the commercial relations 
connecting his production to the world market and, 
... a good measure of commercial knowledge. 
(Willmott,1970a:40) 
Correspondingly, news from overseas, according to informants was 
usually gathered in the same venue and arrangements that were 
consequently made for travel overseas would invariably start at the 
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nearest market town. A network therefore could be traced from the 
village to the overseas destination very often through individuals 
who had originally come from the same district. For instance, 
contacts would be located in Canton, Hong Kong, Sydney and then 
Auckland or Wellington for the traveller and much of this information 
came via the market towns. Besides this however, the market town 
became the place where wealthy overseas Chinese who returned home to 
start their own business would locate, unless they were of course 
wealthy enough to locate in places as large as Canton, and also the 
place where the Presbyterian missionaries could find segments 
of the population gathered in one place at one time. 
l~ile the discussion of the home districts has thus far been 
without a cause for migration there were in fact, problems 
in area. In general the area both to the north and west of 
Canton and the Pearl River delta region was not a pleasant to 
live for several reasons. In terms of external relations it has been 
one area that has been under constant incursion from outs for many 
years, and because of this the local population suffered and developed 
a particularly hostile attitude to foreigners which was justified 
according to those who understood what had happened. McNeur, an early 
following: 
missionary to the area described the situation in the 
... Canton was for several centuries the point of contact 
between the Chinese Empire and the outside world. Thus 
Cantonese knew most regarding the insatiable hunger for 
territory and power that possessed European nations. 
They witnessed with alarm the absorption of the next door 
neighbour, India, and feared a like treatment 
themselves. The Portuguese and Dutch ships came plundering 
and wrecking villages, and carrying away slaves to their 
colonies. The Spaniards followed, and massacred almost 
every Chinese in the Philippines. Then came the 
with their opium and gunboats, and HongKong, 
entrance of the Canton River, became a British fortress. 
Even their beloved city was in the hands of foreigners 
for some months. For such reasons it is difficult 
to persuade a Cantonese that the missionaries have 
a higher purpose than personal gain. This hatred of 
the foreigners is one of the most serious obstacles 
to missionary work. It is so deep rooted that is 
hardly changed by a long residence in another 
country. 
(McNeur 1902:14 15) 
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Internally the area had extreme problems in population density with an 
overall density of 600 persons per kilometre by the late nineteenth 
century (Johnson, 1980:8). According to Johnson the 'typical peasant' 
cultivated less than one-third of a hectare of land and the majority 
of the land cultivated had to be rented at usurous rates from landlords. 
Zo (1977) also confirms the situation maintaining that was 
1.6 mou person in 1817 which amounted to .53 less than the national 
average (Zo, 1977:314). 
Chen Han-seng has described the situation in the 1930s in the 
following: 
Within the past five years the total tax burden has 
trebled and this burden is largelY shifted upon the 
shoulders of peasants who have to pay rent. rent, 
which is usually paid in grain, amounts to 50-57 
cent of the total harvest ... Such a high rent, 
together with all its consequent burdens, crushes 
the peasant and sends him to the usurer. In anyone 
district of the province, 60-90 per cent of all the 
families are in debt. Many peasants have to seek a 
loan in grain; others have to pawn their clothes, 
furniture and even hoes, harrows, and ploughs. 
The usual interest charged on a loan in grain is 
30 per cent for six months; the monthly interest at 
the pawn shop is 2 to 3 per cent for six months, 
sometimes as high as 6 per cent. The bankrupted 
peasants rapidly give up their land through the process 
of mortgage; as landless peasants not taken in or 
"absorbed" by industry they ever on the increase, wages 
in general are falling down and rents in all forms are 
rising. Thus bankruptcy repeats and accelerates 
... the speed of pauperization, far exceeds that of 
peasant exodus and possible industrialization. The 
present system of land monopoly can only bestow 
perpetual ownership to a selected few, and simultaneously 
force perpetual indebtedness upon an ever growing mass. 
(Chen, 1936:ix-x) 
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Kil Young Zo has suggested that Seyip area, which contributed many 
to the New Zealand Chinese population, faced even more severe problems. 
He described it as a 'mountainous and traditionally land hungry 
region ... with no more reclaimable land available for the increasing 
population ... having reached a saturation point by the third quarter 
of the eighteenth century' (Zo, 1977:313). Particularly badly off 
were Hsin-ning (Toy San) and K'ai-P'ing (Hoy Ping) districts, the 
former being able to only produce one quarter of its needed foodstuffs 
and the latter only one half (ibid:3l5). 
To further illustrate the situation Choi (1975) pre~ented 
statistics shown in Table II. While Jung Sing is missing from Choi's 
data the indications gleaned from the other relevant districts would 
show considerable population pressure especially in Poon Yu, Toy San 
and Sun Wui, especially since Choi estimates the provincial average 
as being 400 per sq. mi. (Choi,1975:6). 
It was out of this situation that Chinese migrated, although 
officially forbidden by their government to do so until 1859, when 
voluntary migration from Kwangtung was allowed. Despite this however, 
the New Zealand Chinese, as did many others, came without protection 
from their government. The Ching government remained aloof from its 
overseas population although, as indicated in the New Zealand case there 
was ample evidence to support an argument of need. It was only in 
1877 that the Ching government established a legation in Britain and 
it was not until 1908 that a Chinese Consulate was established in 
New Zealand. By this time the Ching officials had become well aware 
of the political anti-government activities in their overseas 
communities and while not wanting to allow emigration they seemed to 
TABLE 2}: Landuse and Population of Fourteen Districts in the Canton Delta 
Canton Total Cultivated Per cent Population Cultivated 
Delta Area Area of total area Population sq. m. land (mows) 
Districts (sq.m.) (mows) cultivated (1923) of land per person 
Toishan 579 2,254,700 18.4 940,680 1,625 2.39 
Sunwui 0.. 712 1,245,100 45.0 1,230,770 1,729 1.10 
or-! 
Hoiping >-. 577 346,800 15.5 671 ,410 1,164 .52 III 
U) 
Yanping 838 299,900 9.2 325,300 388 .92 
Nanhai 15 43,600 72.0 
Punyu 817 1,516,300 47.7 1,367,680 1,674 .90 
Shunte 331 1,087,100 84.4 1,039,740 3,141 1.04 
Tungkuan 1,145 1,848,800 41.5 900,000 786 2.05 
(Adapted from Choi, 1975:7, Table 1.1) 
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have gradually changed their minds at least in terms of watching the 
proceedings in these overseas communities. In the New Zealand case 
they responded to the protest by local Chinese about the 
discrimination they faced in New Zealand but their sympathies lay 
almost entirely with the educated and the wealthy. 
The situation of Chinese migrants therefore was complex, corning 
from a set of social relations which depended on a full compliment of 
kin, an ethical basis that made it mandatory to ideally remain part 
of those social relations yet tremendous pressure to leave illegally 
in order to acquire sufficient money to return and upgrade one's 
family position. However, there were those that carne to New Zealand 
and stayed, even in the early days, whose family had died or was 
limited to a few poor relatives. There were others whose family 
relationships were such that they used the overseas situation to rid 
themselves of familial pressures and still others who found life 
overseas sufficiently attractive despite hostility to envision 
permanent settlement. The variety of reasons therefore for migration 
are considerable and extend far beyond the economic pressures that 
were first described. 
The islands to which the Chinese carne, initially from Australia 
(approximately 1300 nautical miles from Sydney) and later direct from 
Hong Kong (6,000 nautical miles from New Zealand via Australia) lay 
in the South West Pacific. New Zealand is made up of two large 
islands and other adjacent smaller ones; the former together equal the 
size of Japan (see Map 3). The islands first settlers were 
Polynesians who arrived 1000 years ago, to be followed by European 
discovery in 1642 and British attempts at colonization after 1826. 
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Partial colonization was apparent with the settlement of 1500 
Europeans in the North and South Island combined. By the l840s 
settlement began in earnest and by 1864 and the arrival of the first 
group of Chinese the population excluding indigenous peoples, numbered 
172,158, 49,019 of whom lived in the South Island where the Chinese 
first disembarked. The province of Otago where the Chinese first 
resided was one of the six provinces into which the country had been 
divided in 1852 for administrative purposes. The province was 
initially settled in 1847 but by 1861 had undergone dramatic 
transformation with the discovery of gold which increased the 
population from 12,600 in 1861 to 60,000 in 1863. At the time the 
capital of New Zealand was in Auckland where the first general 
assembly gathered in 1854 and elected a House of Representatives 
which met the following year. 
In these early years, life in the two main islands of New 
Zealand was quite distinctive. The South ,Island was characterised 
by predominantly European settlements involved in largely 
agricultural pursuits and gold mining whereas the North Island was 
embroiled in the 'land wars' of the l860s, an often bitter and 
desperate struggle between a determined dominant European society and 
the indigenous Maori population. The wars lasted ostensibly from 
1860-1864 but the effects lingered on in terms of the consequences 
which were largely to do with the alienation of Maori lands which 
included drastic socio-economic disruption to what remained of their 
traditional ways of life. The Chinese were largely absent from 
these affairs since their movement into local areas of the North 
Island post-dated the open conflict, taking place for the most part 
after 1871. 
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The Chinese movement throughout both islands occurred at a 
time when responsible government, dominated by the Provincial 
Councils, located after 1865 in Wellington, gave way in 1876 to 
central government. At that point the nine provinces were abolished 
as administrative units, and while the Chinese presence had been 
tolerated before 1876 it was clear that it would not be so after this 
Centralization of government in conjunction with the 
development of party politics and the migration of Chinese to other 
places in New Zealand left no room for the decentralized opinions of 
former years. 
By 1881 the Chinese settlement of the North Island was well 
under way with two small concentrations in Wellington and Auckland 
and the gradual spread of small numbers of Chinese ifito other local 
communities already settled by Europeans. From this period on the 
mobility of Chinese, both around New Zealand and back and from 
China was considerable. In New Zealand, despite waves of hostility 
to presence more and more local communities had small numbers 
of Chinese living in their midst and the larger urban centres had 
what some alarmists termed Chinatowns. At the turn of the century 
fifty-two boroughs and cities had Chinese living in them which had 
to sixty-nine in 1911, eighty in 1916, eighty-three in 1936 
and by 1961 ninety. The substantial trend represented was 
with the more general movement of population in New 
Zealand for there had been a clear movement into new towns in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century as service centres 
developed to provide for rural areas. By the 1920s this trend had 
changed to a movement into larger towns and cities, some of which 
would continue to have a growing Chinese population after the 
depression and World War II. The dupression in particular had forced, 
75. 
in the absence of welfare provisions, rural Chinese to rely on 
more urban countrymen for help which meant that larger towns had to 
absorb Chinese who found existence in more rural areas difficult. 
the war there were quite substantial increases in the Chinese 
population as families were gradually reunited under various 
provisions and later the extended permit provisions under 
lation. 
The post war years of the Chinese in New Zealand saw a dramatic 
increase in the population and especially children with a gradual 
move towards a more balanced sex structure. It was these 
years that the Chinese community became even more concentrated in urban 
areas and that a number of the smaller market gardening centres 
adjacent to larger centres were consumed by urban sprawl. As the 
population increased however, it was clear that the North Island 
urban centres particularly Auckland and Wellington which included 
55% of the total Chinese population, would grow disproportionately and 
that the entire South Island, while having growing 
communities,would only account for a small percentage of the total. 
Despite this unequal distribution between the two islands which 
a total reverse of the situation in the l880s most 
Chinese communities which have grown in size, have organised 
sufficiently to provide for their needs. 
The community now, unlike its predecessor in the gold fields, 
has the basis of a kinship network with which individuals readily 
associate located in New Zealand and although residential mobility 
of the young is considerable the re-affirmation of 
according to most informants and observation in the 
ties seems, 
to be of 
primary importance. Gatherings for weddings and birthdays of older 
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kin can often bring people from allover New Zealand. Substantial 
farni who have resided in New Zealand over several generations 
may also be found in a single community and in many of these families 
it is to the first pioneer of their family in New Zealand, that they 
trace their heritage. Since travel has been more easily arranged 
between New Zealand and China, others, including the above, have 
availed themselves of a visit to their horne village and 11 others 
for the time have undertaken extensive tours of China. It is 
possible that future generations of Chinese may find their cultural 
links with China much more substantial and important, given the 
diplomatic relationship between New Zealand and China. 
FOOTNOTE FOR CHAPTER 1 
1 This disagrees with'Taher (1970) who maintains that Chinese 
in New Zealand came from nine counties including all of 
Sze Yap, one from Sam Yap, Poon Yu and Chung-shan, Jung 
Sing, Shiuning and Tung-Goon (Taher,1970:4l). He further 
states that 60% of the New Zealand Chinese are from Sze Yap 
and that Po on Yu and Jung Sing are represented by 20% to 
15% respectively with 5% remaining for the three other 
counties. While I have heard this estimate, by far the most 
frequent generalisation acknowledges equal number of 
Jung Sing, Poon Yu, Toy San and Sun Wui with some ~a Yuen 
and Tung-Goon people. 
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PART II 
79. 
CHAPTER III 
INVITED GUESTS AND UNINVITED RESIDENTS 1868-1871 
The earliest arrival of Chinese in New Zealand is now almost 
totally obscured by mythology but several authors allude to a 
migration, of a few Chinese, in the l850s (Greif, 1975:4; Ng B.F., 
1959:15). Even at this time they were the pioneers of the Asian 
migrants coming to New Zealand. Most evidence to indicate that 
Chinese had arrived prior to 1865 is circumstantial. There had been 
Chinese coolies brought into Australia as early as 1848 (Choi, 1975:18) 
and by 1854 there were an estimated 2,400 Chinese in New South Wales, 
so it is possible that some may have escaped their indentured 
existence and found passage to New Zealand. Also, there was a 
report from Victoria in 1862 of a group of Chinese trying to come to 
Otago by boat. According to the report the Chinese man in control 
spoke good English, was well dressed and was obviously educated, but 
nevertheless they were all thrown off the boat (Millar, 1972:23). 
Other than this purely speculative possibility there are three 
pieces of more substantial evidence. One of these is a document of 
the New Zealand government which lists persons naturalised in New 
Zealand from the earliest years. According to this register there 
was a Chinese man naturalised in Nelson in 1852 at the age of 29. 
His name was, according to the register, Hopton Appo, and he was 
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engaged as a cattle breeder: (Names etc. of Alien Friends Who Have 
Been Naturalised in New Zealand, 1911:190). The second piece of 
evidence is an article in an Otago newspaper of 1862. It is 
entitled the 'Advent of the Chinese' and describes the arrival of 
the first Chinese in New Zealand: 
Yesterday morning the first Chinaman that has ever 
paid Dunedin a visit landed at the Jetty from the 
Steamer, 'Golden Age'. His reception was noisy, and 
appeared rather to disconcert Johnny, who took to 
his heels and scudded up the street at a rapid 
pace. The ice having been broken, it is not unlikely 
that we may have the Celestials down here in great 
force next spring. 
(The Daily Telegraph, June-2, 1862) 
The third piece of evidence comes from Reverend McNeur, who worked 
for many years with the Chinese in New Zealand. McNeur mentioned, 
in his book, that there was an elder of the Chinese Church in 
Dunedin, by the name of Mr. Lo Keong, who had come to New Zealand 
from Australia in 1865 to start a business. Apparently Lo Keong 
was the first Chinese man to bring his wife to New Zealand from 
Melbourne after their marriage in 1873 (McNeur 1951:28). 
According to local Chinese history, these early migrants were 
an exception to their followers in that they were not involved in gold-
mining. They appeared to have come to settle, and it is unknown 
whether or not they ever returned to China. Despite their different 
occupation, however, it is unlikely that they escaped the hostility 
of European settlers. Even New Zealand in the l850s, as yet devoid of 
any Asiatic mass migration, as it became known, was not free from 
racial discrimination. The precedent for this attitude which pervades 
much of the history of the Chinese in New Zealand, was established in 
Christchurch and Nelson. In 1853 a group of landowners and merchants 
had proposed the importation of Chinese labour to remedy a labour 
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short The former group needed cheap agricultural labour to produce 
vegetables to meet an increasing demand in Australia but the 
opposition to both groups was strong and the workmen of Canterbury 
succeeded in getting Colonel Campbell elected as superintendent in 
the same year, a staunch supporter of the working man (Gardner, 1971:12 
and 54-55). Four years later on August 15, a local was held 
in Nelson to submit proposals to the Provincial governments on how to 
keep out of New Zealand. An earlier newspaper c1e, on 
August 12, approved force as an initial reaction, which was 
supported by the August 15 meeting with the further stipulation that 
anyone the Chinese would be considered an enemy 1son 
~~l~~~, 12 and 15 August, 1857). Whether this outburst was prompted 
by Mr. Hopton or by the Australian experience is unknown, but it did 
initiate anti-Chinese feeling in New Zealand, and by 1861 the first 
mention of anti-Chinese legislation appears in the 
Debates. 1 
Chronologically, the Australian States had 
amentary 
this anti-
Chinese feeling and legislation in the areas where Chinese went. In 
1853 South Australia established a~10 poll tax for Chinese immigrants, 
followed by Victoria in 1855 and New South Wales in 1861, and although 
this slation was temporarily repealed in 1855, 1861 and 1867 
respectively, there is no doubt that it provided the basis for the 
opinions which travelled across the Tasman (Choi, 1975:20-21). 
Despite this feeling, however, there were people in New Zealand 
who thought otherwise. In 1865 the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce, 
mainly made up of local merchants and businessmen who were feeling 
the of the declining mining population in Otago, decided 
that they would favour Chinese migration. At their September meeting, 
their justification included the fact that the province needed 
population, that the Chinese were well-behaved, important consumers, 
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and that further, all the things that the Chinese had been accused 
2 of had not been proved. The meeting stood behind these assumptions 
except for one dissenting vote (Millar, 1972:26). 
The year prior to this, however, there had been an inquiry by 
the Chinese in Victoria, who had obviously suffered enough under 
both the legislative restrictions and open hostility in the Victorian 
gold fields. They wondered whether they would receive any 
protection in the New Zealand gold fields as they had supposedly 
received in Victoria (Choi, 1975:20-21), and asked also about 
regulations and privileges (Millar, 1972:25). The reply of the Chief 
Secretary of Otago had been that they would be in the same situation 
as the Europeans in the gold fields (ibid.).3 
This suggested that at least their initial migration was going 
to be mutually desirable. For the Chinese in Victoria, the push 
factors were very evident in the increasingly bad relations with 
Europeans, and the pull factors included a less hostile environment 
in New Zealand that, as yet, had not attempted to pass any anti-
Chinese immigration laws. Also, favourable news of the New Zealand 
gold fields must have spread, even though by 1865 the greatest part 
of the gold rush had subsided. 4 
In October the written statement conferring the right of 
protection on the Chinese from the Provincial Treasurer was conveyed 
by a Dunedin merchant to a Chinese merchant in Melbourne (ODT, 
10 November 1865).5 There was further dissension as regards this 
decision, however, and it came from the gold fields. Neither the 
miners nor the gold fields' representatives in the Provincial Council 
were in favour of a Chinese migration. The miners, particularly 
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those in the Dunstan district, wasted no time in sending a petition 
to the Superintendent of Otago opposing the immigration of 
and other local areas held meetings that generated the same 
sentiment (Millar, 1972:27-28). The Witness~ the Dunedin 
paper, also entered the fray and initially opposed the Chamber of 
Commerce, then changed its mind and supported it towards the end of 
September (Rachagan, 1971 :58). 
On 23 December 1865 Mr. Ho Ah Mei arrived from Melbourne to 
inspect the gold fields and he was to be followed by several other 
Chinese who were to assist him in his task (OW, 23 December 1865). 
Mr. Ah Mei's likeness was captured by the Dunedin 'Punch' in a cartoon 
which depicted him as a Mandarin in fine clothes with an attendant; 
he was being welcomed at the docks by Mr. Punch, who was obviously 
intended to represent the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce. Altogether 
it seems to have been a cordial welcome; however, the departure was 
depicted by the same magazine as harried and antagonistic with a 
large miner trying to remove the Mandarin's queue. Although Otago 
seems to have forgotten the visit of Ho Ah Mei quite quickly, he 
had 'flotforgotten them. 
In 1871 Ho Ah Mei wrote to the and 
out the details of the first visit. He explained his initial 
speculative voyage in 1865 stating that although he was not a miner 
his purpose " ... was to first secure the introduction of labour; then 
with a hope to reap the benefit by having the full command 
provisioning business, should the scheme be proved successful!! (ODT, 
8 June 1871). In the course of his visit, Ho Ah Mei claims that he 
was able to secure a guarantee of protection lives and 
property of the Chinese, should they arrive.and also much useful 
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information from a very helpful Inspector-General of Goldfields, 
Mr. Vincent pyke (ibid.). He left, according to his version, without 
event, and immediately returned to Melbourne where he issued placards 
for various areas of the Australian goldfields. He met with little 
success, and was to later explain this in terms of his fellow country-
men's reluctance to risk what they already had and knew for the 
unknown especially on the word of one man. 
Finally, Ah Mei convinced twelve penniless miners 7 to leave 
Australia by advancing them £.,20 each for passage and supplies (ibid.). 
They embarked in Melbourne and arrived in Dunedin in February 1866" 
and then two days later moved on to Taupeka on the suggestion of Mr. 
Pyke. In Taupeka they were met by Mr. D. Campbell who seems, on the 
basis of Ah Mei' s descr'iption to have taken it upon himself to usher 
h · . T k d fl l' 8 t e mlners lnto aupe a an. ensure peace u re atlons. 
In total Ah Mei spent £800, according to his accounts and by 
1871 had only been able to recoup £340. His role as collector had 
in 1871 been assigned to another man in Dunedin it seems, who was also 
to look after two lodging houses owned by Ah Mei for the express 
purpose of housing newcomers. After an uncertain amount of time 
Ah Mei gave up his wait for news from the men and returned to 
Melbourne and from there went to a job as Interpreter in Ballarat, 
V. . 9 lctorla. Even when news did come to Victoria of lucrative returns 
from New Zealand Ah Mei chose to remain in Victoria. He stated with 
some confidence in 1871 that, 'As I anticipated (the) news was not a 
durable one, for very shortly afterwards unfavourable news again 
returned; and again the migration of our countrymen from Melbourne 
resumed its old state of dullness, but not before a thousand or so had 
already been added to your census' (ibid.). By 1868, Ah Mei, tired of 
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waiting for his returns from the miners in Otago, departed for China 
with his family after ten years away. He had the chance of staying 
in New Zealand with the promise of a job as Interpreter for the 
but turned it down since he saw no financial gain from a government 
job. In Canton, however, he took up a job with the Customs service 
for six months before he again decided to return to Dunedin via 
Melbourne and ', .. look after those pets of mine to whom I had lent 
my yellow boys, and from whom I might get back something with which 
I might be enabled to start life anew,lO (ODT, 8 June 1871). In 
actual fact, by 1871 Ah Mei had got no further than working as a clerk 
and Interpreter for the government in Hong Kong. Interestingly 
enough in this position he was actually involved in the chartering 
of the Whirlwind for the transport of 350 passengers straight to 
D d ' h h . M lb 11, 1870 une ln rat er t an Vla e ourne ln . Ah Mei also 
that two more ships were bound for New Zealand, one having in 
January 1871 and another due to leave later in April. The remainder 
of the letter included in the Otago Daily Times gently reminded the 
'generous and open-handed' government that he would look favourably 
upon recognition of his 'scheme' and they could fy so with 
remuneration. By the end of June the Witness picked up the 
story and added further input from Ah Mei. He now maintained that 
400, were being sent and that he hoped they 'will prove themselves 
useful citizens, or generally termed useful miners and labourers in 
your country and that no cause for complaint will be made against 
them either by the government or the people in general. This forms 
the chief portion of (the) trading interest between this port and 
yours, at least for the present. I have in fact learned that there 
will be about 2,000 Chinese for your part this year' (OW, 24 June 1871). 
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In fact, Ho Ah Mei was not far off in his estimate, considering the 
400 that were on their way. The statistics for 1871 show that 1,596 
Chinese arrived in New Zealand (see Appendix II). The letter caused 
some consternation and the Otago Witness was even accused of 
manufacturing it, but the paper was quick to remind readers that Mr. 
Ah Mei had visited Dunedin in 1865 (OW 1 July 1871). The situation 
turned out to be quite serious. Ho Ah Mei had heard that his notice 
was advertised in the papers in New Zealand and he obviously felt 
that the deal had been accepted by the New Zealand Government. 
Naturally he wrote asking for his reward. It seems as though the 
New Zealand Government had no intention of taking Mr. Ho Ah Mei 
seriously, since nothing more was said of the issue. 
The Chinese, according to one, John Ah Tong, liked Otago 
much better than Victoria (OW 8 December 1866). 
From these early years of migration, there was fairly constant 
reporting12 of the Chinese activity in the gold fields and of their 
arrivals, but some areas of Otago did not like the Chinese. In 1866 
they were thrown out of Nevis and reported in Clyde, and in 1867 it 
was reported that they were earning 25/- to 40/- per week but were not 
buying miners' licences (OW 16 June, 8 December 1966, 17 January, 
27 April 1867). In the middle of 1867 a Chinese was murdered, and 
the local Chinese organised their first petition for the murderer's 
apprehension. They offered a £200 reward, and the notice was signed 
by George Ah Kee, butcher of Gabriel's Gully, Tin Cheong, He Ti, Wong 
Wai, miner, storekeeper and dealer at Tuapeka Flat (OW 15 June 1867). 
The Colonial Secretary also offered £100 reward (ibid.). Perhaps 
more significant than the murder is the fact that within a year 
Chinese not only were mining but also had set themselves up in 
businesses to provide commodities for their own people, which of 
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course defeated the basis of the Chamber of Commerce's and 
Provincial Council's initial decision. 
In the remainder of 1867 Chinese continued to arrive, and by 
September five Chinese men, obviously disenchanted with gold mining, 
had taken up gardening in Dunedin (OW, 7 September 1867). The three 
and one half acres they used were leased from the City Council. It 
was a swampy bit of land near the school house on Great King Street 
and was made avail able to them for three years at a rate of 1.30 
per year. 
The reception of the Chinese in Otago was not all peaceful, 
as has already been indicated, and besides the murder there were 
periodic reports of Chinese being forcibly removed from various 
areas. They were evicted from Mount Ida, Dunstan Creek and Naseby, 
and the evident hostility obviously moved the Dunedin Chamber of 
Commerce to take action. In 1868 both the Superintendent of the 
gold fields and the police were enjoined to 'keep protective watch 
over the Chinese' as had previously been promised to them 
(OW, 8 February 1868). In December of that same year the Otago 
Provincial Government Gazette nade this protection official: 
Proclamation of Police Protection 
over (:hinese Miners 
Whereas several instances have occurred wherein the 
Chinese have been made the subject of persecution by 
the Europeans and other residents of the gold fields -
in one case a gross outrage having being committed by 
a number of persons on a single Chinaman, and in 
another threats having been used to induce Chinese 
miners to remove from the locality they had selected 
in which to carry out their operation. 
Notice is hereby given, that the Chinese having corne 
to Otago under a promise made by successive Super-
intendants, that those who corne will be fully 
protected, the Provincial Government is determined 
to fulfil that promise, and the police are strictly 
enjoined to keep protective watch over the Chinese 
population in their respective districts, and in case 
of their being made aware of any injury having being 
illegally inflicted on any of the Chinese population, 
to lose no time in bringing the perpetrators thereof 
to justice. 
The Superintendent relies upon the assistance of all 
right thinking, well disposed people to aid in 
affording that protection to the Chinese, which 
persons residing with a British Settlement have the 
right to rely on. 
Dunedin 
29 January 1868 
Signed by James MacAndrew 
Superintendent 
(Otago Provincial Government 
Gazette 1868:39) 
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The one point that the above ignored was the fact that many of 
the Chinese legal problems would stern from their own complaints about 
each other. It seems that this was anticipated to some extent, for 
there was a Chinese Interpreter at least in the Tuapeka district, 
a Mr. H. Blewitt, who was required to send quarterly reports to the 
Colonial Secretary in Wellington; after 1868 this was to be done 
by the local police. Also, numerous disputes, largely pertaining 
to mining issues, between various claims were solved in the Warden's 
Court that sat periodically in various areas. These disputes were 
numerous and usually seemed to involve the scarce resource of water 
used for sluicing. Men on one claim, for instance, would divert 
water from another claim to use on their particular area. These 
were often resolved through a fine, which might be as high as ila. 
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Remarkably quickly after their arrival, and coincidental with 
their business activity the Chinese established their own communities 
in the gold fields. By 1868 and 1869 Chinese camps, and later 
communities, had been established in Lawrence, Moa Flat and Nevis. 
At Lawrence the Chinese camp was relegated to an area adjacent to 
the community by a local ordinance, and it appears that most other 
towns in the gold fields followed suit, or the Chinese voluntarily 
set up their camps on the periphery (ODT, 1 October 1869). In 1868 
the Lawrence correspondent for the Otago Daily Times described the 
Chinese camp in the following: 
It consists of a double row of houses built parallel 
to the government road and the Chinese there have 
subscribed, of themselves, ~O for the formation 
of the main street and two side tracks connecting 
it with that thoroughfare. Their dwellings are 
sufficiently comfortable, and are fitted up in a 
creditable manner. 
(ODT,8 July 1868) 
At that time the camp contained a gaming house, cook shop, several 
stores, one of which was called He Tie and Company and the 
correspondent noted that many of the men spoke at least some English 
(ibid.).13 
In 1869 the first recorded group of Chinese arrived from 
China via Melbourne (OW, 8 May 1869). They were noted to have a 
different appearance but immediately upon arrival made their way into 
the gold fields and particularly to the smaller communities. In 
September of the same year 228 arrived from China after a passage 
that had taken 100 days. The majority, it was stated, had corne 
from the Five Districts, which presumably would include Sam Yap, 
and another group had corne from Seyip (OW, 18 September 1869). It 
is also noted that three Chinese women arrived in New Zealand in 
October. They had bound feet and went to join their husbands in 
Lawrence (OW, 2 October 1869). It seems almost certain that all 
women who came out during this period would have come to join 
merchant husbands. It is unlikely that miners and gardeners would 
have had enough capital to afford the trip for their families. 
Furthermore, the period of stay for miners was far more flexible 
depending on their earning power, diligence and desire to return 
home. 
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In the early part of 1870 the Chinese in Otago had expanded to 
2,640 and were situated in the following areas: 
Queenstown 350 
Arrowtown 70 
Nevis 300 
Bendigo 40 
Cromwell 60 
Bannockburn 300 
Dunstan Creek 30 
Mount Ida 250 
Blacks 50 
Macreas 150 
Waipoi 450 
Waitahuna 150 
Lawrence 300 
Beaumont 40 
Switzer 20 
Dunedin and other 80 
TOTAL 2,640 
(OW, 15 January 1870; See also Map 4) 
Although it is known that not all the above were engaged in mining 
the estimates of income for the time did not take this into account. 
It was estimated that the Chinese miners were making from 30/- to£2 
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per week and producing a total of 1,400 ounces of gold week, 
which was equivalent to one-fifth of the total gold field's 
production If one can estimate, based on 1871 stics, 
that approximately 3 per cent of the Chinese population in the gold 
fields was engaged in service-related activities for their own 
countrymen, then there are an estimated 2,560 directly involved in 
mining. The range of estimated income would have been between 
{3,840 and £5,120 per week for the whole Chinese community. 
The service activities of local Chinese, at this time, were 
confined to a few gardens and a range of other businesses including 
two substantial merchant firms in Dunedin. In 1869 a 32 year old 
merchant arrived from Melbourne to establish one of the firms 
Dunedin. He had also brought ten to twelve people from Melbourne 
with him, all of whom were from Sai Gong Village, Poon Yu County 
in China. A company was established, according to informants, 
employing some local people, and eventually it diversified into gold 
mining activity. It is interesting to note two things about 
family. First, as is the case in numerous instances amongst the 
New Zealand Chinese, there is a tendency to drop the surname and to 
adopt the given names for both the name of the company and the 
family name. This means that the number of generations is impossible 
to ascertain without reference to their Chinese names. While the 
Chinese within their own community still use a full Chinese name there 
is still a sense in which a lineage, rather than being generations 
deep, now appears to have a starting point in the overseas community 
and traces its heritage and patronage to this founder. Second, it 
indicates a very clear pattern in male succession to the business, 
which is also evident in most Chinese businesses once they become 
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established in the overseas community. In this case there were two 
sons by a wife in China, who came out to New Zealand in 1884 to 
help run the business. However, after his wife died, the father 
remarried in New Zealand, which meant that the sojourn in New Zealand 
became permanent. One of the sons settled in New Zealand and the 
other returned home, but the company has persisted to this day, now 
operated by the third and fourth generation of males in the family. 
Besides service activity and mining on their own account, some 
Chinese preferred to work for wages. There is evidence to show that 
they were employed by both Chinese and Europeans in the gold fields. 
Their wages appear to have been paid weekly, except in one instance 
(Tuapeka Times, 18 July 1868; OW, 18 April 1868, 12 June 1869) .l~ 
The exception, which involved indentured labour, occurred in 
Orepuki, where one Kee Chang had bought a claim for £125 and intended 
to contact a Dunedin merchant who got men for him (OW, 23 September 
1871). Kee Chang estimated that the deal would involve him paying 
the merchant £20 to £30 to bring each man to New Zealand, and then 
he would pay them 15/- per week and give them food, and the men 
would pay him back a fixed amount for their passage (ibid.). When 
they had paid Kee Chang back, they would be free to go. 
By 1871, according to the numerous reports in the gold fields' 
papers, the Chinese were well organised, but a little bit too much so, 
for the Europeans. They were providing their own supplies and their 
own doctor, Leang Chum Wah who had arrived from Hong Kong (TT, 28 April 
1871). They had established their own meeting place, since a 'Joss 
House had already opened in the Tuapeka area' (TT, 25 September 1869), 
and the first Presbyterian Chinese missionary arrived in Lawrence15 
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(OW, 4 February lS7l). By this time also one of the leading 
merchants of Lawrence's Chinese community had died. Onlookers 
witnessed the body being taken from the hospital in a carriage 
with the relatives riding behind, casting out little white squares 
of paper on the road. The large group of Chinese who followed all 
had white gauze strips in their hats, which were later taken off 
and burned at the graveside. Once at the grave, an offering was 
presented on atraywhich consisted of an SO-lb.roast pig, boiled 
pork, cakes and apples. As each mourner left he was given 1/- in 
an envelope (West Coast Times, 12 July lS70). 
Partially because of the self-sufficiency but largely because 
of an increasingly competitive gold mining situation, the hostility 
towards the Chinese increased. Incidents of deviance were reported, 
and the accusations of Chinese not paying their Miner's Rights were 
substantiated by an investigation resulting in numerous fines. 16 
The total cost of the fines to the Chinese were as follows: 
Waipoi 
Cardrona 
Arrow District 
Mount Ida, Tuapeka 
Dunstan and Switzer 
TOTAL 
£ 60 
I. 120 
f.. 200 
£600 
:£ 980 
(OW, 1 December lS7l) 
Furthermore, European storekeepers were seeing their Chinese 
counterparts doing a thriving business, and one such storekeeper was 
alleged to have separate accounts for as much as £40 and £120. A 
Chinese merchant in Dunedin responded to this accusation with the 
logic that although the Chinese patronised their own storekeepers, 
the storekeepers themselves were benefi t1ing the province since they 
paid customs duty and harbour dues for boats corning in. He added that 
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he had paid £2000 in customs duty (OW, 8 July 1871). The 
particular merchant also mentioned that he had opened a branch of 
his store in the North Island and was collecting fungus for export 
to China (ibid.). Prior to this he had been collecting scrap iron 
in the gold fields to send to China (ibid.) .17 It is interesting to 
note that this thread of the history ties up with a well known Chinese 
merchant who settled in New Plymouth in 1870. His name was Chew 
Chong, and he had left China in 1855 for Australia, where he worked 
in the Victoria fields as a storekeeper for eleven years 
18 (Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Vol. 1:340-341). He came to New 
Zealand in 1866 and settled in Dunedin, where he was engaged in 
collecting scrap iron to send back to China (ibid.). 
According to the Encyclopaedia, it was Chew Chong's travels 
around New Zealand that eventually led him to the Taranaki area, 
;:;l:; ....-1-
where he discovered edible fungus ~~ comparable to a type 
wi~ely used in China as a delicacy and for medicinal purposes. 
Whether or not Chew Chong is in fact the merchant mentioned in the 
Dunedin papers or whether he merely worked for that merchant is 
unknown. It is known, however, that he did set up a business in 
New Plymouth and engage in the collection of the fungus from local 
cockies, who were at that time facing a depression. He paid 6/-
for a sack and apparently one could collect two to five sacks per 
day of the wet fungus, which then had to be dried and sent to Dunedin 
for shipment to China a of New Zealand 19 Vol. I: 340-341) . 
The large part of the opposition to the Chinese seems to have 
centred in the Wakatipu District and especially in Arrowtown. In 
November 1870, one T.L. Shepherd gave a speech in which he proposed an 
immediate imposition of a £50 poll tax on the Chinese and a heavy duty 
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on rice (OW, 12 November 1870). In August of the following year, 
Mr. C.E. Haughton, M.H.R. for Wakatipu20 asked the government 
whether they were going to take any action over the growing number 
of Chinese in the colony (Scholefield and Hall, 1937:262). 
William Fox who had become Premier in 1869, said that: 
... a number, not a very large number, of Chinese 
had arrived in the Province of Otago; but had not 
received any information of an official character 
from any person in that Province. Should the 
government receive any such information it would 
take care to at once inform the House. 
(NZPD 1871, 10:47) 
But two weeks later Haughton again raised the question, 
that the Goldfields Committee should take on the investigation of 
the Chinese (ibid:263). Since it was feared this committee would 
be biased, the government set up a Select Committee on 29 August 
1971 
Initially the Committee was composed of nine members, only 
one of whom came from Otago. By September 1871 three more members 
had been added, MacAndrew (Otago), Thomson (Otago) and White 
21 (Westland) (AJHR,197l,H-5:2). MacAndrew, it should be noted, was 
involved with the Public Works programme which was to begin railway 
construction in Otago in 1871. In the early part of 1871 he had 
written to the Dunedin paper suggesting the use of Chinese labour 
on the Clutha railway, who, according to him, would provide a reliable 
work force at a cheaper cost (OW, 15 April 1871). 
The Report of the Select Committee takes up some forty-
pages and includes thirteen interviews with various people in New 
Zealand, most of whom had either been in China, Australia or some 
other country \vhere Chinese resided. Their comments were ly 
made up of personal opinions which ranged from extremely to 
ambivalent. Without exception they were willing to tolerate 
Chinese immigrants as long as they were useful and as long as 
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they were a minority that could be kept a minority. The suggestions 
of polygamy, frugality, maltreatment of European women, avoidance 
of taxation, general dirtiness, in addition to gambling and 
opium and that they did not settle but took their wealth home, were 
presented totally without proof. The only statistical evidence 
presented included occupations, residence in New Zealand and offences 
committed by Chinese in 1871 in the gold fields'districts (see 
Appendix III). No attempt had been made to calculate earnings, 
customs duty, immigration rates, inter-marriage or length of· stay in 
New Zealand, all of which would have been possible. 
The only Chinese person interviewed was one John Ah Tong,22 
at the time resident in Wellington and working as a cabinetmaker. 
There were only 17 Chinese people living in Wellington at the time. 
John Ah Tong, of his own admission, had spent little time in the gold 
Ids although he had been in New South Wales before his arrival in 
New Zealand. The only facts that he could add to the investigation 
were that wages in China ranged from 8d. to 9d. for labourers per day 
and as much as half a dollar (2/2) for mechanics; that Chinese who 
came out were often indebted to masters for three years until they 
had paid off their passages; that Chinese coming here would be 
satisfied to leave with between ~O and iloo in their pockets; and, 
finally, that blowing out a match as an oath was as binding on a 
Chinese as swearing on a Bible was for Europeans (AJHR, 1971, H-4:S). 
Two other Chinese, Ah Gee and Ah Hing, the former married to a 
European like John Ah Tong, were in attendance, but John Ah Tong 
insisted that they would be able to add nothing to his testimony. 
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Perhaps the most insistent of those that advocated the anti 
line was C.E. Haughton from Wakatipu, who went to great 
lengths to explain the devious activities of a group of Chinese who 
disputed ownership with a group of Europeans over a claim that had 
been found to have gold in it. The dispute went to Court and the 
lost the case. Haughton suggested that they often encroached 
upon European claims in the same gully, as they had done in this 
case, ally after waiting to see if it would be productive 
He added that the Chinese, although generally thought to be 
only re-working areas left by Europeans, were on the contrary staking 
out new areas and, what was worse, they were mining them in groups 
(AJHR, 1871,H-4:7). 
Two other, more interesting facts came out of Haughton's 
testimony, which, although presented as negative opinion, tells us 
something about the relationship between the Chinese miners and the 
merchants that supplied them. It was shown in two separate cases 
that Chinese merchants were known to support their fellow countrymen 
should the necessity arise, especially in legal action, and also that 
Chinese miners had been known to help out a merchant in a similar 
23 
s on. If this was not an entirely altruistic situation, at 
least it was reciprocity based on mutual dependence, since the 
merchant needed his mining clientele and, conversely, the miners 
the merchant. This kind of relationship will be with 
later in more detail. 
It was generally conceded that the Chinese made good domestic 
servants, gardeners and laundrymen but also that their 'superior 
industry and plodding perseverance would, in the end, eat us out of 
house and home ... ' (AJHR, 1871 ,H-5: 12) . Those who were bitterly 
opposed to their presence went so far as to suggest that the Miners 
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Right fee be increased and also that either provisions should not 
be sold to them or otherwise they should be subject to heavy duties, 
specifically rice and dried fish. 24 
Following the interviews in the Report are a series of replies 
to seven questions sent to each of the Wardens in the goldfields. 
They were asked: 
1. State your opinion of the effect on the gold fields of 
Chinese migration. 
2. What is the influence of Chinese upon general conduct 
of mining population especially as to gambling and 
disturbance of peace. 
3. Is there any danger to the morality of the community, 
especially young children and girls? 
4. Are the Chinese useful in developing the gold fields, 
and for agricultural and domestic purposes? 
5. Are you aware of intermarriages of Chinese with 
Europeans; if so, what class of women. 
6. Is it desirable that Chinese immigration should be 
checked or promoted; if so will you suggest what 
legislation might prove effective? 
7. What is the comparative cost of Chinese and European 
labour; also cost of living. 
(AJHR, 1871, Ad Interim Report No. I, 
H-5:l4) . 
The responses to these questions from nine areas indicate little 
more than a fairly negative attitude to the Chinese presence. It is 
interesting to note that the responses from the Wardens of Lawrence, 
Switzer and Naseby concerning the usefulness of the Chinese were all 
positive, and in each of these places there were enough Chinese people 
living for them to have established a viable community.25 It seems 
that even in a situation of high visibility, albeit as a separate 
community, that Europeans were more favourably disposed towards the 
Chinese presence than in situations where they were more dispersed. 
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The wardens of all three places were also of the opinion that no 
immediate action should be taken about the immigration of Chinese 
into New Zealand but also that a poll tax should be imposed if the 
government felt it necessary at a later date. The other 
were more negative in terms of restrictions and ranged from a 
mild form of non-encouragement to a poll tax, or even an annual tax 
plus'a on their basic food commodities of rice and dried sh on 
top of the large duty already paid for luxury goods. 
The information required by Question 7 indicated a considerable 
variation in wages and cost of living for Chinese as well as Europeans 
and can best be summarised as follows: 
TABLE 3: and Labour 
Chinese Chinese cost European European cost 
of of 
Roxburgh 9/- 16/-
Queenstown £.1. 0.0 8/- {2.8.0 
Clyde £1.10.0 10/- £2.10.0 £1.0.0 
Lawrence 15/- to 25/- 5/- £2.10.0 12/- to 15/-
Note: All estimates are based on a week, and five areas gave no 
response 
(AJHR 1871, H-5:14-22) 
Generally, it can be seen that the wages and cost of living 
Europeans were twice as much as that for their Chinese counterparts 
in the gold fields. 
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lar questions were asked of police officers in various 
areas, and in general the responses were similar. None of the 
officers in areas where there were Chinese found them any more of a 
burden than Europeans in the same areas. In short the cons.ensus 
appears to have been that they required no extra pol supervision 
and if there were problems there was more need for interpreters than 
police cers. 
The more useful information from the replies indicated that 
already Chinese in small numbers had moved into towns elsewhere in 
New Zealand where they would have had to depend largely on a 
European population for their income. In Christchurch there were 
two gardens and two employed in storekeeping; in Nelson there were 
two fancy goods stores, one carter and an old settler; in Westland 
there were fourteen in gardens distributed around Woodstock and Ross, 
while there was one cook in Hokitika. In all these places a Chinese 
community was non-existent, so it is obvious that relations were 
amicable enough to support their presence. 
The summation of the Select Committee was forwarded to the 
House on 27 October 1871, only two months after initiation, and 
its conclusions and recommendation were as follows: 
1. That the Chinese are industrious and 
2. That they are as orderly citizens as Europeans. 
3. That there is no special risk to the morality 
or security of the community to be apprehended 
from their presence in the Colony. 
4. That they are not likely to introduce any 
special infectious diseases. 
5. That they are well adapted for menial and light 
mechanical and for agricultural occupations. 
6. But that nearly all those who come to this 
Colony do so for the purpose of mining for gold. 
7. That, as a rule, they occupy and turn to good 
account ground which at present would not pay 
the European miner. 
8. That, as a rule, they return to China as soon 
as they have amassed a net sum of from £100 
upwards. 
9. That no considerable number of them are at any 
time likely to become permanent settlers in 
the country. 
10. That they spend less per head than the European 
~opulation. 
11. That the presence of Chinese in the country has 
not hitherto entailed any additional police 
expenditure. 
In view of the foregoing the Committee are of-opinion 
that there have been no sufficient grounds shown for 
the exclusion of the Chinese; and that no sufficient 
case has up to the present time been made out to 
require the Committee to propose that legislative 
action should be taken having for effect the 
exclusion of the Chinese or the imposition of special 
burdens upon them. 
Wm. J. Steward 
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Chairman, October 27, 1871 
(AJHR, H-SB:4) 
Nine members voted and there were 5 'ayes' and 4 'noes'. Those that 
voted against the conclusions included the representatives on the 
Committee from Wakatipu, Dunedin, Waimea and Otago, and Mr. Haughton 
of Wakatipu registered a final protest against the recommendations on 
the grounds that he believed they were inconsistent with the 
evidence. (AJHR, 1971 H-SB:8). 
In the same year that the Select Committee met, the government 
had also been negotiating the beginning of its railroad contracts as 
part of the public works programme. One of the contractors who 
tendered for the building of the railroads was John Brogden and Sons 
of London, who had managed to procure a large number of the contracts 
ln negotiation with Sir Julius Vogel. The government of the day, 
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according to the Honorable Mr. Ormond, then Minister of Works, found 
themselves obligated to accept an agreement worth three quarters 
of a million pounds (NZPD, 1896, 94:430). Apparently labour was 
short at this time, since it was prior to the assisted immigration 
programme, and Brogden, having trouble getting labour, proposed to 
bring in a couple of loads of Chinese 1abourers. 26 This very neatly 
fits with Ho Ah Mei's venture (see page 83) and also eventually leads 
to John Ah Tong (see page 97). 
Ormond, facing this proposition from Brogden had found that 
there was no legal objection against Chinese men being used and also 
nothing to stop the contractors bringing them into the Colony (ibid.). 
The general principle of the government, however, was to use people 
on the public works scheme who would eventually settle in the 
country (NZPD, 1872, 12:92). Faced with having to stop this possible 
influx, Ormond wrote to the Superintendents of the various Provinces 
and the County Council of Westland asking for their opinion. He 
stated in the circular that there had been difficulty in inducing 
sufficient European migration to New Zealand in order to make up the 
labour deficiency, and it had been suggested by the railroad 
contractors that Chinese labour be used (AJHR, 1972, D-12). Ormond 
added in his last paragraph that' ... un1ess every available means of 
obtaining labour be temporarily adopted, until a sufficient flow of 
European immigration shall have been established, great difficulty 
and vexatious delays will be experienced in the execution of 
railways and other important words' (ibid.) .27 
In the following weeks the responses carne in. Auckland was in 
favour, adding that the savings in labour costs would outweigh the 
fact that the Chinese would be taking their savings out of the country. 
The Select Committee Report was also used as a positive reason for 
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such action .). New Plymouth would accept the importation of 
only 100 or 150; Wellington was in favour to a 'limited extent', 
and Napier's response was that New Zealand's public works could wait 
until sufficient European immigrants had arrived :2). Canterbury 
was totally opposed, and so was the Superintendent of Nelson, who 
led to return an answer but instead published a lengthy response 
in the Nelson Examiner (NZPD, 1872, 12:162). He insisted that the 
lway construction was awaited with optimism, as it was the only 
thing that would rescue the district from impoverishment; therefore, 
nothing should be done to hinder the expectations of those people 
in the area (NZPD, 1972, 12:163). Otago as might have been expected, 
was opposed to the idea because Chinese immigrants seemed to be 
arriving fast enough without encouraging immigration :164). 
Very typically, this long debate in July was really uninformed. 
Otago public works schemes were already subcontracting to a party of 
Chinese labour as early as May 1872 on a portion of the Arthur's Point 
road from Queenstown to Arrowtown (OW, 4 May 1872). By November of 
1872 it had become obvious also that Brogden had ignored the government 
and made arrangements with one John Ah Tong to go to Tuapeka from 
Wellington, where he lived, and procure Chinese labour for the Clutha 
lroad (OW, 23 November 1872:16). The reports in the paper about 
the employment of Chinese labour were however very sketchy for the 
remainder of 1872. In December it seemed that John Ah Tong had 
refused the offer to be Brogden's agent (OW, 7 December 1872:1), but 
by the middle of December there is mention of ninety- Chinese resuming 
contract work on the railway near Adam's Flat and by the end of 
December they were employed on the Clutha railway (OW, 14 and 28 
28 December 1872). 
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In the spring of 1873, however, something had gone 
drastically wrong, and John Ah Tong's involvement with Brogden became 
publicized in a dispute with some of his fellow countrymen over the 
payment of wages. Initially the Bruce Herald had found out about the 
story from the Chinese labourers who had gone on strike in the 
township because Ah Tong had not paid them. As far as the labourers 
were concerned, John Ah Tong was their employer (Bruce Herald, 
7 January 1873). John Ah Tong wrote to the paper and insisted that 
he was engaged by Brogden and that it was Brogden who paid the wages 
(OW, 18 January 1873). Although this may have been the case the 
newspaper was also quick to report that John Ah Tong had organised a 
society whereby the Chinese labourers paid a fixed monthly sum out 
of their wages to him which was to help defray medical expenses. 
Apparently a Dr. Weber had been employed by Ah Tong to look after 
180 men (OW, 18 January 1873), and he had also leased five acres 
of land in the township for ten years at an annual rate of 125 per 
year. This was to be used as a garden, presumably to supply the 
railway workers (Bruce Herald, 10 January 1873). 
It transpired, as information about John Ah Tong leaked out, 
that he had initially come to the area as an agent for Brogden and 
that he procured a number of labourers for Mr. Smyth, Brogden's 
manager in Otago. This arrangement seems to have failed, and Smyth 
dismissed them all (see footnote 28). The first publicity about this 
arrangement had been posted in the area in November 1872 in the 
following notice: 
Notice is hereby given that the Government 
being desirous of making a railway, therefore 
Brogden have employed Ah Tong to issue notices 
and employ Chinese at the rate of Ss.6d. a day. 
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It also included the class of men desired and information 
that if they could not provide their own provisions John Ah Tong 
would do so until they could provide their own. It was by 
Mr. Brodgen Herald 21 January l873}. 
In the court case that took place in Tokomairiro before 
J.P. Maitland between John Ah Tong and Ah Foo, the pI ff, Ah Tong 
was accused of not paying Ah Foo £5.11.0 in wages owing to him 
21 January 1873). During the giving of evidence, 
Mr. Smyth, Brogden's manager, testified that as far as he was 
concerned Ah Tong had been offered a sub-contract for forty men 
and that Ah Tong would be paid 10d. per cubic yard for cuttings 
and excavation (ibid.). Ah Tong then went off and came back with 
eighty men who apparently went to work despite the requirement for 
only forty men. Ah Tong also went to some local storekeepers and 
bought £85 worth of provisions for the men and charged them to Mr. 
Smyth .}. 
In the second week of December 1872 another notice appeared 
in the area for 'the employment of Chinese labour: 
... formerly the work had not been done properly, 
and therefore Ah Tong had been employed to 
employ more suitable parties. The Government 
have considered they would only employ suitable 
and steady parties. Those who wish to be 
employed can come, and will be paid up at the 
end of four weeks - on Saturday of the fourth 
week. Those who do not wish to work by the day 
can obtain contract work. Three feet European 
and two and a half Chinese measure shall be a 
yard. If wheel-barrows are , 10d. a 
yard, if they are not, 9d. a yard. The money 
would be paid in 14 days, or so according to 
work done. If you wish employment, come with 
your friends, and find it with Ah Tong. 
(Dated the 8th day of Chinese 12 the month). 
21 January l873} 
\fuether or not the first notice had been translated into 
unknown, although Ah Tong said that he had had it translated, but 
according to Ah Foo the second one was posted everywhere .). 
Unlike the first, it gave no details of wages or arrangements for 
provisions, and it certainly did not tell of Yett Chung and Chin 
Chuke, the clerk and timekeeper employed by Ah Tong, the latter 
at 115 a week (ibid.). 
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Ah Tong's story of the negotiations with Brogden also provide 
a startling contrast to that of Mr. Smyth. According to Ah Tong, 
Brogden had first asked him to go to China and get 1000 men, but 
Ah Tong told him that there were plenty in Melbourne, Sydney and 
Otago (cf. Ho Ah Mei). After this, Brogden had apparently received 
a telegram from Smyth stating that Ah Tong was to proceed to Otago 
to procure men at a salary of£2.2.0 a day when travelling and 
J.'l 1 0 d h .. h 29 ~ . . a ay w en supervlSlng t e men. Smyth maintained that he 
had no knowledge of this arrangement and knew nothing of the 
12 weeks' salary at £1.1.0 and the £44 for 22 days travelling 
expenses that Ah Tong said Brogden owed to him. Smyth maintained 
that he had paid Ah Tong £343 for piece-work and day-work and a 
further £107.11.7, but according to Ah Tong this was still £80 short. 
Ah Tong had asked the paymaster not to tell the men that he received 
the second amount until such time as he could get it from a friend 
in Dunedin and then pay the men (Bruce Herald, 21 January 1873) . 
The summation of the case by the judge hardly resolved the 
matter. In his opinion, if the plaintiff had willingly entered into 
a contract with Ah Tong by agreeing to pay him 3d. a day for having 
procured him labour then there was no misunderstanding. Further, he 
suggested that it would have made more sense to pay them 5/9d. instead 
of 6/- (Bruce Herald, 28 January 1873), 
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In the interim another contract had been made for Chinese 
labour with the Chinese storekeeper at Milton. During the case 
numerous Chinese had been camped in the local area and had even 
attended the trial, but now that the 'unfortunate connection with 
30 Ah Tong' had been revealed they could go back to work. The paper 
obviously sympathized with the Chinese labourers and, further, 
pleaded with parents to stop their children annoying and insulting 
orderly and peaceable Chinese on the streets Herald 
24 January 1873). 
The extent to which the employment of Chinese labour was 
perpetuated is unknown except for the following statistics which 
appeared in the Census: 
TABLE 4': Chinese as Road Rai Labourer 1874-76. 
----------~~----------~------~--------~----~--------
Construction Labour 31 Undefined Labour 
1874 159 99 
1878 58 135 
1881 77 56 
1886 22 55 
(Census, 1874-1886) 
Generally it seems as though the opposition died down, perhaps due 
to economic prosperity plus the fact that large numbers of assisted 
immigrants were also entering the country at the same time. In the 
period 1870 till 1881, before the first restrictive Act was passed 
in an attempt to limit Chinese immigration, 6,077 entered 
New Zealand and 3,100 departed (Appendix II), and overall Chinese 
population had increased from 2,641 in 1871 to 5,004 by 1881 
(Appendix I). In Australia the Chinese population had increased in 
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the period from 1871 to 1881 from 28,351 to 38,533, and Queensland 
had passed the Chinese Immigration Restriction Act in 1877 which 
imposed a flO poll tax (Choi 1975:22-25). 
The period from 1873 to the late l870s was fairly peaceful for 
the Chinese, and they seemed to have been able to persist with little 
opposition. There were two significant events which do merit 
mention. The first concerns the movement of Chinese to the West 
Coast, which seems to have started in 1868. In May of that year 
seven or eight Chinese were recorded as arriving in Hokitika overland 
from Otago (West Coast Times, 27 May 1868). The numbers were initially 
small,and there were only twenty-four Chinese reported in Westland 
in 1871 (see Appendix III). Even though the resident numbers remained 
small, there were large groups that disembarked in Hokitika. In 1874 
two groups arrived numbering in total 350 persons, although their 
arrival was greeted with little more than curiosity at the time. By 
1879, however, the area had become one of the centres for anti-
Chinese agitation fostered by people like Seddon, who had come from 
England to Australia and then to Westland. More will be said about 
this in Chapter 4. 
The second event concerns the attempt by the Chinese to have 
Warden Beetham of Queenstown removed from office. Beetham was well 
known in the gold fields, by both Chinese and Europeans, for his 
stern justice, and it appears that in 1872 the Chinese in the 
Wakatipu District actually organized to accomplish their task. 
In 1872 a petition was sent to the Provincial Council in Otago 
which went as follows: 32 
CHINESE PETITTION AGAINST MR. WARDEN BEETHAM 
A book for the collection of money issued by many 
who deliberated. 
We, the Flowery people have not counted it far to 
corne a thousand ley (3000 miles), and having 
arrived in a strange country in search of wealth, 
expected that Chinese and foreigners would dwell 
together in harmony; but at Queenstown there 
is a great feeling of anger, indignation, and 
resentment against the magistrate of that place, 
who is wicked and vicious, a violator of decorum 
and moral propriety, and introducing confusion 
and anarchy into the relations of life. 
If we go to law, this dog magistrate does not 
distinguish and separate clearly, but at once 
takes and inflicts fines on us, the Flowery people. 
Thus it may be seen that this dog magistrate _ 
appropriates the fines in the dark ... 
A great lawyer, who is just and upright, respects 
us, the Flowery people, as people of original 
ability and our bellies filled with talent ... 
With him was spoken clearly about the payment of 
money. If the lawyer explains clearly and 
manages ably this business so that this 
magistrate shall not in Queenstown perform his 
functions, then he will receive the money. But 
if he explains clearly and the magistrate is not 
removed from office in Queenstown, he will not 
touch the smallest amount, but it will be 
returned to the subscribers. Certainly, if this 
dog magistrate is sent away, truly we shall 
rejoice ... 
Those who are the treasurers and will see that 
the money is disposed of as stated are 
Ye Goon (Store name) 
Kwan Hay 
Oun Woa (Store name) 
~g~g~oo 
(Gilkison, 1930:155) 
A list of names followed the petition, which indicated a 
list of donors to the cause, each having contributed between £5 
and 3/6d. (Gilkison, 1930:156). The petition reached the 
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Council, and it was referred to Select Committee. In the meantime 
the miners of the Arrow District, Shotover, Skippers, the Chinese 
and European miners of Moke Creek, residents of Franklin and the 
Ill. 
settlers and miners of Queenstown all submitted petitions saying 
that the services of Warden Beetham be retained (Votes and 
Proceedings of the Provincial Council of Otago, l872:xxvi and xxix). 
The Chinese at Wakitipu had managed to get 827 signatures (which 
in the course of the inquiry were supposedly proved to be false 
(Gilkison, 1930:156), and those on the other side managed to get 834. 
The Select Committee reported back in seven days completely 
exonerating Warden Beetham (Votes and Proceedings of the Provincial 
Council of Otago, 1873:5). The proof used was an examination of 
cases in the Warden's Court from November 1870, where it was shown 
that of the 15 Chinese cases only 8 had resulted in judgement 
against the Chinese (OW, 5 July 1873). In the Resident Magistrate's 
Court for the same period, there were 43 cases between Chinese and 
Europeans of which 24 were decided against the Chinese (ibid.). 
In the area of costs, it was stated that they were high for 
Europeans and Chinese but that the Europeans actually paid more in 
fines (ibid.). 
In looking at this situation, it seems very likely that the 
issue was the Wakitipu District ,renowned as an area where the 
, : 
Chinese were not liked and where relations were strained. One only 
has to think of the case that Haughton went to great lengths to 
explain in the Chinese Immigration Committee Report of 1871 where 
the Chinese lost a claim in both the Warden's Court and the District 
Court (AJHR 1871, H-4:7). It does not appear that this problem 
occurred in any other place in the gold fields. On the contrary, 
in at least one case a warden was actually presented with a gift 
and a speech by the Chinese community upon his resignation (Mayhew, 
1947:91) . 
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These two events are significant in that they herald the 
beginning of a new era in New Zealand politics, the beginning of 
the long depression and the development of an increasingly hostile 
environment for the Chinese in New Zealand. Despite these changes, 
however, mining and other occupations persisted as viable 
occupations for the Chinese population in the gold Ids. Chinese 
communities grew in various areas, and a whole network of trading 
relationships between groups of miners and shopkeepers developed to 
provide for the distribution of goods and services. Some of this 
has been imp in the foregoing, but a more penetrating view has 
been made possible by an unusual set of documents produced by a 
European who lived and worked with the Chinese in the gold fields 
for several years during the late 1800s. Although chronologically 
out of context, the intimate view he provides is far more useful 
for analysing social structure even though it is mediated by 
Christian ideology. Besides the sociological import of the 
information that the Reverend Alexander Don and his followers 
provided, their presence also marks an unusual and continuous 
relationship the church and the Chinese in New Zealand. 
The relationship is unique for three reasons. Perhaps the 
foremost is that, although various denominations of the church 
have been active with overseas communities of Chinese, the 
relationship has at best been intermittent, which is contrary to 
the case in New Zealand. Secondly, the relationship that developed 
in New Zealand was also reinforced by mission activity in 
villages where the New Zealand Chinese had come from, and, thirdly, 
the church has been instrumental for many years as a mediator 
between the and the New Zealand government. 
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The relationship started with the great influx of people into 
Otago during the gold rush and the realisation that the Presbyterian 
Church had not only Europeans to minister to but also a growing 
Chinese population. In the Victoria gold fields of Australia, the 
Presbyterian Church already had a thriving mission and was also 
training Chinese missionaries for work elsewhere. A request for a 
missionary, sent to the Victoria Church, produced after two years 
a Chinese missionary by the name of Paul Ah Chin (Wan Ah Chin), 
who was assigned to Lawrence and remained there for four years, 
leaving because of unexplained friction in 1874 (McNeur, 1951:14). 
Paul Ah Chin came back for one more try in 1877, working with 
Reverend Hugh Cowie from Amoy who had returned to New Zealand. 
Unfortunately, Reverend Cowie spoke the wrong Chinese language 
and eventually resigned, and Paul Ah Ching again returned to 
Australia. The vacant position was to be filled eventually by 
Alexander Don, the son of a miner in Ballarat who at the age of 14 
came under the influence of Reverend Fitchett, who encouraged both 
the Christian development and educational pursuits of the young 
boy (McNeur, 1951:17). Eventually Don came to New Zealand to pursue 
his missionary activity; thinking that he would be sent to the 
New Hebrides but finding that position filled, he volunteered for 
the job of missioner to the Chinese. 
In 1879 Don was sent to China and spent 18 months in Canton 
learning Chinese. He returned to New Zealand with a Chinese 
teacher and, after some time at the Theological Hall in Dunedin, was 
sent to the biggest Chinese mining centre at the time, which was 
the Riverton-Round Hill area in Southland. It is during his time 
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in Southland, 1882 till 1889, that Don records his observations 
and dealings with the Chinese community in the New Zealand 
P b . 33 h' h bl' h d hI res yter1an, w 1C was pu 1S e mont y. The diary that is 
published there is very detailed, and, although heavily directed 
towards Don's particular purpose, it does allow one to extract other 
information which is not recorded elsewhere. There were, at least 
once, objections to this diary being published. It was felt that 
this information was trivial and monotonous, but Don persevered 
arguing that it is the details about life and people which are 
important (NZP, 1 June 1885:223). 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1 In 1861 the Member for Otago in the House of Representatives 
became the first government member to bring the issue of 
Chinese to the attention of the government. Anticipating 
that numbers of Chinese would flock to Otago for the gold, 
he wanted to know whether the government would be willing to 
take steps to prevent such an influx. The response was 
negative, his attention being drawn to the treaty signed 
between Lord Elgin and the Chinese Government in 1859. A 
clause in this treaty prescribed that " ... all Chinese shall 
be at liberty to take service in any British possession, 
and the Emperor binds himself to allow them to ship them-
selves and families from free ports of China, in British 
ships, without let or hindrance". Because of this, it was 
deemed impossible for the Colonial government to impose any 
tax or restrictive legislation on the Chinese. 
(New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1861:373, hereafter 
abbreviated to NZPD). 
2 The meeting was made up of James MacAndrew, member for the 
House for Port Chalmers~ E.P. Cargill, President of the 
Chamber of Commerce and shipping merchant agent and owner, 
first director of Union Steamship Company and the main 
owner of ships carrying Chinese to Otago; W.H. Reynolds, 
T. Dick, A.W. Morris and F.J. Moss all members of the 
Provincial Council and in shipping or merchant activity and 
W.A. Tolme also in shipping (see Buckingham, 1974:6). 
3 The Chamber of Commerce prior to this presented two 
resolutions to the government, one dealt with protection 
of life and property and the other which said, 'That it is 
desirable that the immigration of Chinese into the province 
be encouraged', (Otago Daily Times, 28 September 1865). 
The Provincial Treasurer agreed to give verbal assurance 
for the first provided a written submission was received 
from the Chamber of Commerce outlining the grounds on 
which the request was made, but refused to give assent 
to the second resolution (Otago Daily Times, 28 September 
1865). 
4 In February 1864 there had been an estimated 22,000 to 
24,000 European gold miners in the gold fields, but by 
1866 the number had dropped to 6,000, by 1867 to 4,414 
and it was only in 1871 that the number of European miners 
again increased to 5,000 with the advent of quartz-mining. 
In 1867 there were 1,213 Chinese males and six Chinese 
females in New Zealand (Forrest, 1961:67-69). 
5 The Otago Daily Times is hereafter abbreviated to ODT. 
6 The Otago Witness is hereafter abbreviated to ow. 
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7 According to the 1871 article another batch, (eighteen men) 
arrived some days later and was despatched to another area 
of the goldfields, again under Ho Ah Mei's guidance 
(ODT, 8 June 1871). The decision to send them to another 
area was to give them experience of another gold field 
area, according to Ho Ah Mei. The information about 
various areas, was no doubt,expected to filter back to 
him since they were still in his debt. 
8 According to the Otago Witness, eight of the party hired a 
dray, loaded their provlslons on it and left for Blackstone 
Hill to ]Oln three or four of their countrymen (OW, 25 
January 1866). 
9 In the time Ah Mei was in Dunedin he apparently endeared 
himself to the local police by helping in the prosecution 
of one of his fellow countrymen who had entered New Zealand 
with the express purpose of making counterfeit gold. Ah 
Mei seems to have known of the arrival and ~ctually 
informed the police (ODT, 8 June 1871). 
10 The nature of this arrangement is unclear and is never 
specified although it does appear that he had an agent in 
Dunedin who was supposed to take care of his interests. 
11 This seems to have been the first direct passage from Hong 
Kong to New Zealand even though as noted on page 
there had been passengers from China as early as 1869 
although they appeared to have gone via Melbourne. 
12 The gold field's papers were according to Buckingham 
' ... unusually anti-Chinese and employed a vicious polemic 
which added nothing to the literature of the time nor to 
historiographical sources of the period, beyond 
demonstrating a vehement dislike to the "heathen Chinese'" 
(Buckingham, 1974:5). 
13 The Chinese communities usually contained several shops 
providing cooked and other food, a blacksmith and a 
butcher, gambling houses that seemed to have been ubiquitous in 
the goldfields with fifteen to twenty reportedly exist-
ing in 1870 by the newly arrived Chinese Interpreter, 
Mr. John Aloo (OW, 1 October 1870). John Aloo eventually 
settled in Clyde and married an Irish girl. They 
apparently had a family of boys and girls, and all could 
speak English well (Appendix to the Journal of the House of 
Representatives H-5:l7, hereafter abbreviated to AJHR). 
14 The Tuapeka Times is hereafter abbreviated to TT. 
15 The missionary was Paul Ah Chin (Wan Ah Chin), who had 
been trained by Reverend Robert Hamilton of Fitzroy. 
Paul Ah Chin arrived in New Zealand in 1870 and was sent 
to the Synod of Lawrence. He remained there, according 
to McNeur, until 1874, when he returned to Australia. He 
had managed to convert eleven Chinese in his time at 
Lawrence (McNeur, 1951:14). 
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16 'Any person not being the holder of a miner's right, licence 
or lease duly empowering him in that behalf, who shall mine 
for gold, or occupy or carryon any business upon any Crown 
Lands, shall be liable to the penalties following - that is 
to say: for the first offence a sum not exceeding £5; for 
the second or any subsequent offence a sum not exceeding ilo 
nor less than ~, with imprisonment in some Goal, there to 
remain for any time not exceeding one calendar month for 
every £5 or fractional part of £5 so to be paid." 
(Extract from Section 172 of the Miner's Act - also 
translated into Chinese and posted in the gold fi€lds). 
17 According to McLean, MHR for Waikouati, the scrap iron had 
been sent to China in exchange for tea, which was brought 
back to New Zealand. McLean, who argued against the total 
restriction of Chinese immigration in 1880 used this 
evidence to show how the Chinese were saving New Zealand 
cash (NZPD, 1880, 38:101). 
18 The entry for Chew Chong and Ventnor are the only two 
entries which deal with the New Zealand Chinese in the 
Encyclopaedia of New Zealand. 
19 The Secretary and Inspector of Customs in Wellington became 
curious about this export activity in 1873 and wrote to a 
contact in New Plymouth to inquire as to the nature of the 
operation. William Seed, of the Customs Department feared 
that the Chinese had a monopoly of the market and were 
getting the fungus for less than its value (AJHR, H-39, 1873:1). 
The reply from the New Plymouth customs officer stated that 
since Chew Chong had started the operation other Chinese 
merchants had also appeared, buying the fungus from settlers 
and Maoris. Most of the fungus was sent by boat to Dunedin, 
and the price paid in his area was £20 per ton (ibid:1-2). 
Between 1872 and 1920 £433,623 worth was exported from New 
Zealand to Hong Kong, Australia and the west coast of the 
United States at an average price of (54 per ton 
(Statistics of New Zealand 1872-1920). 
20 M.H.R. stands for Member of the House of Representatives. 
21 All members of the committee were foreign born. 
22 John Ah Tong's name was to become well known in the gold fields 
in 1872-73, since he was supposedly employed by Brogden, the 
contractor for railway construction in New Zealand, as a labour 
agent for the employment of Chinese. 
23 Gilkison in recounting the story of a Chinese merchant in 
Queenstown who collected money from his fellow countrymen 
when they were engaged in litigation so that the judge 
could be paid - says that when the merchant went bankrupt 
his books were examined and payments ofi30 were recorded. 
Gilkison adds that of course the payments went straight in 
the pocket of the merchant (Gilkison, 1930:157). 
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24 Opium, brandy and tobacco already had a heavy duty on them, 
and these, according to some, were consumed in large 
quantities by the Chinese, especially when they were well off. 
25 Although the Warden's office at Switzer had replied in 
fairly favourable terms to the questions about the Chinese, 
the miners in the local area were not as charitably disposed. 
Wood sent in his reply in September 1871, and by the end of 
October in the same year a petition had been sent by 155 
miners in the area to the Public Petitions Committee of the 
government. They wanted 'an effectual bar to the_further 
influx of Chinese' and a discontinuance of issuing miners 
rights to the Chinese (AJHR, 1871, H-5B:l). 
It was reported in the Otago Witness on 14 October that some 
Chinese miners in the area were willing to support the 
petition since they too feared further competition from 
their own countrymen (OW, 14 October 1871). 
26 This was not the first time that Chinese labour had been 
suggested as a remedy to labour shortages in New Zealand 
(see page 80). 
27 When Ormond relates this story in Parliament in 1896 while 
debating the Asiatic Restriction Bill then before them, he 
says that the circular asked each Superintendent whether 
this proposal would be 'desirable or have a disastrous effect 
on the country'. As can be seen from the above, the approach 
was far less open ended, yet even in 1872 he said, 'the 
government of the Colony never had any intention of bringing 
Chinese into the Colony to be employed on railways and what-
ever the wishes of Superintendents might have been the 
Government would not have hesitated to refuse their consent 
to contractors employing Chinese labour on the railways' 
(NZPD, 1872, 12:163). Even more interesting is the fact 
that Brogden's employees were actively recruiting workers in 
some English counties (OW, 27 April 1872) but that it was 
readily known in Otago that the contractor needed workers and 
could not wait much longer for their arrival. By November 
1872, negotiations for Chinese workers were well under way 
(see Bruce Herald, 20 November 1872). 
28 According to the Otago Witness, sixty Chinese had been hired 
to begin work on 25th November. They were hired on a daily 
basis but objected to this after several days, insisting 
that they should be employed on a contract basis (see Baldwin, 
1975:40-41 for a complete description of this situation). 
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29 Another version was reported in the Tuapeka Times in 1872. 
The article said that John Ah Tong and some 'Celestial 
friends' had gone by coach from Lawrence to Tokomairo to 
procure navvies for Brogden. It also added that Brogden 
wanted 500 Chinese and that he had wanted Ah Tong to go to 
China but Ah Tong had declined. Brogden had, however, 
found another agent, according to the article, and he would 
import large numbers of Chinese 'which he will have working 
at Manawatu' (West Coast Times, 12 February 1872). 
30 The concern of local residents was evident. The Milton 
Sergeant of Police together with other residents, visited 
the Chinese camp, and noting the demoralized state and lack 
of food, were instrumental in getting the Recreation Ground 
Committee to employ the Chinese at 2/6d. each to tidy up 
the grounds (Baldwin, 1975:44). 
31 The West Coast Times of 1874 estimated that there were 1,833 
Chinese in Otago at the time, 533 miners and 350 employed on 
railway works between Tokomairo and Lawrence. It-added that 
there were approximately 200 at Waitahuna, 18 at Glenmor 
50 at Adams and Miller's Flat, 900 at Queenstown, Cromwell 
and above Teviot and 350 at Nokomai, Waikaka and Switzers 
(West Coast Times, 23 January 1874). 
32 According to Gilkison this petition was found by a European 
in Otago and sent to Melbourne, where it was translated and 
published in the Daily Times, 16 June 1873. Further, the 
actual copy that went to the Council contained nothing about 
the lawyer and merely said that they wanted the Warden of 
the District removed and another placed in his position. 
33 The New Zealand Presbyterian will hereafter be abbreviated to 
NZP. 
CHAPTER 4 
A CHINESE COMMUNITY IN THE GOLD FIELDS 
1870-1890 
When Don arrived at Round Hill's Chinese settlement in 1881, 
he wrote the following description of what he saw: 
The Chinese settlement of a hundred and twenty 
huts covers about five square miles of spur and 
gully; but, like a sort of nucleus near the 
centre, is a collection of 38 houses, by Europeans 
called 'Canton' - by Chinese called 'The Street 
of Chinese men' synonomous with Walker Street in 
Dunedin ... of the 38 places five are business 
houses, 24 are gambling and opium smoking, while 
the use of most of the remainder is too easily 
guessed. 
(Annual Inland Tour, 1893-94:2)1 
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Don. described this nucleus as supplying the needs of some 400 Chinese 
miners both as regards everyday needs and also for occasions 
held during the year. There was one double-storied building which 
was a tea shop owned by a Riverton firm and which Don was allowed to 
use as a meeting house for his gatherings with the local Chinese. 
When Don looked at the local gold fields, he was amazed at the 
destruction that was taking place as the result of sluicing. 
The Chinese miners seemed unperturbed by this destruction and 
in fact rationalised it by insisting that New Zealand had no 
shui', since it was of an earthly nature and therefore one 
could dig gold here. This also explained why such action could not 
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be tolerated in China, since China was T'ien wan - of heavenly 
nature - but it could not explain why Chinese miners considered the 
Riverton area to have good 'fung shui' when it produced gold. 
Most of the Chinese in Riverton had corne from China and had 
paid from€8 to tl3 (40 taels of silver) for the passage. This money, 
usually more than any individual would have, was borrowed from kin 
or fellow villagers at a considerable rate of interest, sometimes as 
much as 2% per month, which worked out to 25% per annum (NZP, 1 July 
1884:3). Sometimes the ticket was paid through the 'credit ticket 
system', which meant that the individual had to work off his 
passage before he was free to do what he wanted. This system 
operated in New Zealand, but it is generally maintained that there was 
no coolie-labour system operating (Tour, 1905-06:16). The only other 
system that operated for bringing out relatives was sponsorship by 
a relative in New Zealand. This was possible only if the benefactor 
in New Zealand was sure of the relative (usually confined to brothers 
or sons) and was also wealthy enough to provide passage money. This 
limited the scheme to wealthy merchants until such time as Chinese 
in New Zealand were ensured of a regular wage through being employed 
as labour or self-employed in their own shops, which became much more 
prevalent after 1900. 
Once the Chinese had arrived at their destination, of course, 
it was their express purpose to earn as much as possible so that 
they could return to China, discharge their debts, should they have 
any, either in China or New Zealand and perhaps even return again. 
This system has been made to sound simple and it was definitely 
believed to be a simple process by relatives in China, who thought 
2 that the gold merely had to be dug up and sold. As Mr. F.L. Law 
remarked to Don in 1911: 
I can see now that it is really hard. I used 
to think that it was only pretended; for we 
said in China that if their lot was really so 
they would return home sooner and not 
remain so long away. The home folk rather 
think that digging for gold is like digging 
peanuts - that the ground is shallow and the gold 
in lumps. 
(Tour 1909-11:8) 
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Further if we look at some statistics recorded meticulously by Don 
in 1896 we can see that, not only were the miners of the time fairly 
old when they arrived in New Zealand, but also few had been able to 
afford a home and, in fact, had been away from home for a 
considerable number of years. It was estimated that at least seven 
out of ten of the Chinese at Round Hill had wives at home staying 
with husbands' kin looking after children and other family 
members while their husbands sent, or were supposed to send, 
remittances home (NZP, 1 September 1884:43). Many of the men lost 
touch through time. If they were not married and never went home 
to get married, it was a sign of poverty, and often men were loath 
to go home with only ilOO, since they feared it would not clear their 
debts (Tour, 1909-11:10). Letters were never received from China 
unless remittances had arrived home or kin wanted more money, and so 
stories would be made up about bad seasons, the high cost of living 
and the money that had to be borrowed so that could be kept 
with home .). In one case Don recorded a man of 66 who had been 
in New Zealand for 27 years and had not heard from home in 18 years. 
Even though the man was a comparatively educated person with 12 years 
of schooling in China, he had not written home and he had sent 
no money home, nobody wrote to him (Tour 1900-01:25). More 
responsible men sent money home regularly and did receive letters, 
but they often told of hardship and, as shown in the following letter, 
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the rather idealistic view held by those at home about one's 
earning power in the gold fields. This letter was written to two 
brothers in the gold fields by their mother, which Don suggested 
was unusual since women rarely wrote to their men overseas, it being 
always a man's responsibility: 
These words are to let my sons Cassia-Forest and 
Cassia-Foundation know, that in the ninth moon 
of last year cousin Prosperity brought home two 
sovereigns; this year in the second moon Rising-
Aim brought three; and in the fifth moon Shining 
brought six--all these were safely received, so 
you need not be anxious. In the fifth moon of 
this year your father left this world, and was 
buried in a lucky spot on Old Prince Hill. Thi3 
year is very dry, the farmers have no harvest, and 
rice is extremely dear. Your two younger brothers 
at home are in great distress, in fact dying from 
poverty, suffering piercing hardships. Your mother 
is aged, and her body frail. I pray you two 
brothers a thousand times over, on receipt of this 
letter, to return home at once and see your 
mother's face. It is most urgent. If you continue 
longer in foreign lands your aged mother may be 
like a candle in the wind. Although you two men 
of wealth amass a myriad sovereigns, I fear you will 
drink bitter regret into your soulds. This paper 
is short and words are many, so it is really 
difficult to say fully how important it is that you 
SOON RETURN HOME. It is impossible to over-state 
this command. 
(Tour, 1905-06:22) 
There was also evidence that letters which requested more money were 
sent despite the fact that the family in China was well off, which 
left the male overseas constantly insecure about his position if he 
returned home. 
The outcome of all these factors was a growing reluctance to 
return home. In New Zealand they felt free to do with their money 
what they wanted, even if it meant spending their year's savings for 
a holiday in Dunedin or Alexandra. If they did this in China, they 
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had readily admitted they would face the vituperations of their fellow 
villagers and especially their wives. One old man who returned to 
China wrote back to New Zealand that he could not take the drudgery 
of working in the fields nOr all the problems at home. If he loafed 
and gambled in his own market town, his family and neighbours led 
him, and all he wanted to do was to return to New Zealand, but he 
was too old and had no Exemption Certificate3 (Tour, 1909-11:17). 
There are other reasons also which lead one to suspect that 
the ideal of the sojourner was just that - an ideal often disrupted 
by other problems. In one case Don recorded the unusual 
of a father who had sold his claim, sending his son home instead of 
home himself, which was the usual custom. When Don inquired 
as to the reason for this behaviour, he was told that the 
could not return home for fear that his older brother would return 
with him and kill him in China. It transpired that the younger 
brother had given 98 ounces of gold to the older brother to 
home and divide equally between their two respective families. The 
older brother, however, gave his younger brother's wife only 36/-, 
spending the rest on his own buildings and land. younger 
brother, hearing of this, held a feast for his friends in New Zealand 
and told them of the treachery. When the other brother returned to 
New Zealand to take up the claim, he was unable to help and was 
forced to sell his claim to the younger brother (Tour 1892-93:13-14). 
The elder brother apparently was awaiting his chance for revenge 
should the younger brother return home. 
In other cases families died leaving no 1 close relatives 
in China and, rather than returning home to an unpredictable 
retirement they were happy to eke out a life of 
New Zealand. 
subsistence in 
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Although there were windfalls and many cases of miners taking 
home considerable wealth, there were other cases which indicate a 
minimum being sent home. Table 5 gives a sample of a number of cases 
Don recorded over a period of seven years. 
TABLE 5: Recorded amounts sent Home by Chinese Miners, Gamblers 
and Businessmen, 1882-1889. 
No. of Men Total Amount in £. Years in New Zealand 
1 70a 
1 600b 
40 3000c 
5d 300 6-8 5 300 6 
1 200e 
1 900 f 1 170 10-20 yrs 
1 120 
1 200 
1 150 
1 200 
1 300g 
8 1080h 4-14 
1 184i 
1 l60j 5 
1 159k 27 
2 40 18 
1 171 16 
6 2000m 
TOTAL 80 19,150n 
Source: New Zealand Presbyterian 1882-1889. 
Notes 
a Out of the £:70, £20 would be required to pay passage home. 
b This was the largest amount recorded that was taken from Round 
Hill by a single man. 
c It was estimated that these 40 men also took about £3000 to give 
to relatives of friends in amounts ranging from Jrr to tlO sums. 
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d Four of these men were of the surname Chan and from the same 
village. 
e This man also carried £700 given to him by friends for delivery 
in China. 
f This group of men were allan S.S. Charlton which sank on its 
way from Newcastle, New South Wales to Hong Kong. 
g This man wanted to go horne, buy land and build a house and then 
corne back to New Zealand or go to America. 
h Three of these men were in business and the rest were miners. Two 
other men were sent with them with their passage paid by friends. 
i This money was made by running a lottery saloon in Round Hill. 
This money was actually sent horne in this period. j 
k This money had been won in two lotteries and the man concerned 
actually paid the passage of a village mate. 
1 The amount was sent horne. 
m The six bodies were recovered after they had drowned when the 
steamer Changchow sank in 1885. 
n Don was told in 1883 that land cost 40 to 60 taels of silver per 
mau, or ilOO per acre (NZP, 2 April 1883:184). This would mean that 
the total amount taken horne by the 81 men in the above t.able would 
buy only approximately 102 acres of land (NZP, 2 April 1883:184). 
It indicates that the range in amounts was considerable, and 
obviously good luck in either mining or the games of chance provided the 
difference between the large and small amounts. Often Don found 
that the older men, perhaps with less energy and fewer village mates 
or clansmen to call upon to mine larger areas, were forced to 
cradle alone. If one had partners, however, the situation could be 
much better. In good times, that is, in a good claim with plenty of 
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water for sluicing, a group of men could make as much as '4 to i6 
each in a week, while a single old man working alone might as 
as 13/- in three weeks (NZP, 1 November 1882:87). While the 
former group might seem lucky, one has to acknowledge that it often 
took up to six months to open a claim. This would be a period where 
one had to live off what had already been saved and was described as 
a time when men became irritable and also poor (NZP,l March 1887:164), 
The situation also varied seasonally. In May the rains came 
and provided plenty of water which was needed for sluicing, but 
also proved to make mining very hazardous. Since many of~the mines 
were actually holes dug into the sides of creeks or rivers, excess 
water made the likelihood of slips and cave-ins a constant possibility, 
often resulting in the death of an unsuspecting miner. In the dry 
weather, water became a scarce resource, and there is some' hint that 
if it came from another claim it had to be paid for. Whether water 
was scarce or plentiful, when times were good miners worked 
ly, often all night. This for the Chinese miner was real 
work, but there was also trifling or leisure (Haan), which for them 
included chopping firewood, cutting mining timbers or bailing water, 
all of which, according to them, took little time (NZP, 2 October 
1882:67). 
While gold mining was intended to yield profits without much 
investment, a sojourn was not without a cost of living, despite the 
fact that the standard of living was kept to a minimum most of the 
time. To start mining the Chinese, like anyone else, were required 
to buy a Miner's Right for £2. If one did not pay it, which, as 
already mentioned, was a risk some Chinese miners took, then one 
always took the chance of being caught and subjected to a fine. After 
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establishing a claim, then the matter of obtaining supplies required 
attention. Initially in the gold fields, various merchant shops 
in Dunedin had been the sole source of supply, but as miners moved 
out into various districts a network of shops followed them, and each 
local community always had as many Chinese merchants as the market 
could bear. 
Don recorded the presence of Chinese supply shops in Nokomai, 
Maori Point, Kyeburn, Waikia, Ophir, Roxburgh, Gore, Macreas, Clyde, 
Alexandra, Butcher's Gully and Arrowtown in the late l800s 
Chapter 3, Map 4). These were all single shops, while in like 
Naseby there were two shops, at least three in Round 11 (one of 
which was named 'Virtuous Store'), several in Lawrence, and at 
Riverton there were four. 4 These were larger centres with a resident 
community all year round, more in the winter months when individuals 
with savings migrated into larger communities to wait till 
The merchant shop provided food stuffs like rice and pickles 
imported from China and rice from India and Java (NZP, 1 December 
1882:104). According to Don, the average weekly cost of food for a 
e miner was about 11/- to l2/~, much of this taken up with the 
of pork and rice. Since the rewards of mining were 
intermittent, merchants had to extend credit, but in the years 
to insulate themselves against bankruptcy they often added large 
mark-ups of 100 to 300% to their wares. In one case where a 
Queenstown merchant went bankrupt, his books showed total liabilities 
of over £5000, £3000 of which was owed to two other firms. The 
outstanding accounts amounted tot4000, but this had been over a period 
of eighteen years (Tour, 1894-95:14). According to Don the rates of 
mark-up and the amount of credit dwindled as the gold became less 
plentiful and the population more depleted. When businesses ceased, 
they also terminated their credit, as one storekeeper in Nokomai 
indicated by a notice on his door that read: 
As the business is being wound up, credit 
diminished and bank accounts reduced, our 
intimate friends should not show their 
SUSP1C10US countenances for loan(s) nor 
credit, as refusal is inelegant. 
(Tour, 1893-94:8) 
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Debts then, were a perennial problem to both miner and merchant, and 
the merchant seems to have had two possible methods of keeping track 
of his clients. Sometimes merchants would employ collectors who 
would have to go around to the various areas and collect the debts. 
Don was once asked to collect several hundred pounds worth of debts 
for a storekeeper in Tapanui, but he declined (NZP, 1 February 1883:147). 
Otherwise the payment of debts depended on Chinese tradition, since at 
New Year, which fell usually in February, all were supposed to pay 
their debts. If one had outstanding debts, creditors pasted their 
accounts on their house doors or on the front of their shops for all 
to see. The only way to avoid the debt was to leave one's residence 
over New Year, returning afterwards, with the hope that one's 
credit would be extended for yet another year (NZP, 2 April 1883:184-85). 
Shops also provided other services for their clientele, which 
included the writing of letters home for the illiterate miners at a 
cost of 2/- each (NZP, 1 September 1882:45), In at least one 
instance, a local store in Nokomai collected the county rates from 
local Chinese, All the notices would be sent to the store, and he 
would distribute them and collect the amount due, Obviously, this 
would give the local storekeeper considerable leverage, and in this 
particular case, two men, having in the previous year offended the 
shopkeeper, feared that he had destroyed their notices, thus placing 
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them in jeopardy (Tour, 1894-95:12). They solved their problem by 
giving the money to Don so that he could pay their rates. 
Whether or not Chinese merchants acted as banks 
debatable, and little evidence is apparent to support the contention. 
Judging by the attitude of the Chinese to banks, it seems unlikely 
that they would have entrusted their life savings to a storekeeper, 
yet they were willing to entrust it to friends and relatives to take 
home. The rationale expressed by at least one Chinese for not using 
the New Zealand banks, even though the banks went out of their way 
to advertise their services in Chinese, was not because of the 
institution but because of the mere activity of going to the bank. 
It was to Don in the following way: 
a man puts money in a bank it is soon 
found out, and then he is continually applied 
to for loans. 
(Tour, 1893-94:9) 
If one refused to give a loan to a clansman, it was considered a 
very grave insult, and no doubt social pressure through sip would 
attempt to correct one's meanness. 
Even more plentiful than the merchant shops in the gold fields 
but distributed in the same areas were the gambling and opium saloons. 
In some places they were part of the merchant's shop, but in many 
others they were separate, which meant that there had to be a viable 
local Chinese population sufficiently motivated to take time off work 
to come to the various gambling places. Opium smoking was less 
problematic for the supplier, since the addiction ensured a clientele. 
Most men seem to have used gambling as a means of recreation - a 
break from long, tedious hours of mining and something additional to 
do on festival days after or before the feast. Others, however, 
despondent over their failure at mining or about the general 
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situation of their sojourn, turned to gambling as a last resort 
where they might find wealth in another man's misfortune. s In one 
instance, Don noted that a man who had been in New Zealand eight 
years was killed on a claim at the age of 31 after about an acre of 
overhang had fallen on the claim. He had no relatives in China, 
since his parents were dead, and it was his village mates who took 
care of the burial of the body (NZP, 1 December 1882:106). of 
returning to the claim after this accident, the claim mates, also from 
the same village, became lottery ticket (paak kop piu)6 collectors in 
Riverton (NZP, 1 February 1883:146). They would go round from claim 
to claim collecting the marked-off lottery tickets and taking them 
to the lottery salon. When the lottery was drawn, they would again 
have to go around to each claim and deliver the accounts to the 
winners (NZP, 1 February 1883:147). For every ticket they sold they 
got 1/2d. from the proprietor, and from the winners they would get 
l/lOth of the amount collected (ibid.). An example of one of the 
accounts sent out to a winner by the collector is as follows: 
Heavy Knife (1) 
~) Water No. 21 mark (2) 
(enter ~e 5 (3) 
(7) ( 
(month Two 6 (4) 
(8) (ponder Pay ) (5) ( 20/- ) 
(glad 
( 
(evening 
( 
(9) Fair Profit House ---
(10) T'iu 
The figures in parentheses refer to notes of explanation and are read 
from the right side: (1) A secret mark denoting the day of issue. 
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(2) No. 21 in order of issue. On one ticket 5 characters struck off 
corresponded with the winning characters. (4) on two tickets 6 on 
each corresponded. (5) An order for the total amount won. (6) The 
cyclic term for the present year. (7) Enter month - "enter" being 
double entendre for "eight". (8) 29th evening - "ponder" being used 
for 20, and "glad" for nine. (9) Name of the salon. (10) A 
manufactured word to represent 9, the number of tickets lodged by 
the winners. The plain figures 8, 9, 10 are not written on these 
account slips: it is said to be a bad omen to write them, for if 
ticket holders were to hold tickets with so many corresponding 
numbers it would mean the breaking up for a while of the establishment. 
For 9 tickets lodged the winners would pay 4s.6d., with 2s. to the 
collector, leaving l3s.6d. net gain. The collector's receipts would 
be 2s. 4!zd., while the bank would lose to the extent of ISs. 10!zd. 
(NZP, 1 February 1883:147). 
The obvious implication of this kind of network organized 
through a lottery is that the movement of Chinese miners could be 
easily monitored by shop-owner and lottery-salon-owner alike. The 
role of the collector, then, was crucial in keeping both types of 
operations, which were run at some distance from their clientele, 
solvent. There were other gambling establishments, however, which 
depended on their clientele coming to them. Mahjong 
and fan tan were played at various establishments, which were 
especially busy during the weekends, when miners took time off 
to go to their nearest community centre. Don recorded the presence 
of over 150 men coming to the Round Hill gambling places on any 
one weekend (NZP, 1 December 1882:105). Those who tended the gaming 
tables got an average of 1/- for every £1 spent and were sometimes 
described as "La ka", one who does not usually look for work but waits 
for work to turn up (NZP, 1 December 1882: 105). 
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If one looks through Don's material, it becomes obvious that 
these establishments were located in every place where there was a 
Chinese shop. Often they were far more numerous, and in some towns, 
like Cromwell, Lawrence and Alexandra, there were anywhere from three 
to seven such places at anyone time. Don noted that their presence 
fluctuated with the wealth or the poverty of local miners there and 
also with the presence of men willing to take out shares to start the 
business. Usually it took only three or four men pooling their 
capital to start the operation, and it could continue as long as 
their shares remained in it. 
In Round Hill there once had been as many as twelve gambling 
houses, and to ensure enough business for all, they had worked out 
their own calendar in twelve-day cycles, which meant that at least 
one was open every day (Tour, 1894-95:4). The opening of the hall 
for the day was initiated by a loud shout down the street indicating 
the tables were ready for action (NZP, 11 January 1885:126). 
If one was lucky enough to win a substantial amount, then it 
was possible, having paid one's debts, to return to China or, as 
happened in one instance, at least retire for the year to the 
nearest town and leave one's claim to be worked by someone else 
(NZP, 1 October 1886:1). 
Gambling was illegal in the gold fields, but the police, 
generally pre-occupied with mining offences, infrequently arrested 
or fined Chinese, although periodic fines were reported in the Otago 
papers. Some Chinese were critical of their countrymen's habits, 
though, and in 1870 the Chinese interpreter John Aloo (previously 
mentioned) took it upon himself to announce to the Mount Ida Chronicle 
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that he was going to rid the gold fields of the fifteen or twenty 
gambling houses then in existence (OW, 1 October, 1870). Judging 
by their continued existence and their popularity, it seems unlikely 
that he received any support. This type of remedy was tried again 
by a Chinese constable, Wong Nrai, who was appointed to the 
Riverton-Round Hill area in September 1883 to catch gamblers, thieves 
and miners without licences. lherationale for this innovation was no 
doubt that a Chinese person would be more efficient, but the reverse 
was the reality of the situation. Wong Ngai was too well known, and 
all the gambling houses closed for the duration of his presence 
(NZP, 1 December 1883:105). The local Chinese explanation for the 
lack of success was the fact that Wong Ngai was from Seyip, while 
most of the locals were from Sam Yap, and therefore the likelihood of 
him enforcing the law was negligible (NZP, 1 March 1884:162). 
Th.e opium trade and the use of opium also became part of the 
Chinese business community in the gold fields, but little is known 
of its origin and distribution mechanisms, although the opium and 
gambling establishments seem to have been the same places in some 
instances. Initially, it came in as part of New Zealand imports with 
no restrictions,7 but in 1882 the Customs Law Consolidation Act was 
passed, which placed a prohibition on the import of opium: 
... Unless in ships of 40 registered tons burden 
at least, and in who:.e and complete packages, 
each containing not :ess than 45 lbs net weight 
and not containing any oth.er goods; and unless 
into such ports as are or as may be approved by 
the Governor for the importing and warehousing 
of opium. 
(Drug Dependency and Drug Abuse in 
New Zealand, Report Series No.14, 1970:112) 
Besides enforcing these requirements, the import of things like opium 
was probably restricted to licensed dealers under the provisions of 
the Poisons Act 1871. 
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The appearance of the habit amongst the Chinese in New 
Zealand is not recorded, but the 1871 Report of the Select Committee 
did mention it several times. The newspapers at the time said 
relatively little about its presence, but Don's articles make 
considerable reference to the habit. Naturally, like gambling, it 
was a social problem for Don and the church, since it hindered their 
work and very often seemed to be detrimental to the health of older 
miners while costing a considerable amount at the same time. 
Don recorded cases of heavy users having consumed as much as 
~5 worth or four pots in four and a half months, each P9t costing 
about ~.15.0 (NZP, 1 September 1883:47). The weekly rate in this 
instance would have amounted to l6/8d, while a more conservative 
user would spend only 10/6d. per week (NZP, 1 November 1884:85). Even 
this amount would deplete a weekly income of iA fairly rapidly, with 
the additional physiological problems of stomach ache and sleepiness, 
which resulted in lost mining time. If one needed a Chinese doctor, 
of which there were several, offering their expensive services in the 
gold fields, one could be confronted with an additional problem, since 
some of them were heavy users of opium and required that their 
patients provide them, not only with room and board, but also with 
a supply of opium; more will be said about this situation later. 
In the l880s and l890s8 anti-Chinese feelings flared up again 
in the gold fields, and meetings were held in Dunedin, Invercargill 
and Bluff to suggest ways of expediting the Chinese departure from 
New Zealand. Because of the problems of direct legislation, it was 
to be a process of gradually squeezing the Chinese out by making 
their life miserable. In 1888, the solution of excessive duty on 
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basic subsistence goods that the Chinese used, previously mentioned but 
not enacted, was imposed. The duty on rice, tea and opium were all 
increased. 
The Chinese merchants in various ports of New Zealand 
responded to the increased opium duty and decided that they would 
deprive the New Zealand government of a sizeable source of duty which 
they estimated to be ilo,oOO at the time. 9 The result was the 
. . . ~) '\i1.11 4-organlsation of the 'Cherishing Vlrtue Unlon' 'v~ ~ ~ 
which tried to enforce the following rules, which were distributed 
and posted on placards: 
1. No opium is to be sold after October 4 (1888) at the 
New Zealand ports and after December 2nd up-country. 
2. Anyone secretly importing is to be finedi120 for 
every large chest seized. 
3. Anyone buying from a non-Chinese is to be fined~ 
for every tin so bought. 
4. In both of the above cases the opium will also be 
confiscated. 
s. Anti-opium medicinal pills are to be distributed 
free to cure those having the opium habit. 
(NZP, 1 December 1888:106) 
According to Don, subscription lists had been opened at all the 'chief 
places' to help pay for the campaign, and by December Dunedin had 
contributed %207 (ibid.). The effect of this Association was to some 
degree beneficial, but only for a short time; smokers tried to quit 
the habit but. often m~rely replaced it with gambling. The import of 
opium declined in 1888, as evidenced by the £634 drop in revenue from 
duty, but the following year it soared to overJ:7000 (see Appendix IV). 
According to Don, many shops continued to sell it, and the cure was 
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distributed in very small quantities (NZP, 1 April 1889:185). Some 
people had deferred to older remedies, and one that seemed popular 
included the following ingredients: 
two mace of burnt alum 
4 mace of opium ashes 
Stir into milk or coconut and allow it to 
stand for a week and whenever craving occurs 
take a Chinese wine cup full of the mixture. 
(NZP, 1 April 1889:185). 
By the middle of 1889 the Association's activity was terminated, and 
the organizers posted a public notice which said: 
The former arrangements for the Cherishing 
Virtue Union with regard to the two matters 
of abstaining from opium and cherishing 
virtue have unavoidably come to nought 
through differences of opinion. Contributors, 
on application to the managers who have 
recei ved their contribution"may have the same 
refunded. 
(NZP, 1 July 1889:3) 
Although Don does not specify the source of disagreement, it is not 
hard to guess that the major point of contention would have been the 
enormously profitable activity of dealing in opium. Judging by the 
increasing amounts imported and the dramatic drop in 1902 and 1903, 
when the duty was only £270 and ~92, it may be assumed that the 
largest proportion of the opium trade was in Chinese hands. Although 
some was exported occasionally to Fiji and the South Seas, it never 
exceeded £30 worth in anyone year except in 1888, when £B64worth was 
exported to New South Wales. Since this practice seems to have been 
fairly intermittent, we may assume that most of the imported opium 
was for internal consumption. Unfortunately, nothing is known of the 
price, so it is impossible to calculate profits after sale. 
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Perhaps by far the saddest tales that came from Don's 
recollections are the stories of sickness, suicide and death that 
occurred on the gold fields. Some of this could be blamed on 
economic misfortune resulting from excessive gambling or opium 
consumption, but other cases were the result of loneliness and old 
age or accidents. Medical care was available on the gold fields, 
but the Chinese version was excessively expensive and the European 
version was distrusted. There was a hospital at Riverton, but few 
Chinese ever ventured there alive and clansmen even refused to take 
their friends there for a postmortem. In one instance a man had 
broken his leg, but his clansmen refused to take him to Riverton 
hospital because they believed that the doctors used cold water, did 
not apply linament and plasters, and furthermore, were prone to 
cutting off limbs with a saw. The latter was also the reason for 
the refusal of the postmortem. There were two other possibilities 
for medical care. One was the meagre knowledge of clansmen, which 
could be used courtesy of the local store that supplied 
such things as glue, dragon bones, deer sinew, antelope horn, 
bamboo sap, dried scorpions, black-tailed snakes, ground amber, 
stalactite dust, cicada exuviae, dried centipedes and ginseng 
(NZP, 1 February and 1 April 1884:147 and 184). 
The employment of a Chinese doctor was more problematic, since 
10 he would have had to be summoned from Lawrence. When he came, he 
would have to be provided for, which, as already mentioned, might 
include an opium habit. In one case the basic cost for the repair 
of a broken leg soared from the standard 137 to i200 after two 
doctors were consulted. Their fees were as follows: 
Dr. Chow 
Fares 
Contract 
Medicines and 
Doctor's opium 24 
Board and lodging 
for Doctor and 
attendant £65 
(11 months) 
Dr. T'aam 
Contract 
Medicines 
Board and 
£37 
t 8 
lodging £10 
(NZP, 1 April 1884:184) 
Don tried to encourage men to go to the Riverton hospital, where 
broken legs could be fixed for &10, but the advice was seldom 
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taken, and if it was, other clansmen would ignore the patient, yet 
if the same patient died they would all appear to bury him. 
One type of sickness that curtailed the benevolence of 
clansmen was leprosy, which occurred from time to time. Don recorded 
a case in 1884 where fellow miners refused to contribute money for 
the care or a house in which the fellow could live, and it remained 
for the local council in Riverton to provide for the patient 
(NZP, 1 September 1884:44). At best they would contribute money for 
the victim to go away, but in one case the person sent the money 
home to his relatives and the purpose of the collection was 
defeated (NZP, 1 September 1884:42). 
Those that died from accident, suicide or old age would 
usually be taken by a large group of clansmen to the local morgue 
and later buried. Even if men were without direct kin in the gold 
fields, those from the same lineage would take responsibility and 
collect amongst themselves to defray the cost of burial (NZP,l January· 
1883:126). Death in a house or a claim meant that both would be 
abandoned, as the bad luck surrounding such events were more than 
the Chinese miners could tolerate. 
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For some who were old and felt that they would never able 
to return home with dignity and wealth, there was a decision to be 
made. One could either appeal to kin who were in Australia or New 
Zealand for the money to pay for the return passage or just plan to 
in New Zealand and hope that one's kin would feel obliged to 
one's body home as a 'sin yan' (former man) with dignity. In 
the case of the first alternative, there were a variety of possible 
responses that one might get. A rich man in Melbourne turned down 
his very poor brother in New Zealand when the latter asked for thei20 
for the return trip, so the brother collected some seaweed which he 
hoped to sell to pay for his passage (NZP, 1 March 1884: 162) . In 
other cases requests were made of kin elsewhere in New Zealand, and 
would be no response, since this was the acceptable way 
to help (NZP, 2 November 1885:86). Sometimes the 
was positive, especially if relatives were close by and could not 
refuse a face-to-face request. Clansmen and relatives would take a 
collection and pay for the trip and usually provide some extra 
money, but this was explained to Don as not so much a gesture of 
benevolence and clan responsibility but rather a pragmatic response. 
It was much cheaper to collectl:20 or {30 from a group of men to 
send a live body home than to spend as much as f80 for a burial with 
a celebration plus the cost of disinterment for shipment of the dead 
body at some later date (NZP , 1 October 1883:67 and 2 November 1885:85). 
In 1883 a young boy of 17 had been killed in a claim at Round Hill 
only two years away from China, and his clansmen of the surname 
Wong collected iP2.l4.6 from 156 people for the funeral expenses. 
arly, in 1884 a very poor old man committed suicide because he 
had not been able to pay his debts and join a number of his clansmen 
on homeward voyage. Again the clansmen took up a collection 
ofl44 which paid for the man who cut him down from where he hung in 
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his house, for some other men that arranged the funeral and also for 
the feast that was given after the burial (NZP, 1 April 1884:184 and 
1 July 1884:4). The man was buried in Riverton with guilt paper (to 
represent money) placed under the head, a towel over his face and 
three packs of Chinese playing cards beside his hands (ibid.). The twenty 
seven clansmen who followed the procession scattered paper money down 
the road behind them to show the spirits the way to the grave, and 
many turned up for the feast that followed. It was suggested that 
some had merely turned up for the food and prospect of a good 
gathering (ibid.). 
Suicide was not too prevalent, but when it did occur it caused 
considerable consternation amongst the miners. It was thought often 
to be a form of revenge for a Chinese man who had been wronged and 
who wanted to achieve redress. By committing suicide and letting 
others know why, the revenge would be complete (NZP, 1 August 1884: 2S) . 
A common activity in many overseas Chinese communities that 
were made up of men who had intended to go home was the arrangement 
for the shipment of their remains back to China, where they could lie 
with the ancestors and be assured of their children's respect. 
Rather than seeing this task as one which would be the responsibility 
of individuals it became the responsibility in most instances of an 
association, as it was also a collective responsibility to celebrate 
11 Ch'ing ming each year. In New Zealand some bodies had been 
disinterred by individuals, especially by kin who were returning to 
China and felt it their responsibility to take their deceased 
relatives home, but in 1882 an association was started by a number of 
concerned merchants for the disinterrment of Poon Yu 'sin yan' who were 
increasingly numepous in the gold fields. In the late l860s, it 
12 
appears that Poon Yu people organised a Wui Koon at Lawrence, and it 
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is assumed that the Ch'eung Shin Tong was a natural 
extension of this organisation with the exception that the actual 
control of the operation resided in Dunedin. The association posted 
notices in all Chinese shops throughout the gold fields. The notices 
listed the rules which specified that each person was to contribute 
41.10.0, and if one were wealthy one would be expected to more. 
Collectors were employed by the association who would go around the 
gold fields and collect the money, and this in turn would be given 
to the managers of Sew Hoy's stores. The collector's expenses would 
be deducted and the remainder would be deposited in the bank to gain 
interest. Relatives of the dead were to give the collectors the 
surname and name of the deceased, the village or and the place 
of al. Receipts were to be issued for donations, and if one was 
intending to return to China, that receipt had to be 'presented 
before departure. Those who absconded were to be fined £s 
(NZP, 1 December 1883:105 - see Appendix V). 
In total, 230 'sin yan' were exhumed for shipment to China and 
although there were only five from the Riverton District, £800 was 
contributed by the Poon Yu Chinese from that area. 13 When the 
steamer Hoihow left Port Chalmers for China on 9 August, it carried it's load 
of 'sin yan' plus forty six living men. The 'sin yan' had all been 
placed in separate coffins at a cost of3r4 for large ones and 10/- for 
small ones, and despite the costs of the effort, some!2000 or £3000 
remained in the hands of the association after paying all expenses 
(NZP, I October 1883:6). Don gave no further information about this 
balance, but he did record the second operation of the Ch'eung 
Shin Tong in 1892. The operation seemed to have been run in the same 
manner with the posting of notices through the gold fields. This 
t , however, the primary concern was with the growing number of 
elderly Chinese and the notice read as follows: 
Having already favoured the bones of the 
departed by their removal some years ago, it 
is a primary duty to care for the aged. We, 
who do not reckon several thousand miles is 
far to come, have all as members of a family 
to make provision for the food and clothing 
of one another. When they (the old men) came, 
they were vigorous in body, from east to west 
they rushed about year following year, they 
were unable to return home, in a twinkle of 
cycle (60 years) and more passed away; now 
weak in body and feeble in mind, unable in 
the morning to reckon on the evening, finding 
it difficult to plan for food, what can they 
do? 
(Tours, 1892-93:10) 
According to Don, 762 people had subscribed to the fund for the removal 
of the dead,which amounted to £1098.9.3, and the organisers, believing 
the funds to be insufficient for the removal of the dead, suggested that 
those over sixty should be returned to China first. They 
requested that names of the elderly be submitted to the managers 
and that more money be donated. ~~en the old men had been sent back 
to China, the managers decided to meet again and for the 'sin 
yan' to be disinterred (ibid.). 
Don gives us no further details about this col and 
planned activity, although there is a slight hint that it never was 
completed. In 1893 two bodies were exhumed by individuals so that 
they could be taken back to China when they departed. However, there 
was some doubt about the operation, since landing at Hong Kong in 
the new month of the year was prohibited, being a time of 
ies (Tour, 1892-93:41). There was to be one more shipment of 
disinterred remains from New Zealand in 1902,14 but the Is of 
that will be given later in this chapter, since it shows the extent 
of population dispersal throughout New Zealand. 
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Despite the morbid aspects of death, sickness, conflict and 
poverty in the gold fields, there was also a number of more 
positive activities which attempted to gulf the vast gap of time 
and space that the Chinese faced in New Zealand. 
If one could not maintain written contact with friends and 
relatives, nor afford to visit, then there were other ways of re-
newing at least superficially, the bonds that tied one to horne. 
Celebrations of festivals in urban communities and the individual 
observance of what Don called 'idolatry' in their homes marked the 
maintenance of the folk tradition. 
Homes were important to the Chinese gold miners, and, 
providing there was an opportunity for sedentary existence, they built 
them of sod, rock slabs or sacking and wood depending on what was 
locally available. Others, mining particularly along rivers, used 
natural caves which, barring slips and high water levels, provided 
adequate but dark shelter. If a more mobile form of shelter was 
necessary, then they turned, like their European forerunners, to tents 
or 'sleeping out'. Many appeared, as early as 1878, according to the 
census, to be living in more permanent houses built of brick, stone, 
wood, iron or lathe and plaster (see Appendix VI). 
Houses or huts, although sparsely equipped, usually with only 
a fire, table, storage containers and sleeping bunks, were also 
conspicuously adorned with auspicious inscriptions both inside and 
outside. Some of these marked the occasion of building a new house 
and might include the following: 
Above the fireplace: 'May those who face me 
get rich'. 
On the door: 'May the people at this 
simple door become wealthy' . 
Opposite fireplace: 'Let prosperity corne in the 
new house'. 
(NZP, 1 January 1883:126) 
Others were renewed each year at the time of the Chinese New Year 
to bring special blessings, like the following noted by Don when 
visiting Lawrence in 1888: 
'May Heaven's Ruler Send Blessing'. 
'May Five Blessings Descend on this House' .15 
'May this Year Decide the Return to China'. 
'May Songs of Return Be Sung'. 
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Still others actually gave the house a name, like three houses noted 
at Orpeuki which were called 
Peace Harmony Hall 
Vast Harmony Hall 
Sincere Harmony Hall 
(Tour, 1900-01:17). 
Some inscriptions were far more pragmatic, however, like one Don 
saw pinned to the sack door of a cave on the Clutha River (previously 
Molyneux River) which read: 
Outsiders require not enter in; 
Things missing many suspicions begin. 
(Tour 1891-92:12) 
Houses were usually occupied by several men who shared clan or 
locality as a common factor, and this would endure as long as 
temperament would allow. Disputes resulted in splits and usually 
removal from the district, depending on how serious the offence 
committed had been. As already noted, houses were vacated after a 
death or suicide had occurred. 
Many homes in the gold fields contained, much to Don's 
disappointment, small shrines which emulated those places in the 
temples at Round Hill and Lawrence. Two common gods, represented by 
clay, wooden or stone figures, were Kuan ti (~t) and 
Hung Shing,16 but there were numerous others that appeared in 
houses, including the Goddess of Mercy and the North God 
as well as ancestral shrines with offerings (Tour, 1909-11:16; 
Tour 1896-97:44-45). The interesting aspect of this observation 
is that they seemed to become more prevalent as time went on, and 
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in Don's later tours of the gold fields, when the Chinese population 
had decreased considerably, there seemed to be a more active appeal 
to this form of obeisance. One could argue that this was a product 
of increasing deprivation and solitude in the face of the declining 
populations,17 or perhaps Don's previous observations did not 
include the inside of houses where temples once had been present. 
According to Don's record, there were two major temples 
in the gold fields; one in Lawrence established in 1869 
footnote 12) and one established in Round Hill in 1883. The one 
that Don saw in Lawrence had a large relief character for the word 
happiness at one end on the wall and underneath it a tablet labelled 
'The seat of the Ancestor's spirit' (Tour 1892-93:20). The temple 
or meeting hall in Round Hill was dedicated to Kwan-ti the god of 
war, and had an elaborate painting of the god as a centre ece with 
his two attendants on either side (Tour 1890-91:5). 
Inside there were 'antithetical couplet-tablets' on the wall 
that were presented to decorate the hall. One such tablet appeared 
in 1894 and contained the following: 
1. With true relations between ruler and 
the dynasty of Han was established. With no 
regrets between brother and brother the oath 
of eternal friendship is sworn. 
2. May the affairs of this society be without 
partiality, and the right be done when seen. 
Thus if fulfilled the oracle of Peace will 
become a guest. 
May the people of this hall possess wealth as 
their hearts desire. Then is realised their 
longing in the joy of returning home. 
(Tour, 1894-95:4) 
In the following year another tablet appeared which indicated that 
the wishes of the previous one had at least come true for some: 
Do we not recall in time past we crossed a 
vast expanse of dashing billows in preparing 
to pass through hardships to obtain our 
desires? 
Always glad were we to go deep into the 
precious hills. 
Let us rejoice that on this day, with a 
full myriad guineas we have met, happily, 
pleasure with profit in becoming wealthy. 
So along with our fellows we return to glory 
home. 
(Tour, 1894-95:4) 
Besides the maintenance of temples in New Zealand, in at least one 
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case subscriptions were collected to repair temples at home. In the 
village of Great Cypress Hill, there were three temples in need of 
repair, and a man had brought a bunch of subscription chits back to 
circulate in New Zealand. The red strip that acted as both a 
receipt for donation and a sign of generosity read as follows: 
Heung 
City 
Great 
Cypress 
Hill 
The Three Hills Princess 
The Saintly Duke Hong 
The Goddess of Mercy 
The Star of Wealth Ruler 
The Lo Hills Ox God 
Three Temples 
Important Repairs 
"The faithful man ..................... cheerfully aids 
the work with gold and silver ......... sterling",18 
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Curiously enough, most festivals were celebrated at Riverton, 
where there were three major shops which provided fairly lavish fare for 
their clients (NZP,l September 1882:43). Ch'ing ming ~ ta~ 
was one such festival (cf. footnote 11) when miners from Round 
Hill would come to visit the graveyard at Riverton. Don observed 
that not all miners left work on this festival day, since some had no 
tombs of friends to worship and clean, and perhaps others really had no 
interest or could not afford the 10/- per man for the feast . ) . 
One shop at Riverton at Ch'ing ming had done some (50 worth of business 
100 men who managed, according to the shopkeeper, to 
drink considerable amounts of brandy. Other festivals in the lunar 
year were celebrated in a similar way which included Zhong Yuan: 9 
(15th day of the 7th month) or All Souls Festival, Tung Chi Festival 
20 (13th day of the 11th month), Ch'ung Yeung (9th day the 9th month), 
or the Kite Flying Festival, Chinese New Year (usually celebrated in 
21 
February), the Dragon Boat Festival (5th day of the 5th month), and 
the birthday of Fou-tei, the God of the Land (2nd day of the 2nd month). 
The variation in the actual celebration of these occasions 
little, except that the latter two were held at Round Hill. 
For all festivals, a large feast was held, crackers were let off, 
and sometimes the food was offered at shrines in the individuals' 
homes before being eaten. Most men seem to have stopped work for the 
day. The day was selected by reference to the Chinese Almanac, which 
was always imported from China and which gave the dates for the 
following year's festivals. It also listed rules for calculating 
fates of children, rules for foretelling the weather on a proposed 
voyage, lucky and unlucky days for washing the head, plus numerous 
other bits of information on dreams and various signs that could be 
used to forecast the future (NZP, 1 January 1885:125; Tour, 1893-94:10). 
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The only celebration that differed was the New Year, when people went 
around visiting friends. It was the one time - according to one of 
Don's informants - when Punti and Hakka, Seyip and Sam Yap men were 
all friends. 22 People visited each other and left their cards as 
well as attending to the old tradition of paying one's debts (NZP, 
2 April 1883:184). In places like Riverton and Lawrence, firecrackers 
were let off, but often local ordinances were passed to ensure that it 
happened only once (NZP, 2 April 1883:184). 
In the late l800s, when Don returned to Round Hill on his 
annual tours, he found the temple still operating, and presumably its 
activity might have been explained by Don's absence. Each year 
an average ofi2S WaS contributed towards the organisation of the 
Ch'ing ming, Zhong Yuan and Ch'ung Yeung festivals, and invariably 
the list of accounts would be posted giving the expenses for ritual 
paraphenalia and food offering, which usually amounted to £4 or £5. 
The balance always went fOT the cost of the feast in Riverton and the 
trip to and from Round Hill by train (Tour, 1892-93:3). 
One point that should be mentioned in connection with both the 
temples that have been re'corded in the gold fields is the fact that 
they almost certainly represent the interests of the Poon Yu people, 
since they were well organised by the Ch'eung Shin Tong. Also, 
according to Don's figures and informants' comments, they, along 
with Jung Sing people, formed the majority of the early settlers as 
far as the Chinese community in New Zealand is concerned. As already 
noted, relations with Seyip people were not always amicable and for 
many years, Don found himself forced to hold two meetings in certain 
localities. This was especially true of Roxburgh (Tour,190S-06:l4), 
Dunedin (ibid.), and even at Round Hill (NZP, 1 February 1884:148). 
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and Don suggested that the factions had in the years violently 
opposed each other, but as time went on there is some indication 
that the Seyip numbers decreased and peaceful relations were 
established between the two groups (Tour 1905-06:14). There had 
even been a court case between a,group of Seyip and Sam Yap men in 
Round Hill in the early years of Don's activity A Sam Yap man 
and two of his friends had been accused of breaking into a Seyip man's 
house and stealing £7.5.0 (NZP, 1 February 1884:147). Since the Sam 
Yap man was a Christian, Don had posted bail for him and his friends, 
but the case went to court. Although Don~s friend was acquitted, 
since there was little evidence, rumours were about the 
dishonesty of Sam Yap people, and one man told Don: 
Of the Sze Yap (Seyip) men on Round Hill, if it 
comes to going to the law nine in ten will 
swear to help a clansman. 
(NZP, 1 February 1884:148) 
Besides the implications from this concerning the relationship 
between Chinese from different counties, the innuendo about honesty 
before the law seems rather strong. A few Chinese from both areas 
were known for their unscrupulous behaviour even if it was only 
accepting an overpayment for their gold when they cashed it in at the 
bank. Sometimes cases went to court, and justice was attempted 
despite the incredible language problems that confronted the officials. 
Don's position in the gold fields was always difficult and even 
worse where there was local hostility towards the Chinese. In these 
situations, he entered the category of all foreigners or Europeans 
ana tolerance was withdrawn. Despite this, Don was often cornered for 
news of China or for local news that would reveal the state of 
hostility between Europeans and Chinese. After the 1881 Act was ed, 
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there were still rumours in the gold fields that the local Member 
of the House of Representatives would bring in a bill to prohibit 
the issue of business licences and miner's rights to Chinese (NZP, 
1 November 1882:87). At the same time as the event mentioned above 
the Chinese in Riverton also made a move to get Dan's gatherings out 
of their store by suggesting, as already noted, that they would be 
willing to contribute for a meeting house that he could use. 23 
The generalisation that can be made from this is that, while most 
Chinese miners, gardeners, and small shopkeepers were content to have 
Don around or at least to disappear if they did not want to see him, 
merchants were antagonistic (Tour, 1900-01:30). Don noted in 1889 
that merchants never came near his meetings but were polite enough 
not to oppose him (NZP, 1 April 1889:185). 
The Chinese attitude, however, was not so polite to the Chinese 
catechist, Kwok Wai-shang, who had replaced Don in the Riverton-Round 
Hill' area in 1886 (NZP, 1 April 1889:182), and was later moved to 
Lawrence in 1889 after a very successful time in Round Hill (NZP, 
1 November 1889-86). Kwok spent a few weeks in Dunedin before going 
to Lawrence and happened to be misquoted in the local paper after 
making a speech to the Synod. He had said " ... some of the Chinese 
who came out here from China left their country for their country's 
good", but by the time this got to the local papers the 'some' had 
been changed to 'many', and by the time it was translated into 
Chinese it became " ... all the Chinese in New Zealand are criminals 
and dare not return to China" (NZP, 1 February 1888:147). The 
dislike of Kwok Wai-shang was unanimous, but, as Don noted, it must 
have been generated by Chinese who spoke and read English. The 
unwritten and unspoken rule that seems universal amongst the Chinese 
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here is that one never, as a member of the community, speaks out 
on behalf of the community unless it is legitimated by a whole 
group or unless one has, status and wealth onone' s side to begin 
with. This limits such voicing to merchants, and even they seldom 
speak out on behalf of the whole community. Kwok violated this rule 
and was openly threatened for his transgression (ibid.). 
At other times awkward situations were generated by European 
hostility. Isolated events of open hostility occurred periodically 
allover the gold fields when miner's huts were broken into and 
occasionally when larrikins actually beat up Chinese miners, but 
there was little the Chinese could do except hope for some form of 
justice. When large meetings of Europeans were held with the aim of 
expelling the Chinese from the gold fields, however, it was a matter 
of panic, and news travelled fast. In 1888 an act was passed limiting 
the number of Chinese on anyone ship to one for every 100 tons 
(instead of one to every ten tons under the 1881 Act), which resulted 
in a ship with 260 Chinese on board being sent back to China with its 
passengers (NZP, 1 December 1888:106). The Chinese in New Zealand 
were outraged, but again there was little they could do, especially 
in the face of anti-Chinese meetings in Invercargill, Bluff and 
Dunedin and extensive claim-jumping of Chinese claims by Europeans 
at Round Hill (NZP, 1 December 1888:106). The limited response was 
the posting of a placard in Dunedin which extolled the virtues of the 
Chinese over and above the English and the merchants attempting to 
organise an anti-opium campaign, both of which were very indirect 
measures that achieved little. It is interesting to note the contrast 
between this response and the more sophisticated response from 
Wellington as early as 1883. In that year the illustrious John Ah Tong 
and other Chinese residents in Wellington requested by formal 
petition that Chinese immigration be freed from poll tax until 
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the number of Chinese in the colony reached 7,000 (AJHR, 1883, Vol. 3, 
H-I:490 and Chapter 5, page 180). 
In 1900, after four years away from the goldfields, Don returned 
to visit the areas he had visitedymrly since 1886. 24 While he 
had been away T.F. Loie, a Seyip man, came from Australia to take 
Don's place in Otago. When Don returned, he again resumed his tours, 
taking with him Mr. G.H. McNeur, who had just volunteered as a 
missionary to go to China. The situation they both saw OR this tour, 
and which Don recorded till his last tour in 1910-11, was one of 
declining goldfields for the Chinese. Compared to the 3,856 Chinese 
gold miners in New Zealand in 1881 at the peak of the mining period, 
there were 1,313 left in 1901 (Census 1881:270 and 1901:396). Just 
over 68% of these men were over forty five, and Don noted that many of 
them were barely eking out a subsistence living (ibid.). There were now 
numerous cases of men that depended on the county Charitable Aid 
Board, which provided 4/- per week in an account at the local shop 
so that these men could at least get basic supplies (Tour, 1909-10:5). 
Other ageing men were removed to the old folks home at Dunedin where 
by 1910 there were twelve old Chinese men living (Tour, 1910-11:26). 
It is uncertain how many were depending on Charitable Aid, but in 
1895 there were six recorded in the whole of New Zealand, so one 
could expect there would be considerably more by 1900 (AJHR, 1895, H-16). 
In 1901 the Census recorded twenty three in what they called 'benevolent 
asylums' and twenty three in 'lunatic asylums' (Census 1901:396). Despite 
the possibility of care, many preferred to remain alone in a world they 
knew without the tension in a strange place where only English was 
spoken. 
Many of the Chinese Don saw were concerned about the 
situation in China in regard to both their horne area and the 
25 
events surrounding the Boxer Rebellion. In their horne province, 
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a considerable amount of Western influence had led to the development 
of railways and, according to some, the laying out of new viI 
and the improvement of the market places, but other reports told of 
bad times and blamed them on the same factors (Tour, 1909-11:20). In 
New Zealand, life was also becoming more uncertain. Declining 
possibilities in gold mining forced middle-aged Chinese, no longer 
capable of rugged activity, into more sedentary occupations. Don 
found many working for Europeans, picking fruit, thinning turnips, 
shearing or fencing (Tour, 1900-01:24), while others were moving 
towards larger communities where they could establish laundries, 
market gardens or cook for their clansmen or work in local hotels 
:20). For some, the costs of the move offset the benefit of 
a steady income ~f perhaps £1 a week. 
In these local towns, more established Chinese had set up 
their gambling and opium parlours, and some feared the attraction 
of these habits should they move from their envirortment,where their 
economic enterprise would have to depend on a European clientele. 
Once the large Chinese population had gone, there was no possibility 
of maintaining the merchant-shop-keeper complex that had kept miners 
supplied in the gold fields. Where a whole network of shops and 
merchants were necessary to keep the vast area of Otago supplied, 
it was totally unnecessary in urban a'reas where everyone Ii ved in 
close proximity, so if one anticipated a move, occupational 
diversification was necessary, and for many this was too much effort. 
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Despite this, however, the migration northward to communities both 
small and large had been occurring slowly since the early 1870s. 
By 1896, 1,208 of the total Chinese population of 2,963 were scattered in 
sixty six of the ninety five boroughs in New Zealand (Census 1896: 20-21) . 
The hostile environment the Chinese faced was not of their 
creation, but they had become the scape goats. New Zealand by 1888, 
with a population of 600,000, was £38 million in debt and suffering 
through a long depression (Sinclair, 1959:168). According to Sinclair, 
the depression created two classes and brought an end to provincialism. 
The beginning of the Liberal Party brought the end of rule by the 
colonial gentry made up of 'squatters ,_ speculators, merchants and 
British gentlemen' and also saw the rise of the trade-union movement, 
which wanted an end to Chinese immigration and British assisted 
immigration; according to them, this was only adding to the pool of 
unemployed (Sinclair 1959:166-168). From 1877 on, the Chinese 
immigration had been a subject of annual debate, gradually 
entering the public arena. Local overt hostility and the beginnings 
of the White New Zealand Policy were not far behind. 
In 1888 several Chinese were assaulted in Dunedin (ODT, 3 
January 1888), a Chinese market gardener had been plundered in 
Auckland (NZH 13 and 16 March 1888) ,26 and a large group were waiting 
to throw stones at Chinese landing from a boat in Dunedin (ODT, 9 May 
1888). This kind of violent hostility continued in Dunedin, but the 
courts seemed to have taken a dim view of this type of activity and 
severely punished the offenders (NZT, 20 September 1892).27 It was 
even suggested after an incident in April 1898 that perhaps 
Lo Keong and Sew Hoy should be made Chinese Magistrates since they 
were educated and reputable men and therefore could adjudicate in cases 
between Chinese and 'hoodlums' (ODT, 2 April 1898:6).28' 
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In Wellington the opposition to the Chinese took another form, 
largely stimulated, according to Sinclair, by active trade unionism, 
which had been legally recognised by the Trade Union Act of 1878 
(Sinclair, 1959:169). A considerable part of the activity in New 
Zealand seems to have emulated the more radical activity in Australia, 
but the unemployment in New Zealand meant that much of the 
organisation was doomed to failure (ibid.). 
In the years that followed, the opposition to the Chinese 
occupied much government time and produced, at best, a difficult· 
atmosphere for Chinese immigrants as they moved into urban and small 
communities of the North Island (see Chan, 1972:31). Wellington's 
growing Chinese community for instance, was to inherit the position 
as the official centre for New Zealand Chinese but the transition was 
gradual. In the interim a foreboding of what was to face the Chinese 
came with the last attempt to send their 'sin yan' home, an event 
that almost commemorated the end of their involvement in gold mining 
as the number had declined considerably from its peak in the l870s. 
In 1899 the Chinese in New Zealand initiated the last 
exhumation of bodies of 'sin yan' to be sent to China. The operation 
of the Ch'eung Shin Tong had been organised from Dunedin by the 
president, Mr. Kum Poy Sew Hoy, and according to the secretary a 
collection had been made from 2,500 Chinese throughout New Zealand. 29 
The whole operation was under the supervision of the Health 
Department, and the Colonial Secretary had given his consent to the 
operation. A licence had been granted, which specified: 
1. All the bodies must be exhumed within ... 
days (number of days depends upon number of 
bodies), not including Sundays 
2. The time for working in the cemetery shall 
be from daylight to twelve o'clock noon. 
3. Before leaving off work each day the graves 
must be filled up, the coffins hermetically 
sealed, and all cause of nuisance removed to 
the satisfaction of the sexton. 
4. That the coffins are to be exhumed 
carefully and placed at once in substantial 
lead or zinc coffins, which are to be 
hermetically sealed immediately and covered 
with a strong outer casing of wood. 
5. That disinfectants - chloride of lime and 
Calvert's carbolic acid - be used plentifully 
during the exhumation. 
6. The gates are to be locked and no funerals 
or visitors are to be allowed in the cemetery 
during the hours of exhumation. 
7. When the coffins are removed from the 
cemetery they must be shipped off as soon as 
possible, or deposited in some place where 
they cannot possibly be a nuisance or source 
of annoyance to anyone in their neighbourhood. 
8. The above directions are to be carried out 
under the immediate supervision of the sexton. 
(NZPD, 1902, 122:442-443) 
Despite this, a very gory stories crept into the newspapers about 
the activity which, like the following in the Greymouth paper, 
gave a picture of anything but an organised operation. 
The resurrection proceedings are bad enough in 
all conscience, but what is happening at 
Greymouth is even worse. In an iron shed at the 
cemetery are stored not only the remains dug out 
of the Greymouth Cemetery, but also that of 
defunct Chinamen from other parts of the Coast. 
How long these 'ghastly articles' are to be 
allowed above ground seems doubtful, but 
certainly an effort should be made to clean out 
the charnel-house ere the warm weather sets in, 
seeing - so we are informed,that a number of 
bodies that have never been buried are boxed up 
and stored along with the dry bones of some and 
partially decayed bodies of other Chinamen. 
The Borough Council in question had objected to the operation, but 
157. 
the Colonial Secretary had apparently not acknowledged their complaint 
(ibid.) . 
In all, 474 bodies were exhumed, described in the Dunedin 
paper as follows: 
Dunedin 
Greymouth 
265 (84 large, 181 small) 
173 (66 large and 107 small) 
Wellington 36 
TOTAL 474 
30 (ODT, 27 October 1902) 
Those that were recent deaths were placed in zinc-lined cases, and 
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the late Mr. Sew Hoy and Mr. Ah Chung received rimu coffins, as was 
their status. Apparently the work of exhumation was 
contracted out to a Mr. Mos Chang, and the cost of exhumation and 
shipment was about £30 for each body. The actual work was 
supervised by Mr. Chang, an inspector and a clerk, and the operation 
was in the following account: 
When the remains consisted of bones alone, they 
were washed, dried over a fire in a riddle then 
tied together in a bundle, wrapped in a cloth, 
and placed in a wooden coffin only. Each bone, 
before being thus disposed of, was carefully 
labelled, and the name of the deceased was in 
all cases attached to the body or bundle of bones 
as well as to the coffins. The coffins were then 
ready for removal or storage, in readiness 
shipment when the appointed time arrived. 
coffins were replaced in the graves, which 
filled in . 
.. . those on which any portion of the flesh 
remained, on being washed, were wrapped in 
for 
The old 
were 
linen and placed in a zinc coffin, which was 
made on the ground by the tinsmith, and which 
before being used, was immersed in water to make 
certain that it was perfectly airtight. These 
coffins after receiving the bodies were at once 
soldered down with great care and then placed in 
a wooden coffin, made of l~ in. kauri timber. 
(Press, 30 October 1902). 
The coffins, once made ready in various areas, were sent to 
Wellington for loading on the S.S. Ventnor. The Ventnor's carg03l 
of bodies was insured for £4,650.32 with the Alliance Assurance 
Company, and lJ,860 of this amount was underwritten by the South 
British Insurance Office (Press, 30 October, 1902). 
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The Ventnor set sail from Wellington, bound for Hong Kong on 
26 October, 1902 but struck a submerged rock off Cape Egmont on the 
following day, and although it managed to struggle on for a while, 
it eventually sank on October 28, off Hokianga Harbour with the loss 
of 13 lives and its cargo (Encyclopaedia of N~w Zealand, Vol. I: 
487-488). There were two results of this tragedy: a sadness on 
of all the Chinese whose relatives would never reach horne but 
would lie 300 feet deep off the New Zealand coast and secondly a 
long protracted argument over the estimated £4000 insurance. 
managers of the Ch'eung Shin Tong had endless meetings to sort out 
the problem, and, according to Don, it was only after three years 
that a compromise was finally worked out (Tour, 1905-06:8). The 
managers decided to help repatriate Chinese men who were over 
five along with any other coffins that needed to be sent horne (ibid.).33 
They also contributed a fund to be spent on a mortuary temple and 
burial ground near Stone Gate (a Poon Yu village) for 'friendless 
men who die abroad' (ibid.). 
The event itself needed some explanation, and it was to be 
found in the unfinished strife between Chinese men who had lived in 
New Zealand. There were two such stories recorded by Don, one 
involving two men, one a wealthy man who had accused another 
of misappropriating funds. Because the wealthy one had status, his 
story was believed, and it was said that only in death could the 
other seek revenge, resulting in a massive argument between the 'sin 
yanl on the Ventnor. Another story told of a man who robbed his 
partner in China and then came to New Zealand. The China partner 
sent his nephew to investigate the partner in New Zealand, but the 
nephew died of suspected poisoning in a Dunedin hospital. Don 
responded to these stories with the following comment: 
With the Chinese experience of money as the 
main cause of miscarriage of justice in this 
life, it is easily understood why rich and 
poor are made equal in the. spirit world where 
justice is done. 
(Tour, 1905-06:10) 
In a mere thirty-six years of residence in New Zealand the 
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Chinese population underwent considerable change. Even in-this short 
period the three spheres of activity which form the basis of 
relationships with both New Zealand and China have developed and 
produced a number of reactions and a noted effect on the New Zealand 
Chinese community. The apparent simplicity of the gold mining 
existence becomes a complex network of necessary relationships. 
It is very clear that while their initial presence is 
characterised by a somewhat friendly relationship between represent 
of both the Chinese and European community it is short lived and although 
antagonism is localized and ineffectual it is enough to generate the 
1871 inquiry. It is also clear that a supposedly acquiescent Chinese 
population has the capability, not only to organise vis.a.vts 
survival in New Zealand, but also in terms of its cultural ties with 
China. It takes only one year before the first petition emerges from 
the Chinese community - a strategy in a European idiom - five years 
for the first locality association to appear and eleven further years 
before this association organises the first of three collections to send 
the dead back to China under the control of the Ch'eung Shin Tong. 
Social organisation is evident even if only in a male dominated, 
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dispersed gold mining context and a merchant leadership has,on at 
least two occasions,flexed its power when confronted with accusations 
from European society. They counter the accusations of competition 
in business by pointing to their contributions in customs duty and 
local trade,and the accusations concerning opium with an unsuccessful 
attempt to control their fellow countrymen through the Cherishing 
Virtue Union (1888). 
The community is also the victim of its own fact however, 
some arising from the nature of their economic activity, gold mining, 
and others from a more traditional source of district and county enmity. 
former like the unscrupulous dealings over contract labour in the 
community become public issues resolved through means of 
European justice but the latter are problems that have to be solved 
internally, despite superficial resolution in the courts. They become 
part of the social relations in the community, which even in its early 
years manifested both fragmentation and cohesion. 
With the decline in gold mining as a lucrative endeavour for 
the remaining Chinese population, moves are made into other areas of 
New Zealand, unfortunately at a time when European society begins in 
earnest to be increasingly antagonistic towards their presence. While 
the extent of this antagonism will be pursued in future chapters it is 
in the period of the late 1870s when the pressures of economy and 
politics in New Zealand coalesce to provide a context of anti-Chinese 
feeling. 
If the situation was difficult for New Zealand Chinese 
minority faced even graver problems. The Chinese population was 
hardly in its prime. In 1896 Don recorded in his diary information 
on 1080 Chinese, including their names, age in 1896, the number of 
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years away from China in that year, and the number of times they had 
visited home. Of these 1080, 362 had been recorded as leaving New 
Zealand permanently before 1914. Of these 362 men, only thirty-nine 
had been home for a visit, eleven of them more than once. The 362 
men had spent a total of 1,677 years away from China, or an 
approximate average of thirty-two years each, while their average 
age at departure was fifty-eight. The thirty-nine who had been home 
for visits had spent an average of thirty-seven years away from home. 
The short-term deprivation that would have been anticipated 
initially by overseas Chinese coming to New Zealand stretches into 
long-term deprivation for some and at least longer and longer periods 
of deferred gratification for others. 
Don made the following comment about the influence of poverty 
on Chinese miners: 
My own experience of the Chinese in general is 
this: Shortly after they come from China they 
work very hard and are very saving so as to be 
able to return soon; but if after some years 
struggling they are unsuccessful they seem 
gradually to lose all hope of ever being able to 
return, become lazy, drift into the opium habit 
and spend every penny in opium or gambling. The 
most prosperous men are the most industrious -
working hard because they are prospering and 
thus adding to their prosperity; while the non-
prosperous become lazy and loose, and thus add 
to their poverty. 
(NZP, 1 March 1888: 166) _ 
In addition to old age, poverty and prolonged absence from 
China, there was also a population that would have to seek jobs in other 
areas of New Zealand inequipped to operate in an English language 
environment, fully exposed to hostility and restriction from New 
Zealand society and increasingly uncertain of their homeland's future 
following the events of the Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the Boxer 
Rebellion (1900). 
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Despite problems however,the relatively small North Island 
population of Chinese in the period from 1891 (541) till 1901 (792) 
manages to articulate an opposition to the barrage of immigration 
restrictions that started in 1881 and would continue unabated till 
1920 (see Appendix VII). In the next chapter the context and content 
of this anti-Chinese legislation will be discussed in detail followed 
by five further chapters which will explore the context of Chinese 
community in New Zealand as its social organisation responds to the 
above and changing conditions in China. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1 The Annual Inland Tour will hereafter be abbreviated to Tour. 
2 Mr. F.L. Law was from Poon Ye, Crow Lake Village of about 
40,000 people. He came from Canton in May 1909, where he 
had been a student in the Presbyterian seminary and became 
Don's assistant in Dunedin. He stayed at Dunedin till 
August 1910, when he resigned over some misunderstanding, 
according to Reverend McNeur (McNeur, 1951:30). However 
F.L. Law later took up a position in 1914 with the Anglican 
Mission in Wellington for five or six years. 
3 At this time, each Chinese entering New Zealand would have 
had to pay ~OO poll tax to the New Zealand governm~nt. Upon 
payment he would be issued with a certificate which would 
allow him to return home for a maximum of years and 
return again to New Zealand without further payment. 
4 Don records such names as the 'Profits of New Glory Shop' , 
'Shing Lei' shop, 'Concord of Mankind' shop and the 
'Exalted Arrival' shop. 
5 Over the entrance of the door of the gambling hall was the 
inscription 'Enter the door of slaughter' on white paper, 
and the hall there were other inscriptions which read 
'Great slaughter on all three sides', 'The Murderer's Star 
is enthroned here', 'The Murderer's Star must show its power'. 
According to Don these, too, were all on white paper, the 
colour for mourning as opposed to red as the of joy. 
The inscriptions were apparently to encourage the bankers 
at the fan-tan tables (NZP, 1 November 1889:85). It was 
generally held by the Chinese that there were two types of 
weal th: that produced by one's own hands, whi ch was 
honourable, and that gained through the misfortune of others, 
such as from gambling. 
6 Each lottery starts with the saloon issuing a series of tickets with 
eighty Chinese words on each of which the purchaser strikes off 
twenty. Each ticket costs 6d. The saloon one copy of the 
ticket and the buyer gets another copy, On a set day ten words 
are drawn which are the winning words. If one had struck off 
of the winning words, one gets 1/-; six 9/6d; 
seven, £.4; eight .t,:21.l0.0; nine £40; and ten words 
correct £80. Since the 'bank' has only a limited amount, 
should anyone win large amounts a proportionate division is 
made (NZP, 2 October 1882:67), 
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7 The first duty levied on the importation of opium was 
recorded in the Statistics of New Zealand in 1869, but was 
imposed in 1866 (see Appendix IV). Initially the amount of 
duty was ~ per lb. imported, which was increased to £2 per 
lb. imported in 1888. Initially the opium was imported from 
Victoria, New South Wales and the United Kingdom, but by 1878 
it was also imported from China (Statistics of New Zealand). 
8 By this time, the New Zealand government had passed The 
Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881 which imposed a £10 poll tax 
on each Chinese person entering New Zealand and restricted 
the number of Chinese on each boat arriving to one for every 
10 tons of tonnage. It suffices to add at this point, since 
this subject will be dealt with at length in a later chapter, 
that the agitation for legislation was influenced by West 
Coast politicians with Australian experience and those who 
could convince people that the Chinese living in California, 
Australia and Hawaii were totally undesirable as immigrants. 
There was no attempt to try to assess the objective 
situation of the Chinese in New Zealand, as indicated before. 
9 After 1901 the Opium Prohibition Act was passed to 
specifically prohibit the smoking of opium by the Chinese. 
It made it an offence to import opium in any form suitable 
for smoking and required special permission for the import 
in any other form from the Minister of Customs (Drug Abuse 
and Drug Dependency in New Zealand, Report Series No.14:ll3). 
The duty from imported opium in 1902 amounted to £.270.11.6 (see 
Appendix IV). 
10 One doctor who apparently operated in the gold was 
W.Y.K. Chan. According to an advertisement placed in a 
Christchurch paper in 1938 he had arrived in New Zealand in 
1887 to take over the directorship of the K.Y.L. Company from 
the grandfather (Press, 19 November 1938). This firm of 
merchants and herbalists had started,according to the son, 
in Melbourne and came to New Zealand during the gold rush, 
later opening branches in Arrowtown, Cromwell and Lawrence. 
W.Y.K. Chan was a doctor, Buddhist priest and an al in 
the Kwangshi Emperor's court but later was converted to 
Christianity by Alexander Don and returned to China to 
complete a graduate course at Poi Yaun University and a post-
graduate course at the American Canton University. He was 
ordained in 1906 in New Zealand and died in 1934. son 
was a herbalist for some years in Christchurch. 
11 Ts'ing ming or Ch'ing ming is an annual pilgrimage to the 
graveyard of the ancestors which takes place in the third lunar 
month between the tenth and twentieth days usually on the 5th 
of April in the solar calendar. Relatives visit the graves and 
provide food, money and clothing (paper) and at the same time 
clean the graves. In New Zealand, crackers, incense, apples, 
hard-boiled eggs and brandy were offered and later removed for 
human consumption (NZP, 1 August 1884:24). 
12 The only evidence that remains of this Association are two 
plaques preserved in the Otago Early Settlers' Association 
Museum in Dunedin. It was opened, according to the 
Times in September 1869 (TT, 25 September 1869). 
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13 The total Chinese population was estimated by Don to be about 
300 in 1883 (NZP, 1 October 1883:67). 
14 The initiation of this collection seems to have started quite 
early. Late in 1889 Don recorded the collection of the~l levy 
from Chinese on a ship about to leave for China who had not 
already paid it to the Ch'eung shin Tong. If they refused to 
pay this levy, they would face extortion when they arrived in 
China, according to Don (NZP, 1 November 1889:85-86). 
15 The five blessings include wives, riches, children, office and 
old age (NZP, 1 August 1888:26). 
16 Kwan-ti was a popular god in South China worshipped as the 
God of War. He was a man named Kwan-yu, born about i\.D.160 
in Shansi. During the period of the Three Kingdoms, he was a 
military leader but was beheaded by his opponents in A.D. 219. 
In the Twelfth century he was canonised and later elevated to a 
God in 1594. Hung Shing was the God of the South Seas. 
17 Don noted that the population of Round Hill had dropped from 
ninety two in 1897 to thirty seven in 1901. Similarly, Alexandra 
had dropped from fifty two to twenty nine, Arrowtown from 
to twelve, Cromwell from seventy seven to forty two, although 
there were still numerous Chinese miners in the surrounding 
areas (Census for appropriate years). 
18 The blanks were to be filled in with the name of the person, 
and the money would be sent to China with the slip, which 
would later be hung in the temple (NZP, 1 October 1887:63). 
19 During Zhong Yuan rituals are undertaken to pacify the 
unattended ghosts that might otherwise be malign. The rituals 
involve burning paper clothes and money and making libations to 
sat the needs of the ghosts (Willmott, 1970: 93) . 
20 time of this festival was calculated by the Imperial 
astronomer, who filled a six-stop flute with the ashes of a 
reed and placed it in a room which was sealed. When 
Tung-chi arrived the ashes would (from draft) fly about. 
Europeansreferred to it as Chinese Christmas (NZP,l March 1883:164). 
21 The Dragon Boat Festival is celebrated in southern China and 
commemorates the suicide of a faithful privy counsellor of the 
in the State of Ts'u. Apparently the counsellor was 
traduced by a competitor and was consequently banished. After 
his suicide was discovered, his friends went out in boats to find 
the body and offered large quantities of food so that the spirits 
would relinquish the body. The boats that are used each year are 
dug out of the mud and then reburied after use. For the actual 
they are heavily decorated and painted (NZP, 1 August 
1883:25). 
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22 This was a traditional antagonism that developed of 
the Hakka's migration into Kwangtung coupled with the 
ethnocentrism of the Cantonese. It erupted into open hostility 
during the Taiping Rebellion, since many Hakka joined the 
Taipings (Wakeman, 1966). The war between the Punti and 
IIakka lasted from 1853 till 1867. The Seyip-Sam Yap conflict 
will be mentioned later. 
23 In fact, the local Chinese contributed iBo for the Round Hill 
mission house. There was also another interpretation given by 
the Chinese in 1886, when they insisted that they had helped 
build the Mission house hoping that Don would as them with 
law-suits against Europeans, and they were displeased when 
he did not do so (NZP, 1 February 1886:148). 
24 Don went on a tour of America and then to China in the four 
years he was away. The purpose of his trip was to investigate 
the organization of Chinese missions in the United States and 
then to go to China and eheck the feasibility of pl~cing a 
missionary in Kwangtung (Don, 1904:6). 
25 The Boxer Rebellion swept across northern China in 1900, 
culminating in the seige of Peking's eleven foreign legations 
in July of the same year. It was essentially against Chinese 
Christians and those who supported foreigners, and finally it 
became totally anti-foreign. The rebellion was finally put 
down by foreign troops in August of the same 
26 (NZH) is the abbreviated form for the New Zealand Herald. 
27 (NZT) is the abbreviated form for the New Zealand 
28 See Chapter 3, page 80 for reference to Lo Keong and the 
description of the Ch'eung Shin Tong for Sew Hoy. 
This was highly unusual and the only time that a suggestion 
of this kind was to be made by a European until Peter Fraser 
became Prime Minister and suggested that the Chinese should 
have their own organisation to represent their market gardeners. 
Appeals for representation-consular or otherwise was always to 
come from the Chinese. 
29 The total Chinese population in New Zealand in 1901 was 2,963. 
As in the previous collection, once a donation had been 
from a subscriber a pass was issued allowing the 
person to return to China. If one did not pay, he was subject 
to a fine of i20 before he could set foot China. In Hong 
Kong the bodies would be turned over to Cheun - the Hong 
Kong counterpart of the Ch'eung Shin Tong - and they would 
distribute the coffins to their relatives for a fee of il 
, 30 October 1902:5). 
30 The final report said that 40 graveyards had been visited all 
over the country, including Auckland, Wellington, Palmerston 
North, Greymouth, Christchurch, Dunedin and other towns, and 
that 489 bodies had been exhumed (Press, 30 October 1902). 
31 The Ventnor's cargo also included nine aged Chinese body 
, £4,500 worth of Westport coal, and a quantity 
that was insured fori320 in Wellington. 
32 There is some dispute over this amount: another source 
says they were insured for £5,490 and that Yee Yong of 
Wellington also shipped 10 coffins with those of the 
Ch'eung Shin Tong. The latter shipment was destined for 
Jung Sing county (Ingram and Wheatley, 1961:277-278). 
33 According to an informant, the Ch'eung Shin Tong still had 
some £3,000 in 1928. The money was kept in Wellington, 
Hong Kong and Poon Yu, but the funds in New Zealand were 
used to repatriate people returning to China. If one had 
donated once you received £10 and if you had donated twice 
£15 to help defray the costs. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RABLE IMMIGRANTS: LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 
AND ITS CONTEXT: 1878-1920 
In the previous chapter the context has been set out for the 
development of an intensive period of anti-Chinese 1 lation ee 
Appendix VII). As indicated, it developed particularly in the l870s 
and will be shown here to reach its extreme point under the Liberal 
era which lasted from 1890 to 1911. While it has been maintained 
that the architects of this continued effort at anti-Chinese 
legislation can be limited to a few names and their particular 
biases Ng, B.F., 1959:19-28; Hall and Scholefield, 1927:1-16), 
this is by no means a sufficient explanation. One cannot lay the 
hundreds of pages of debate in both Council and the House at the 
feet of personality alone. Nor can one blame it on a public that 
demanded an eradication of the Chinese from the shores of New Zealand, 
for despite the efforts that produced the legislation, none 
accomplished absolute exclusion. Certainly it is clear that a 'white 
New Zealand' policy was and would continue to be complimented by 
Anti-Asiatic groups of various sorts who used the issue to influence 
government, but, despite both, Chinese immigration continued and the 
poll tax survived all manner of immigration restriction. 
Clearly, also there was an element of dislike for the 
but in neither the public nor the political sphere, as will be 
indicated, was it great enough to bring about either a total ban 
on immigration, a purge of the New Zealand Chinese population, or 
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even the systematic collection of evidence to support a move against 
them (see Ng, 1972:8). If the Chinese represented, as it was 
repeatedly maintained, a threefold threat of economic competition, 
immorality and outright danger as a 'coloured race', then one 
would expect absolute exclusion to be swift (see Ng, B.F., 1959:17). 
It was not, however; instead there was a constant barrage of amended 
legislation aimed at restriction. 
Given the absence of exclusion and substantive data making a 
case against the Chinese one is forced to seek other explanations 
for the activity of this period, and it is argued here, that only by 
detailed exploration of the context can this be provided. 
This exploration reveals several points. First, the continued 
emphasis on the Chinese leads one to the conclusion that it must have 
had some use as a political tool both in terms of New Zealand's 
internal politics and its external relations, especially with 
Britain. The evidence suggests that restriction without absolute 
exclusion allowed the Chinese to exist but not flourish. Furthermore, 
characteristics of the Chinese community itself also added to this 
role, since it had no representation from a homeland that began to 
concern itself with its expatriates only towards the end of the period. 
The dominant European community was unfamiliar with Chinese culture 
and social structure, and it appeared to them unworthy of such 
interest and in fact impossible to penetrate. The first task of 
this chapter, therefore, is to show how the Chinese issue - and 
indirectly their community - was used to influence internal and 
external politics of New Zealand. 
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In addition to the continued use of the issue to stir up 
local electorates, it became a powerful lever against vested 
interests of the Legislative Council on the part of the Liberal Party. 
More importantly, the whole prolonged process of formulating 
immigration policy in regard to Asiatics eventually led to its 
curtailment, and by the end of the period the topic is no longer 
the subject of parliamentary debate but instead the prerogative of 
Cabinet alone. This consolidated power in one group as far as policy 
was concerned and also increased the power of individual bureaucrats 
who were responsible for its implementation. Externally it became a 
-
lever for the colony against the hegemony of Britain as it strived 
for autonomy and the right to determine the composition of its 
population. New Zealand's vulnerability became more pronounced as 
other colonies and countries achieved autonomy in this area and 
excluded Asiatics from their shores, leaving those less powerful as 
alternatives. 
The second task of this chapter is to show unintended 
consequences of the activity surrounding restrictive immigration 
legislation in New Zealand. In particular, parallel changes in 
China eventually led to a new interest in their overseas population on 
the part of Peking, especially in regard to the restrictions their 
fellow countrymen faced. This interest in the case of New Zealand 
coincided with the local Chinese community's persistent appeals for 
rights and representatives, which finally resulted in direct relations 
being established between China and New Zealand in the person of a 
Chinese consular officer posted to Wellington. Simultaneously, these 
events led,in conjunction with influences from political changes in 
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China,to the emergence of organisation in the local Chinese 
community, a situation feared by the New Zealand government lest it 
reinforce ties with China to the extent that any allegiance to New 
Zealand would be impossible. 
The earliest discussion of the Chinese question involved the 
employment of labour on railway construction under the Fox ministry 
and the more general question which was left up to the activities of 
the 1871 Select Committee. As previously noted, the issue of labour 
was more complicated than the case presented in Parliament, and 
although various members denied the employment of labour there was 
no question that it took place - only the extent remains unknown. 
Even Mr. Stout, Minister for Lands and Immigration, said in 1878 
that it had been a question considered by the Minister of Public 
Works at the time, but policy was never implemented (NZPD 1878,29:420). 
As for the Select Committee, its results have already been discussed, 
and all that can be added is the fact that those who opposed 
immigration at the time were to be replaced by a new group from 
Westland and later Wellington, and also that the trend set in this 
report of talking about the local Chinese residents with absolutely 
no idea about actual social facts and statistics ted. A large 
part of the parliamentary debate on the problem tells one 
considerably more about the participants in the debate and the 
situation of the Chinese in California and Australia than it ever 
does about the local situation. The prime requisite for expressing 
an opinion in the debates on various bills was contact of any sort 
with at least one Chinese person, and apparently, the fewer the 
number in one's constituency, the greater the freedom to talk 
about them. 
Although the matter of restriction declined as an issue 
from 1871 for six years, it again emerged in 1878, brought to the 
attention of the government by Reeves, M.H.R. for Grey Valley. 
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When Reeves finally got a debate on his motion for restrictions to 
be introduced, he launched into a long attack stating evidence from 
Hawaii, California and Australia. 1 The major issues which were used 
to support opposition were much the same as those heard in 1871, with 
perhaps more emphasis on the possibility of Chinese spreading 
leprosy and their competition in the labour market (NZPD 1878,29:417). 
The situation of labour had become increasingly dismal after 
1870, as already noted in the previous chapter,until in 1877 it 
merited the term ~epression! According to Salmond (see Crowley, 1950), 
every winter after 1877 witnessed worse conditions and increased 
agitation from the unemployed (Crowley, 1950:29). By late 1878 a wave 
of anti-Chinese fervour swept through the country following news of 
the Australian seamen's strike over Chinese labour. Unions such as 
the Wellington Bookbinders collected funds to support the anti-
Chinese strike, although the Lyttelton Times 2 reporter saw no 
apparent reason for the support (LT, 16 December 1878). In Wellington 
a large public meeting was organised where a number of resolutions 
were passed opposing Chinese immigration. The meeting largely 
concentrated on the undesirable nature of a competing Chinese labour 
force whose presence was blamed on the unscrupulous capitalists. It 
was further argued that New Zealand already had 'an inferior class. 
of people amongst them, and they were, physically speaking, much 
superior to the Mongolian race' (NZT, 18 December 1878). 
In the discussion that ensued in Parliament, members of the 
House from Totara, Dunstan, Napier, Wakitipu, Thames and Tuapeka 
did not feel there was any need for immediate action. They spoke 
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quite favourably about the local Chinese and even the cases of inter-
marriage that they knew of, although the member that mentioned inter-
marriage also had to read a motion from his electorate, the local 
Tuapeka Council, which asked that Parliament take measures 'to 
prohibit any further influx of Chinese' (NZPD 1878,29:418 and 
LT, 10 August 1873).3 If there was to be legislation, then it should 
be imposed in the areas of import duty on rice, for which they would 
either have to pay extra or buy locally produced food. Alternatively, 
it was suggested that the Chinese could pay a protection or 
fee and have their employment restricted to such areas as were not 
desired by Europeans. The obvious occupation, to Captain Russell of 
Napier, was domestic servants in urban areas (NZPD,1878,29:42l). In 
1878 there were seventy-eight Chinese engaged in this activity in 
New Zealand (see Appendix VIII). After considerable debate the 
motions were withdrawn, but a bill was introduced by Mr. Gisborne 
in the following sessions (modelled on the Queensland Act of 1877) 
which was to impose arlO poll tax (after the Chinese population 
reached 5,000 or 1% of the total); to limit the number of Chinese 
to one for every ten tons of tonnage; to provide a penalty to the 
master of the ship of £20 per illegal Chinese on shipboard; to 
require the master of the ship to provide a list of Chinese 
p~ or face a penalty of up to £200; to exempt the crew from 
the poll tax; to allow the vessel to be seized; and to require all 
Chinese in the colony to get an exemption certificate before 
1 January 1880 (Bills Thrown Out, 1879, No.12:3).4 The Bill was 
supported strongly by Sir George Grey on the grounds that the Chinese 
' ... exercise a deteriorating effect upon its [New Zealand] 
civilization by forcing the European worker to ... descend the scale 
of civilization ... ', in order to compete with the Chinese who work 
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for less wages and have a lower cost of living (AJHR, 1879, 0_3).5 
The bill, however, did not pass, so a private member's bill was 
introduced by Hutchinson from Wellington the following year. 
Hutchinson's bill provided for the same poll tax but made the vessel 
responsible for the Chinese passengers who were not landed plus 
imposing a fine of£5 on them before deportation (Bills Thrown Out 
1880, No.78:l). 
There are three important aspects surrounding this private 
bill. First, support for the bill came from the unemployed and 
working class in various centres. Initially it started in Wellington, 
where two Chinese had been attacked, which in turn led to the Native 
Minister warning a gathering at the Workingmen's Club that this kind 
of activity went against their own interests (LT, 6 January 1879). 
In Dunedin, workers in a local boot factory 'severely treated' local 
Chinese who were passing during their lunch hour (LT,14 January 1879), 
and in Auckland the Workingmen's Club circulated an anti-Chinese 
petition which had three thousand names by April (LT, 7 February, 
8 April, 1879). Auckland working men, according to the Lyttelton 
Times' Auckland correspondent, had been seized by 'yellow fever' 
and now accused the Chinese of reducing their rate of wages. The 
article pointed out, however, that the accusation assumed that 
Chinese would indeed work for less wages, a fact that was nowhere 
verified (LT, 20 February 1879). In Christchurch the activity was 
similar, with a public meeting and a set of resolutions passed 
deploring the state of unemployment, the employment of Chinese for 
lower wages and their continued immigration (LT, 26 May 1879).6 
.. 
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Secondly, the bill questioned the dependent status of the 
colony, suggesting that New Zealand had the right to determine who 
emigrated to her shores without consulting the Home Government. 
Thirdly, its presentation provided a platform for a new emerging 
leader and one who also responded to the anti-Chinese lobby. This 
was Seddon from the West Coast. 
Seddon, according to Burdon, was opposed not only to Chinese 
immigration but in fact to any immigration when there were already 
plenty of people in New Zealand for the jobs available (Burdon, 1955:43). 
The results of the debates provided no basis for regional 
solidarity, and Reid (Hokitika) and Trimble (Grey) opposed the bill 
along with Shrimski (Waitaki), Te Wheoro (Western Maori), Wallis (West 
Auckland) and others. Te Wheoro suggested that if the New Zealand 
government could so easily ignore a treaty between Britain and China 
then he wondered whether the Treaty of Waitangi would also be ignored, 
and McLean from Waikouati suggested that Hutchinson knew full well 
that the bill would never be supported in New Zealand and in fact 
would never receive royal assent, so the operation was just to get 
the electorate stirred up.7 Seddon and Reeves were totally in 
favour, with Seddon suggesting, as regards the equality between 
Chinese and Europeans, that 'There was about the same distinct 
between a European and a Chinaman as that between a Chinaman and a 
monkey' (NZPD, 1880,38:97). Grey made an appeal for a white New 
Zealand: 'Why not let the people of New Zealand - a European race 
keep themselves as pure a European race as they possibly can' (NZPD, 
8 1880,38:102). The Premier opposed the bill as it stood but real 
that legislation was necessary. In the meantime, there was to be an 
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Inter-Colonial Conference of the Australian colonies in Sydney in 
January of 1881 which would discuss the Chinese question and the 
constitutional position of the colonies (Price, 1974:204). Before 
the conference could take place, however, the Chinese Immigration 
Bill was proposed by the Government and justified on the grounds 
of protecting the standard of living and the independence of New 
Zealand. Those opposed to the Bill included Sir William Fox 
(Rangitikei), Trimble (Grey), Turnbull (Timaru), Murray (Bruce) 
and Fulton (Taieri), who felt that the legislation was contrary to 
the British tradition and that the antagonistic feelings were being 
generated by working-class agitation. 
The provisions of the bill were similar to the one proposed 
by the government in 1879. It limited the Chinese on any vessel to 
one for every ten tons and provided for a poll tax of £10 for each 
Chinese landing except for those who would be excused. Those who 
had paid the poll tax would be issued with a certificate, and those 
already in the country would have two months to apply for a 
certificate (without payment of £10), which in both cases allowed 
the person to leave New Zealand and return without paying a further ~10. 
The act also made provision for fining a ship's captain £20 plus tax 
if they should try to land Chinese without paying the poll tax. 9 
The funds that were to corne from this poll tax would be paid 
10 into the Public Account (New Zealand Statutes, 1881,47:302-303). 
The bill was passed by the Lower House and then moved to the Council, 
where it was also passed. The debate in the Upper House was marked 
by a feeling that some legislation was imminent and this seemed as good 
as any. The most adamant opponent of the bill was Dr. Pollen (Auckland), 
who used the findings of the 1871 report and the investigations on 
the Chinese in the United States to support his claim. He also felt 
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it was a strange coincidence that this bill was pushed through on 
the eve of a general election (NZPD, 1881,38:210). Other comments 
ranged from support of the bill based on public opinion and vehement 
personal attacks on the Chinese from Hawkes Bay and Otago members,to 
others who felt that it did not take those Chinese into account who 
had been naturalized or who might be coming as government 
representatives (NZPD, 1881,38:208-214). The Act was sent to 
England for assent and received it, since the Australian colony had 
11 
already set the precedent, and the Act came into force the following 
year. 
In the remaining months of the session the Chinese question 
was raised only twice, both times by Seddon. He complained in one 
instance that of 400 Chinese miners in the Westland gold fields only 
150 had miner's rights, and he asked that the Warden's bailiff be 
given authority to collect the fee. Seddon was told that this 
provision was already in existence, therefore there was no need 
for the change (NZPD, 1881,39:142). The other point he raised at a 
later date was actually in the interest of the Chinese community at 
Waimea and Stafford. He asked that a paid Chinese interpreter - he 
actually knew a Chinese man who could to the job and was 'truthful'-
be appointed, which was to avoid a situation he described where 
two Chinese interpreters were operating in a court case between 
Europeans and a group of Chinese miners. The matter was to be 
considered, but no more was said of it. 
The following year, although the government was not as 
concerned with the Chinese question, they did not let it rest. In 
the first session a Chinese Mining Exclusion Bill was presented to 
the House by the Timaru representative on behalf of Mr. Daniel (Wallace), 
who was absent at the time. It was an act to prevent Chinese mining in 
the gold fields, and its provisions were as follows: 
It shall not be lawful for any Warden administering 
"The Mines Act 1877" or "The Gold Mining Districts 
Act, 1873", to grant any mining right, residence 
area, certificate, lease, licence, or any other 
right or title to any mining tenement or easement 
to any Chinese person. 
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(New Zealand Parliament, Bills 
Thrown Out 1882:245) 
It went on to make provision for those who already had miners rights 
but prohibited the issue of any new ones (ibid.). Mr. Daniel never 
spoke to the bill, and its reception was met with cries of 'ridiculous', 
since many considered it proper to stop Chinese coming to New Zealand 
but unfair to take away their rights when they were already here. 
The second incident of 1882 concerned an Act that actually had 
nothing to do with the Chinese but which involved Seddon. Seddon 
asked the government to reduce the naturalization fee fromLl per 
person to 2/6 and to make provision for the children of naturalized 
parents to automatically become naturalized. He justified this on the 
basis of a number of extremely poor Scandinavian 'settlers' at 
Seventy Mile Bush who could not afford the cost but wanted to stay 
(NZPD 1882, 42:11). By the time the bill left the House, however, 
Pyke (Dunstan) had managed to quickly add a.statement that said: 
'Provided that nothing in this Act contained shall apply to persons 
of the Chinese race' (NZPD, 1882,42:166). The House voted in favour 
of the bill with its new addition after Seddon had told them that 
the Chinese did not get naturalised 12 anyway. The Council was opposed to 
the inclusion of the clause and voted against it by seventeen to twelve 
votes, but the debate took some strange turns. Some suggested 
that it was the end of the session and if they opposed the bill on 
the basis of Pyke's clause, then they would lose that legislation of 
which they were generally in favour (NZPD, 1882,43:315). Others 
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felt that the precedent of unequal treatment had been set by the 
1881 Act, imposing a poll tax on just the Chinese, so why not make 
them totally unequal, but for others this did not solve the problem 
of the few children who had a Chinese and European parent and who, 
it was felt, should be naturalised (NZPD, 1882, 43:315). A further 
complication arose when Holmes (Otago) introduced the 1881 Act into 
the discussion and told the Council that a Chinese woman had just 
in Wellington with her two New Zealand-born children and 
had been charged ~O poll tax (ibid.). Although not directly related 
to the Alien Act, it was an indication that the 1881 Act had major 
problems, for there was also the question of whether shipls Chinese 
cooks should be charged 210 poll tax when they came off the boat 
arid whether the poll tax was going to be imposed on travel 
(NZPD, 1882,42:620). 
The bill went back to the House and once more to the Counci 1, where 
it was_ again opposed by nineteen to fuurteen. The compromise in the end 
was a provision which allowed the reduced fee for all other aliens 
Chinese but still allowed Chinese to be naturalised (NZPD, 1888, 
60:395). 
In the 1883 session the first Chinese petition was sent by 
residents in Wellington - one of which was John Ah Tong - to 
ask that the matter of charging poll tax for internal travel be 
stopped and that the poll tax requirement be withdrawn till the 
p.0pulation reached 7,000. 13 Shaw (Inangahua) an 
approach, from the petitioners , inquired of Major Atkinson (Egmont) 
as to the status of the petition (NZPD, 1883,45:180). Atkinson 
that the petition had not been dealt with and that 
immigration requirements would remain unchanged. The charging of 
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poll tax when Chinese were merely going from Greymouth to Dunedin, 
however, Atkinson stated, was an administrative error and could be 
sorted out . ) . 
From 1883 till 1886 the Chinese question was not mentioned 
in the proceedings of either House, and it remained for Seddon to 
re the matter in 1887. In 1886 the Chinese population had 
declined to 4542 from 5004 in 1881, with a substantial drop in 
arrival between 1882 and 1885 (see Appendix I and II). Although 
the population had dropped, there had been a substantial increase 
in the number of Chinese being naturalized. In the sears 
since the 1881 Act was enforced, 105 Chinese had become naturalised, 
and Seddon was alarmed. He stated in the House that he had heard 
rumours of Chinese sending their newly acquired naturalisation 
papers back to China with enough information to allow other Chinese 
to come to New Zealand avoiding the poll tax of llO and saving £9 
14 (NZPD, 1887, 57:227). Also, Seddon had heard news of Chinese 
Commi who were to visit Australia, and he wondered whethe.r 
they would be coming to New Zealand. In response to his questions 
Vogel, the Minister of Customs, said that it was not naturalisation 
certificates that were being used for re-entry certificates,for 
which they applied if they were thinking of going home for a trip 
(ibid.). Vogel also stated that the Chinese Commissioners were coming 
to New Zealand, but with the express aim of easing restrictions, not 
tightening them :228). Several other times in 1887, the question 
of Chinese 1 lation was brought before the government by Reeves 
(Inangahua) and Seddon (Kumara), but Atkinson, the Premier, said that 
there did not seem to be any need for immediate action. Reeves at 
one point that there were abuses surrounding the issuing of a 
re-entry and wanted an end to naturalisation for the 
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Chinese (NZPD,1887, 59:320) and Seddon maintained that 
numbers of young girls were visiting the Chinese quarters in the 
colony's larger centres, which he described as totally unsanitary. 
The Minister of Justice said that he had investigated the latter 
question and insisted that, contrary to Seddon's assertion, the 
numbers were small and that the police had no right to 
unless charges had been made (NZPD, 1887, 59:295). 
One curious anomaly did occur in 1887 concerning a bill that 
appears in the list of Bills Thrown Out but which is not mentioned 
in the Parliamentary Debates. It appears that Seddon was 
for the future and tried a bill which was entitled tChinese Influx 
Prevention' intended to replace the 1881 Act. The provisions were 
as follows: 
1. One Chinese to every 100 tons. 
2. Penalty to master of ship of £20 to £100 per person for 
excess Chinese. 
3. A complete list of Chinese passengers with name, , 
place of birth, former place of residence the absence 
of which was to be punished by £200 fine. 
4. The Chinese crew must be reported to Customs or 
Master to be fined i20. 
5. Poll tax was to be £20 regardless of naturalisation 
or previous exemption. 
6. Poll tax can also be raised to £100 by government if 
they see fit. 
7. Should Master fail to provide poll tax for those who 
land, he is liable for the amount plus the forfeiture 
of his vessel. 
8. Should Chinese avoid payment they would be tried and 
fined f20 to £So and a time would be fixed for the payment. 
9. Chinese already in New Zealand have two months to apply 
for exemption certificates. 
10. Naturalisation does not allow exemption, which is 
applicable only to representatives of the Chinese 
government. 
11. Naturalisation fees to be increased from £1 to flO. 
(Bills Thrown Out 1887, No. 63:4) 
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These undoubtedly were harsh provisions but did not provide, 
as one might expect, for total exclusion. 
In the following year Reeves inquired again about the 
prevention of Chinese landing in the colony and Atkinson replied 
that the government had been given notice of a bill, which essentially 
15 followed the Victoria Act that had already received Royal assent. 
The bill provided a further tonnage restriction on bringing 
the to the colonies and imposed a harsher fine. It also 
exempted Chinese who were British subjects by birth or naturalisation, 
which was to be a source of much consternation for the Lower House, 
who that Chinese who were British subjects in Hong Kong 
or would be flocking to New Zealand, where they could feel 
16 free. It was also feared that, since the United States had 
negotiated a treaty with China17 that effectively barred the 
immigration of Chinese labour into that country for ten years, there 
would be a tendency to look for more favourable places. Similarly, 
A I , 1 ' d h hI' 1 . 18 ustra la was a so mOVlng towar s ars er egls atlon. 
were three major problems that confronted this 
lation and which effectively prevented both the House and the 
Council from achieving consensus. At the time the issue was being 
discussed in New Zealand, the British Government, aware of its 
colony~s action, was trying to negotiate a treaty with China that 
would do what the Sino-American treaty attempted to do. Since the 
negotiat were delicate, Governor Jervois 19 of New Zealand had 
been asked to try and prevent the implementation of harsh slation 
(NZPD, 1888,60:146). Despite this, there were a number of bills 
before the governments of Victoria and New South Wales which 
promised to try and exclude the Chinese altogether. The result of 
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this action led to a refusal for 350 Chinese to land in Sydney, 
but the Supreme Court case that followed this Act overturned the 
20 
right of anyone to do this (NZPD, 1888, 60:152). In the meantime, 
however, it added fuel to the anti-Chinese fever in the House, 
where some members insisted that this would result in a mass exodus 
for New Zealand. Since the Imperial government was in a position to 
negotiate a treaty, it was hardly likely that assent would be given 
to any new immigration-restriction acts that would jeopardize this 
procedure, so it was not in New Zealand's interest, according to some 
b f h h h " 21 mem ers 0 t e House, to pus t 1S 1ssue. If assent would not be 
given to a new Act, then the alternative was to follow the Victoria 
Act, which had already received assent and which added increased 
restrictions in certain areas of the 1881 Act, plus an additional 
proviso concerning British subjects and naturalisation. Other 
members of the House, however, claimed that the Imperial government's 
position related to more generalised international agreements and 
really did not have the interest of each individual colony at heart; 
besides, they felt that the Victoria Act had been a failure 
(NZPD, 1888, 60:32). The more restrictive course of increased 
poll tax was sought by some, like Ballance (Wanganui), O'Callaghan 
(Lincoln) and Dr. Newman (Thorndon), who suggested that any on 
their way could be put in quarantine. Atkinson, the Premier, fielded 
most of the extreme positions and tried to find a consensus by 
suggesting that they pass what restrictions they could and then wait 
and see (NZPD, 1888, 60:37). Seddon merely kept the argument going 
by attacking the more liberal members and supporting the antagonists. 
Finally, after a protracted argument about procedure, the Bill to 
Amend the Chinese Immigrant Act of 1881 was sent to the Council. 
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The Council was much more hesitant 22 about the bill, 
that the Imperial government's activity might be thwarted and also 
suggested that it would be wise to wait until the Inter-Colonial 
Conference had met and discussed the issue. The Conference was to 
be held in Sydney in June, which was in the middle of a session, 
making attendance difficult. Some members feared that changing the 
legislation quickly would only lead to an embarrassing situation 
where ships would arrive with too many Chinese on board unaware 
that restrictions had changed, and the whole issue would thus be a 
source of embarrassment (NZPD, 1888. 60:217). 
The naturalis.ation issue was not seen as a problem. If 
people were naturalised then they were entitled to the rights that 
came with it. Besides, the Aliens Act of 1882 still required that 
Chinese had to pay fl for the privilege while the fee had been 
reduced for all others (NZPD,1888, 60:395). Some part of the debate 
centred on the discussion of three clauses that prohibited Chinese 
from voting in local elections unless they paid rates or were 
naturalised. The Council struck them from the bill. The Council 
also added a clause that Chinese government officials and Chinese men 
of war and those who had left China prior to 10 June, 1888 were 
exempted from the bill's provisions. On the third reading of the bill, 
nine members of the Council opposed it, but the majority in favour 
prevailed (NZPD, 1888,60:524). 
When the bill returned to the House with several clauses 
struck from it and others changed, there was little that could be done. 
The House argued about the amendments, and Grey (Auckland Central), 
made an impassioned plea for' ... nothing but a European race within 
the limits of New Zealand ... ' (NZPD, 1888,61:176). A committee was 
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set up to argue for the three clauses struck by the Council, but the 
Council stood firm (NZPD, 1888, 61:245-276) and in fact set up their 
own committee, which in due course set out a number of responses to the 
House's statements. Largely, their rejection of the latter's suggestion 
was based on the results of the conference in which Victoria, Western 
Australia and Queensland abolished their poll tax and raised the tonnage 
limit to one Chinese person for every 500 tons (Choi, 1975:26). Tasmania 
and New Zealand abstained, the latter because the individual appointed 
to attend the conference arrived three days late. 23 
Generally the results of the conference were mild,24 but 
not according to Jervois, who sent off a dispatch to London on 10 July 
after his former suggestion had been politely declined by the Imperial 
government (Fieldhouse, 1956:334). He insisted that Australian~ 
move to introduce legislation immediately after the conference was 
founded on a ridiculous pretext that more Chinese would destroy the 
'moral and social condition of the people' (Fieldhouse, 1956:336). 
Jervois' condemnation of the Colonial governments was summed up in his 
dispatch's final sarcastic note, which actually twisted Parkes' 
25 (President of the Conference) summation of the conference results: 
The Colonial Governments in all that they have done ... 
have been studious of Imperial interests, in that they 
have irritated a valuably ally; studious of 
international obligations in that they have violated 
the Treaty of Peking; studious of their reputation as 
law-abiding communities, in that, irrespective of the 
outrages above mentioned [these included the wrecking 
of the Chinese quarter at Brisbane and several other 
events], the Government itself of New South Wales has 
so withstood the law as to call down a severe rebuke 
from its own Supreme Court. 
(Fieldhouse, 1956:337) 
The response of the Imperial government was again polite acknowledgement 
but no comment, since it was generally felt that Australia's action would 
have little effect on diplomatic relations (Fieldhouse, 1956:338). 
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The House did not like the Council's obvious refusal to budge 
and especially its insistence that if temporary settlement was enough 
reason to deprive one of one's rights then this ought to apply to 
Europeans as well (NZPD, 1888, 61:276). The obvious stand-off was 
followed by a Free Conference in which members from the House and 
Council were to meet and discuss a compromise, but it resulted in 
failure (NZPD, 1888, 61:737). Through the rest of 1888 the House kept 
inquiring about the bill, and the only response was that it was still 
under consideration by the government. In the interim Seddon took 
the opportunity to collect some statistics on inter-marriage and half-
caste children and asked that the information in Table 6 be laid 
before the House (NZPD, 1888, 61:1920). 
TABLE 6: a Chinese Marriages with Europeans in New Zealand, 1886. 
Auckland 
Taranaki 
Hawkes Bay 
Wellington 
Marlborough 
Westland 
Canterbury 
Otago 
TOTAL 
No. of Chinese 
married or widowed 
to European wife 
7 
2 
1 
7 
1 
1 
4 
28 
51 
No. of Half-Caste 
children 
6 
8 
5 
13 
3 
2 
11 
53 
aAlthough these statistics were called for in 1888, they were 
actually collected in 1886 and were already two years out of date 
(AJHR, 1888, H-29). 
bOf these 101 children, thirteen resided in Australia, one in China 
and the remainder in New Zealand. 
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Seddon never had the opportunity to use these statistics, 
but obviously they formed the two halves of his belief that the 
Chinese were basically immoral and that New Zealand should be white. 
Despite the fact that the legislation never appears for discussion 
again, it did corne into effect with the following provisions: 
An Act to Amend the Chinese Immigrants Act of 188126 
Provisions 
1. Does not include Chinese naturalised in New Zealand. 
2. One Chinese permitted to enter for every 100 tons 
of cargo. 
3. If, however, one had left China or Hong Kong before 
10th June, 1888 the above will not apply. 
4. The fine for Chinese evading the poll tax was 
increased from ~O to i50. If the Chinese do not 
pay they may spend one year in goal. 
5. Chinese duly accredited to New Zealand by the 
government of China or under the authority of the 
Imperial Government are not liable. 
(New Zealand Statutes, 1888:123-124). 
The only other activity in Parliament in 1888 was a question raised 
by Seddon about the arrest of Chinese under the Gaming and Lotteries 
Act in Wellington. Apparently all the Chinese arrested were released, 
which he could not understand, since they had even been treated 
reasonably well when arrested. It turned out that they were in fact, 
not gambling at the time of the arrest, so the charges were dropped 
(NZPD, 1888,61:358). 
In the following year the Chinese issue was first raised by 
Joyce (Lyttelton), who requested that a return be laid on the table 
showing the number of Chinese who had paid property tax since 1879 
(NZPD, 1889,64:486). The motive was unknown, but one can suspect 
that.he was trying to refute the case the Council had made the previous 
year concerning the rights of Chinese in local elections, 
which resulted in three clauses being struck from the government 
bill. The result of his request was as follows: 
TABLE 7: Chinese Residents in the Colony who have Paid 
Property Tax, 1879-1889. 
1879 · ........ 9 
1880 - 1881 · ........ 9 
1881 - 1882 · ........ 9 
1882 - 1883 · ........ 9 
1883 - 1884 · ........ 17 
1884 ,- 1885 · ........ 17 
1885 - 1886 · ........ 18 
1886 - 1887 ......... 17 
1887 - 1888 · ........ 16 
1888 - 1889 · ........ 16 
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(National Archives, LE 1/1889/101) 
Nothing resulted from the above, but Seddon again took the 
opportunity to push the immigration matter by enquiring of the 
Premier whether or not a new act would be presented, since the one 
passed in the previous year was only temporary. Atkinson's response 
was that the act would continue in force, and in the following months 
the Chinese Immigrants Act Continuance Bill passed through both the 
House and the Council with little comment. 
From 1890 till 1893 the issue of the Chinese in New Zealand 
subsided with three exceptions. 27 
The first was the murder of a young man in the Hutt on 
28 September 1890 by a 'Chinaman'. The incident occurred after five 
youths, having repeatedly,over a period of time,been throwing stones 
on Chinese gardeners' huts, got caught by several of the gardeners 
who lay in wait for them. The fight that ensued left one of the 
youths dead and nearly resulted in a general assault on the local 
190. 
Chinese by neighbours. The possible revenge situation was averted 
by another neighbour carrying a gun, and the next day two of the 
three Chinese men were charged with wilful murder, and a third 
awaited a similar charge after his discharge from hospital. An 
inquest was held four days later, where it was revealed that the dead 
boy had died from excessive bleeding from knife wounds; that one of 
the Chinese gardeners had also been seriously wounded and that the 
youths in question had previously thrown stones once before on 
the same night (NZT, 3 October 1890). It was also stated that the 
three gardeners in question leased land and operated a garden together. 
While the whole affair looked potentially capable of stirring 
up massive trouble, which was obvious to the Chinese community who 
attended the initial court proceedings in great numbers (NZT, 
2 October 1890), little eventuated. On the same d'ay as the inquest 
there was in fact a sober letter to the New Zealand Times which 
summarized the incident. 
People may refuse to do business with them [the 
Chinese], they may criticise them, they may urge 
the prohibition of the immigration of their 
countrymen among us. But those who are here must 
be treated as men lawfully abiding in the country, 
and entitled to the privilege of freedom from 
molestation .... We trust that public feeling will 
not, in view of the admissions made in the witness 
box, become excited. 
(NZT, 3 October 1890) 
The letter went on to insist that justice be handed out equally to 
both the Chinese and the youths, arguing that the latter had been 
responsible for the whole situation in the first place (NZT, 3 October, 
1890). 
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In the midst of anti-Chinese feelings, the reason evident in 
the above letter prevailed. The youths were prosecuted by the police 
for stone-throwing and molesting, and the Chinese were sent before 
Supreme Court. In December their case came up, and after the 
Justice had heard the case he instructed the Grand Jury that 
indictment of murder could be changed to manslaughter (Press, 
2 December 1890). The result was the discharge of one gardener and 
a reduced charge of manslaughter for the other two men, who were to 
be arraigned at a later date. There was no discussion of the 
incident in Parliament, and there seems to have been little if any 
public reaction against the Chinese, contrary to the picture 
portrayed by Ballance in the following year. 
The second occurrence, while far less sensational, was 
cant in that it initiated a particular type of anti-Chinese 
activity. With the movement of Chinese into service and shopkeeping 
activity (see Appendix VIII) it became apparent to Europeans in 
similar occupations as well as the labour movement that they now had 
a solid base for opposition to the Chinese. The result was for 
instance, the appointment of a committee by the Wellington Grocer 1 s 
and Early Closing Association in 1891 who, alarmed at the fact that 
Chinese fruit shops often stayed open when they were supposed to be 
closed, wanted to press government for more stringent lation. 
Similarly organisations like the Trades and Labour Council and 
Knights of Labour kept watch, on not only legislative activity 
Chinese immi,gration, but also on any movement by the 
Chinese which was deemed undesirable. The Knights of Labour 
opposed the movement of Chinese traders and labourers into the 
Wairarapa and insisted that they close their businesses on Thursday 
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LT, 8 March 1892 and NZT, 3 November 1892). Two years later 
the Trades and Labour Council in Wellington were responsible for an 
unsuccessful charge laid against a Chinese fruiterer over the 
supposed sale of 'unsound fruit' and the suggestion that a personal 
residence tax should be levied on the Chinese (NZT, 31 January 1894). 
What seemed to have occurred was a licence for close surveillance 
of activity in the name of scrutinising practices 
and unemployment but more accurately for the support of anti-
1 slation. 
The third occurrence in 1891 was the unexpected of a 
dispatch in New Zealand containing a request from the Chinese 
government that consuls or consular agents be appointed to certain 
of Her Britannic Majesty's dominions. The request was based on the 
increasingly friendly relations between Britain and China and also the 
fact that China had opened her country to foreign interests 
considerably since 1887 when a previous request was made. In the 
letter from the Chinese legation, Sieh Ta-Jen stated that: 
"At more than twenty Ports and places in the Chinese 
Empire foreigners are allowed to reside and carryon 
commerce on conditions which, as compared to what 
takes place in territories of many of the treaty 
Powers, may also be considered as free-trade, and at 
twenty-two of these emporia Her Britannic Maj 
represented by Consuls or Consular Agents". 
(AJHR, 1891 A-2:8) 
The reply from the Foreign Office was favourable, with one 
proviso that exequaturs to consular offices could be appointed 
as long as local considerations did not make it impossible . : 8) . 
The response from Ballance in New Zealand was to be a case in point. 
The Secretary of State had assumed that, since the immigration of 
Chinese to New Zealand was already covered by certain restrictions, 
there would be no objection, but on the contrary Ballance stated: 
... owing to the strong feeling existing in the 
minds of the colonists against the immigration 
of people of the Chinese race into New Zealand, 
it would be inexpedient to grant permission for 
the establishment of a Chinese Consulate the 
Colony. 
With regard to Chinese already in the Colony, 
they have the power to naturalise themselves and 
become British subjects; while those who do not 
desire to do so have the protection of the law, 
and cannot be injured in their person or property 
with impunity. 
(AJHR, 1892, A-1A:4) 
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The Governor responded to Ballance I s statement with a request 
to know how the Ministers thought increased immigration would be 
brought about by having a representative in New Zealand. He also 
stated that he felt the Chinese were a special case and suffered 
considerable hardship including 'violence and maltreatment' and that 
they were perhaps in more need of representation than other 
foreigners. He further suggested that it might be possible to insist 
on the Chinese Consul being of European nationality, as was the case 
for other foreign powers. 
In due course,Ballance responded to the Governor, but no set 
of responses from ministers was included, merely the blanket 
, 
statement that theY,the ministers,were 'not prepared to ~measure the 
ingenuity of the Chinese by any known rule', and further that they 
considered the Chinese a special case unlike other 
(AJHR, 1892, A-1A:S). 
In 1893 the Seddon administration commenced and the first 
piece of anti-Chinese legislation was introduced in the same year by 
one of Seddon's colleagues from the West Coast. Q'Conor (Buller) 
introduced a private member's bill in August which was to exclude 
Asiatics from the right to naturalisation and also from carrying on 
specifi c bus including hawking, manufacturing or shopkeeping 
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(NZPD, 1893, 81:328). The bill received support from the WBllington 
and Masterton members, but others feared that such legislation was 
an Imperial matter and better dropped. The bill died naturally! due 
to a lack of a quorum, but it was unlikely to succeed especially 
in any case, with the Wellington papers of the day reporting the 
destruction of a Chinese hawking cart by a drunken European driver 
and the brual assault on the hawker by a European labourer after 
the accident (EP, 19 August 1893 and NZT, 28 August 1893).28 In 
1894 h U d . bl I' b' 11 29. . d b R , ten eSlra e mmlgrants 1 , lnstlgate y eeves, was 
placed on the order paper. However, it was dropped before the end of 
the year even though there had been several questions in the House 
about Chinese arrivals in Wellington and Chinese housing conditions 
in the cities. Both enquiries had come from Collins (Christchurch), 
but they received little reaction. The departures and arrivals of the 
Chinese were almost equal,30 and Seddon insisted that housing 
conditions were a matter for local bodies (NZPD, 1894, 86:253). 
Despite these events, Reeves went to some lengths to justify 
his bill and was allowed to air his views in the Review of Reviews 
in 1895. In his article, 'Why I proposed the "Undesirable Immigrants 
Exclusion Bill"', he admitted that the bill had been publicly 
condemned but insisted that it had also been misrepresented. The 
bill's contents, he argued, were the response not to union demands 
but to a crisis faced by a new Liberal government trying to improve 
conditions for the masses. Further, in the midst of these attempts, 
the country.was faced with the presence of nearly 15,000 migrants in 
two years, many of whom were destitute. The bill was seen as a 
method to protect New Zealand from this influx and to protect those 
who might come (Reeves, 1895:39-42). The influx, according to 
Reeves, had brought 'crime, disease and Asiatic labour', which had 
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also been faced by the United States. In short, the United 
States could declare that they were no longer a 'vacant lot' for 
the 'rubbish of the old world', so could Australasia . : 41) . 
Similarly, South Australia had enacted harsh legislation which had 
been in effect for three years and had produced very trouble. 
Although no legislation had been passed, the Chinese 
community obviously felt that it was imminent, and their anticipation 
resulted in three petitions from Auckland requesting that the 1881 Act 
be amended. Two points should be made about these petitions. First, 
they referred to the 1881 Act and obviously were more concerned about 
the poll tax than the further provisions made in the amendments in 
1888. Second, the Auckland Chinese community had seventy males and 
twelve out of the total eighteen Chinese females in New Zealand. 
Considering the numbers, the concern is curious, was such a 
small community and especially since there were other, far more 
urbanised Chinese communities like Wellington (107, Dunedin (147), 
Alexandra (84) and Greymouth (451) (Census, 1891:19-20). Notably, 
the remaining Chinese females lived in Dunedin. Third, the 
petitioners relied heavily on the argument that immigration restrictions 
were violating existing treaty arrangements: 
The petitioners protest against any slation 
that imposes, or may impose, restrictions on the 
immigration and residence of in this 
Colony, pleading that such legislation is not only 
unjust and impolitic in itself, but that it 
constitutes a violation of treaties now in f0rce 
between the British and Chinese Empire. 
(AJHR, 1888, I-l06:3) 
which confirmed their knowledge of changing diplomatic relations 
between their homeland the countries where overseas Chinese resided. 
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In 1895 a new bill was presented to the House by Reeves 
(Minister of Labour) called the "Asiatic and Other Immigration 
Restriction Bill" after it had been to the Labour Bills Committee. 31 
The justification for the bill, as presented by Reeves, was based on 
the assumption that 'undesirable people' cost New Zealandi260,000 a 
year and that a portion of this was attributed to the Chinese, who 
he estimated, took an average ofi200 each away from New Zealand 
32 
when they went home (NZPD, 1895, 89:347). As far as Reeves was 
concerned the Chinese in New Zealand had no liabilities, moved around 
at will, and prevented Europeans from growing vegetables, which he 
saw as far more insidious than European operations in the treaty ports 
of China (NZPD, 1895, 89:346-355). In fact, there was no case to 
support the contention that the Chinese were a liability as far as 
charitable aid was concerned. The House was presented with statistics 
that showed there were only six Chinese receiving charitable aid out 
of a population of 4,067 (AJHR, 1895, Vol. 3, H-16). However, 
Collins (Christchurch) argued that the legislation was not aimed at 
the Chinese receiving charitable aid so much as to alleviate the 
situation of Europeans who were forced to seek aid in the face of 
competition (NZPD, 1895, 89:362). Collins also insisted that there 
were two hundred Chinese gardeners in Christchurch (in total actually only 
fifty three) working for 'slave drivers' ,which meant that Europeans could 
not compete in growing vegetables (NZPD, 1895, 89:363). A large part 
of ~he debate was based on this question of growing vegetables, and 
those who spoke in favour of the Chinese generally suggested that their 
role in this capacity was beneficial to the colony. Duthie (Wellington) 
argued that the Chinese had provided much needed fruit and vegetables 
in Wellington at reasonable prices, and MacKenzie (Clutha) supported 
Duthie, describing the contribution of Chinese growers in Milton who 
came seventeen miles to supply the people of Clutha with vegetables 
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(NZPD, 1895, 89:356-375). Other opponents to the bill argued that 
Reeves was purposefully stirring up people by his involvement with the 
Anti-Chinese League in Wellington and Christchurch and that to push 
the bill in the interest of labour was irrelevant, since few Chinese 
were actually labourers (ibid: 358-385) .33 Earnshaw (Dunedin), however, 
would not stomach the supporters and accused O'Reagan (Inangahua) of 
being young and nalve. Earnshaw maintained that you had to be around 
thousands of Chinese to know how despicable they were, and only those 
who had seen San Francisco or the gold fields of Otago could possibly 
understand the situation (NZPD, 1895, 89:365). As far as he was 
concerned " ... New Zealand shall be a country for white labour ... " (ibid.). 
Others were more moderate in their demands and felt the 
proposed poll tax of £Joo too much and the expectation of captains 
as regards their passengers too extreme (ibid. :366-367). One, more 
liberal, member felt that New Zealand was indebted 'to the Chinese for 
showing them how to rework the gold fields and cultivate unused land, 
but it was now time that New Zealanders did it for themselves (ibid. :369). 
In the midst of this activity, the Wellington Chinese presented 
a petition to the government, and the Wellington Anti-Chinese League 
sent their petition signed by Allan Ward and three other residents 
. . d' f h Ch' 34 presentlng a strong ln lctment 0 t e lnese. 
The Chinese petition was signed by 207 residents and presented 
by eight Chinese merchants in Wellington, led by Mr. Sung Kwong-lee. 
The text included the points raised in the 1888 petition but, in addition, 
took issue with all the other complaints that had been levelled at the 
Chinese. Its text is outlined in the following seventeen points: 
1. In accordance with the Sino-British (the 
Tianjin Treaty signed in 1858 - the author) the 
Chinese may enter any British colony to or 
engage in commercial activities. 
2. The majority of the Chinese (in New Zealand) are 
gold miners, some are fruiterers or storekeepers. 
3. The Chinese like the Europeans, need bread, meat, 
and groceries, their attire too is similar to the 
Europeans. To say the contrary is incorrect. 
4. The Chinese have no immoral affairs with (the white) 
women folk. The contrary is incorrect. This can 
be borne out by the record of any magistrate's court. 
5. It is nothing less than unjust, when no other 
immigrants except the Chinese pay a 1;0 poll tax. 
The petitioners deem it very unjust and unreasonable 
to impose a higher poll tax than what it is now. 
(The poll tax was increased to iroo in 1896 - the 
author). 
6. The Chinese are just as kind as other people. Any 
Chinese who cannot fend for themse because of 
old age are helped financially by other Chinese to 
return to China. 
7. The petitioners like other residents, pay taxes and 
rents. What's more, they pay them off at once. 
8. The petitioners do not compete with workers in the 
lower brackets, nor vie with others in the fields 
of boot manufacturing and shed building. 
9. Before the arrival of the Chinese, fruit and 
vegetables were scarce commodities to many New 
Zealand workers and poorer people. Sometimes they 
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had to pay a high price for them. After the Chinese 
took over the trade, fruit and vegetables have never 
been short in supply and are selling at more competitive 
prices. 
10. The petitioners buy provlSlons and clothing from local 
producers, factories and importers. 
11. The petitioners are law abiding 
frugal and hard working. 
, realistic, 
12. The criticism of the Chinese abodes as being dirty is 
unjust, because they are bound by health regulations 
as much as the others. If the Chinese breach the 
regulations they are subject to fine. It is un-
reasonable to evict Chinese residents when the 
inspectors are not performing their duty. 
13. The Chinese prospected mines relinquished by the 
European miners thus drawing benefits from the waste. 
14. The Chinese do not recognise the above accusations 
laid against them. Upon investigating,the government 
will find that these allegations are concocted on 
selfishness. 
15. The Chinese do not compete for positions in government 
institutions nor managerial posts in shops. Neither 
do they add to the burden of unemployment nor seek 
relief from charitable boards. 
16. It is the hope of the petitioners that the local 
residents who are Christians treat the Chinese in 
Christian kindness and forgiveness, just as they 
themselves hope for when going abroad. 
17. Owing to the decreasing population of the Chinese and 
to the reasons stated above the petitioners are of the 
opinion that the poll tax be reduced instead of being 
increased. 
(Shen I. Yao, 1970:108-109, 
translated from the Chinese) 
Although the Public Questions Committee said they had no 
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recommendations to make about either petition, the Anti-Chinese League's 
contribution generated considerable comment in the Council. Shrimski, 
on hearing of it, immediately asked that a committee be sent to 
substantiate the allegations, and Rigg, who had introduced it, 
that the allegations would only be supported and he could not understand 
why Shrimski wanted more information (NZPD, 1895, 90:130-131) .35 
Th .. 36 d' h . C . 1 d e petltlon, accor lng to t e comments ln ounCl , accuse 
the Chinese of disregarding the 'decencies of civilised life', of 
tampering with young girls, of smoking opium, of herding together, of 
driving residents away by using urine collected from boarding houses 
on vegetables, ripening fruit in their sleeping chambers, gambl 
and generally contributing to unsanitary conditions (NZPD,1895,9l:l6l-284). 
Rigg (also Secretary of Wellington Trades and Labour Council), in 
support of the petitioners, threatened the Council with a continued 
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debate if they did not vote on a motion that labelled the Chinese 
as 'undesirable immigrants', which merely resulted in all the evidence 
being presented to the Council (ibid.). 
The evidence presented was hardly conclusive: the 
Inspector had reported to the city council that the houses were 
not too bad, the matron from the Pauline Home testified that there 
were some girls rescued from presumably opium dens, and the matron 
of the Alexandra Home said they had one illegitimate child 
whose father would not pay any support (NZPD, 1895, 91:283 284). 
Ultimately, the Council voted thirteen to eight against motion that 
the Chinese were 'undesirable immigrants' (ibid. :284), much against 
the advice of the Attorney General and member of the Anti-Chinese 
, Sir Robert Stout, who feared that such opposition by the 
Council would lead to people organising to bring about the 
abolition of the Upper House. 37 
While Sir Robert had his say in Wellington, his Lady 
Stout, had her say at the National Council of Women's convention 
in Christchurch in April 1896. It was at this convention that the 
subject of 'undesirable immigrants' was a topic for the session, 
and Mrs. Tasker, the honorary secretary of the Anti-Chinese 
League in Wellington, presented a harsh attack on Asiatics, 
ing to women and mothers not to ' . .. se11 their children's 
birthright for worse than a mess of potage', (Lady Stout Collection, 
Hocken Library). Mrs. Tasker continued attacking the Upper House 
and the Chinese: 
cs must be prohibited from coming 
with their revolting and degrading code of moral 
law. They increase the evil passions of the 
criminal class of the European races. . .. It 
was a well known fact that whenever the Chinese 
had settled that settlement had been poorer, and 
the labourers were worse paid than in those 
places where the Chinese had been kept down. Why 
should an Englishman be placed on an equal footing 
with the almond-eyed foreigner? It would mean 
human degradation, the acceptance of starvation 
wages, living under conditions bestial in the 
extreme and opposed to the laws of health and 
sanitation; in fact decadence of the worst 
physical and mental description. 
ibid. ) 
Lady Stout responded to this, first mentioning that her husband 
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was President of the Anti-Chinese League and then arguing that she 
was opposed to the motion of supporting the Undesirable Immigrants 
Bill. She stated that the Chinese were most immigrants, 
industrious, law-abiding, sober, honest. and good contributors to 
our chari table aid funds (ibid.). (The Chinese in Wellington had 
contributed £:10 to the Bruner Fund, and in Christchur.ch they had 
contributed £50 to the hospital.) The Chinese gardeners, as far as 
she was concerned, had made a considerable contribution by turning 
small eces of land into productive gardens that provided 
vegetables at reasonable prices that even poor people could afford, 
while previously vegetables had been sold at prohibitive prices. 
When another member of the session opposed Lady Stout, saying that 
every third man in the world was a Chinaman and that if they were 
allowed to continue to come, New Zealand would be overwhelmed, Lady 
Stout merely replied, 'If we are an race then we ought to go 
to the wall' (ibid.). Lady Stout's opinion of the Anti-Chinese League 
was made clear the next day, when she addressed the Southern Cross 
Society on the outcome of the meetings: 
With all its outcry against the Chinese ... 
the Anti-Chinese League which had been 
tence for more than a year, had as yet 
not succeeded in growing even a two-penny 
cabbage. 
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(Lady Stout Collection, Hocken Library) 
If the women of New Zealand were at least partially sympathetic 
to the Chinese, a Wellington paper saw them as totally opposed to the 
whole of New Zealand and accused them of being extremely unfit to form 
any 'stable conclusions' (NZT, 21 April 1896). This went also for 
their demands to be placed on juries and their support for old age 
pensions, which, according to the author of the article, would do the 
same as charitable aid, which 'degrades and pauperizes' (ibid.). 
After the failure of Reeve's38 second bill, which had not been 
proceeded with in the House, he introduced the Chinese Immigrants Bill, 
which proposed to raise the poll tax to £;00. According to Scholefield 
and Hall, the bill was passed by the House but thrown out by the 
Council (Scholefield and Hall, 1927:9). 
In June the following year Seddon took over where Reeves had 
left the immigration issue and introduced the Asiatic Restriction 
Bill No.1. Several important points emerge from this bill. 
it attempted to exclude all Asians, and in specifying Asiatics as 
'persons of the coloured races of any part of Asia or of the islands 
adjacent to a, or in Asiatic seas' (NZPD, 1896, 92:258), explicitly 
added the criterion of race to the already overworked economic 
arguments. Second, the bill clearly impinged on an area of the 
Governor's jurisdiction, which allowed him, upon assessing a bill's 
, . 39 
effect on the government, to reserve It. While this was the case, 
Seddon also knew that an 1891 Privy Council decision specified that 
no aliens from landing in the colonies had any right of 
40 
action against local governments. Finally, it would seem that Seddon 
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wanted to force the hand of the Legislative Council by exposing 
them as acting contrary to the interests of those they represented. 4l 
Seddon's introduction of the bill was direct and swift. He 
argued, without proof, that large numbers of Chinese were coming to 
New Zealand, that urban Chinese were increas in numbers, and 
finally that the purity of race was of great importance for the future 
of New Zealand (NZPD, 1896, 92:252-258). Out of all the responses 
to Seddon's move, only Bell (Wellington) and Newman (Wellington 
Suburbs) broached the issue of the Home government's reaction in 
regards to both Japanese and the Indians who were British subjects 
(NZPD, 1896,92:254-257). The bill passed through the House 
quickly, only to become an item of hot debate in the Council. 
Walker, Minister of Immigration, introduced the bill and used the 
same line of argument as Seddon had done in the House. In addition, 
he maintained that in the name of economics and purity it 
should be the right of New Zealand to pass such lation 
(NZPD, 1896,92:372-452). Two issues competed for prominence in the 
debate, on the one hand whether loyalty to the Empire could best be 
shown by protecting natural inhabitants or on the other by adhering 
to the edicts of the Imperial foreign policy. The latter 
prominence and much of the argument dwelt on the British subjects, 
namely Indians, who would be excluded under the act and consequently 
this would represent an insult to India. When the Council voted on 
the bill, it was defeated only by the casting vote of the Speaker. 
The results were in some degrees predictable. Seddon was 
furious with the Council, even though his Labour appointees had tried 
hard to get the bill passed. The Anti-Asiatic League responded, in 
a last effort, cially presenting a resolution to Seddon sympathising 
204. 
with him and condemning the Council (NZT, 2 July 1896). It further 
suggested that if Seddon made the bill applicable to the Chinese 
alone they were sure it would pass (NZT, 2 July 1896). 
Another outcome was the despatch of a report by the Governor 
to the Secretary of State, Chamberlain, in which the events 
surrounding the bill were described. Glasgow, the Governor, made 
it quite clear that he felt Seddon was exaggerating his claims 
about Chinese immigration but was doing it purposefully to get at 
the Council. Chamberlain was also informed that Seddon was 
proceeding with a bill to abolish the remaining life membership in 
the Council (see C.O. 209/256, 8 July 1896 quoted in Kay, 1973:26). 
The newspapers divided over the issue in line with their 
traditional positions, the New Zealand Times supportive of Seddon 
and the Ot Times in Dunedin supportive of the Council's 
position. According to Kay, the Otago Daily Times interviewed a 
member of the Council who maintained that the bill had been thrown 
out because there were enough restrictions already and that if 
such legislation had passed it would have been an embarrassment to 
the government (Kay, 1973:24). The Mayor of Dunedin who had attended 
the National Municipal Association Conference in Wellington during 
June, was the only one in New Zealand to show sympathy for the 
Chinese (Willis, 1974:34). The other mayors present sided totally 
with the Mayor of Greymouth, who presented the following remit: 
That provision be made in the Local Government 
Bills to enable boroughs to cope with the Chinese 
difficulty: 
1. power (be given) to confine the Chinese to a 
separate district. 
2. to issue licences to opium dens and stores 
where opium is sold, with heavy fee for such. 
3. to limit the number of persons who may legally 
occupy the same tenement, with the exception 
of Chirese families. 
4. to make it an offence against any Chinese house-
holder if he harbours or encourages any European 
of immature age; any infant found on the premises 
being prima facie evidence of harbouring. 
(Willis, 1974:34) 
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Despite the fact of hostility noted by Willis, it is also interesting 
that only (3) and (4) in the remit were passed (ibid.). 
Three days after the previous bill had been rejected, the 
Asiatic Restriction Bill No. 2 was introduced, which had, according 
to Seddon, a number of the offending clauses of the previous bill 
removed, although the term 'Asiatics' was still employed. Dr. 
Newman (Wellington) supported the bill but felt that the inclusion of 
Japanese under the term 'Asiatics' might be problematic because of the 
treaty signed between Japan and Great Britain and wanted it changed to 
'Chinese' (NZPD, 1896,92:466). As far as Seddon was concerned, since 
New Zealand had the option of agreeing or disagreeing with this treaty, 
it would not apply to New Zealand (ibid.) .42 
On the whole Seddon was pleased with the way the House received 
the bill and because of the reception decided to add several more 
restrictive clauses when it went into committee. The additional 
1 d h 'h 1" 43 d d N causes remove t e rlg t to natura lsatlon an ma e re-entry to ew 
Zealand possible only after payment of the poll tax or with prior 
naturali~ation (NZPD, 1896,94:310). Two additional clauses defined a 
'Chinese' person as anybody of Chinese race and gave the Colonial 
Secretary or anyone appointed by him the right to decide whether anyone 
was or was not Chinese (ibid.). Those who opposed the legislation, like 
Button (Auckland), were too soft in Seddon's view, 
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The argument that Britain had forced her way into China and 
developed the opium trade was not enough, in Seddon's opinion, to 
merit an open-door policy in New Zealand, since New Zealand was 
hardly responsible for these deeds. Besides, Europeans had forced 
their way into New Zealand with the 'rum bottle and scriptures' , 
and that was no reason " ... why we should not protect our race" 
(NZPD, 1896, 93:471). 
Other members tried to get the proposed £Joo poll tax reduced 
to ~5, but the majority supported the ~OO (NZPD, 1896, 94:310). 
Duthie (Wellington) and Hogg (Masterton) argued about the rising 
Chinese population in Wellington and the monopoly of the fruit and 
able industry by the Chinese. Duthie maintained that the 
Wellington population had increased to 212 only because of a recent 
influx from the West Coast not from China; that the Chinese made a 
considerable contribution to the fruit and vegetable industry and 
that Seddon was using this to satisfy the agitators just before the 
general election even though he (Seddon) knew that it would be thrO\Vl1 
out by Council (NZPD, 1896, 94:311-312). Hogg accused Duthie of 
things in the House that he would not dare say before his 
electors and also went on to castigate the Chinese ,who lived in 'dens', 
worked as Cheap labour and " .. . live off the smell of an oily rag" (ibid.). 
Other criticisms of the bill included some support for Chinese 
merchants by MacKenzie (Clutha) and Thompson (Marsden), who under its 
provisions would now have to pay poll tax to re-enter New Zealand if 
they departed (ibid.: 311 and 313). Seddon's response to this was that 
he knew there were some 'good' Chinese even including some who went 
to school and one practising law, and if they wanted to leave and 
return Governor of the Colony had the power to grant permission 
. : 318) . 
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When the bill went to Council, it had few opponents, the most 
vocal being Shrimski (Otago), who tried to stern the tide of what 
other members saw as an inevitability. He could not understand why 
this legislation was needed when the Chinese population was decreasing 
as he readily proved with arrival and departure figures from-the 
Registrar General. From 1881 to 1895 there had been a nett loss of 
1293 Chinese (NZPD, 1896,94:427). Furthermore, he could not see how 
a petition, signed by four hundred women of the social and political 
leagues of Wellington, who wished to see the Chinese prevented from 
entering Wellington and the Colony, but who represented only 1% of the 
entire population, was enough to justify legislation. 44 Shrimski 
also took time to dispel some innuendos that his opposition to the 
legislation was purely for mercenary reasons. He confessed that his 
wife leased six acres to a Chinese gardener but added that she received 
the £20 per year rent only occasionally (NZPD, 1896,94:427). Others 
also opposed the bill for a variety of reasons. McLean (Otago) 
thought that the provisions of the bill were going too far, even 
exceeding the restrictions of other colonies, and furthermore, it was 
providing unnecessary problems for ship's captains (ibid. :428). Mr 
Williams (Auckland) also opposed the bill, maintaining that the 
British treatment of China should at least be countered by some 
conscience in the colonies. He felt that the poll tax, if it was to 
persist, should be used to train the Chinese in the colonies as 
missionaries to be sent back to China (ibid. :429).45 He also argued 
that the evidence that had corne from the Anti-Chinese League was 
totally misleading and went out of his way to prove that the Chinese 
were honest by reading the following from the Wanganui Chronicle: 
The first meeting of the creditors in the estate 
of Liu Kum, storekeeper, of Hunterville, was held 
at the office of the Deputy Official Assignee on 
Tuesday, Mr. J. Notman presiding. The debtor 
filed a most complete statement of assets and 
liabilities, showing every transaction clearly and 
fully. Both Mr. Notman, the Assignee, and Mr. 
Marshall, who appeared for Ching Chow, one of the 
three creditors who have claims against the estate, 
complimented the debtor upon the excellence of his 
statement, which they said would do credit to any 
European traders. 
(NZPD, 1896, 94:428) 
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Mr. Reynolds (Otago) suggested that the Council should oppose 
the bill and allow the electors to decide at the following election, 
and Mr. Ormond tried to make a distinction between the acknowledged 
repugnance one would naturally have for a situation where New 
Zealand was flooded with 'Chinamen' and the use of the matter as a 
political tool. Ormond, as Minister of Works under Vogel, had found 
himself in a position of having to resolve the ultimatum of Brogden -
no labour, no railroad. As already noted, the suggestion of Chinese 
labour was floated but never fully institutionalised. Despite this, 
however, Ormond gained some reputation then as being in favour of 
this 'alien race' and was later held to account for this attitude when 
he was a candidate for Napier. It so happened that the accuser, who 
was using the issue as a political tool, was the very person who, as 
Superintendent of Auckland in the l870s, had given full approval to 
Chinese immigration, suggesting then that any fears were unfounded, 
so Ormond had no problem dispensing with the accusation. Ormond's 
argument in 1896 was that one would have to acknowledge the bill but 
curb its excessive nature. It was permissible to oppose immigration, 
but to oppose it excessively was to use it as a political tool. On the 
one hand, he agreed that too much was being made of a small number, but 
on the other, it was permissible to legislate against the immigration 
of large numbers (NZPD, 1896, 94:431). 
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Mr. Kerr (Westland), however, was far less diplomatic in his 
statements, describing the Chinese as undesirable immigrants who were 
prone to thieving, immorality and corrupting female children (NZPD, 
1896, 94:432). He suggested Shrimski should put nationalism before 
humanism and that 'real' objections to the Chinese presence preceded 
implications for use as a political tool.). He added 
that he had nothing personal against 'Chinamen' but hoped the Council 
would approve the bill. Bonar (Westland), Peacock (Canterbury), Bolt 
"(Otago) and. Walker (Canterbury) spoke before the vote was taken. Bonar 
supported Shrimski's position, offering substantive proof that from 
1890 till 1894 only forty-six Chinese had been convicted in New 
Zealand, representing .71% of all convictions and also maintained 
that further legislation seemed inappropriate at a time when Li Hung 
Chang was in London negotiating China's position (NZPD, 1896, 94:434). 
According to Bonar, the Council had opposed the previous bill but 
now had it back again under the guise of a compromise which was even 
more harsh than the original provisions, a clear indication that the 
House had worn the Council down. 
The remainder of the speakers supported the bill lyon 
the basis that something might have ,to be done and perhaps this was 
, and it was better to implement it now. As to its use as an 
electioneering measure, the response was consistent: the sue had 
been around too long to be used in this manner since it affected 
lation which went back to 1881. 
The bill passed the second reading with a majority of nine 
(NZPD, 1896, 94:435). Although Shrimski tried in committee to get 
some changes, the only major amendment was the removal of a clause 
requiring both a fingerprint and photograph for the naturalisation 
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certi When it returned for the final reading, the positions 
were 1 the same, but despite the result eleven members of the 
Legisl Council laid a protest before the Governor for submission 
to the Queen: it stated, 
We the undersigned Members of the Legislative Council 
of New Zealand respectfully record our protest against 
the passing of the Asiatic Restriction Bill on the 
following grounds:- That it is an arbitrary measure 
based on the assumption that the Colony is threatened 
with an immediate influx of Chinese and other 
Asiatics, while the Registrar General's statistics 
show that the number of Chinese, now less than four 
thousand has been decreasing since 1881, and that the 
number of Asiatics of other nationalities in the 
Colony is inconsiderable; that it is inadvisable and 
impolitic for a Colony, which forms a comparatively 
small part of the Empire, to pass a law practically 
excluding from its territory the greater part of 
the population of Asia; and that such action is 
calculated to restrict trade, to lead to international 
complications, and possibly to embarass the relations 
of the Imperial Government with the intell 
nations of Asia. 
(Fieldhouse, 1956:341)46 
This submission was forwarded with the Act to England for Royal 
Assent without the signature of the Governor. Once this occurred 
and it was indicated that it might be some time before any decision 
was made, Seddon moved back into action and in September 1896 gave 
notice of an 'entirely new Bill', the Chinese Immigrant Amendment 
Bill (NZPD, 1896, 95:605). The next day Seddon introduced the 
contents, describing it as a provisional measure to stop the Chinese 
coming in, which was actually an amendment to the Chinese Immigrants 
Act already in force. The new bill would merely increase the poll tax 
from £10 to 1100 and increase tonnage requirements from 100 to 200 tons 
(NZPD, 1896, 96:7). What caused some concern' the House was not so 
much the nature of the bill but the fact that Seddon wanted it 
discussed and debated before members had even seen it. After a 
protracted debate on this point, the bill arrived from the Government 
Printer and was finally read and passed. 
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The bill went to the Council and passed with only one 
amendment which exempted Chinese in transit before 1 October 1896. 
There are some curious anomalies in the passage of this bill. 
In the first place, it had always been possible to amend the earlier 
act legitimatelY and impose at least some of the restrictions that were 
desired and in fact contained in the 1896 Asiatic Restriction Act. 
Secondly, if total exclusion was the ideal professed in the 1896 Act, 
then it was certainly not explicit in the Chinese Immigrants Amendment 
Bill, which if anything tolerated immigration but increased its 
contribution to the Consolidated Account through an increased poll tax. 
There seems to have been therefore, an internal and external dimension 
to the issue. Internally the issue was (a) to undermine the power of 
the Council and (b) to ensure some financial return to New Zealand. 
The external issues seem to have been a lever to establish some notion 
of independence for New Zealand in a situation of colonial dependency. 
The way to independence was seen partially through the ability to form 
and implement legislation that might or might not coincide with 
B . . hI' 1 . 47 rltls mperla lnterests. 
In England the Asiatic Restriction Act was submitted to 
scrutiny, and while it was acknowledged that it applied only to the 
Chinese and Japanese, the provisions included were deemed too drastic 
(Fieldhouse, 1956:342). An internal minute of the Colonial Office 
smggeststhat the act was deficient on two counts: 
... the absence of any power to the Executive to 
suspend the exclusion or poll tax as regards any 
individual or class except the few cases specified 
in sec. (24), and (2) the making of aliens of native 
born British subjects are serious objections to this 
law, and the provisions of sec. (11) will make it 
practially impossible for a Japanese ship or a ship 
with a partly Chinese crew to trade with New Zealand. 
(Fieldhouse, 1956:342)48 
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The Secretary of State, Mr. Chamberlain, concurred with the 
above and agreed that the matter should wait till the Premier's 
conference in June, when they would all be in England for the 
Jubilee celebrations. It was also clear, as far as the Colonial 
Office was concerned, that the colonies needed to be brought 'into 
line in regard to this matter' (ibid.). The Office also apparently 
replied to the protest from the Council's group of eleven, but the 
exact nature of the reply was never conveyed to the Legislative 
Councilor to the eleven members who signed the original document. 49 
All that the eleven learned was in fact what the Governo~ conveyed 
to them, which noted their protest and that the bill concerned was 
being returned to New Zealand for amendments (NZPD, 1897, 100:124). 
At the Premier's conference the Secretary of State, Mr. 
Chamberlain, made it quite clear that the several bills presented on 
the matter of immigration could not be accepted, except for the 
50 
one from Natal (NZPD, 1897, 100:759). He sympathised with 
' ... the determination of the white inhabitants of these colonies 
which are in comparatively close proximity to millions and hundreds 
of millions of Asiatics and appreciated the fact that if they came 
with alien religion, customs and civilisation they would probably 
interfere with ... the legitimate rights of the existing labour 
population' (NZPD, 1897, 100:759). However, one should' ... bear in 
mind the traditions of the Empire, which makes no distinction in 
favour of or against race or colour', and to exclude Indians or for 
that matter Asiatics' ... would be an act so offensive to those 
peoples that it would be most painful ... to Her Majesty to have to 
sanction it' (ibid. :759). Chamberlain therefore was not opposed to the 
idea itself as long as it was done properly: 
\fuat I venture to think you have to deal with 
is the character of the immigration. It is not 
because a man is of a different colour from 
ourselves that he is necessarily an undesirable 
immigrant, but it is because he is dirty, or he 
is immoral, or he is a pauper, or he has some 
other objection which can be defined in an Act 
of Parliament, and by which the exclusion can be 
managed with regard to all those who you really 
desire to exclude. 
(NZPD, 1897, 100:763) 
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The Alien Immigration Restriction Bill introduced by Seddon upon his 
return from England was an attempt to meet these suggestions by 
51 implementing the language requirement of the Natal Act. It passed 
safely through the House and would have been passed by Council if 
the issue of the missing dispatch had not led to its indefinite 
postponement (see footnote 49). 
In the course of the debate about the dispatch, some ght was 
shed on the bill. Shrimski gave notice that he was going to ask for a 
new clause which would allow naturalised Chinese already residing in 
New Zealand to bring their wives out and have them enter exempt from 
poll tax. He was attempting, apparently, although unsuccessfully, to 
remedy a situation that he had been made aware of by a letter from 
Chin Ting, a merchant in Pahiatua. The issue which Chin Ting brought 
up had been going on for over a year and actually involved a case of 
his cousin, H (F)ook On of Yee Chong Wing & Co. in Manners Street, 
Wellington. Fook On, who was naturalised, had returned to China, 
married and brought his wife back to New Zealand. When he arrived, he 
found that he had to pay ilOO for her to enter, according to the letter 
he wrote to Shrimski (NZPD, 1897, 100:873).52 As far as Chin Ting 
knew, Fook On had never received his refund, so it was assumed that 
even if a Chinese person were naturalised it would convey no special 
rights unless, according to the Colonial Secretary, Parliament 
approved of these rights. 
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In 1898 the Immigration Restriction Bill was introduced, 
which coincided as far as was possible with the needs of New Zealand 
while at the same time adhering to the Natal Act. After some debate 
it was by the Council despite some feeling expressed that a 
language test might select out useful Scots and sh who could not 
write (NZPD, 1897, 104:176). Its passage in the House was less 
successful due to the lateness in the session, and the bill was 
dropped . : 616). 
In the next session Seddon introduced for second reading 
the Immigration Restriction Bill (2), which on his own admission 
complied with the Natal Act (NZPD, 1898, 105:158). Despite compliance, 
however, the introduction of the bill again occasioned considerable 
debate. The major areas of controversy were fourfold. First, the 
dictation test to be administered to all incoming aliens proved 
problematic the content was arbitrary and it appeared from the 
Act that it would be applied indiscriminately (NZPD, 1898, 105:159-176). 
Second, was opposition to the use of literacy, disease and 
criminality as criteria for the exclusion of future immigrants, when 
these had not previously been employed. Third, the purpose of the Act, 
as some understood it, was precisely to restrict, if not stop the 
immigration of Chinese, yet this Act, in clause 21, was made not 
applicable to the Chinese. 53 Fourth, there was some feeling that Seddon 
was pushing 
devised 
slation for the sake of it and that the bill was ill 
.). Some even felt that Seddon had been carried away 
by the Premier's conference in introducing a bill that was generally 
acceptable to Britain (NZPD, 1898, 105:176). The bill led on its 
second reading. 
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While the government received considerable opposition to the 
bill, Seddon also came under personal attack from the opposition member 
for Patea, George Hutchinson. The verbal assault came during the 
Financial Statement debate, when Hutchinson accused Seddon's uncle 
of embezzling the Kumara Borough accounts and Richard Seddon of being 
a partner in a Chinese gold-mining claim. Hutchinson, when 
challenged by Seddon, stuck with his story and further refused to 
retract or substantiate its content then or even later in Committee. 
Seddon, determined to clear his relative's name if not his own, 
had a committee assigned the task of investigating all allegations. 
The Bun Tuck affair, as it was named, was duly reported, and the 
Seddons name was cleared, but of more importance, the proceedings gave 
for the first time some clear indication of Seddon's personal 
relations with the Chinese. 
Seddon had been a registered mining agent on the West Coast 
and in this capacity appeared for many Chinese clients in disputes 
over claims. He also helped them conduct their bus (AJHR, 1898, 
19:78-80).54 In the case mentioned, Bun Tuck had been a shareholder 
in the Chinese company of Tum Shum & Co., which was made up of ten 
shareholders. Seddon was the agent for the company, and when Tum 
Shum left New Zealand, his share in the company claim was transferred 
to Seddon. The claim in total was worth £)500, and Shum I s share was 
1100 of which £85 had been paid by Ah Lie, who had worked it after 
Shum's departure. There was no question of Seddon having a partnership, 
nor was there any indication of hostility towards Seddon by the four 
Ch " 11 d of 55 lnese wltnesses ca e to testl y. According to J.A. Murdock, a 
solicitor who replaced Seddon as the agent, "He [Bun Tuck] was very 
friendly disposed towards yourself as were all the there" 
(AJHR, 1898, 19:86). 
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While 1898 had been a difficult year for Seddon, it was not 
without at least one victory in the Old Age Pension Act. After three 
years of debate the Act finally passed, ensuring the survival of the 
Liberal Party at the polls the following year while at the same time 
providing a non-contributory assistance scheme. Clearly, the Act was 
one about charity, but it also made the limits of this charity clear. 
In Section 64, three clauses which were never the subject of debate 
during the passage of the bill specified the following: 
This Act in so far as it provides for the gr~nt of 
pensions, shall not apply to, 
2. Aliens 
3. Naturalised subjects, except such as have been 
naturalised for the period of five years next 
preceding the date on which they established 
their pension claim, 
nor to 
4. Chinese or other Asiatics, whether naturalised 
or not. 
(Statutes of New Zealand 
1898:58) 
In 1898, election year, the 1898 bill again came up for debate. 
The Council faced it for the second time, but aside from Shrimski's 
critique which deni'grated the lack of opposition from the "swamped 
council" and also drew attention to the unfairness of an education 
test when one only had to consider that 75% of the British people had 
not been able to read or write in 1875 (NZPD 1899, 106:530), little 
other resistance was shown. It passed through its three readings 
with little trouble, helped somewhat by the amendments in the House 
which included the exclusion of those of British and Irish parentage 
from the application of the bill and the granting of a right of 
appeal should a person be refused entrance (NZPD, 1899, 110:532). 
217. 
The passage through the House was somewhat more stormy, and, 
as already mentioned, gave rise to several amendments. After a long 
debate on the second reading, Seddon finally gave his summation of 
the reasons why the bill should be passed. First, if people were 
rejected from other colonies it was extremely likely that they could 
flood to New Zealand and would saturate the small business 
occupations already in existence. 56 According to Seddon it was 
likely that they would come from China and the Pacific and even closer -
from South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales, who had 
already passed similar acts (NZPD, 1899, 110:383). Seddon went so 
far as to suggest that "new Zealand is a dumping ground for the 
rej ects of Australia" (ibid.: 469). Very clearly, the Liberal Party 
wanted to be seen not only as the protector of small business but 
also as aware of the fact that legislative dependence in 
immigration matters for some colonies might lead unintentionally to 
dependent status for others, especially during times of Britain's 
expanding trade network which invariably stimulated emigration. 
Those who attacked the bill wanted amendments which would clear 
up the definition of parentage and also provide exceptions for 
tourism (NZPD, 1899, 110:461). O'Regan (Buller) objected to the whole 
fuss that was being made about "alien migration" and suggested that 
there were no "Assyrian Hawkers" in New Zealand, only people from the 
Island of Cyprus, Mount Lebanon and Egypt who, he admitted, were small 
businessmen running competitive businesses with their New Zealand 
counterparts. He further stated that New Zealand should be part of 
. 
the expanding British Empire, and to be part of it meant to accept 
all those who were in it (ibid. :461), no matter what race or colour. 
Seddon could certainly accept the notion of Empire but not the masses 
in it that might flock to New Zealand. 
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One other interesting observation came from Pirani (Palmers ton) , 
who noted that it seemed now that the Council would "swallow almost 
anything" that Seddon put forward and also that it had been left to 
the opposition members of the House to bring about the change which 
provided for the exemption of people of British or Irish parentage 
or birth (NZPD, 1899, 110:463). After both the House and Council 
were done with the bill, it went to the Governor, who in turn reserved 
it "for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure". In May 1900 
the Act finally received assent, and on 8th August it was brought into 
effect. 
In 1901, while the larger issue of immigration faded to some 
degree, the government took the opportunity to tighten .up a loophole 
with the implementation of the Chinese Immigrants' Amendment Act. 
In that year the Commissioner of Customs apparently discovered that 
it was possible for Chinese to get into New Zealand as members of a 
ship's crew. Previously crews were allowed to go ashore, and 
according to Seddon there was nothing to stop a captain of a vessel 
bringing a number of Chinese as a crew, paying them small wages and.then 
allowing them to disappear ashore once in New Zealand. The new Act, 
once in effect, made captains responsible for their crew (NZPD, 1901, 
116:361). The master of a ship now had to present a list of all 
Chinese crew members to the Customs Office upon arrival which would be 
checked at departure to insure a similar complement. Failure to 
comply resulted in a fine of i50 (ibid.: 393) . 
In the following year the appointment of a representative for 
the local Chinese community became an issue for the third time in ten 
years 57 (see Chapter 6, pp. 294-295).The Petitions Committee who received 
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the petition passed it on to the government for favourable 
consideration. From all accounts, the government stalled and did 
nothing. Duthie (Wellington), aware of the lapse in time, requested 
the status of the petition (NZPD, 1903, 125:563). At the same time 
he added his own thoughts that the absence of a representative for 
the Chinese was the cause of many of their problems, for otherwise, 
he suggested, they were good citizens and gave liberally to public 
subscriptions (NZPD, 1903, 125:563). 
In the two following years the domestic situation of the Chinese 
attracted little attention except for the insinuations of Rigg and 
Moss in Council that the Chinese were now being brought into Wellington 
by a wealthy syndicate (NZPD, 1904, 128:430). While there was no 
support for this claim of indentured labour in New Zealand, Seddon had 
been aware since 1903 of the complicity of the British government, 
which had agreed to the importation of Chinese coolies as indentured 
labour into the Rand mines of the Transvaal. Seddon was outraged: 
not only had Britain engineered New Zealand's immigration legislation 
to serve the interest of Empire but now they were actively engaged 
in supporting the lobby of wealthy miners who wanted Chinese labour 
in a country which had been recently created thanks to the lives of 
New Zealanders and others that fought there in 1900. 
Seddon related his feelings in a personal letter to 
W. Hutchison Esq. of Johannesburg, saying amongst other things that: 
The cause of Empire freedom, and justice is worth 
struggling for against all odds. To have the 
Transvaal peopled by the British to give them self 
government and to have ultimately a federated 
British South Africa should be the aim and object 
of all who are well wishers of our country. 
(Seddon Papers 1904,Series 2, Item 17) 
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Seddon went on in the letter to suggest that once they had a 
Chinese population, Chinese traders and merchants would follow and 
then they would have ' .. . in Johannesburgh a Chinatown with all the 
attendant horrors equalling in immorality, degradation and debasement 
of humanity the Chinatown of San Francisco'; however, he never once 
mentioned the situation in New Zealand (ibid.). 
In 1903 and 1904 Seddon tried his best to construct a case 
against a British policy decision that would act in favour of the 
Rand Mines. He enlisted support from Canada, Cape Colony, Natal and 
Australia, but Canada considered interference inadvisable; Cape 
Colony had already protested, and Natal was opposed to making an 
objection. This left Australia as the only accomplice, but Deakin, 
the Prime Minister, suggested that the issue should be discussed 
only between self-governing colonies without appeal to the Imperial 
government. He felt that an appeal to the Imperial government 
over legislation in another colony might set a dangerous precedent. 
Although Seddon disagreed with Deakin's approach, he chose to take 
his advice and sent a telegram of protest to the Colonial Secretary 
of the Transvaal and the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. 
In the telegram, Seddon made three points which are worth 
noting, since they reflect the historical circumstances surrounding 
Chinese immigration to New Zealand. He suggested, firstly, that the 
'practical prohibition' of Chinese immigration is linked directly to 
the potential or actual powers of 'responsible self government' (ibid.: 
telegram 58 to Colonial Secretary, Transvaal, 18 January 1904). In 
other words, it would appear that Seddon would define responsible self-
government and effective control of immigration as synonymous. 
Secondly, Seddon suggested that the introduction of Chinese, based on the 
New Zealand experience, would lead to 'grave perils, racial, 
poli tical and sanitary' and that no matter what restrictions one 
imposed regarding their introduction this situation would still 
1. Thirdly, he stated that the introduction of Chinese 
creates 'vested interests on the part of employers, which 
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it 
extremely difficult to terminate practice once it has been sanctioned' 
. ) . 
It is clear from Seddon's analysis of the New Zealand situation 
that the presence of Chinese had resulted in three actual areas of 
conflict. Their presence had led to a confrontation with Imperial 
gn policy as it affected New Zealand immigration law. It further 
had produced a conflict between the Legislative Council and the House 
of Representatives, both having a vested interest in particular 
of the economy. Lastly, it had produced a pub conflict 
which was embellished by 'racial', 'social', and 'sanitary' 
condemnation of the Chinese. While this is to some an 
accurate assessment, it is hardly a situation that was caused by the 
Chinese. Nor was the situation met with a total ban on immigration, 
but, however unintended, it clearly provided the basis of anti-
Chinese sentiment. In the months that Seddon was involved with this 
he received support from various Trades and Labour Councils 
(Nelson, Auckland, Canterbury, Hawkes Bay and Wellington), branches 
of the Liberal and Labour Federation of New Zealand (Cook County, 
Auckland, Mangaweka, Marsden and Wellington), the Amalgamated 
(Auckland), the Dunedin Wharf Labourers' Union, the Otago 
Workers Political Committee, the Seamen's Industrial Association 
(Dunedin), and two public meetings in Christchurch and Masterton 
(Seddon Papers 1904, Series 2, Item 17). The majority of the statements 
j their support on the grounds of opposition to slavery, to 
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the deprivation of white and coloured labour and to the self-interested 
activity of capitalists. Even both houses of the New Zealand 
Legislature passed a motion that noted with regret 'the introduction 
of Chinese labour into the Transvaal without the expressed and direct 
sanction of the government being granted' (AJHR, 1905, A-I). Despite 
this, however, the efforts were in vain, since by the end of 1904, 
20,000 Chinese coolies were already employed in the Rand and, according 
to Burdon, 'Balfour's government (had) basely surrendered to the 
importunities of South African plutocrats' (Burdon, 1955:305). 
After the Transvaal issue faded, attention was again directed 
towards the New Zealand context. In the Council, Rigg asked the 
Attorney General what steps had been taken to prevent Chinese evading 
poll tax by coming to New Zealand as supposed returning residents. 
Rigg had received information to the effect that 234 Chinese had 
arrived in the financial year ending 31 March 1905, 153 of whom were 
new arrivals and 81 returning, while only 137 had departed from the 
colony. 
The Attorney General informed Rigg that the Collector of Customs 
was watching the situation carefully and that for each Chi:n.ese person 
departing the Customs Department retained a duplicate certificate which 
included a set of fingerprints that could be compared with those on 
the original certificate upon return (NZPD, 1905, 134:397-398). If the 
Chinese person had left without the certificate, then they were 
required to pay the poll tax upon returning until such time as they could 
get a 'reputable European' to testify that they were previous residents 
of New Zealand (ibid.). 
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In the House, Moss (Ohinemuri)59 took up the issue of Chinese 
immigration, pressing the Commissioner of Trade and Customs for 
increased poll tax considering the excess of arrivals over departures 
for 1904-05. The Commissioner preferred a more historical view, 
however, and suggested to Moss that departures exceeded arrivals in 
the period 1899 to 1904, which indicated to him, at least, that the 
poll tax was adequate (NZPD, 1905, 134:412).60 The following week 
Moss again took Commissioner Mills up on the issue, arguing that the 
arrivals had exceeded departures in 1903-04 and 1905, but was met 
with the response that a large proportion of those entering in 1905 
were actually returning to New Zealand (NZPD, 1905, 134:617-618). 
Moss, frustrated by the exchange, added that he would 'do his best 
to see that fair play was given to the Chinamen now in the country' 
but that he would not tolerate a 'further invasion' (ibid. :618)61 
While there was no legislative action against the Chinese, one 
Lionel Terry took it upon himself to protest against alien immigration 
and shot Joe Kim Ling (Yung) in Haining Street, Wellington, on 
Sunday 23 September 1905. Terry had been in Wellington in 1903 but 
in the intervening period had been a trade unionist in Canada and 
South Africa. On the evening of the act, he wrote to both the Governor 
and the local newspaper stating in the first instance that in order 
to make a protest against alien immigration he (the writer) deemed it 
'desirable to put to death a Chinaman in Haining Street this evening' 
(Press, 26 September 1905), and in the second that: 
Having spent several years in various portions of 
the British Empire, enquiring into the subject 
and the results arising from alien immigration, and 
being convinced of the evil consequences arising 
therefrom, I have decided to bring the matter 
before the public eye in a manner which will compel 
the attention it demands. I will not, under any 
consideration whatever, allow my rights and those 
of my brother Britons to be jeopardised by alien 
invaders, and to make this decision perfectly 
plain, I have this evening put a Chinaman to death 
in the Chinese quarter of this city known as 
Raining Street. 
(Signed) Lionel Terry, British Subject. 
(ibid. :5) 
Terry's victim, Joe Yung had been away from China for forty 
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years, four of which he spent in Victoria. In New Zealand he had spent 
thirty-three years on the West Coast as a miner and labourer until he 
had broken his leg tree-felling and had been hospitalised in Grey for 
six months, after which he was supposed to have returned to China with 
the benefit of the contributions made by the local Chinese community 
but after a brief sojourn as a market gardener in Palmerston North had 
obviously moved to Wellington (ibid.). 
Terry, in his trial on 21 November, that he had killed 
a 'race alien ... not a man' (Tod, 1977:47). In effect, Terry maintained, 
British law was for a particular race; Joe Kum Yung was not of that 
race, therefore he should not be protected by that law, and the act he 
committed should test this proposition. However, the judge made it 
clear that the law applied equally to all, and the jury found Terry 
guilty but asked for mercy. The judge sentenced Terry to hang, but 
in the interim clemency was granted on the grounds of insanity, and 
Terry was confined in various institutions for the remainder of his life. 
\~ile the case commenced in court, others fearing that the law might not 
be 'applied equally' compiled a petition to appeal the death sentence. 
It had been circulated directly after the trial, and according to Tod 
'thousands' had signed it (Tod, 1977:49). 
Towards the end of 1905, the subject of Chinese immigration was 
raised again in the house by MacKenzie (Waikouaiti), who asked the 
Premier if, considering the steady influx of Chinese, it would be 
advisable to increase the poll tax. Seddon that the matter was 
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being watched carefully and that he saw no reason for alarm, since 
the Chinese population had decreased by 250 in the period from 1899 
to 1904 (NZPD, 1905, 134:817). 
In 1906 anti-Chinese activity ceased in parliament with 
the death of Seddon, leader of the Liberals and Premier since 1893. 
In the same year, Ward assumed the Premiership and inherited the legacy 
of the Seddon administration and its immigration policy. 
By 1907, when New Zealand became a dominion, it was abundantly 
clear that the entire parliament was agreed in opposition to 
further Chinese immigration. In the first Session of 1907, both Davey 
(Christchurch East) and Poland (Ohinemuri), who moved and seconded 
the Address in Reply, spoke of the prohibition of Chinese immigration. 
Davey justified the demand on the basis of news from the Transvaal, 
where the once desired Chinese labour force was being repatriated as 
no longer desirable. He further noted, as both Poland and Massey 
(Leader of the Opposition) would do, that there was a rising tide of 
anti-Chinese sentiment in New Zealand (NZPD, 1907, 139:22, 26 and 34). 
Given the above statements, it was safe for Ward to add that' ... my 
firm conviction is that the sentiment of the whole country is against 
the importation of Chinese into New Zealand' (NZPD, 1907, 139:42). He 
also added, however, the point that absolute prohibition would not 
receive the assent of the Crown and therefore it was the responsibility 
of the government to introduce legislation that was ' ently 
restrictive' . :43) . 
The anti-Chinese 'sentiment' recognised by members of the House, 
while evident, was by no means Ubiquitous but what there was had been 
largely encouraged by a rabid and sensational campaign in the press, and 
in particular Truth. The paper started in 1907 by detailing a court 
case against two Wellington Chinese accused of having 'carnal knowledge 
of two European females' (Truth, 12 January 1907). 
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A week later Truth continued its campaign by reminding the 
government of its avowed White New Zealand policy and by applauding 
Lionel Terry for his effort as an 'instrument of a higher being' 
(Truth, 19 January 1907). In the same article the paper also dealt 
extensively with miscegenation, which could result at worst in total 
opium addiction or at best in a higher standard of living than a 
European marriage but residence in a bad neighbourhood (ibid.) .62 
The next day Truth continued with an article called 
'Another Phase of the Chow Curse', which dealt with the supposed 
unscrupulous activity in the fruit and vegetable business, On the 
evidence of one customer and a Truth reporter who lived in a hotel 
behind a Chinese fruit and vegetable shop, the article accused them 
of keeping disgusting premises and charging excessive amounts for 
inferior produce (Truth, 20 January 1907). In the one case Truth 
investigated, they had called in the City Inspector, James Doyle', and 
he ensured that the shop was cleaned up. However, the paper maintained 
that the city had done little to ensure that the Chinese shops were 
carefully watched. 
While the campaign was sensational in one sense, it was also 
subtle. Reading the articles separately gives one the impression of 
an attack on the Chinese, but read together the attack is actually 
against European women who in some cases offer themselves to the 
Chinese, frequent their opium dens and in other cases even marry them 
and most certainly purchase fruit and vegetables from their shops. The 
substantiation of this was brought home in two other articles. One 
documents the case of a Martinborough Chinese shop-keeper who had a 
sixteen-year old boy working for him, competed unfairly with local 
European shops, had a Maori 'sleeping partner' and whose shop was 
constantly frequented by the 'impudent little daughters of local 
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resident!; (Truth, 20 January 1907). Of course, the paper did not 
hesitate to gauge the results if the young women were not kept away 
from the shop and did so explicitly in the following article, which 
documented the fate of a young girl in Newtown who was pregnant to a 
part ··Chinese boy and who was forced to marry him (ibid.). 
T:::-uth had made a sustained call for what they described as an 
'Anti-Chow Society', and by June such organisations were beginning to 
6;, h . h . d 1 .. d appear, pus lng t e government to lntro uce tota restrlctlon an 
the public to stop all transactions with Chinese business. 
The first groups formed were in Masterton and Palmers ton North. 
In the first instance we find Mr. J. Cameron, the organiser of the anti-
Asiatic movement in Masterton, invited to address a meeting in 
Wellington on 19 June where Mr. Fisher MHR was in the chair. The 
evidence from Palmerston North Has the Anti -Asiatic League rule-book, 
which oU'~lined the league's policy and organisation. The League 
maintained that by Rule 1 and 2 the organisation would pressure the 
government to increase the poll tax, by Rule 3 they would urge tighter 
control of Chinese business by including them under the Factory Act, 
by Rule 4 they would push for the deportation of 'undesirable 
Asiatics I, by Rule 19 they would dissuade their membership from 
patronising Asiatic business, and finally by Rule 20 they would push 
for the :removal of the "Yellow Peril" from the colony (Anti-Asiatic 
League, Palmerston North 1907). 
Dl Wellington a civil servant, W.A. Lloyd, resigned his job with 
the goveTnment and formed the "White Race League", which was to pressure 
the gove:mment to increase the poll tax to £s00 or ilOOO, which he 
thought would break the monopoly the Chinese had over the fruit and 
vegetabh~, laundry, opium and gambling businesses in the city (ODT, 
6S June 13 and 19, 1907). The other aim was to force the Chinese to 
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conform to the 'laws of working and the mode of living' (ibid.). 
Curiously, part of Lloyd's fervour had been stimulated by his 
responsibility for Mr. Hwang Hou Cheng, a Chinese commissioner sent 
by the Chinese government to 'make investigations into the condition 
of the Chinese residing in various places in those parts of His 
Britannic Majesty's Dominions before they took to appoint 
Consulate Representatives' (AJHR, 1908, A-2:2), while he was in 
New Zealand. 66 The Chinese commissioner had told Lloyd, after visiting 
the area of Wellington where Chinese lived, that' ... they [New Zealand] 
must not judge the Chinese by the representatives of the race, 
mostly from the slums of Canton, they saw here ... ' (NZT, 20 June 1907). 
He apparently went on to suggest that the only way to stop the 
Chinese coming to New Zealand, after Lloyd had stated that these were 
the very people they had to deal with, was to starve them out by not 
patronising them . ) . 
Lloyd related his experience at the same meeting called to 
listen to Mr. J. Cameron from the Anti-Asiatic . M 67 ln asterton. 
The aim of Cameron's League was to effect legislation that would 
'absolutely prohibit' the entry of Asiatics into New Zealand (ibid.). 
The justification was the monopoly of the fruit by the Chinese 
and the fear of a growth of this monopoly to other trades including 
laundries. At the request of the meeting, both Ward and Massey 
provided statements of support. Massey, as leader of the opposition, 
said that he had asked the Premier to do something about the immigration 
of Chinese and would go so far as to support a doubling of the poll 
tax CNZT, 29 June 1907). Ward's contribution was as follows: 
... 1 have consistently, in my place in parliament 
on the public platform and on every opportunity 
which favoured my purpose, advocated the most 
strenuous efforts to maintain the purity of our 
race: and, consequently the exclusion from our 
shores of peoples whose admission, in my judgement 
can only make for the deterioration of the physical 
moral and well being of our people. 1 always have 
used, and am still prepared to use, every means in 
my power to effect the end 1 have mentioned, and 
exclude from New Zealand the immigration of 
Asiatics. The history of the Victorian cabinet-
making industry shows but too plainly how the 
competition with the Chinese can reduce the 
competent workman to want. Such a state of things, 
must, in my opinion, be vigorously , and, 
if I am satisfied that the competition of the 
Chinese in this country is bearing unfairly upon 
the honest competition of the Europeans here, 1 
shall be ready and willing to bring in lation 
to remedy such a state of things. 
. ) 
The challenge had been put and the promise made; it remained 
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only it to be followed through. Cameron quashed the idea that a 
general boycott of Chinese.business would have the effect by 
arguing that people of the 'poorer class' depend on these outlets for 
fruit, and Westbrooke, a representative of the and Labour 
Council, moved a motion "That this meeting declares itself emphatically 
in favour of a White New Zealand, and urges upon the government the 
of passing legislation prohibiting the immigration of 
Chinese and other Asiatics" (NZT, 29 June 1907). While there was 
unanimous support for this motion in the end, the boycott issue was 
also pushed, but Westbrooke maintained that evidence from overseas had 
suggested that the Chinese merely went into other trades when they were 
excluded from their current ones (ibid.).68 
While the gist of the publicity and the speeches in the House 
indicated the decidedly undesirable nature Chinese immigration, one 
lone voice, that of Malcolm from Clutha, tried to grapple with what he 
saw as a rather contradictory situation. speech sounded very much 
230. 
like a relic from the Council of the early Seddon administration which 
often argued, as Malcolm was doing, that China had opium and 
foreigners foisted upon her and to now prohibit Chinese immigration to 
New Zealand was unfair. Further, was it not the case that the Chinese 
were disliked more for their virtues than for their vices? (NZPD, 1907, 
139:82). He stated that he had personal knowledge of an unscrupulous 
European market gardener in Dunedin who complained of Chinese 
competition to a female customer in order to solicit her business. It 
was later proved that he in fact bought his vegetables from a local 
Chinese grower .). Even after this, however, Malcolm, like his 
colleagues, supported further legislation, and the government eventually 
specified its intent in the Financial Statement later the same year. It 
contained a proposal to add 'a higher educational test' to the already 
existent poll-tax requirement, a move which received unanimous approval 
(NZPD, 1907, 142:606, 612, 618). 
The legislation, the Chinese Immigrants Amendment Bill, was 
introduced into the House by Ward. Essentially, it specified that no 
Chinese could enter New Zealand without successfully reading a printed 
passage of not less than one hundred words in English. If the person 
was dissatisfied with the test, they had the right of appeal to a 
magistrate, who could re-administer further tests. A penalty was to be 
imposed on ship's captains and defaulting Chinese. Ward described the 
legislation as the only means of satisfying Imperial demands while at 
the same time maintaining 'purity of our race' (NZPD, 1907, 142:838). 
The support was fairly general. Davey (Christchurch like his 
colleagues Barker (Newtow~ and MacKenzie (Motueka), agreed with the bill 
but wanted the poll tax raised to i200 to discourage Chinese who he 
had heard were already learning English in China .) .69 Fisher 
(Wellington Central) was particularly supportive, since his electorate 
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contained the second largest number of Chinese as well as Haining 
Street, which he described as a 'state of things that should not 
be allowed to exist' .70 He maintained that naturalisation should be 
discontinued and concluded with an endorsement of Ward's advice to 
Freemantle, Australia, which he viewed as equally applicable to New 
Zealand: "Make it White and keep it White" (NZPD, 1907, 142:840). 
Gray (Christchurch North) also concurred with the bill but was 
adamant that people's actions should coincide with the intent of the 
slation. If, in Gray's opinion, people did not want the 
in New Zealand, then they should not trade with them, and they would 
be eradicated in six months (ibid.:84l). 
Finally the bill went to Committee, where Malcolm (Clutha) 
attempted to amend it to exempt Chinese preachers accredited by the 
Christian churches in New Zealand. The amendment was negated, but 
only to be rephrased by Ward, who suggested that Chinese ministers 
would be exempt if the Colonial Secretary was satisfied with their 
legitimacy (NZPD, 1907, 142:843).71 
After a brief return to the House, the bill again went to 
Committee, where Heke (Northern Maori) proposed an even stronger bill 
that would prohibit the Chinese from landing in New Zealand (NZPD, 
1907, 142:844). Undeterred by defeat of this, he went on to propose 
that the government should ' ... expel all persons of the Chinese race 
now living in New Zealand' which, in his opinion, would ' .. . cleanse the 
pakeha community of the immorality brought about by the Chinese owing 
72 to their contact with the pakeha people' . :844). The Speaker, 
however, ruled the clause out of order, and the bill was finally reported. 
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In November the bill went to the Council, where it was 
received with little question and only one opponent. Questions largely 
related to the date of implementation and the publication of the bill 
in relevent areas of China. The major opponent was Trask, who not only 
argued for a twelve-month postponement of the bill corning into operation 
but also that it was ' .. . unfair, unpolitic and ... detrimental to New 
Zealand in the eyes of the Chinese people' (NZPD, 1907, 142:963). As 
far as Trask was concerned, the legislation would only counter 
lation which would affect British interests, and they in turn 
would impose pressure on New Zealand to change its stance .:963-964). 
Despite Trask's prophetic words, the bill had its final reading and was 
sent to Britain for the assent of the Crown, but not without protest. 
The . f N Z 1 d .. . 73 communlty 0 ew ea an sent an extenslve petltlon 
requesting that His Majesty not give the bill his assent. The 
government got their assent, however, and the Chinese community 
received a reply, which stated that' ... the question of the immigration 
of aliens into the Dominion is one which must be determined according 
to the will of Parliament and people of New Zealand' (AJHR, 1909,A-2:7). 
However, the reply also suggested firmly that' .. . His Majesty's; 
government have every confidence that the government and Parliament of 
New Zealand will afford all just relief to Chinese residents who are 
domiciled in New Zealand and who may have occasion to pay temporary 
visits abroad' (ibid.). 
Trask was partially right, but it was not to be Britain who 
brought to bear on New Zealand: it was China. In early 1907 
the Colonial Office received a note by way of the Foreign from a 
Chinese minister regarding the appointment of Chinese Consular 
in Australia and New Zealand. It was clear that Mr. Hwang's report (see 
page 228), indicating the concerns of the New Zealand and Australian 
233. 
Chinese and the trade potential of the South Pacific, had produced 
positive results. The decision of the Chinese government was to appoint 
a Consul-General to Melbourne, one Consul in' Wellington and a Vice-
Consul each for Freemantle, Sydney and Brisbane (AJHR, 1908, A-2:2). 
Both New Zealand and Australia were informed, and neither government 
expressed opposition to the appointments. Some leading Chinese in 
New Zealand, however, were obviously dubious about a Peking appointment 
to Wellington and made it clear to the High Commissioner for New 
Zealand that one Henry J. Marriner of Christchurch would be suitable 
for the post (NA, IA 08/211 17 December, 1907) .. 
The High Commissioner passed the request on to the Chinese Foreign 
Office and was duly informed that only Chinese officials and merchants 
were eligible for diplomatic and consular appointments (ibid.). 
The following year the Colonial Secretary was notified by the 
Chinese legation that Mr. Liang Lan Hsu would be appointed as Consul-
General in Melbourne and Mr. Hwang Ylffig Lian, an American-educated 
Chinese who could speak English, would be appointed as Consul in 
Wellington (ibid., 26 May 1908). In the same year, the Immigration 
Restriction Amendment Bi1l74 was put forward by the Minister of 
Customs, Mr. Millar. The source of the initiative for the amendment, 
as revealed by Dr. Findlay later in Council, was diplomatic 
representations to the Minister of Marine (NZPD, 1908, 145:786). The 
proposed bill was to remedy the situation for returning Chinese 
residents, who were being subjected to a reading test, but it still 
required residents to register their name and thumb print before 
75 departure (NZPD, 1908, 145:722). The bill was to come into effect 
on 1 January 1909, after which date overseas residents could return 
freely as long as they satisfied the Collector of Customs as to their 
identity. In future they would be able to stay away for up to four years 
and still re-enter as long as they fulfilled the requirements of the Act 
(ibid.) 76 
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The bill received little attention except in the House, where 
Heke insisted that if 'they' really desired to stop the Chinese they 
should prohibit them totally (ibid.). 
While the House and Council had been liberal in their approach 
to the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill, the Cabinet met with the 
opposite intent. In 1908 the Minister of Internal Affairs decided not 
to naturalise any more Chinese in New Zealand and presented this 
proposition to the Cabinet. Accordingly, the Cabinet decided on 
4 February, 1908 to decline any further rights of naturalisation to 
. 77 
the Chinese (NA, IA 116/7,24 June 1946). 
In 1909 the 1907 Act came under further scrutiny, but this time 
it was from the Chinese Legation in London by way of the Wai-wu Pu in 
Peking. The approach was in the form of a note to the Secretary of 
78 State for Foreign Affairs from the Chinese Minister Li Ching Fong. 
It showed clearly that the Chinese government were aware of the 1907 
legislation and further that they considered the restrictions imposed 
. 'oppressive and undiscriminating' (AJHR, 1910, A-2:44-4S) and 
'derogatory to their [the Chinese] dignity and respect' (ibid.). The 
note continued: 
As New Zealand is within easy distance of China, 
and has made great progress within the last 
generation in the development of various industries, 
and also in her economical conditions, it would be 
to the advantage of both countries if facilities 
were afforded to Chinese subjects to visit the 
Dominion not only for the purpose of encouraging 
trade, but also for intellectual studies. 
(ibid.) 
The Chinese Minister further suggested that they had given this matter 
considerable attention and had enclosed a set of modifications for the 
existing immigration rules (see Appendix X for full proposal). 
Essentially, it required that Chinese merchants, students and officials 
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be accorded the same treaty ri ghts as they had with Britain; that 
Chinese residents in New Zealand for more than three years should be 
allowed to bring their wives and families to New Zealand and at 
least should be allowed to depart for temporary trips without 
having tel leave a thumb print j that Chinese passing the language 
test be permitted to land exempt from poll tax; and finally, that 
neither Chinese passing through New Zealand nor those who could pass 
the entry language test should be subjected to poll tax (AJHR, 1910, 
1\-2:45). 
The following year Ward responded, agreeing to the first and 
the fifth of the modifications (C.0.209, 27 February 1909), and the 
House was presented with anothe:r Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill. 
Besides satisfying some of the Chinese government's demands, it also 
remedied the problems arising f:::'om the use of only a single language 
test which by 1910 was deemed to be well rehearsed by new immigrants. 
Foulds introduced the bill, as Minister of Customs, stating that 
New Zealand was the only country in the British Empire that made it 
impossible for students, touris1:s and merchants to arrive without 
the imposition of poll tax or some other kind of restriction (NZPD, 1910, 
151 :401). The proposed hill, according to Foulds, would remedy this 
as well as making it possible for Chinese in transit to proceed without 
being subj ect to restrictions ill New Zealand and for New Zealand 
residents who went insane on departing from New Zealand to be returned 
at New Zealand's expense (ibid. 402). 
Massey, as Leader of the Opposition, was in favour of the bill 
and added little except his approval for the representative of the 
Chinese Empire who was then in New Zealand (NZPD, 1910, 151:402). Ward 
affirmed his support for a white New Zealand and stated that this 
legislatian brought New Zealand into line with Australia, Canada and 
. (. b' d ) 79 Amerlea ,~.. 
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Malcolm (Clutha), more reflective in his approach, saw the 
slation as initiating new relationships, not as merely keeping up 
with other countries. He maintained that, while China had been 
legitimately ignored as a power previously, this was no longer justified 
or satisfactory. Now, as the Chinese had themselves already pointed 
out, China should be accorded the rights and privileges of other 
European powers that dealt with New Zealand (NZPD, 1910, 151:405). He 
maintained that future legislation should be made in consultation with 
the Chinese. Foulds replied curtly that this legislation had emerged 
from just such consultation (ibid.). 
In Council the bill was introduced by Findlay without mention 
of the Chinese. He remarked, however, that certain 'Orientals' had 
the language test, and to avoid this several forms of the test 
would be used in future (NZPD, 1910,152:258). \fuen questions were 
asked, it was only in terms of the Chinese finding loopholes in the 
provisions or that various aspects might be difficult to enforce; 
otherwise the bill passed with little discussion. In its final form it 
allowed Chinese merchants and tourists to come to New Zealand and stay 
for up to months provided they had a bona fide passport and placed 
a ~O bond with the Collector of Customs. If they had no passport, the 
bond was increased to ~OO (New Zealand Gazette, 1911, 22:1047). Under 
the Act , students could remain for up to six years, and all categories 
included could appeal for an extension. If the immigrant was 
prohibited, then they could stay only twenty-one days provided they 
deposited a bond of £200. 80 
desired 
the four preceeding years of legislative activity, the 
was not attained until 1909, for in both 1907 and 1908 
arrivals still outnumbered departures (see Appendix II) by 363 persons. 
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This was due presumably to a large number of residents returning 
to New Zealand before the imposition of the increased restrictions. 
Although Chinese immigrants continued to arrive through the war years, 
it was not until 1915 that arrivals again outnumbered departures 
in any single year. In the entire period from 1907 to the end of the 
war, there was in fact a net gain in Chinese migration, contrary to 
O'Connor's contention that the legislation had provided an effective 
bar (O'Connor, 1968:459). While it would be possible to argue that 
many of these were returning residents and therefore do not constitute 
a new migration, it must also be acknowledged that an increasing 
number were Chinese women. In the period from 1906 to 1921 the number 
of Chinese women in New Zealand had increased from fifty five to 273. 
Generally, explanations for this persistence in migration usually blamed 
the return of Pacific shipping to normal after the war and the ability 
of the Chinese to master the language test (see ODT, 9 April 1920). 
While these reasons are significant, there is no mention of a more 
important variable, namely, the changing events in China. 
From at least 1907, revolutionary activity in southern China was 
becoming more intense, although thwarted by many failures. Then, with 
the Wuchang plot on 10 October 1911, a potential failure because of 
discovery, came the sudden end of the Manchu regime as provinces of 
Central, Southern and Northwestern China proclaimed their independence. 
These events had important consequences for the overseas Chinese 
population. Clearly, intellectual ideas about reform in both political 
and economic spheres had made a steady impact on segments of the Chinese 
society, and these ideas became more and more focused on revolutionary 
change and through a set of circumstances found a leader who was himself 
an overseas Chinese. While Sun Yat Sen was proclaimed President of the 
Republic on 24 December 1911, this merely heralded the beginning of three 
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decades of turmoil for China which affected both the private and public 
lives of all overseas Chinese. 
Many Chinese were faced with the dilemma of deciding between 
repatriation or continued residence overseas. The situation in their 
homeland, and particularly in their home counties and villages, was of 
immediate concern. Trying to get information about this became a 
preoccupation alongside a continued concern for their economic welfare 
overseas in the face of public protest and hostility. Increased poll 
tax and a changing occupational structure which demanded more capital 
input and a predictable labour force led to a form of stability in New 
Zealand which had to be weighed against the attempts to increase status 
for the family in the home village. Once chances of status and wealth 
in China became precarious, there was little alternative but to transfer 
the same desires to the New Zealand context, albeit to a situation that 
was less than receptive. 
In 1911 the Imperial government in China fell, and the two 
. decade hegemony of the Liberal Party in New Zealand faltered. The 
Liberals had tried to hang on, but in a few months Massey and the Reform 
Party finally succeeded in forming the government. By 1914 this new 
party had consolidated its position with strong support from urban and 
rural employers (Lipson, 1948:221). 
The strength of the urban Reform supporters and their firm 
opposition to the Chinese was equal to that of former Liberal supporters, 
as evidenced by a confrontation that developed in Christchurch in 1912. 
Seventeen years previously Christchurch had been the scene of anti-Chinese 
feeling and an Anti-Chinese League, and in 1912 the events were much the 
same with one unfortunate addition. In the first year of the war two 
Chinese fruit shops opened 'with attractive window dressing and very 
reasonable prices' which attracted customers and protests staged by 
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81 European hawkers (LT, 26 February 1912). Within days of the 
first confrontation, the Chinese Consul, Hwang Yung Lian, wrote to the 
Chinese mayor (J.J. Dougal) drawing his attention to the disturbances 
(LT, 29 February 1912).82 The Consul asked the mayor to: 
... be kind enough to see your way to such a 
favourable influence as to contribute to preventing 
a recurrence of such unlawful and arbitrary procedure 
against my countrymen. I would indeed feel deeply 
if you could use your kindlY 
to calm the passions of these unreasonable men, so 
that justice may be accorded to the subjects of a 
friendly nation, who at all times endeavour to live 
1y with their European brethren. 
.)-
The mayor contacted the police, but his like those of 
the Consul, made little impression on a public unconcerned with diplomacy 
or war all A week later the news spread that a Chinese fruit and 
vegetable shop was to open in the Christchurch suburb of Sydenham, and 
the local burgesses' association met in earnest opposition (LT, 13 March 
1912). Supported by the local fruiterers who had met the previous 
evening, the burgesses'association agreed on a boycott of Chinese shops 
to break the ' ring' (ibid.). Compared to the invective of the 
meeting, which at one point suggested that Lionel Terry should be let 
loose and at another that the government should raise the poll tax to 
~lOOO, the motion was civil, recommending that the meeting: 'suggest 
to the citizens Christchurch the advisability of buying their fruit 
and other goods from Europeans and of confining their patronage to white 
83 tradespeople' (LT, 13 March 1912). 
The correspondence in the local press on the of the 
Chinese was extensive and was by no means totally opposed to the presence 
of the Chinese. Some suggested that the Chinese charged low prices 'a 
blessing in di set (see LT, 18 and 28 March 1912). The Canterbury 
Trades and Labour Council meeting had nothing to say on the issue 
(LT, 18 March 1912), but the South Christchurch branch of the Labour Party 
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approved a remit for the annual conference urging a total ban on 
Chinese immigration and a 'White New Zealand' 16 March 1912). 
By the end of March an Anti-Chinese League had been organised at 
a meeting of fifty or sixty 'workers, grocers, tobacconists, cabinet 
makers, fruiterers, launderers and general public' (Press, 28 March 1912). 
The meeting also passed a motion condemning the action of those'who rented 
premises or businesses to the Chinese, but not before it was argued 
that Chinese fruiterers were needed until such time as a municipal 
market was provided where 'poorer people could get cheap commodities' 
(LT, 29 March 1912). While matters simmered through most of April, 
towards the latter part rumours spread from Dunedin and Wellington that 
a Chinese furniture factory was to start in Christchurch (DDT, 27 April 
1912, Press,6 May 1912). Almost immediately the whole machinery of 
opposition moved into action, and articles in the local press debated the 
implications of Chinese competition in the business. The Anti-Chinese 
started a hunt for the factory (Press, 13 May 1912) even though 
the Inspector of Factories stated categorically that no such factory 
was present in Christchurch and the Trades and Labour Council voted in 
favour of a total ban on Chinese immigration (see LT,9 May and 10 May 
1912), Tired of the verbal attack by certain members of the Anti-
Chinese who had amongst other things accused the Chinese of being 
the 'scum of Asia', two local Chinese men responded with their own 
attack (LT, 16 May 1912). Mr. Chew Lee and Mr. W. Tim denied the story 
of the factory, maintaining that it was absurd to think that 
the local Chinese had either enough capital to invest in such a venture 
or were, in effect, stupid enough to enter such a competitive business 
.). As to the accusation of being 'the scum of Asia', Mr. Tim 
suggested that Mr. Cameron and Mr. Willis who had made the statement 
should come into their shop and repeat the statement and prove it or 
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' ... 1 (Mr. Tim) will put him where he will have an opportunity to 
clear his brains (LT, 24 May 1912). 
Following the end of the war and the repatriation of New 
Zealand veterans, the issue of Asiatic immigration was again resurrected. 
84 This time the protest was initiated in Auckland, where the local branch 
of the Returned Serviceman's Association met to draft a political 
programme which would be submitted to the annual meeting of the RSA later 
in the year. One of the remits said simply, 'That the principles of a 
85 White New Zealand be affirmed' (Quick March, 1919, Vol. II, No. 13:11). 
By doing this the Auckland branch intended to initiate national 
political action by the RSA, but the remit was rejected as an addition 
to the constitution at the annual meeting, and the RSA remained 
essentially non-political (QM, 1919, Vol. II, No. 14: 
While the situation fermented in Auckland the government, 
according to O'Connor, remained largely oblivious, more concerned with 
the Undesirable Immigration Exclusion Act which was ly developed 
to protect New Zealand from Germans, Australians and Hungarians who 
might be socialists or Marxists (O'Connor 1968:52). By this Act the 
Attorney General was given the power to prohibit the landing of 
'disaffected persons and to deport persons likely to prejudice the 
peace, order and good government of the country' (Scholefield and Hall, 
1937:275).86 As Ponton notes: ' ... for the first time the principles of 
rigid immi ion restriction received almost universal sanction, even 
though the ce was high arbitrary power which could be used unfairly 
(Ponton, 1946:44). 
The trends set in motion by government and the opponents of 
Asiatic immigration in 1919 persisted in 1920. At a March meeting of 
the RSA in Timaru the Chairman was quoted as having brought to the 
attention of the members the unfair competition that a recently arrived 
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Chinese fruit shop was giving to three returned soldiers. 87 The 
complaint was laid against all those who supported Chinese business 
which undercut any attempts by those who fought for New Zealand to 
establish themselves (QM, 11 March 1920). The chairman also accused 
the Labour Department of complicity with the Chinese, who were allowed, 
according to some at the meeting, to contravene rules about hours 
of business (ibid.).88 
By April, after a concerted campaign by the local RSA entitled 
'Support Local Industry by Purchasing from a Retired Soldier' (Timaru 
Herald, 16, 17, 19 April 1920), some of the community too~matters into 
their own hands. On 19 April, a group of 'young fellows' wrecked a 
local Chinese fruit and vegetable shop and forced it to close (Timaru 
Herald, 19 April 1920). Even after the shop closed the produce 
outside was destroyed and the windows smashed. The police intervened, 
but the crowd only moved on to two other Chinese shops, and it was not 
till later the same evening that they were finally dispersed (ibid.). 
The general aim of the protest was to get the Chinese out of Timaru and 
ensure that legal and institutional means were taken to stop Asiatic 
immigration,according to the paper. Another article in the same issue 
referred to the raid as 'A Discreditable Demonstration' and suggested 
i twas not the fault of the Chinese that they were here but the fault 
of laws made by government which had allowed them to come (ibid.). It 
maintained that the young men involved had no idea of the seriousness 
of their action and that the Chinese had the right to live in 
peace (ibid.). 89 
Nine days after these events, the Auckland Watersiders met 
and unanimously decided that Indian and Chinese immigration must 
halt on the grounds that: 
1. The influx of Asiatics to this country can only 
have one ending - the lowering of the standard 
of living of the workers. 
2. The fusion of the Asiatics and whites will produce 
a piebald population. 
3. Their presence will lead to unfair competition in 
all trades and callings. 
4. If immigration is permitted by all means give 
preference to England, Ireland or Scotland, and; 
s. We condemn the Government for its failure to cope 
with this serious menace and favour a white not 
piebald New Zealand. 
(Auckland Star, 28 April 1920) 
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A month later the Watersiders informed the Advisory Board of 
the Transport Workers Federation that they would discontinue work on 
vessels carrying Indians and Chinese. The justification was the 
continued growth of Chinese and Indian involvement in the fruit and 
vegetable industry (ibid, 2 June 1920). 
Following this event a local Auckland orchardist wrote to the 
paper complaining of Chinese middlemen buying apples for 9d. a dozen 
and selling them for 2/- a dozen, and it was reported that the local 
Customs Department had caught three Chinese leaving for Australia with 
currency in excess of the.£S allowed (Auckland Star, 1, 3 June 1920). 
In July the mounting opposition finally filtered through to the 
government, and Poland (Ohinemuir) asked the Prime Minister in the 
House what steps he was taking to satisfy the complaints of both the 
RSA and the Farmers Union (NZPD, 1920, 186:18). Massey responded 
that legislation was already being drafted (ibid.). The Auckland RSA 
that had initiated Poland's request in the House had received 
complaints from an Auckland trade union and a returned serviceman who 
was a fruit and vegetable supplier. The former told the RSA that some 
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Chinese in Auckland had started manufacturing furniture, and the. 
latter complained that a Chinese supplier had successfully got the 
tender for supply of fruit and vegetables to the Rotorua Military 
Hospital (QM, 19 July 1920). In Dunedin the RSA branch had been 
asked by local fruiterers to help protest Chinese competition that 
was apparently starting at the time (ibid.). 
The case of the Rotorua Military Hospital was taken up with 
the Minister of Defence, the Hon. J.G. Coates. Coates replied that 
the RSA had been in error, since the Department of Defence was not 
giving 'preference' to the Chinese but merely accepting a favourable 
tender which was in the public's interest since it was public money 
being spent. He concluded: 
All money being equal the Department would naturally 
to deal with reputable firms, such as Messrs 
Johnson and Cooper, in preference·to Chinese merchants 
(Sing Key Chong), but in making contracts there could 
be no question of giving preferential treatment to any 
particular firm. 
91 (QM, 10 August 1920) 
The RSA was dissatisfied with the reply and went directly to 
Surgeon General McGavin to lay their claim that there could be no 
such thing as equality in this kind of arrangement. The Chinese cost 
of living and pay rates were too low to make equality justi cation 
for refusing the contract. While there was no immediate success, the 
Auckland RSA was satisfied with McGavin's response (QM, 10 August 1920). 
Shortly after this, the Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill 
was presented to the House, and in September it received its second 
d ' 92 rea lng. In the interim the Chinese Consul, reading of the Bill in 
the local newspaper, after specifically requesting noti cation from 
the Prime Minister should such a bill eventuate, reacted strongly, 
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writing the following to Massey: 
So far as the Bill itself it concerned, I am quite 
unable to understand how the Government of this 
Dominion can offer such a studied insult to every 
foreign nation. 
To make entry into this Dominion subject to the whim 
of an cial is a strange element to present to 
the community of nations, while the proposal that 
the Governor General may by order in Council declare 
IIthat the provisions of this Part of this Act shall 
not apply to nations or peoples spe in "such 
Order in Council" will no doubt be appreciated very 
highly by such countries as Japan, France, or the 
United States of America should they be selected for 
preferential treatment. 
The Bill, however, appears to me to be specifically 
to enable the Government of this Dominion 
by a stroke of the pen, to exclude Chinese absolutely. 
This being the case, I cannot appreciate the empty 
compliment in the proposed abolition of the thumb-
prints, and I am surprised that the iniquitous poll tax 
was not coupled with the thumb-prints. As the Bill now 
introduced into Parliament means total exclusion of 
Chinese into this country, what is the reason of 
retaining the inhuman poll tax about which I have made 
more serious complaint than the thumb-prints. 
If your Government had any regard for the treaty 
between His Majesty the King of England and the late 
Emperor Kwang Hau, which treaty is still in existence, 
having been ratified and confirmed by the Governments 
of our respective countries, such an insult as this 
Bill would never have been offered. 
In order that it may not escape your memory, I again 
quote the clause which is as follows:-
"It is agreed that subj ects of the two powers shall 
each within the territories of the other enjoy all 
the privileges, immunities and advantages that may 
have been, or may hereafter be accorded to the 
sub j ection of any other nation". 
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To profess to put all nations on the same level, and at 
the same time to retain the right to give any particular 
nation or nations preference over others without saving 
treaty obligations is a distinct violation of the treaty 
to which I have referred. 
In order to show that the Chinese Government is not 
unmindful of the domestic prejudices of the people of 
New Zealand, I now state briefly the conditions to 
which I am authorised to assent. 
1. Every Chinese proposing to land in New Zealand 
should be provided with a passport and a certificate 
of good character, and in the case of temporary 
visitors of sufficient means to enable their return 
home. 
2. That the number of people of the labouring class 
to be allowed to land should be subject to reasonable 
limitations. I myself suggested to you not more than 
300 per annum. 
3. That accredited Chinese should be allowed to bring 
wives and family of tender years with them. 
4. Abolition of all such degrading and barbarous 
conditions such as poll tax, thumb-prints, etc. 
I hope that your better judgement will yet prevail and 
that the Dominion of New Zealand will not distinguish 
f by throwing a treaty to the winds. 
246. 
94 
eMS 985/1/44, 12 August 1920) 
Massey ignored the Consul's words when presenting the bill in 
the House. He justified it stating that in six months prior to 
June 1919, 476 Chinese had entered paying the poll tax, and 174 
Indians, 18,774 people from Britain and 829 from other countries had 
also arrived (NZPD, 1920, 187:905). The bill being presented, he 
argued, " ... is the result of a deep-seated sentiment on the part of a 
huge majority of the people of this country that this Dominion should 
be what is called a "white" New Zealand and that the people who corne 
here should as far as it is possible for us to provide for be of 
the same way of thinking from the British Empire point of view ... " 
(ibid.), He went on to maintain that the legislation proposed 
intended no injustice to people who were already in New Zealand or 
who would come later, but he affirmed New Zealand's right to approve 
of those who came .).95 
The bill before them required any person not of British or Irish 
birth to get a permit from the Minister of Customs before entering 
New Zealand .). 
In effect, it replaced the education test and fingerprinting 
exercise provided for under previous legislation without, however, 
removing the poll tax requirement on the Chinese. The lation also 
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specified as the Council had pointed out, that the Governor General 
by Order in Council could decl.are the provisions of the bill 
inapplicable for any specific case if warranted, which removed the 
necessity for further immigration legislation in the future. The 
debate in the House was interesting,for now the wartime coalition 
had broken up, and a three-party system emerged, with Reform premiers 
governing, a fading Liberal Party surviving (until 1928) and a growing 
Labour Party with eight newly elected members under Holland. Now 
it was the Reform Party who, representing the wealthy new farmers 
created by the land legislation of the Liberals,' wanted absolute 
prohibition of certain immigrants on the basis of a 'white New 
Zealand' po Hcy. Labour argued for a more moderate means of exclusion 
while at the same time presenting the image of a consolidated labour 
force including both Chinese and Indians resident in New Zealand. 
Sidey (Dunedin South) asked why birth and parentage conferred 
by naturalisation were not accepted and further why it was that 
aboriginal inhabitants did not count as of British parentage or birth, 
for under the bill, Maoris leaving New Zealand would be required to get 
a permit to return. Massey merely pushed the issue aside, retorting 
that for the purpose of the bill, "The Maori is a European ... " (NZPD, 
1920, 187:907-908). Massey ignored several other questions asked, 
and it remained for Downie Stewart (Dunedin West), a person with some 
sympathy for the plight of the Chinese to redirect the debate. Downie 
Stewart had also been in communication with the Chinese Consul, Lin 
Shih-yuan prior to the presentation of the bill to the House and had 
received first hand the Chinese government's feelings about the 
legislation imposed on the Chinese in New Zealand. The Consul had 
initially considered a circular letter to all members of Parliament 
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stating his case but had according to a letter to Downie Stewart 
reconsidered the tactic fearing that Massey would use against 
the Chinese community (MS 985/1/44:10 August 1920). Lin Shih-yuan 
did, however, write a lengthy statement to W.B. Matheson (which was 
also sent to Downie Stewart). He described the movers of the Bill 
in the following: 
(They) ... are actuated solely by personal interests, 
and they are parochial, and cannot see beyond the 
end of their own noses. If their clamorous voices 
are allowed to produce echos without being checked, 
narrow minded prejudice will mould public opinion 
and the government, possibly seeking votes for 
future elections will be led in the direction of 
mischief. 
(MS985/l/44: 1 June 1920) 
He went on to against New Zealand's parochial stance stating 
China had now 'awoke' and would be directing her attention to 
development of all her resources which would necessitate trade with 
countries like ain and New Zealand. Furthermore, he reiterated 
article XVIII of the Convention between Great Britain and China of 1894 
included in his letter of Massey (see page 245) and then proceeded 
to list the privileges, immunities and advantages bestowed on the 
Chinese in New Zealand: 
1. Thumb-prints are used in China in the identification 
of criminals, and, consequently, is a very cruel and 
unjust thing to apply it to the Chinese who are free 
from guilt and who are the subjects of one ally of 
the intents of the late war. 
2. heavy capitation tax imposed on our Chinese is 
tantamount to suggest that they are not considered 
as human beings, but only as animals or goods. Well, 
they are human beings, and those who treat human 
beings as animals are not humane. The design of such 
a tax recoils from the victim on to the imposer. 
3. The literature test is the most unfair of all. 
Before they are allowed to land, the Chinese 
immigrants are called upon to pass the test. The 
white man is asked simply to read his own language, 
but a Chinese is required to read 100 words of a 
language foreign to him. These 100 words are 
selected by a customs officer, and the reading must 
satisfy him, and he has great power this respect. 
Now those Chinese who have bad luck and fail in the 
examination, unless appealed to the magistrate at 
once, must, according to the law, be deported 
immediately by the boat in which they came, and find 
their way back to their native land without even a 
brief stop after a long and fatiguing trip on the 
ocean. Moreover, those poor creatures may be 
children or wives of wealthy Chinese merchants here 
who came to join parents or husbands; nevertheless, 
failure of the test results in a perpetuation of 
the separation of the family. Fortunately, the 
present Customs Controller, Mr. W.D. Montgomery 
shows great consideration, and in special 
circumstances will allow a few weeks'· respite. 
If humanity means anything, such a state or 
condition should not be allowed to exist any 
longer. So, for the sake of humanity, I appeal to 
the conscience of the New Zealand people, and ask, 
if the positions were reversed, would they tolerate 
it? 
I venture to say that the way that New Zealand treats 
the Chinese is worst among all the white states. 
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(MS 985/1/44:1 June 1920:3)96 
While sympathetic to his own people in New.Zealand the Consul was by 
no means totally supportive describing them as 'small farmers and 
rustics' unlike the 'millions of Chinese of high intellectual 
attainments who are found among officials, students and merchants' 
(ibid. : 4) . He was not in favour of Chinese labourers coming to New 
Zealand - although he would accept the notion of a quota - being much 
more supportive of the American system of allowing the entry of 
Chinese merchants, their wives and children. Downie Stewart's 
presentation in fact followed the Consul's argument closely. He 
essentially approved of the bill but maintained that it was likely to 
exclude people like the French and Americans, which he felt was 
unnecessary (NZPD, 1920,187:910). Stewart went on to argue that 
there was no need for the poll tax to be retained. It had, he 
maintained, never been entirely satisfactory, merely leading to 
syndicates being formed to provide passage money for the 'coolie 
class'. Desirable Chinese immigrants like merchants and tourists 
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would not submit themselves to the indignity of the poll tax, according 
to Stewart, and furthermore the Chinese Consul had singled this out 
as the worst aspect of New Zealand's immigration legislation (ibid.)97 
Stewart wanted the poll tax abolished and a quota system for Chinese 
immigration established,98 which would change the class origins of 
immigrants and presumably defuse the arguments of organised labour 
and their party. 
Holland (Buller), leader of the Labour members, followed 
Stewart but maintained that he supported the bill primarily so that 
the standard of living in New Zealand would be preserved (NZPD, 1920, 
187:913). He agreed with Stewart's statement on the poll tax and also 
with the notion of continued immigration of the Chinese provided 
through a quota system. He saw the means of changing the class of 
origin as already existent in the education test which he argued 
should.be an education test at the Sixth Standard Level in English and 
Mathematics. It should, he maintained, provide the means to select 
immigrants rather than a means of prohibiting all immigrants (NZPD, 
1920, 187:913). While he was strongly against the idea of introducing 
a competitive labour force, he did, however, mention that while he was 
editor of the Maoriland Worker a number of Indians had joined local 
unions and shown themselves to be quite capable (ibid. :913) . 
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Holland's concluding comments represented an attack on the 
government. He stated categorically that it was clear 'the government 
intended to use Cabinet decisions (Orders in Council) from now on to 
manipulate the contents of the bill and further that he viewed the 
discretionary powers given to the Minister of Customs as excessive 
(ibid. : ~14-9l5) . 
Once the two positions had been made clear, other members added 
their bit in accordance. McNicol (Pahiatua) supported Stewart, but he 
also noted that he had seen "a new class of Chinese" - one well dressed 
commercial traveller travelling by train - which he described as a 
'class of parasites' and hardly preferable to the Chinese market gardener 
who grew vegetables and contributed to the health of New Zealanders 
(ibid. :919). Savage (Auckland) supported Holland, arguing for government-
to-government negotiation and also noting that local Chinese ~nd 
Indians he knew were in favour of limiting the numbers of their fellow 
countrymen. Stratham (Dunedin Central) decrie~ the Cabinet's new powers 
and noted that if one did not have provisions to vet the applications in 
the country of origin then there was little point in having such a 
system, and Hanan (Invercargill) thought it was pointless to negotiate 
with governments and that it was certain that Indian trade unionists 
would not last (NZPD, 1920, 187:922 and 929). 
Generally, the five hours of debate were rational and polite except 
for a brief heated exchange between McCombs (Lyttelton) and Hanan 
(Invercargill) about Labour's inconsistency in policy towards 
immigration. In committee Holland attempted to get the education and 
quota requirement included as well as a provision to stop Cabinet 
seeking exemptions to the bill in order to provide a source of cheap 
labour should the demand arise (NZPD, 1920, 187:1019-1020). His 
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attempts led and the only changes made were those from the government 
side. One in particular related to the Maori, who would now under an 
amendment be excluded from any provision in the act (ibid. :930). The 
Hon. Mr. Ngata (Eastern Maori), who had requested this change, also made 
a statement sympathising with the British, whom he described 
as not the 'highest' but the' ... best civilisation that has so far 
appeared on the face of this globe ... ' (ibid. :931). After the flattery, 
however, he said quite bluntly that he could not understand why the 
New Zealand government and people, who obviously did not want 
Chinese in New Zealand, could not tell the Chinese people ly that 
they did not want them to come here (ibid. :931). Also, he could not 
understand why there was pretence of negotiating with China when New 
Zealand had no diplomatic basis for this except for indirect negotiation 
through Secretary of State for the Colonies. Finally, he found it 
hard to see how the Minister of Customs could evaluate anybody's 
eligibility on the basis of an application which said nothing . :931). 
Aside from the debate the bill received no major in 
the House and proceeded to the Council in September, where was 
introduced by Sir Francis Bell, Attorney General. Bell, in a careful 
fashion, approached the bill by essentially laying out all the areas 
which might generate discussion and then defining these areas as 
irrelevant.- In this way, the poll tax and the fingerprinting 
requirement were removed as issues and Bell verified that the education 
test was not meant as an education test in the first place but as a 
deterrent, and all that was important in terms of the bill them 
was the app'lication for a permit to enter New Zealand. The bill passed 
the Council with little discussion, and it became an Act on 1 January 
1921. The Act provided that all persons not of British birth or 
parent must obtain a permit to enter New Zealand unless Orders in 
Council had been passed to exempt certain nations or peoples, or on 
the other hand the Minister of Customs could use his discretion to 
exempt certain persons or classes of persons from the provisions of the 
Act. 99 Temporary permits were to be granted to bona fide 
The Chinese government disliked the bill and sent a telegram to 
the Consul Lin Shih-yuan especially opposing the retention of the poll 
tax. passed on the substance of the telegram to Massey in a letter 
where he stated that in his government's opinion the poll tax was to 
obviously remain ' ... as an indication of the mercantile value placed by 
New Zealand upon intercourse between that country [New Zealand] and 
China' eMS 985/1/44,27 August 1920). The Consul appealed to Massey to 
think about the international situation and future al 
reconsider erradicating the poll tax and making immigration 
arrangements the prerogative of government to government 
and not that of the 'arbitrary decision of an official' 
and 
ations 
.) . 
During 1920 while the bill went through Parliament, 1029 Chinese 
arrived in New Zealand, and the RSA continued to watch the situation 
with alarm. The South Taranaki Branch passed an unanimous resolution 
calling for increased restrictions (QM, 10 September 1920). The 
Auckland Branch tried to pass a resolution prohibiting the immigration 
of Chinese into New Zealand and Samoa (ibid.: 11 October 1920), and 
Wellington, in alarmist fashion, passed a series of resolutions 
calling for a halt to the 'invasion' and the repatriation of all 
Chinese who had arrived since 1914 (ibid.: 11 October 1920). In 
December the national executive of the NZRSA met in Wellington, 
discussed the recently passed bill and then went on to discuss means 
of stopping the rapid influx of Chinese. Curiously the suggestion put 
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forward by the General Secretary was one that endorsed a quota 
system where the Chinese would not exceed 5% of the population (ibid.: 
10 December 1920). The suggestion was short-lived, however, when Mr. 
Long from Auckland made it clear that the RSA had 'made a name for 
itself in connection with the Asiatic Question and had taken the lead 
in educating the public on the question', so if the current legislation 
failed they must push for absolute exclusion (ibid. :40). 
In October 1920 the new bill was sent to London with a memorandum 
by the Governor, Lord Jellicoe, stating his confidence in the 
legislation, but in a separate telegram he aired his feelings that 
the government in New Zealand would resent any interference in this 
bill because of its priority (O'Connor 1968:63). Jellicoe added also 
the comment that if any amendments were required he was sure they could 
be done in the next session (ibid.). 
According to O'Connor, the Colonial Office disliked the bill, 
partially because it violated the Natal arrangements and mainly because 
it now meant that the New Zealand government could amend the legislation 
by Order in Council, in the absence of London's scrutiny. Their 
response, therefore, was to ask that they be notified of any changes 
or exemptions before they were actioned, thereby removing the chance 
that New Zealand might exclude some nations and exempt others which 
could upset Imperial agreements (ibid.). 
In January 1921 the bill was finally gazetted, but not before 
J 11 ' h d' . d h 1 f . . .. 100 e lcoe a lnslste on t e remova 0 some lnconslstencles. 
In 1921, therefore, after more than half a century of nearly 
continuous argument over the issue of Asiatic immigration, the matter 
had been resolved. The legislation had now removed the matter from the 
arena of public and parliamentary debate and lodged policy decision with 
Cabinet and implementation with the Minister of Customs and later the 
Minister of Immigration. 
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From 1921 onwards Hansard contains little if any mention of 
the issue, with the exception of 1923 when Downie-Stewart, Minister of 
Customs, was asked to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation. 
He argued that it had the required effect since in the eighteen months 
prior to the Act 1,234 Chinese had entered while in the eighteen 
months after the Act only 166 Chinese had arrived (NZPD, 1923, 201:152). 
While one would suspect that the whole tenor of Asiatic 
immigration restriction had been inexorably directed towards total 
prohibition and that the 1920 Act was the culmination of this effort, 
the facts speak to the contrary. In 1921, despite an unappeased 
Auckland population witnessing a doubling of the Chinese population 
in their province, the Cabinet approved a quota of 100 Chinese a year 
(Ponton, 1946:68). In the period from 1922 to 1926, when the quota 
policy was in effect, 390 permits were issued and 397 Chinese arrived 
101 (Ponton, 1946:89). 
While it appears that Ponton's figures coincide with some 
figures presented by the Census and Statistics Office (see Appendix XI) 
for the period 1922 to 1927, it is clear that this is only part of 
the immigration picture. A memorandum to Internal Affairs in 1937 
gi ves additional statistics. First ly it must be noted that at least forty 
five of the arrivals in the period from 1921 to 1927 were women (see 
Appendix XI) but that according to Appendix XII, 148 Chinese women 
arrived. The complexity of this is further compounded when one finds 
out that the Customs Department excluded women from the quota of 
permits in 1926 and maintained this provision until 1935 (NA,L/22/l/8l:2). 
This move was apparently justified on the basis that local Chinese 
' ... either had no intention of settling permanently or were just not 
interested in bringing their wives here' (ibid.). If either figure 
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for the arrival of women is correct this would hardly seem the case; 
on the contrary one is led to the conclusion that the Customs 
Department was aware that permanent settlement was desired by many 
local Chinese. Similarly, whereas Ponton's material documents the 
arrival of only 447 Chinese, the Census and Statistics memorandum 
gives a figure of 2,930 arrivals in the period 1922 to 1927 (see 
Appendix XI).102 
Clearly, if the permit or quota system was strictly enforced, 
the number of immigrants should not exceed one hundred, so one must 
assume that the excess were returning residents or people granted 
temporary permits. Whatever the case, the policy is unclear. Ponton 
maintains that the quota system was in effect from 1922 till 1926, 
while the New Zealand Herald stated in 1930 that no permanent Chinese 
residents had been permitted since 1923 (NZH, 13 October 1930). 
Similar problems arise for the period from 1928 to 1936 (see Appendix XIII). 
If one compares all three Appendices from the Census and Statistics 
Department (including Appendix XI and XII) discrepancies are noted. The 
most obvious point is the large number who are not returning residents 
and who must therefore have received permits, either temporary or 
permanent, but Ponton maintains, as stated previously, that the quota 
system was discontinued in 1926 and further that the temporary permit 
system was discontinued for Chinese in 1930 (Ponton 1946:87). Obviously, 
given the numbers entering, there must be some error in Ponton's 
assertion, but no proof remains. 
Hall, in his critical evaluation of New Zealand's Asiatic 
Immigration policy in 1927, suggested that the large numbers of Chinese 
entering despite the permit system might have reflected a testing of the 
temporary permit system.by organisations interested in Chinese 
immigration (Hall, 1927:233).103 The logic of this analysis depended, 
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however, on the assumption that Chinese immigration involved a 
highly structured system run by syndicates who were dealing in 
indentured labour. 'Ihese syndicates, according to popular mythology, 
had knowledge the legislation and therefore were availing themselves 
of the 1911 provisions which allowed tourists, merchants and students 
to get permits and also to have them extended. 104 
Hall argued that few tourists and merchants would be 
interested in coming to New Zealand, so by inference it must be an 
organised labour migration (Hall, 1927:233). This, however, neglects 
the provision for students made in 1911 and the fact that the supposed 
syndicates would have had to post a bond for their temporary workers 
which could go as high as £100, a proposition which would be very 
unlikely. Aside from this, there has never been any evidence produced 
to support the contention aside from the case of Ho Ah Mei (see 
Chapter 3). The more likely explanation would be a system of rotating 
migration which would be made up initially of students who would 
become merchant-retailers in a partnership for a period of years and 
then return to China, leasing or placing their business interest in 
the hands of another person. The government was aware that people 
under temporary permits were in fact working and took steps, 
according to Ponton, in April 1924 to stop by prohibiting work in 
any occupation other than 'a technical expert or specialised field', 
but apparently there was no attempt to enforce the decision 
(Ponton, 1946:86). 
Regardless of government regulation during this period, the 
poll tax revenue continued to accumulate. In the period from 1921 to 
1936, £)93,746 was collected, £102,950 of which was paid in 1921 alone 
(see Appendix IX). This amount was equivalent to £432 for every 
Chinese person in New Zealand at the time, an amount that would take a 
shop assistant sixty-four weeks to accumulate. 
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If one looks at the total arrivals and departures (in 
Appendix XII) from 1921 to 1935, there was a comparable number of 
people arriving and departing, although for the entire period departures 
outnumbered arrivals by 706. 105 The result of this was an actual 
decline in the overall Chinese community in New Zealand as it went 
from 3,374 in 1921 to 2,943 in 1936 (see Appendix I) but a real increase 
in the number of females in the community from 273 1921 to 511 in 
1936. s increase was acknowledged for the first time in 1928, when 
the Abstracts of the 1926 Census started appearing. The New 
------
Herald maintained that this had far graver consequences than the male 
Chinese population which had formerly caused so much consternation. 
Now, according to the Herald the principle of a 'White New Zealand' 
was under threat, with the presence of females. Now, it argued, 
'the race must multiply in the Dominion', but at least, the majority 
were New Zealand born and bred, although sadly Chinese were 
sending their children back to China for education so they could 
maintain their economic position (NZH, 14 May 1928). 
While the paper!s statistics are correct, certainly cannot 
the total Chinese female population through natural 
New Zealand, since from 1921 till 1927, forty five women arrived 
(Appendix XI), and in the period 1928 to 1936, 133 of the 244 e 
in 
women who arrived were not returning residents (Appendix XII), It is also 
quite noticeable that the departure rate for women almost doubled in the 
latter 106 The evidence seems to suggest as the Herald points 
out, that Chinese families were being reconstituted in New Zealand, at 
least briefly, but the phenomenon also produced a new legal problem. If 
Chinese couples, even on a temporary permit, had children in New Zealand, 
those children automatically received certificates of registration that 
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allowed for re-admission should they ever leave. While there has 
been no documentation of this problem prior to 1939, at that time an 
Order in Council required persons to be at least fifteen years of age 
in order to receive a certificate of registration (Ponton, 1946: 11). 
The period 1879 to 1920, previously discussed, marks the most 
intensive efforts on the part of the New Zealand government to limit 
or exclude Chinese from the country. It is clear, however, that the 
aim was never totally realised, and in fact much of this chapter 
leads one to the conclusion that total prohibition was never intended. 
In forty-two years, twenty-one separate bills had been introduced, 
eight of which passed, although most of these were amendments to major 
acts or bills to consolidate previous legislation. In addition, the 
Old Age Pension Act specifically excluded the Chinese from receiving 
the first national form of social welfare. 
The endless pages of debates that document the above process 
give some idea of the positions and interests represented. As Hall 
noted in 1927, the sectional economic interests and economic 
history of New Zealand have obviously influenced the anti-Chinese 
legislative activity. He maintained that the l870s and early l880s 
with their adverse trade balance and the depression following in the 
late l880s and early 1900s are sufficient explanation. Further, he 
argues that economic explanations give way to racial arguments and 
those of bureaucratic efficiency after 1907 (Hall, 1927:288-299). 
It was true that the post-1878 deluge of unpassed bills 
coincided with the working men's opposition and that the 1895 
legislation was accompanied by economic opposition. However, contrary 
to Hall's assertion, the white New Zealand philosophy paralleled both 
phases of legislative activity and gave rise, finally, in 1895 to the 
Anti-Chinese association which would appear again in 1907 and in 1926 
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and would probably have existed in 1918 had the RSA not performed the 
same role. Race, as a justification for the actual legislation was 
made explicit by Seddon in 1896 and it has been noted that politicians 
were not strangers to any of the anti-Chinese organisations. If the 
economic interests were a key determinant it was probably more 
apparent in the area of political representation. Clearly, there was a 
group of landowners, merchants, shipowners and professionals whose 
general humanity and wealth afforded a paternalistic attitude towards 
the Chinese presence. Reeves described them as the 'employing class' 
who, together with the 'humanitarian school', the Colonial Office and 
capitalist economists, had tried to hamper the law-makers in their 
efforts to 'bar the yellow men' (Reeves, 1901:598). The economic 
interests that opposed the Chinese presence came from the organised 
labour and the working man of the colony, who, .to quote Reeves, thought 
Chinese competition 'foul, contrary to nature and unjust' (ibid.). 
Siegfried agreed with Reeves and argued that the Chinese being only 
sojourners could exist with few of the expectations that colonists 
had, making life at least considerably simpler if not cheaper 
(Siegfried, 1914:221). It was the Protestant thrift, admired as a 
virtue by colonists that now became a sin for aliens like the Chinese, 
regardless of whether or not they had become Christians. Organised 
labour therefore opposed Chinese immigration and the 'employing class' 
was partially supportive. The former had the Liberal party who in the 
interest of staying in office supported the demand ,for a non-
competitive labour market and the latter had the Council. As 
Siegfried observed both organised labour and the Liberals wanted 
'a little country free from outside taint ... small and happy' (Siegfried, 
1914:211). This at least was the situation until Reeves left New Zealand. 
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When Seddon took over, the alliance between organised labour and the 
Liberals gradually diminished, and although labour remained 
adamantly anti-Chinese it was the small business community who were 
encouraged in their anti-Chinese fervour, particularly at a time when 
the Chinese communities were developing in urban areas. Seddon, 
secure with this support then proceeded to wage batt Ie with his Council, 
the Governor and British hegemony over the New Zealand colony. 
The Council was not only a group protecting particular vested 
interests but also the conscience of New Zealand vis a-vis Britain's 
imperial desires. Their reluctance to approve immigration restrictions 
against the Chinese, on more than one occasion, thwarted the efforts of 
Seddon. In 1896 and 1898 they had stopped legislation and on one 
occasion in 1896, complained to the Crown about Seddon's exaggerated 
attitude to the Chinese. While this may have inadvertently helped 
the Chinese it was more likely that they were protecting their own 
interests with the exception of a few members, in opposing Seddon, for 
it had been the same Council in 1881 who approved of unequal treatment 
for the Chinese by retaining their naturalisation fee at £1 while it 
was reduced for all others. 
Successive Governors had also hindered the government's intent 
and in both 1888 and 1896 they had complained to England about New 
Zealand's alarmist behaviour as well as suggesting that Seddon was 
using the to get at the Council: As for Imperial interests, 
they appeared to continuously interfere with New Zealand's right to 
self determination, a point that was made blatantly clear when Britain 
supported the interests of capital in procuring Chinese labour for the 
Rand mines in 1903. 
Seddon in his lifetime was able to remedy only one of these 
problems, and by 1898 he had gained sufficient influence over the 
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membership of the Council to make any opposition but he 
died in 1906 and thereby missed the granting of Dominion status to 
New Zealand the following year. It remained for later governments to 
find the remedy for the other two problems. 
The solution to the remaining problems was to be found in 
devising slation that circumvented the Governor's scrutiny and 
by placing the administration of the new restrictions under the 
jurisdiction of a government department rather than Parliament. Both 
strategies, originating in the first place from the Natal Act and in 
the second from the War Conference in 1917 were suggested by the 
British government. 
The 1898 Immigration Restriction bill (2) and the 1907 
Immigration Amendment bill complied with the Natal Act and the 1920 
Act ful led the War Conference statement that gave British 
Commonwealth countries the right to control immigration. The permit 
system in 1920 did exactly this as well as carrying on the precedent 
set in the war for the head of a government department to have the 
right to approve OT deny access to New Zealand. 
While the administration of the restrictions had been made 
explicit in this legislation, there were inconsistencies that remained 
despite a method that could be used for absolute exclusion. The two 
provisions that remained were the exclusion of Chinese only from the 
right of naturalisation from 1908 till 1952 and the survival of the 
poll tax requirement till 1944. It is not clear from the evidence why 
these two provisions remained although one could make arguments in terms 
of revenue and the ability to stop the establishment of Chinese 
families in New Zealand. The former could be substantiated from 
Appendix IV and the latter from the explicit statements about 
naturalised Chinese males conferring the right on their spouses, 
but in the face of the permit system they remained anomalies. 
A more likely explanation seems to lie in the observation 
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that the excessive attention paid to the Chinese immigration question 
had created what Hall called in 1927, 'racial consciousness'. He 
contended that it was not' ... too far fetched to gn to New Zealand 
agi tation and lation a contributory part, however small, in 
creating the situation from which arose that striking reaction of 
racial consciousness ... I (Hall, 1927:231). No matter how exclusive 
immigration restrictions had become the New Zealand government still 
did not want a Chinese minority in this country, even though Hall had 
admonished private and semi-public organisations to erradicate racial 
consciousness through 'sympathetic treatment and a general raising 
where necessary of economic and cultural standards' (Hall, 1927:236). 
As noted ,however, it would be many years before the remaining 
previously mentioned restrictions were removed, an indication that 
'racial consciousness'was persistent. 
While is clear to Hall that racial consciousness had 
affected the kind of milieux the Chinese had tolerated in New Zealand 
since their arrival,he had not noted its impact on the social structure 
of the Chinese community with the exception of his observation about 
Chinese quarters. In other words the persistent activity by government 
not only created racial consciousness amongst New Zealanders but also 
amongst resident Chinese (see Ng, 1959:47). A parallel process then, 
to the anti-Chinese activity,was the emergence of a Chinese community 
conscious of a need to survive in New Zealand and also influenced 
by its homeland, which had become aware by 1887 of its overseas 
cOmllunities and their problems. Already in the l870s the Chinese 
population in the gold fields had organised the Ch'eung Shin Tong 
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and Cherishing Virtue Union, the former providing for the internal 
needs of the community and the latter for its continued existence in 
New Zealand. At the same time the petition had become a medium for 
articulating the needs of the community, specifically for alleviation 
of restrictions. 
Although organisational development will be dealt with in the 
following chapter the use of petitions linked the early organisation 
of the gold fields to later developments. They continued through the 
late l880s ending only with the arrival of diplomatic representation 
for the local community. These petitions, did little to modify 
immigration restrictions but did provide evidence of an organised 
community which managed to alert Peking to its plight in New Zealand. 
The result was two Chinese Commissions which came in 1887 and 1906, 
resulting in the appointment of a Chinese Consulate in New Zealand 
with the permission of the New Zealand government. Peking had 
particular feelings about its overseas population in New Zealand as 
did successive Consuls, both being supportive of their own class, that 
is merchants and students (educated Chinese) but intermittent in their 
defence of the many other Chinese who came. 
The unintended result of New Zealand's adamant anti-Chinese 
stand was,after 1908,direct contact with China which, while beneficial 
to New Zealand in terms of controlling the local Chinese, also re-
inforced the minority's contact with their homeland. The contact, as 
noted prior to 1900,had been in terms of cultural patterns of behaviour 
but gradually social relations in the Chinese community, especially 
with the move to other areas in New Zealand and an increasing 
tendency to become urbanised began to reflect political changes in 
China. 
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While diplomatic developments have been discussed it remains 
now to indicate how a Chinese community organisation develops to cope 
with New Zealand society, and government, their homeland and the 
fragmentation in their community largely caused by decisions in the 
former relations. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. Throughout his career Reeves was capable of vehement and 
sustained attacks on the Chinese. His article 'Aliens and 
Undesirables in Australia' has several sections which are 
examples of his invective. For instance . 
2. The 
... to begin with the Chinese are admitted by all 
observers to be utterly unfit to use political rights 
in democracy. They have no conception of government 
and public duty as these are understood in Europe. 
Their civilisation is an arrested development, their 
education petrified, their learning confined to a hand-
ful .... Industrious they are, but industry without 
certain social qualities is a doubtful virtue. A man 
may be industrious and yet be dirty, miserly, ignorant, 
a shirker of social duty, and a danger to public health. 
All these most of the Chinese immigrants are. 
lton Times is hereafter abbreviated to LT. 
3. It becomes quite obvious when going through the debates that 
a member knew local Chinese in his constituency it was 
usually a merchant or a family where a Chinese man had married 
a European woman and whose children attended the local 
school. See the case of Manders from Wakatipu, who knew a 
Chinese merchant, well known in Dunedin, Queenstown and 
Melbourne and Sydney, and Brown from Tuapeka, who knew a 
case of intermarriage where the children were of comparable 
intelligence to local European children (NZPD, 1878, 29:419). 
4 This does not qUite concur with Scholefield and Hall (1927:5) 
or Price (1974:20). 
5 Grey submitted a memorandum to both Houses of the General 
Assembly regarding the immigration of Chinese into the Colony, 
in which he argued for a colony of a 'coloured population' 
and 'industrious immigrants' from China to be established in 
Northern Australia and for the preservation of the pure bred 
descendants of the Anglo-Saxon population in New Zealand by 
the passing of restrictive immigration laws. He substantiated 
the second point by suggesting that, because the Chinese tended 
to settle in one place once they had arrived, they would be very 
to the holders of large properties, and that this was not 
what New Zealand needed (AJHR, 1879, D-3). 
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6 One of the thrusts in this meeting was the acknowledgement 
that the Public Works Department had money available for 
employment and that this money might be used to employ cheap 
labour for projects, as had been tried in 1873. This was 
also made clear at a meeting in Dunedin, where a resolution 
was passed prohibiting the employment of Chinese by local 
councils or contractors (LT, 29 May, 1879). 
7 The alternative suggestion is perhaps that he was merely 
getting the House stirred up, paving the way for less harsh 
restrictions the following year, since much of the debate 
would have already taken place and most members would have 
agreed that they would have voted in favour of it had 
it not called for total prohibition. 
8 This firmly establishes the beginnings of a white New Zealand 
policy and in fact concurs with Premier Ward's statement in 
1907, when he boasted, according to O'Connor, a twenty-five-
year-long devotion to the ideal of a white New Zealand 
(O'Connor, 1968:44). 
9 W.P. Reeves was struck by the extent to which provlslons were 
made in various acts for fining ships' masters and ship owners. 
He suggests that many colonies blamed their so-called 'yellow 
influx' on the money-making exploits of steamship owners, yet 
it was the colonies who were being criticised for their 
exclus ionist poli des, " ... the same British trading spirit 
which, while poisoning Chinese with opium in the interests of 
India, was ready to champion the cause of China when money 
was to be made by swamping Australia and New Zealand with 
yellow barbarians" (Reeves, 1901: 604) . 
10 Appendix IX gives the recorded amounts of poll tax deposited 
in this account for each year available. 
11 By 1881 New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
Queensland by the 1877 Act had poll-tax provisions and 
tonnage limitations (Choi, 1975:26). 
12 This was not correct, since it can be seen from Appendix X, 
that between 1852 and 1881, 48 Chinese had been naturalised 
in New Zealand, the majority of whom were merchants, shop-
keepers and gardeners. What is perhaps more important is the 
fact that there was quite a noted increase in the number 
naturalised from 1882 (26) to 1888 (40) and that the 
occupational range spread considerably to include professional, 
service, mining and labour (see Appendix VIII). 
13 Unfortunately this petition and many others submitted by the 
Chinese community have since disappeared from the New Zealand 
Archives, so the actual text remains unknown. 
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14 Seddon's allegation was the subject of a Supreme Court case 
in 1916. In the case it had been proved that a Chinese man 
had assumed the name of another Chinese man who had previously 
been naturalised in New Zealand and returned to China (NZLR, 
1916:1095-98). The accused obtained his fellow countryman's 
naturalisation certificate and used it to obtain identification 
papers. This, in turn, allowed him to go to Sydney, marry and 
bring his wife back to New Zealand exempt from the poll tax 
and reading test imposed at the time. By 1908, however, 
naturalisation was prohibited to the Chinese in New Zealand, 
which made the establishment of a family even more difficult 
than it had been in 1887. 
15 This inquiry was made pending the landing of the ship Te Anau 
which was to arrive with Chinese settlers early in 1888. Its 
arrival had already led to a mass meeting in Invercargill 
where a member of the House of Representatives, J.G. Ward, 
had stated that 
... the time has arrived when the Anglo Saxon raGe 
of New Zealand should make a stand against an 
invasion of its shores by a host of Mongolian 
barbarians, this meeting pledges itself to boycott 
any person or persons who employ or deal with the 
said race. 
(LT, 7 May 1888) 
The meeting decided to form a vigilante committee to take 
action against the landing of Chinese in conjunction with the 
Dunedin Carpenter's Union if the government did not intervene 
to stop further Chinese immigration (LT, 8 May 1888). However 
the Chinese landed in Dunedin safely although amidst hostile 
crowds (see LT, 9 and 11 May 1888). 
16 There was considerable debate on this point as to whether or 
not naturalisation was transferable from colony to colony. 
Atkinson insisted that it was relevant only to the colony 
where one was naturalised (NZPD, 1888, 60:38). Others, like 
Hutchison, insisted that it was applicable if you were 
naturalised in any British colony. 
17 The Treaty, signed on 12 March 1888 by which China was to 
prohibit Chinese labourers coming to the United States, was 
never ratified, and two other Acts were passed to hasten 
the same result (see Tung, 1974:18-19). 
18 There was considerable expression of fear that Australia would 
increase her restrictions to the point that New Zealand would 
be the only viable place for emigration in the Pacific. 
19 Jervois had actually written to England to outline the 
problem as he saw it in the colonies. He st that 
people in the Australasian colonies were afraid of being 
swamped by Chinese and also afraid of competition from 
Chinese labour. He suggested that the first statement was 
'thoughtlessly and unreasonably proclaimed' and that the 
second was perpetrated by the 'idler sections of the 
working classes' (Fieldhouse, 1956:327-28). He went on to 
add his own opinions of the Chinese, which were largely 
favourable, suggesting that they were disliked for their 
virtues not their vices, and further suggested that 
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' .. . the tropical portion of Australia, or some part of it, 
should be excluded from the operation of the treaty; that 
the territory ... shou1d be opened freely to Chinese 
immigrants; and that it should be placed under Crown Colony 
Government (ibid.). This latter suggestion seems similar 
to that made~Grey in 1879 (see footnote 5). 
20 According to Jervois in a dispatch to London, the number 
entrance to Australia had been 600 ldhouse, 
1956:336). Atkinson, the Premier of New Zealand, had been 
informed by the Premier of Melbourne that at least one ship, 
the had been turned away from Melbourne and was on 
New Zealand ports with sixty-eight Chinese 
immigrants aboard (AJtIR, 1888,A6:3-4). They were refused the 
right to land because the ship had an number of 
Chinese for the tonnage it carried and also because the 
natura1isation papers carried by some Chinese passengers 
were determined to be false (ibid.). The same dispatch told 
of fourteen other Chinese who had been sent back to Hong Kong 
from Sydney without landing. Atkinson had tried to stop the 
boat by contacting the Union Company but was too late (ibid.). 
21 Bruce (Rangatiki) mentioned that the Chinese Ambassador in 
London had, already described colonial slation as 
'exceptional and exceptionable' (NZPD, 1888, 60:33), but 
Seddon insisted that the Chinese commissioners in Australia 
had said that the colonies were eminently suitable for 
emigration (NZPD, 1888,60:35). 
22 While the Council pondered, some sections of the House plotted. 
Seddon, in particular, suggested to the Premier that a measure 
should be introduced through the Appropriation Act, since the 
Council could not amend or throw out an Appropriation Act. 
The Premier, however, declined the suggestion, maintaining 
that the situation would have to be drastic for this avenue 
to be used (Press, 31 July 1888). 
23 Hon. Mr. Oliver (Otago) was assigned the task of attending 
the conference, but due to some 'urgent business' in New Zealand 
Mr. Oliver missed three connections and at least two boats 
going to Sydney. When he did leave, he ended up in Melbourne 
and then had to travel to Sydney. Seddon, who inquired as to 
the whereabouts of Mr. Oliver, was extremely distressed by 
this situation (NZPD, 1.888, 61:200). 
24 For the resolutions proposed, see AJtIR, 1888, A-6:l1. 
25 See Parkes' cablegram to the Secretary of State in 
AJHR 1888, A-6:l0-ll. 
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26 Scholefield and Hall present a different version of this Act 
with several additional provisions which include a £100 fine 
for ships with an excess of Chinese on board; Chinese men of 
war exempted and that the Act would be in force for one year 
(Scholefield and Hall, 1927:8). 
27 In 1890 the Liberals took power and according to Lipson this 
provided the fundamental shift in the role of the state. For 
the following two decades the state increasingly fulfilled a 
more prominent place in shaping New Zealand's future. 
According to Lipson, the state was to determine what benefits 
would be shared and how they would be distributed, and 
consequently" ... as many persons as possib-le would be brought 
into direct economic dependence upon governmental machinery ... " 
which the Liberal party could control (Lipson, 1949:198). 
Liberal politicians, unlike previous participants, were of 
the lower middle class and even some workingmen, and their 
supporters were the previously unrepresented urban and rural 
proletariat (see Lipson, 1949:198 and 221). 
28 The driver of the t ruck was taken away, and the labourer who 
assaulted Mr. Lee Long was also arrested. The police charged 
the labourer with assault, and despite the fact that Lee Long 
had stabbed the man in self-defence, he got six weeks hard 
labour. The judge received support for his action in the 
New Zealand Times, a pro-Liberal paper (ibid.). 
29 This bill received wide publicity and was fairly well ridiculed, 
but it is interesting to note that the following year Reeves 
(Minister of Labour) said that the bill had been brought forward 
only to familiarise the public with the issues and was not meant 
to be pushed through. Because of this, he maintained that the 
'crudities and mistakes' in it were acceptable (NZPD, 1895, 
89:278). 
30 Russell (Riccarton) had ordered that a return showing the 
number of Chinese who had arrived in and departed from New 
Zealand in the years 1886-1894 be laid before the House. It 
showed that. 1,196 had arrived, 1,420 departed and 251 died in 
the colony. Out of the arrivals, 663 paid the poll tax, 533 
were exempt (AJHR, 1894, H-2l). 
31 All bills that had anything to do with labour went to this 
committee. 
32 In 1894, 170 Chinese had left New Zealand, and Reeves estimated 
that they had taken ~4,000 with them. Collins (Christchurch) 
thought Reeves' estimate was too low and suggested that ~200 to 
~OO was much more likely, based on the fact that fifteen 
Chinese who left on the Catterthurn which was wrecked, had a 
total of is,800 worth of gold with them (NZPD,1895,89:363). 
Collins does not acknowledge the fact that Chinese invariably 
took home money for friends and relatives, so estimates of 
individual income are meaningless. It is interesting to note, 
however, that the amount required before Chinese would leave New 
Zealand had inflated from ;£'50 or £100 up to boo. Reeves failed 
to note that the Chinese had already contributed fJl,360 to the 
Consolidated Account (see Appendix IX). 
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33 The Wellington Anti-Chinese League was started at a combined 
meeting of the Trades and Labour Council with the newly organised 
United Furnishing Trade Union in September 1894 (see NZT, 
1 September 1894). The Christchurch version was started in June 
1895 (see NZT, 8 ,June 1895) stimulated, like Wellington 
counterpart by the active agitation of people like the Han. W.P. 
Reeves and a member of the House Mr. G.J. Smith at a public 
in April 1895 (see Press, 25 April 1895). The rules of 
the Christchurch branch (see below) brought together the concerns 
by different interest groups opposed to the Chinese 
page 191): 
To educate public oplnlon, to assist in all social 
movements and support all legislative efforts in 
direction of restricting the Chinese and other un 
desirable competitors in the Colony's labour markets 
by raising the pall-tax on Chinese to at least £100, 
by enforcing the inspection of premises occupied by 
Chinese and other Asiatics, by urging the Government 
to refuse mail subsidies to any steamer or other 
vessel carrying, as a whole or part of the crew, any 
atic, Lascar or Kanaka; by the members pledging 
themselves and inducing others not to deal with any 
Asiatic grower and vendor of any marketable products 
or with any European retailer who supplies such 
products, or with any trader who sells, or causes to 
be SOld, any goods, except such as could not be made 
by our own workers, manufactured or produced by 
Chinese and other allied races. 
(NZT, 8 June 1895) 
34 The petition was not the only activity of the Anti-Chinese 
It haq also been involved in trying to the 
Wellington city council to restrict Chinese to residence in 
certain c areas (NZT, 15 August 1895), and having led 
in this turned to attempt the undermining of the Chinese market 
garden-hawker-fruit shop network in the city, by asking the Works 
Committee of the Wellington City Council to organise a fruit, 
fish, vegetable and flower market to replace the free market 
already operating (NZT, 24 September 1895). The move was made in 
conjunction with the Hutt Farmer's Association and the Fruiterer's 
Association and was intended to erradicate the hawking 
and encourage European consumers to buy direct from the market 
rather than through their Chinese retailers (NZT, 27 September, 
1895). Although the market was not formed, despite recelvlng 
Council approval, public moves were activated along similar lines. 
In a Wellington suburb 200 families boycotted their local 
vegetable hawker, in Auckland the Chinese fruiterers had been 
excluded from the business and in Christchurch the vegetable 
auction was refusing vegetables to a newly arrived Chinese 
fruiterer Ie 5 October 1895). 
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35 In March 1895 Shrimski's efforts on behalf of the Chinese were 
to be reciprocated in part with the presentation of a silver 
tea and coffee service by the Chinese residents of North Road, 
Dunedin. The presentation was made by Mr. W. Ah Tong, who 
noted the hi gh es teem accorded t·o Mr. Shrimski by the Chinese 
community for his past and current work on their behalf. The 
contemporary reference was to his work in the lative 
Council in supporting the rights of the Chinese as 'strangers 
in a strange land' (New Zealand Mail, 15 March 1895). 
36 Petition no longer extant. 
37 Sir Robert Stout held office in the Anti-Chinese and was 
also the attorney for a Round Hi11 syndicate which 
employed Chinese labour, since he had 'drawn up the contract. 
Apparently Stout's partner had to make sure that the Chinese were 
hastily removed from the job. Seddon had discovered this and 
used to attack Stout (NZT, 4 April 1896). 
38 In 1895 Reeves, one of Seddon's "ablest Cabinet co11eagues" 
according to Lipson (1948:208), was appointed as Agent Generalfor 
New Zealand and left for London. Reeves' absence from New 
Zealand led to the decline of the We11ington Anti -Asiatic 
(see Willis, 1974:40-41). According to Willis, Reeves, 
in league with the New Zealand Times (of which he was a director 
see O'Connor, 1922:33) and the Anti-Asiatic League, attempted 
to enlist the support of the middle class, who had been 
essentially sympathetic to the Chinese. However, Reeves, while 
successful in getting six labour bills passed in 1894, led 
to get any immigration bi11s through, which led fina11y to the 
demise of the Anti-Asiatic League (see Sutch, 1969:124-25). 
According to the New Zealand Times, the League was in debt for 
£109.6.00 by February 1896 (NZT, 11 February 1896). 
39 The Governor could reserve a bill that was 'inconsistent with 
obligations imposed on us by treaty' or prejudiced 'the 
and shipping of the United Kingdom' or finally a bill which had 
not already received assent (New Zealand Gazette 1892, 57:1026). 
40 The outcome of this was that petitions from foreign powers or 
local. minorities affected by New Zealand legislation had presumably 
to be addressed to the Home Government. As already noted, the 
Chinese had taken their chances and appealed to the sl 
Council, but in 1896 they sent two petitions directly to the 
Governor, which were consequently forwarded to the Colonial 
after comments had been added by the Premier (see 
C/O 209/256,Nos. 47, 48 and 60, Glasgow to Chamberlain, 21 
December 1896). Similarly, one notes that the Chinese and 
governments both approached the British government about 
immigration matters (see AJHR, 1891, A-2:7-8, AJHR, 1892, 
A-l:4-5) for Chinese Consular activity and O'Connor, 1972:55 
the Japanese reaction to the 1896 Bill). 
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41 The Liberals had managed to get twelve Councillors appointed 
to the conservative Council through an appeal to the Colonial 
Office, and by 1899 Seddon succeeded in constructing an 
entirely pro-Liberal Council (see Lipson, 1948:357). 
42 In 1895 Japan had defeated China after a clash of their naval 
fleets in September 1894 over Korea, which was a humiliating 
event for China and for the Chinese in New Zealand. Don's 
tour report in 1893-94 was filled in large part with questions 
about the war, and many of the Chinese he visited were enraged 
at the thought "of the Great Chinese Empire yielding to the 
Dwarfs" (Tour, 1893-94:17). 
43 Seddon had already taken the iniative upon himself to stop 
the Customs Officers from issuing naturalisation certificates 
and restricted the right to the Colonial Secretary or the 
Commissioner of Customs (NZPD, 1896, 82:470). This was also 
the subject of a petition from the Chinese community to the 
Governor in 1896 (see Chapter 6, p. 292). Seddon responded to 
the Governor over the petition asserting the following in 
regard to naturalisation: 
The statement made by the petitioners that it is 
proposed to make it unlawful to grant letters of 
naturalisation to Chinese is quite correct. In 
taking this course, the New Zealand Legislature is 
undertaking that which has been in force in New 
South Wales for several years, and there is nothing 
in the legislation just passed which is either 
exceptional, cruel, or unjust. To preserve the 
purity of race by restricting the increase of 
Chinese is considered of paramount importance. 
(C.O. 209/256,17/767) 
The legislation referred to is the Asiatic Restriction Bill 
No. 2 which was sent to England for Royal Assent without the 
Governor's signature. Obviously Seddon had terminated the 
right to naturalisation without waiting for Assent. 
44 This petition had been presented to the Council by Rigg 
(Wellington) before the second reading (NZPD, 1896, 94:426). 
45 In this connection, Mr. Williams noted that Mr. Chang Luke, 
assisted by several members of the Christian Endeavour Society 
were already providing Bible classes to some of the local 
community (NZPD, 1896, 94:429). 
46 The protest was signed by eleven members including Bowen 
(Canterbury), Bonar (Westland), Shrimski (Otago), Reynolds 
(Otago),Whitmore (Hawkes Bay), Taiaroa (Otago), Williams 
(Auckland),Holmes (Otago),Scotland (Taranaki), Captain Baillie 
(Marlborough) and Barnicoat (Nelson). 
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47 There is some hint of support for this view in an article by 
Gowen where he is discussing the relationship between the 
Dominions and Britain during the 1911 conference and the 
Alliance with Japan which spanned two decades. Gowan suggests 
that there was a clear intent on the part of the colonies to 
be self-governing and to be aggressive racialists. The colonies 
, ... had erected immigration walls impassable to Japanese and 
other Asians on the assumption that Britain would forever rule 
the waves' (Gowan, 1980:386). When Britain made the treaty 
with Japan which had clearly shown its superiority in defeating 
the Russian fleet in 1905, the Pacific Dominions felt abandoned. 
It was in Britain's interest to have Japanese power in the 
Pacific while its own forces attended to Germany, but it was 
not in the interest of the colonies to be put in this 
position. Gowen adds the comment, however, that unlike Australia, 
New Zealand was more realistic about her defence capabilities and 
was prepared to side with the notion of Imperial defence rather 
than expect to be independent (Gowan, 1980:385-413). Similarly, 
, in Democracy in New Zealand, quotes Charles Dilke 
who stated "To the colonies the Chinese question to 
present itself in a very different aspect from that in which it 
is viewed by us at home; and it is difficult to induce the men 
of the colonial lower middle or working classes, dependent upon 
labour or trade for maintenance, to take what we shall call a 
broad international view of Chinese immigration" (quoted in 
, 1914:225 
48 The act had neglected to make exceptions for merchants and 
tourists as was the case with the Australian acts. 
49 This return dispatch became the centre of some controversy as 
it was requested to be laid on the table at least three times 
without any results. Walker had been requested to produce it, 
but the first time he forgot to ask the government for it and 
on the second time maintained that' .. . the dispatch was simply 
a formal acknowledgement of a certain letter' (NZPD, 1897, 
100:760). On the third request, which actually went to the 
Government, the response was that the Council had all the 
information they needed (ibid. :873). Because of this 
situation, the Council killed the new Asiatic Restriction Bill 
for the Session even though it embodied suggestions acceptable 
to the ,Council. 
50 The Natal Immigration Restriction Act of 1897 required a 
literacy test in any European language before admission (see 
Choi, 1975:27). 
51 There is a curious anomaly here. The Scholefield and Hall 
article suggests that the 1897 bill complied with the Natal Act, 
but the Colonial Office dispatch (to inform the same of the Bill) 
suggests that it did not follow the Natal Act (see Fieldhouse, 
1956:343, C/O 209/257 NZ No. 1967). This second view is also 
supported by the exchange between Chamberlain and Ranfurly, in 
which Ranfurly eventually stated he had convinced Seddon to 
comply with the Natal Act (Kay, 1973:40) and also the C.O. 
minutes which contain instructions that the Governor be 
given a "confidential hint" to get New Zealand to adopt the 
Natal Act (Fieldhouse, 1956:343). 
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52 This version tends to disagree with the actual of 
events outlined in the material attached to the petition which 
Fook On made to the Government through his lawyers, Brandon and 
Hislop. Apparently, Fook On had tried to avoid the tlOO 
payment to the shipping company in China by proving that the 
person he was actually bringing to New Zealand was his wife. 
The lawyers found that there was no provision in the Act to 
sue a Certificate which would absolve the shipping company 
of risk. Fook On paid the boo, and then Brandon and Hislop 
attempted to get it refunded by the Crown Law Offices on the 
grounds that under the Naturalisation Act 1870, Section 10, 
Sub-Section (I), a married woman is decreed to be a subject of 
the state of which her husband is for the time being a subject. 
They further got a declaration from a Chinese missionary, 
Reverend Cheok Hong Chong, that Fook On's marriage was 
legi timate in Chinese law. The Crown Law Office in response 
merely suggested that Brandon arid Hislop had the wrong :Act and 
referred them to the Aliens Act of 1880 Section (14), which 
declared that any alien woman married to a naturalised person 
be deemed to be herself naturalised, but in this case, they 
insisted one could not accept the marriage from a country where 
polygamy was accepted. 
53 It is interesting to note that the Act made specific reference 
to the Asiatic Restriction Act, which it noted, did not receive 
Her Majesty's assent and had never been in effect in the colony. 
The Council presumably saw this as a direct attack on them at 
least the non-Seddon appointees - and had the clause deleted 
(NZPD, 1899, 107:91). 
54 One of the roles of the agent was to procure access to Crown 
Lands for the Chinese, which according to the report could 
take a long time and cost the Chinese claim-seeker as much as £60. 
(AJHR, 1898, 19:85). 
55 Two Chinese witnesses who were called, Joe Tie and Hoe Gett, 
knew Seddon well since they were interpreters and had been on 
the coast eighteen and eleven years respectively before moving 
to Wellington, where they had become shop-keepers (ibid. :82-83). 
56 He used the example of Syrians who had come to New Zealand and 
who, in his opinion, had come only so that they could engage 
in business malpractice (ibid. :383). 
57 There had been a similar approach in 1891 (from China) and in 
1900 (from the New Zealand Chinese), the latter of which fails 
to be mentioned in any government document (see Chapter 6). 
58 It is hard to ascertain whether the notion of 'self government' 
is used to refer to freedom from domination by internal 
sectional economic interests or freedom from Imperial control (see 
Burdon, 1955:305). On this issue it seems to have been used in 
both senses. More precisely, it is clear that 'self-government', 
correct economic policy and Imperial relations are inextricably 
linked together although not perceived as such by economic 
(e.g., Rand mines). Clearly 'responsible self-
government' was for whites only. 
59 The electorate of Ohinemuri had one Chinese resident In 
the period 1905-07. 
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60 There were three sets of figures quoted in the House concerning 
Chinese immigration. One came from the New Zealand Year Book, 
another from a letter sent by the Attorney General to Moss which 
confirmed the figures that Rigg had presented in the Council, 
and finally those of the Commissioner of Customs. All three 
sets vary in accordance with their respective intention. 
61 Mills made one final attempt to clear up the statistics by 
presenting up-to-date figures on Chinese immigration that 
covered a period he called 'for some years'. In the period, 
56:~ Chinese arrived, 330 paid poll tax and 232 were returning to 
Ne\v Zealand, while departures for the same period were 849 (NZPD, 
1905, 134 :619). Moss I s last effort was to try to catch Mills 
out some time later by inquiring as to the status of twenty-
se'/en Chinese arriving in We llington by boat from Sydney. Mi 11 s 
calmly responded that ten were in fact returning (NZPD, 1905, 134: 
828) . 
62 The evidence used to support the contentions about mixed 
marriage came entirely from reports that appeared in newspapers 
in Chicago and San Francisco. 
63 It is interesting to notE' that the anti-Chinese movement in this 
period, excluding the ca~.es of Masterton and Palmerston North, 
se'8med to have been engineered and organised by government, which 
is to some degree, analogous to the 1894-1895 situation except 
for the absence of Trade~; and Labour involvement. This leads 
one to speculate on the disenchantment felt by the labour movement 
with the Liberal Party which was clearly evident by 1907. 
64 The remaining fourteen rules outline the organisation of the 
League. Unfortunately little is known of its membership or 
longevity. 
65 Apparently civil service regulations required that Lloyd give up 
his job, since his activity was mentioned in the House by 
Malcolm (Clutha), who approved of the man's efforts and hoped 
that he would get his job back on completion of his work for the 
League (NZPD, 1907, 139:82). 
66 See Chapter 6 (page 304) for further information on this visit 
of Mr. Hwang Hou Cheng. 
67 Both Cameron and Lloyd did much to propogate the idea of the 
League by speaking in va:c-ious centres (see NZT, 29 June 1907; 
OCT, 13, 25, July 1907). 
68 It is unclear what happened to this movement of anti-Chinese 
groups and White Race Leagues, since information in the papers 
faded after legislation was introduced by Ward later in the same 
year. 
69 The most consistent argument against raising the poll tax 
stated that the higher the poll tax, the longer the Chinese 
person would have to stay in New Zealand to pay it off and 
the more contrary the situation would be to the interests 
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of New Zealand. As regards the learning of English in China, 
Ward was later to suggest that China would not bother 
educating its "inferior classes" for such a test (NZPD, 1907, 
142:842). 
70 Seven electorates had no Chinese residents: Bay of Islands, 
Franklin, Egmont, Hurunui, Kaipoi, Selwyn and Waitaki. The 
electorates with the predominant number of Chinese were 
Grey - 262; Wellington Central - 191; Tuapeka - 175; 
Westland - 155; Wakatipu - 138; and Dunedin South - 107 
(NZPD, 1907, 142:839). 
71 The Governor finally amended this to allow the Minister of 
Internal Affairs this jurisdiction (NZPD, 1907, 142:1157). This 
move seems to verify the presence of suspicion on the part of 
government about the role of some New Zealand churches, 
particularly the Presbyterian Church, which had acted 
historically as a lobby for Chinese. Its role was already well 
known and now met with concern in some quarters. In June 1907 
Alexander Don, a Presbyterian Minister, had rebuked those who 
wanted to boycott Chinese businesses by suggesting this would 
be tantamount to 850,000 boycotting 2550 Chinese (ODT, 17 June 
1907). In August 1907 Truth attacked the members of various 
churches saying that " ... a number of black-coated clerics ... 
have suddenly come to the conclusion that the much-maligned 
Mongolian is a dear lost brother" (Truth, 10 August 1907). The 
paper maintained that the churches always opposed any national 
movement that spoke for 'progress', 'prosperity', and 
'enlightenment' and would be better employed saving young girls 
who fall under the influence of the Chinese than trying to 
protect the latter (ibid.). After the passage of the bill, 
Truth went so far as-ro-accuse Ward of pandering to the 'black 
coated brigade' (Truth, 23 November 1907). Ward, a Roman Catholic, 
was as far as Truth was concerned, setting a dangerous precedent 
by allowing the church to interfere in politics, especially as 
this would now result in a 'special brand of coloured wowser' 
being permitted to enter New Zealand without restrictions (ibid.). 
72 In the several instances when Maori members have spoken to this 
issue there is a sense in which the comments reflect less the 
racist attitudes of Maoris than the Maoris' impatience with 
pakeha insincerity. On the one hand, the pakehas continued to 
allow Chinese to come to New Zealand and pay the poll tax, while 
at the same time continuing to devise new means of restriction 
(see also page 234). 
73 This is the last petition sent from the New Zealand Chinese 
community in a situation without diplomatic representation. Its 
contents and the establishment of the Consul will be dealt with 
in the next chapter. 
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74 In 1908 the Immigration Restriction Act was also passed, but 
it merely consolidated eight pieces of prior legislation into 
one Act and was not the subject of debate (New Zealand Statutes, 
1908: 711-720) . 
75 The provision required a Chinese who desired to leave New 
Zealand and return to apply for a certificate of registration 
in duplicate with a picture and a thumb print on each. If the 
Collector of Customs was unsure as to identity then he could 
take a duplicate thumb print and compare them (New Zealand 
Gazette, 26 November 1908:2996). 
The requirement of fingerprinting before entry to and departure 
from New Zealand, however, had been required of the Chinese 
since 1900 (Circular Memo 64; Department of Trade and Customs, 
15 May 1900) and was formalised even more in Circular 350, 1904 
entitled 'Instructions for Taking and Comparing Finger 
Impressions of Chinese Entering and Leaving New Zealand'. In a 
memo to the Colonial Office from the Foreign Office it was 
suggested that the finger-print requirement be abandoned for 
Chinese of good standing who were well known, educated and with 
property. This situation, according to the memo prevailed in 
the Transvaal (C/O 209/257, 12 January 1909). However, there 
was no objection by India or China, so the Act was accepted as 
originally proposed (C/O 209/257, 27 January 1909). 
76 Even this provision was to cause problems. In Lum v Attorney 
General 1919, a Chinese man requested a judgement on the status 
of his six children should he and his wife return with them to 
China. Neither Lum nor his wife, Chu Ag Nui, were naturalised, 
but they had both lived in New Zealand prior to 1905, when they 
were married. Under the provisions of the 1908 Act and later 
amendments, it was feared that the children, should they remain 
away from New Zealand more than four years, would have to pay 
poll tax and pass the reading test prior to re-entry. The 
judgement of the court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, and it 
was deemed that the children were and would remain British 
subjects and were entitled to the same exemptions as Chinese 
naturalised in New Zealand, which was a provision of the 1908 Act 
(NZLR, 1919:741-753). Clearly, since naturalisation was 
unavailable to the Chinese after 1908, the only possibility 
of conferring similar rights on family members was to make sure 
they were born in New Zealand. 
77 This move remains unexplained,although one can speculate on a 
number of reasons that a Minister might give to support it. For 
instance, the problem of naturalised Chinese marrying and 
expecting to bring his wife to New Zealand as a naturalised person 
and thus avoid immigration restrictions could only be overcome 
by refusing to accept the legitimacy of Chinese marriage (see 
case of Fook On in 1897, page 213). Alternatively, if naturalised 
Chinese had children, they were, under the existing legislation 
(Aliens Act Amendment 1892), legitimately naturalised by right. 
While legitimate reasons may exist for this decision, there is 
some questions as to its legality. Under previous legislation 
dealing with naturalisation, it was the Governor alone who had the 
power to decide on individual cases, yet this prohibition applied 
to a whole category of people. In this way, Cabinet had fettered 
the discretionary power of the Governor as it applied to individual 
cases by passing a broad policy. One legal opinion has suggested 
that this move, while appearing to be ultra vires, was probably 
unintentional, since they would not have been aware of statute law. 
However. one cannot but notice the effect on the Governor's Dowers. 
78 The initial approach by the Chinese legation, according to 
Colonial Office correspondence was to have been direct to 
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the New Zealand government through the Chinese Consul General 
then in New Zealand. The Colonial Office received notice of 
the note and maintained that this was inappropriate but said 
it was for the Foreign Office to object (C/O 209, NZ 28930, 
24 August 1909). This resulted in the Chinese Ambassador re-
writing the note in London, deleting all reference to the Consul 
General and sending it to the Secretary of State (ibid.). 
79 America had made such provisions by Treaty in 1881; Canada by an 
Act in 1885, and Australia between 1901 and 1906. Australia in 
fact, made separate provisions for each category of immigrant. 
80 The objection to fingerprinting was ignored by the legislation 
and was only dealt with in 1920 after more drastic protest by 
the Chinese Consul. 
81 Harrassment of Chinese shops actually occurred at three 
different times, 26 February, 9 March and 16 March,-and in all 
three cases Europeans were arrested (see LT on appropriate dates). 
82 It is curious that Hwang responded to this situation since 
according to other information he had already been appointed as 
Consul General in Australia in 1911. One must assume that he 
remained in New Zealand and continued to act in his capacity 
as Consul despite the appointment of T.H. Shah as Acting Consul 
(see Chapter 7, page 326). 
83 This meeting had the backing of the Metal Workers Union and the 
freezing workers, who had proposed a boycott on 8 March 
(LT,9 March 1912). On 22 March the Canterbury Drivers Union 
also supported the cause (LT, 22 March 1912). 
84 In the period from 1911 to 1921 the Chinese population in 
Auckland province increased from 419 to 867, and in the first 
three months of 1920, 217 Chinese arrived in Auckland of whom 
10 were women (ODT, 9 April 1920). In the same period (1911-1921) 
the Chinese population in Wellington Province increased from 753 
to 1135. The percentage of Chinese in the North Island had 
increased from 52.85% of the total Chinese population in 1911 to 
77% in 1921. 
85 Quick March is hereafter abbreviated to QM. 
86 The prototype for this had been rehearsed in 1914, an election 
year, when the Reform Party Handbook for Candidates listed the 
Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill as one of their 
accomplishments. As O'Connor points out, the bill had not in 
fact been passed, but Massey had already consulted the Imperial 
government (O'Connor, 1968:49-50). The Secretary of State 
responded with the advice that if New Zealand could emulate 
the South African and Australian legislative equivalents 
without publicising the grounds of exclusion all would be well. 
The secret of this, according to the correspondence, was to 
allow full power to the Minister or Customs Officer concerned 
to approve or bar admission (ibid.). 
87 Timaru in 1921 had a Chinese population of sixteen. 
88 The RSA, in its concern over infringement of the Shop's Act, 
invited the Inspector of Factories to one of its meetings. 
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Mr. Arnold, the Inspector, assured them that neither Europeans 
nor Chinese had broken the law as far as he knew, and as it stood 
fruit and vegetable shops could stay open as long as they liked 
provided they sold only produce. If they sold silk or tobacco 
as alleged, he would be willing to take the case to court 
(Timaru Herald, 19 April 1920). 
89 On 11 June the Timaru Herald reported that against three 
men had been laid regarding the incident in front of the Chinese 
shops and that one was dismissed while the decision on the 
remaining two was reserved (Timaru Herald, 11 June 1920). 
90 In 1892 a similar accusation had been made in Auckland, where 
the Charitable Board was accused of contracting with a Chinese 
grower for the supply of vegetables to a.local hospital. In this 
case the Knights of Labour investigated this and another 
accusation that the Chinese were supplying the Union Steamship 
Company. The latter case was proven true, but the former was 
proved false (LT, 22 August 1892). No action seems to have been 
taken in regard to the Steamship Company contract. 
91 Coates did not mention, however, that Messrs Johnson and Cooper 
had received state aid to establish a business and furthermore 
had been supplying the hospital for three months (QM, 10 August 
1920). 
92 This was the first piece of immigration legislation in New 
Zealand to be formulated by a civil servant. According to 
Sir Francis Bell: 
The suggestion of this method of controlling the 
immigration of foreigners was due to the genius,the 
work, and the wisdom of the then Chief of Customs, Mr 
Montgomery. 
(Downie Stewart, 1937:297) 
93· Massey in his reply to Lin Shih-yuan stated that had not made, 
and indeed could not make, any promise to circulate the 
legislation before it was sent/to the government. Massey 
further denied that the 1920 bill singled out the Chinese for 
exclusion and stated that it provided the means for one to 
visit the country for the purposes of pleasure, business or 
health. He also accused the Consul of using 'unusual' language 
in his letter which he obviously deemed unjustified 
eMs 985/1/44, 16 August 1920). 
94 These are very reminiscent of the suggestion made by the 
Chinese Minister in response to the passing of the 1907 and 1909 
immigration restrictions (see pp. 234-36 and Appendix X). 
95 This had been established at the Imperial War Conference of 
1917, where it was agreed that 
It is an inherent function of the Governments of the 
several communities of the British Commonwealth, 
including India, that each should enjoy complete 
control of its own population by means of restriction 
of immigration from any other communities. 
(NZPD, 1920, 187:905) 
96 Informants have confirmed that arrivals unable to pass the 
test were allowed to stay for a period in which they 
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usually received intensive coaching from local bilingual 
Chinese in order that they could pass the test. Yue Jackson, 
in particular, a person attached to the Consulate, and 
bilingual, was of considerable help. 
97 Canada was the only other Dominion that maintained the poll tax, 
and even there merchants and their wives and children were exempt. 
98 Downie Stewart had ascertained from the Chinese Consul, Lin 
Shih-yuan, that Canada had initiated negotiations with the 
Chinese government to establish a situation where the poll tax 
would be discontinued and the accumulated revenue would be 
turned into scholarships for fifty Chinese students to study 
in Canadian schools and universities each year. The agreement 
would also establish a quota of 500 Chinese immigrants per 
year (NZPD, 1920, 187:911). Stewart does not however, add 
the information from the Consul that the scheme was turned down 
by the Chinese government who considered it a case of adding 
'insult to injury' considering the source of the money 
(Ms. 985/1/44,3 September 1920). 
99 Ponton points out that New Zealand was not alone in allotting 
this amount of power over immigration to a Minister of Customs. 
In Britain, the Secretary of State had been given power over 
aliens in 1920. Similarly, the Minister of Immigration in 
Australia and the Boards of Immigration in South Africa had 
identical ,powers (Ponton, 1946:63). 
100 O'Connor points out that the original draft contained a 
statement that even though Chinese were in possession of a 
permit they would still be prohibited immigrants. Jellicoe 
had this rectified (O'Connor, 1968:64). 
101 In 1926 the Cabinet decision was rescinded to appease public 
protest (Ponton, 1946:68). According to Ponton, on 26 June 1926 
Cabinet decided that no further Chinese were to be admitted 
except wives and fiancees of New Zealand-born residents (ibid.). 
Ponton approved of this, even in 1946, when he added that the 
Chinese were a 'prolific race' and that it was better to 
restrict numbers than try and control morality (ibid.). 
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102 The important point here is that Ponton's arrivals are in 
excess of permits issued, so one would assume this includes 
returning residents, but the Census and Statistics 
suggest that the returning residents in this period exceed 
permits arrivals by 2,485 (see Appendix XII and Appendix XIII), 
and not the 52 people from Ponton's table. 
103 Hall's 1927 article documented the excesses in legis 
and economic discrimination in regard to Asiatic immigration 
and particularly what he called an 'excessive' racial 
consciousness' which he viewed as a 'mass problem' in New 
Zealand (Hall, 1927:228-238). For his clear thinking, Hall 
received sharp reaction especially in the local papers of 
Taranaki, Wanganui and Westport (Ponton, 1946:72). 
104 Even the policy over extensions seems to have been variable. 
Extant poll tax records indicate that in at least one case a 
Chinese doctor was able to get his permit extended from 1924 
till 1928 after the government received a petition from a 
large number of the Chinese community. It was also noted 
in the same records that it was legitimate for permits to be 
extended from several months to several years (Poll Tax Records, 
Department of Labour). Ponton maintains, however, that the 
policy of extending permits was changed in February 1927 to 
limit the period to two years (see New Zealand Gazette 10, 
24 February 1927). 
105 It will be noted here that the figure of 706 obtained from the 
Census and Statistics report to Internal Affairs is markedly 
from the decline in population reported in the Census 
of 431. 
106 This change in immigration pattern will be dealt with in the 
next chapter, but it suffices here to suggest that these 
and the observation by the Herald about mothers and children 
returning to China for economic reasons seems to relate to the 
depression which was felt to be more easily tolerated by local 
Chinese without having to maintain a large family in New Zealand. 
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PART III 
284. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE NEW ZEALAND PETITIONS: 1880-1908 
By the 1920s, a community of a little over 3,000 Chinese 
survived in New Zealand, despite a continual barrage of immigration 
restrictions, waves of anti-Chinese fervour, periods of buoyancy" and 
depression in the New Zealand economy the discontinuation of the 
right to naturalisation, exclusion from welfare provisions and the 
uncertainties resulting from substantial changes in their homeland, 
Coincident with this survival, however, was the purposeful development 
of internal organisation (a segmentary structure) which attempted to 
respond to the various pressures facing the Chinese community. The 
organisations that made up this segmentary structure had a political 
function in that they can be seen to allocate and legitimate power 
and authority in the Chinese community. This segmentary system and 
its organisations developed for three reasons: a) continual formal 
and informal pressure from New Zealand society which threatened the 
socio-economic survival of the community; b) external pressure 
resulting from changes in China,mediated through the role of the 
Consulate, which variously affected New Zealand and the Chinese 
community; and, c) the articulation of interests resulting from a) and 
b), which produced sufficient tension in the community to necessitate 
at times a reformulation of the segmentary structure. This 
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segmentary system co-ordinated decision-making, administration, 
authority, power and provided sanctions, but it also, and more 
importantly, could be the basis of either fragmentation or cohesion 
within the community. These polar alternatives implicit in the nature 
of a segmentary system provide the dynamic nature of the Chinese 
community, which gradually moved into a cycle alternating between 
cohesion and fragmentation. 
The purpose of the next three chapters, therefore, is to 
continue the history of the Chinese community more from the perspective 
of the organisations which evolved and formed the segmentary structure. 
At this point (1880-1907), however, three significant changes 
occurred which set the parameters for future development in the 
Chinese community. 
First,) immigration restriction and the added disabilities that 
affected the maintenance of business and the establishment of family 
were met with protest, which largely took the form of petitions to 
the government, countering the sojourner stereotype attached to the 
Chinese by Europeans. Similarly, unjust treatment,whether by 
individuals before the courts or by the public, was increasingly 
confronted. 
Second, the economic base in the gold fields was supplanted by 
the other activities once adjunct to the mining and now moved to new 
locations throughout New Zealand. Whereas disenchanted and old miners 
had often turned to gardening and retailing, it was now taken up by a 
somewhat younger generation. The new economic base, like the mining, 
was dependent on Chinese labour, but unlike its counterpart in the 
gold fields, it now depended almost entirely on a European clientele. 
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It was this business, often allied to market gardening, that formed 
the base of a new social structure reminiscent of the mining 
community and mining group. It recruited new members from overseas, 
provided both food and income and a job with more security than 
mining. 
Finally, the community responded to changes in China. A 
consulate was established in Wellington, the intended consequence of 
local Chinese action and the unintended consequence of the New 
Zealand government's fervour for exclusion. The presence of a 
consul, however, had its own consequences, for after his arrival, the 
New Zealand government had an informant - a person who was as close 
to the Chinese community and China as he was to the New Zealand 
government. The Chinese community, on the other hand, had an advocate 
who presumably could be called upon to support their interests (see 
Chapter 7, pp.357-60)and a person who increasingly represented the 
national concerns of China to the overseas community. In this latter 
capacity the consul has been described alternatively by informants as 
merely a facilitator or figurehead of organisational development within 
the community or, on the other hand, as the catalyst responsible for 
its initiation. 
The task of the next three chapters then is to unravel the 
social and political structure as it developed in the Chinese community 
while at the same time relating it to the social context in which it 
occurred, remembering the concluding assumptions of the last chapter 
that both events in China and New Zealand helped create and direct the 
socio-political structure of the Chinese community. 
The first chapter covers a period from the late l880s till 1907, 
.. 
characterised by numerous attempts on the part of government to restrict 
Chinese immigration. This legislative activity coincided with a 
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Chinese community that was re-organising both its residence and 
occupational structure, and the result was an attempt by some in the 
Chinese community to represent their countrymen in trying either to 
reduce or halt legislation, to obtain legitimate representation to 
the New Zealand government and at the very least to change their 
stereotype profile as far as European New Zealand was concerned. 
The action was, therefore, a reaction to the New Zealand government 
and directed at this same body. The socio-po1itica1 structure that 
emerged was a merchant/missionary alliance, which formulated, with 
the help of co-opted others, a series of petitions aimed at the above 
mentioned objectives, and despatched them to the House of 
Representatives, the Prime Minister, the Governor and finally the 
Colonial Office in England. 
The second chapter covers the period from 1908 till 1935. It 
begins with the arrival of a particularly dynamic and vocal consul 
who spoke on behalf of the local Chinese. However, while the consul 
in fact assumed the responsibilities of those who had previously 
organised the petitions, he also had to cope with another parameter 
of socio-politica1 organisation within the Chinese community which 
reflected changing events in China. The emergence of Klang Yu-wei 
and Sun Yat-sen, representing two alternative directions for China, 
divided the overseas community into two factions. The Consul saw 
this as counter-productive and established a Chong Wah Wui Koon 
(Chinese Association), a non-political organisation dedicated to 
preventing political feuds and arguments. The action was initially 
successful, but it centred largely on Wellington as time went on and 
was eventually unable to cope with the influence of post-revolutionary 
changes in China and another wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in New 
Zealand. The community-oriented Chong Wah Wui Koon became obsolete 
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in the 1920s with the wave of enthusiasm amongst overseas Chinese 
for the KMT, which was organised nationally in New Zealand with 
local voluntary branches. This was only one half of a response, 
however; the remaining half was the re-emergence of district 
associations, this time more abundant than their gold-fields 
equivalent. These fulfilled the functions of the Chong WahWui 
Koon, caring for the specific interests of district members both 
within the Chinese community and in their dealings with Europeans. 
From the demise of the Chong Wah Wui Koon in the early 1920s 
till 1927 the socio-political organisation was fragmented and 
localised. Local areas celebrated Double Tenth while the locality 
associations and the KMT seem to have been concerned only with the 
internal affairs of their community, unresponsive to the serious. 
threats from the European community, which were left to the Consul. 
However by 1927 the unresolved antagonism between existing political 
factions, the CKT and the KMT, developed into an open dispute in the 
community only to be resolved by the influence of Chiang's success 
and that of the KMT in China. This conflict,plus increasing 
anti-Chinese hostility, .the depression and the virtual exclusion of 
Chinese immigration to New Zealand embodied in the 1920 Act led to 
renewed attempts to bring existing associations together under a 
community organisation. In 1927 another Chong Wah Wui Koon was founded 
with its headquarters in Wellington but also with branches in four 
other centres and it was this organisation that effectively provided 
a united front for the community during the years of the depression. 
For the first time the entire community took on the blatant anti-
Chinese activity represented in actions by certain segments of the 
population. More importantly the Chinese were seen as a community to 
share the experience of the depression without excessive reliance on 
their dominant host society. 
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The third chapter begins in 1935, when the Chinese community, 
having survived the depression becomes increasingly aware of a 
deteriorating situation in China while faced with the continuing 
restriction on immigration to New Zealand. Stimulated by 
nationalism and a felt need to preserve their community in New Zealand 
as well as their family members in China, the New Zealand Chinese 
Association was started, and in 1937 the Anti-Japanese Movement 
Collection Campaign was launched. The association and the collection 
campaign re-organised the Chinese community into bJenty-six regional 
branches incorporating local Chong Wah Wui Koon already in existence 
and acting alongside the various branches of the KMT. Each had an 
executive modelled on the Wellington headquarters and each was in 
charge of its own local collection effort. For a time, district and 
political differences were sublimated to national ideals and support 
of the homeland. The collection was a massive collective effort, 
but it peaked in 1939 and then trailed off to the end of 1944. By 
that time a whole new community of reunited families faced repatriation, 
there were arguments over remaining monies that had not been sent 
to China, and a tendency emerged for local communities to seek a return 
to autonomy away from the aegis of the national association. 
Furthermore, sectional economic'interests emerged, with the Chinese 
Growers Association granted its legitimacy by government to represent 
a large body of the Chinese community spread from Auckland to 
Invercargill. Merchant interests also re-established themselves with 
the return to normal shipping and turned th attentJon with other 
support to capital ing on their homeland's - and later Taiwan's -
post-war development. This post-war development, however, forms the 
basis of the final chapters. 
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The easiest place to pick up the threads of the reconstructed 
social structure after the decline of the gold-fields community is 
with a series of petitions that originated in the Chinese community 
(see Appendix XIV for the complete list). They are important, as 
already noted, because they preceeded the re-development of formal 
community organisation and illustrate the concerns of at least the 
signatories. They also coincided with the growth of anti-Chinese 
legislative activity and in fact almost ceased once diplomatic 
representation was established and more formal organisations appeared 
to represent the interests of the community. 
The first group of petitions presented to the New Zealand 
government emanated from the Auckland Chinese community in 1888 
and 1891. As noted in Chapter 5, there was evidence of a small but 
nevertheless growing community which consisted of twenty-one males 
and three females in 1881 and seventy males and twelve females by 
1891. 1 In 1879 the first Chinese was naturalised in Auckland, 
followed by eight in 1883, five in 1884 and five in 1885. While 
hardly significant alone, these represent 26% of those getting 
naturalised for these years; 75% of all Chinese naturalised in the 
North Island (see Appendix XV). Outside of Dunedin, Auckland 
was the one place with a significant number of Chinese women present 
in the community. 
Both the 1888 petition and the three petitions in 1891 asked 
for amendments to the 1881 Act, which in the interim period had been 
further strengthened. While we know little about the counties 
represented by the petitioners, at least one of the initiators of 
the first 1891 petition was a merchant from Toy San, Seyip. None 
of these petitions received much note, nor were they in any way 
influential enough to sway the government. 
When it was clear that legislative restriction would continue 
the Wellington community filed a lengthy petition to try and 
halt the continued 'oppressive laws' in 1895. The document was 
formulated by eight merchants and signed by 207 of the local 
community. Judging by the total Chinese population in Wellington 
for 1896, 214 males and three females, the petition would seem to 
represent a strong cons ensus. Clearly, a merchant elite had 
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emerged by this time, capable of wielding public opinion, and 
furthermore of summarising the major arguments that had been levelled 
against the Chinese since their arrival in New Zealand. The 
petitioners maintained that the Chinese were eating and dressing like 
Europeans, were moral, kind, provided their own social welfare, 
paid taxes and rent promptly, were law-abiding, did not compete with 
local labour, were clean, produced useful products (fruit and 
vegetables) and bought local products (see Chapter 5,p.198 for Text). 
All of this was contrary to previously expressed opinions and largely 
resulted from an acknowledged change in their economic base with 
the decline in the gold fields. The Chinese population had clearly 
spread throughout New Zealand by 1896, and their profile was much 
more apparent than it had been previously when hidden away in the 
depths of Otago. 
At the same time as the petition denied the accusations of the 
past, it also, like the Auckland petition of 1888, drew the New 
Zealand government's attention to the obligations present in Sino-
British treaty provisions. The document therefore summed up a set of 
internal and external relations for the government, unfortunately 
with little benefit to the petitioners. 
The following year, the Chinese community in Wellington again 
attempted to change their situation, this time directing their 
attention to the Governor, presumably hoping that the petitions would 
reach England rather than end up in the hands of the House. 
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Two petitions were formulated, the first of which reacted to 
the proposed increase in the poll tax and the possible termination 
of the right to naturalisation. The petition was an appeal based on 
the fact that the proposed provisions were 'exception, cruel and 
unjust' particularly if China and New Zealand were to be considered 
friendly nations (Appendix XVI). It was signed by the interpreter 
(the son of John Ah Tong; see Chapter 3), a Chinese missionary 
Chang Luke, and four merchant companies. The second was a more 
elaborate petition sent to the Governor specifically on behalf of 
naturalised Chinese, who, according to the petitioners, were now 
contemplating permanent residence, since they had become used to the 
country, and desired to bring out wives, families and relatives (see 
Appendix XVII). Clearly, the flurry of legislative activity by 
Seddon and the threat to curtail naturalisation rights drastically 
altered the options open to local Chinese residents. In the light 
of this, the Governor and the Crown remained their last resort. 
In the first instance they hoped that the legislation would not 
receive the Governor's assent or failing this, that the Crown would 
overrule colonial legislation on the basis of international treaty 
obligations. 
The Chinese made it clear in the second petition that no 
legitimate inquiry had been set up in New Zealand to prove or disprove 
the accusations against them, and since there was no just reason for 
restricting the legitimate settlement of Chinese families, impediments 
should be removed (see Appendix XVII). The Governor sent both 
petitions to Seddon, who responded in two memoranda. The first, on 
29 September 1896, told the Governor that the Chinese were right, 
naturalisation would be discontinued, justified on the basis of Tace 
purity' and the fact that a similar provision had existed in New South 
Wales for several years (C.O. 209/256, No. 39). Furthermore, the 
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was a domestic matter and there was nothing 'cruel or unjust' 
in the proposed legislation (ibid.). On 29 October, Seddon 
more politely to the second petition, saying that if the petitioners 
were sincere and could prove this to the satisfaction of the 
government, then the Governor could remit their poll tax under the 
provisions of the 1881 Act. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the appeal fell on deaf ears, 
although the Governor, probably favouring the Chinese position or at 
least not supporting Seddon, refused to sign the bill that was sent 
to England. The poll tax was raised, and the naturalisation issue 
remained a mystery. In contrast to the ninety-five Chinese naturalised 
in 1894 (fifty-five were from Wellington out of which thirty-nine 
were shopkeepers, merchants), there were only seventeen naturalised in 
1895 and sixteen in 1896, none of them from Wellington. The 
following year there were none, and between 1898 and 1902 only 
fourteen received naturalisation. As for rights conferred by 
naturalisation, the case of Fook On discussed in the last chapter 
(page 213) showed that the issue, in the end, depended ent lyon 
the legitimacy of Chinese marriage, which was not accepted that 
particular case, although proof was provided. The efforts of 1896 had 
proved anything, that naturalisation in New Zealand was hardly 
worth the cost or effort. If the Chinese had been accused of non-
participation in New Zealand justifiably in the past, it was to 
continue to be the case but not by their own choice. 
Four years later the Wellington community tried another 
petition, attempting to get the New Zealand government to act on their 
behalf in negotiations with China. The petition was addressed to 
Acting Premier J.G. Ward and contained the following text (translated 
from the Chinese): 
We the undersigned natives of China, now resident 
in the city of Wellington, humbly request that you 
will approach the Chinese Government on our behalf. 
On many occasions we have felt the want of a Consul 
or someone belonging to the British race and 
activated by a wish to see justice done to the weak 
and friendless, who could represent us in time of 
trouble or anxiety. Our desire is to be useful 
citizens and law-abiding colonists, but as nearly 
all of us are either unacquainted or very partially 
acquainted with your regulations, we are liable to 
conflict with the authorities and to be prosecuted 
and punished for things that are simply owing to 
our want of knowledge. If we had someone appointed 
by our Government and nominated by yourself or the 
Governor-in-Council, who would take an interest in 
our welfare and help us adapt ourselves to British 
and New Zealand methods, it would be a great 
advantage to us and to colonists with whom we 
earnestly desire to live on the best of terms. We 
therefore pray that, for the reasons set forth, you 
will recommend a Chinese Consul or Protector. 
(E.J. Arnold papers, Turnbull 
Library, MS H-19). 
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The covering letter from Ah Kan and the interpreter stated that 
the Chinese population was about 4,000 (1900)2 and he hoped the 
would 'use his influence' in getting the appointment of the 
.). The letter went on to state that the Chinese Edwin 
Arnold, JP, of Wellington, 'who has taken an interest in our race and 
continues to do so' .). The petition itself was signed by 172 
representing Seyip (Toy San - 63, Sun Wui - 39), Sam Yap (Poon Yu -
37) and Jung Sing - 33, 69% of the Wellington Chinese population. 
We know little of what happened to this petition, although the 
was a diplomatically impossible task for New Zealand, having 
no links with Peking. All such arrangements would have had to go 
through the Colonial Office and the Chinese Embassy in England. The 
important point, however, is the suggestion of a European as an advocate; 
this was to occur again in 1902-03 (see Chapter 5, p. 219) and 
a shrewd, if not last resort, assessment of what kind of 
advocacy would work in the New Zealand context. There have always been 
a small handful of individuals, solicitors, churchmen and women 
and others who have befriended the Chinese and who have been 
accepted for their regard. People like Alexander Don and, later, ~ 
Reverend McNeur of the Presbyterian Church; Brandon and lop, 
Skerrett and Wylie, O'Regan and Dix, all solicitors in Wellington; 
Shrimski in the Legislative Council, Richard Edward Green of 
Christchurch and Peter Fraser, Prime Minister (1940-1949) are all 
remembered at least as benefactors if not for the actual help they 
gave. 
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The petition also represented an abased stance apparent in the 
language used. Compared to the arguments presented previous 
petitions, the use of 'weak and friendless' as justification for their 
and the statement that conflict with authorities stems from 
their misunderstanding of customs, language and law one as far 
less assertive. While it was one thing to negate the stereotypes the 
Chinese had been castigated for in earlier years, in 1900 it was more 
important to solve the problems emerging in the urban areas as 
clientele changed and business required more sophisticated understanding 
of environment, including local by-laws. 
Two years later another petition requesting essentially the 
same provision was organised by one Louis Kitt 3 and signed by 314 
residents of New Zealand. 4 The tone of the petition was 
more assertive and claimed that, since Chinese were carrying on 
operations allover the Colony, it was necessary that the 
Chinese have a representative who could 'conserve their rights 
the law) and interests (in busines 'where, it was claimed 
they were at a disadvantage (NA, LE 1/1903/11; 1903/2053). It was 
with some justification that Chinese now called for a representative 
to 'conserve their rights', for under the Opium Prohibition Act of 
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1901 a constable with any suspicion concerning the use of opium 
could enter Chinese premises without a warrant, (see below page 298-9) , 
Unlike the situtation in the gold fields where Chinese were accorded 
the same protection under the law as all others, in the urban setting 
they found not only that immigration restrictions were made 
specifically for them, but also that other rights were being erroded. 
The signatures collected from twenty-seven towns Table 
8) ented 11% of the 1901 Chinese population resident in New 
Zealand and would have required a visit by Louis Kitt or his deputy 
to ensure this success, 
TABLE 8 
Distribution of signatures for 1903 Petition 
Masterton 25 
Carterton 1 
Grey town 2 
Pahiatua 4 
Petone 1 
Woodville 1 
Waipawa 2 
Tar ada Ie 12 
Napier 5 
Papakura 7 
Hastings 1 
Christchurch 65 
Oamaru 3 
Timaru 9 
Auckland 29 
Gisborne 7 
Dunedin 20 
Lyell 7 
March Creek 3 
Sanding 1 
Flash Creek 3 
Reefton 3 
Kaikata 1 
Greymouth 17 
Martahita 37 
Murchison 1 
Nelson 19 
314 
(NA, LEI, 1903/11; 1903/2053) 
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The diversity of occupations was consistent with the 1901 occupations 
(see Appendix VIII), including market gardeners, storekeepers of 
various types, restaurant owners and hawkers. 5 As noted in the 
previous chapter, the petitions committee passed the petition on to 
the government for favourable consideration. The government did 
nothing untiil Sir J.G. Ward received a letter from the Colonial 
Office stating that the Chinese residents of Wellington had brought to 
their attention the matter of an appointment of a European official 
and had actually sent a copy of the petition to the Colonial Office 
(NA, lA, Chinese Consul, 12 September 1903). In early 1904 Shack 
Horne,6 a signatory to the 1903 petition, wrote directly to the 
Colonial Secretary about the matter and asked what action had been 
taken (NA, Chinese Consul, 8 March 1904). Four days later he received 
a curt reply that the government would take no action (ibid.). 
Between the two aforementioned petitions, however, other activity 
was undertaken by the Chinese community which can only be described 
as an attempt to demonstrate their changed attitude toward two 
'vices' which Europeans had consistently used as evidence against the 
Chinese community. The 'vices' included opium and gambling, and the 
response of at least part of the Chinese community was to initiate 
petitions which asked, firstly, that opium importation be stopped 
and that sale and use be controlled and, secondly, that steps be taken 
for the suppression of gambling. In all, there were eight petitions 
relating to opium and one to gambling. The first, in 1900 
(actually collected in 1899) from Young Hee (a law clerk in Greymouth) 
and 541 others, acknowledged that opium importation was increasing as 
was use by Chinese and some Europeans (NA, LEl/1900/9, No. 211). It 
is admitted the habit-forming nature of opium and the fact that the 
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Chinese were the major consumers of the amount imported. The 
curious factor, the petitions noted, was that the Chinese population 
was declining but that opium importation was increasing towards the 
amount imported the l890s, when the Chinese population was 53% 
larger than in 1900. The petitioners argued that their efforts were 
a continuation those started in 1888 and probably were supported 
by many who had been party to the original attempt sponsored by the 
Dunedin merchants. While it is clear that merchants lent their 
support to the petition, as evidenced by the fifty-seven who signed 
the document, predominarrtlyfrom Dunedin, Greymouth'and Cromwell, the 
legitimation for the government's sake came from the fact that Daniel 
Wong, Chinese Missionary in Greymouth, May Lilly Macfarlane, teacher 
in Hokitika, and Alexander Don of the Presbyterian Mission to the 
Chinese in Otago-Southland witnessed all the signatures. Clearly it 
was the missionary network that provided the basis for its distribution. 
It is therefore curious that there are some rather obvious Chinese 
settlements missing, including Round Hill with a population of 190, 
which Don knew extremely well,7 
In the following year, six similar petitions were circulated 
in other areas of New Zealand, with a total of 180 signatures 
collected,8 Unlike the 1900 petition, which was recommended for 
favourable consideration by the petitions committee, the later ones 
met with the response that the committee had no recommendation to make 
since the matter had already been dealt with by the Opium Prohibition 
Bill. The bill, which in 1901 became an Act, later to be consolidated 
with amendments into the Opium Act 1908, required: 
"Customs permits for each import and each export, and 
the keeping of records of all quantities which any 
person bought or sold in a ledger retained for that 
purpose. It prohibited the smoking of Opium, and 
authorised any constable to enter and search premises 
occupied by Chinese without a warrant if he had any 
reasonable cause to suspect that opium smoking was 
going on or was permitted or abetted in that house 
or in those premises. A search warrant was required 
for premises not occupied by Chinese. 
(Drug Dependency and Drug Abuse in New Zealand, 1970, 
Report No. 14:15.) 
While the above restricted the importation of opium and severely 
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infringed the privacy of the Chinese, it did not restrict the sale of 
the drug to Chinese. This inconsistency was resolved in 1910, when 
the Opium Amendment Act was passed making it unlawful to sell to 
"any person of the Chinese race" any preparation of opium which 
might be made suitable for smoking unless permission had been given 
by a medical practitioner or the Minister of Customs ibid. 114). 
New Zealand's restrictions on opium importation and use were 
in advance of the rest of the world, but some local Chinese were not 
satisfied with the 1901 provisions. In 1904, Louis Kitt, two other 
merchants, the Chinese interpreter from Wellington and the Chinese 
missionary from Greymouth sent two more petitions to government. The 
two problems dealt with separately were opium importation and 
gambling, both of which were decried by the petitioners, and 
requests were made in both cases to tighten restrictions, asking 
that police be granted the right to obtain a search warrant in order 
to search Chinese premises for opium and that more severe penalties 
than fines be imposed for gambling .(NA, LE~904/9.No 21). The 
Public Petitions Committee was motivated to the extent that they 
called witnesses for both issues in the presence of Louis Kitt. The 
major witness was Inspector Ellison, who stated to the committee that 
be thought the claims in the petition about opium were exaggerated 
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and that, contrary to the contention of the petitioners, police 
powers were sufficient and Customs Department efficiency in 
apprehending illegal importation was high (AJHR, 1904, I-lD:2). He 
noted that the petitioners seemed to be ignorant of police search 
powers as regards the Chinese and assured the committee that these 
were being used but also added that the Chinese caught had been found 
to have procured their opium from Wellington chemists and that in 
most cases the fines had been quite severe. 9 
As regards gambling, Ellison stated that it was indeed 
prevalent amongst Chinese allover New Zealand and that it seemed to 
be the only recreation they had (ibid. :2-3). He confirmed the 
presence of the lotteries (paak-kop-piu) as stated by Louis Kitt and 
added that he knew of twenty two of twenty four agents operating in 
Wellington alone which perhaps, he speculated, were connected to 
other centres through the Chinese shops which seemed to have branches 
in many other places (ibid.). The committee seemed quite interested 
in the way the lottery worked and the possible amounts one could win, 
which were identical to Don's description in 1882 (Chapter 4, page 131), 
despite the twenty two years that had elapsed. 
Two other points bear mentioning in regard to gambling. First, 
in giving his evidence Ellison stated that he had no objection to 
gambling within the Chinese community and that in fact their 
propensity for this activity was no greater than Europeans. If it 
was suppressed it might, he suggested, lead to other forms of 'evil' 
(AJHR, 1904, I-lD:3). If anything was wrong with the gambling in this 
context, it was the fact that 'young men, middle-aged men, or old men 
... mingle with the Chinese', and this was 'bad' and in his opinion 
should be a punishable offence (ibid.). Secondly, Ellison noted that 
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the law was 'defective' as regards convictions under the Gaming 
and Lotteries Act 1881. In several cases in 1902 where convictions 
had been made in Magistrate's Courts under this Act, appeals had 
been lodged and convictions quashed. lO In the period 1901 to 1907, 
nine separate gambling cases came before the Supreme Court to appeal 
a Magistrate's Court decision, and in all cases the Chinese appellants 
won their case. While the courts may have supported the Chinese on 
appeal, the petitions from Wellington seem to indicate that the 
profile of a gambling community and the publicity from such cases was 
counter-productive for some of the community. According to most 
informants, the cause of gambling's popularity in the early 1900s, 
and to some extent in the 1930s, was in the first instance urbanisation 
of an ageing population an~ in the second, a result of unemployment in 
the Chinese community. In the period between 1891 and 1921, the 
age distribution in the Chinese population changed as the population 
in the 25 to 45 and 45 to 65 declined in most of the period, wit.h only 
the resurgence of the 25 to 45 category by 1921 (see Appendix XVIII) . 
The 65 and over category, having peaked in 1916, started to decline in 
1921 as a more youthful group took over. The 65 and over men would 
have little to look forward to in places like Wellington, and while 
they may have been able to work in shops, their lack of English and 
vigour would have made it extremely difficult for them to be useful. 
As Don's records show, the absence of family in China or kin in New 
Zealand removed the rationale for much of their activity, and it was 
in the end only necessary to survive. This survival, however, in a 
context that provides no social security, must of necessity become 
the concern of the Chinese community, but they seemed reluctant to 
offer benevolence to deviants, instead opting to inflict more hardship 
on them and make them the wards of the adopted state. 
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In 1907 the last major petition of the Chinese community was 
circulated. This was before the appointment of the Consul but 
coincident with Hwang Hou Cheng's investigation into the conditions 
of Chinese in Australia and New Zealand prior to the appointment of 
C 1 . 11 onsu ar representatlves. Hwang came to New Zealand most 
probably in response to knowledge of Louis Kitt and Shack Horne's 
1903 petition, but the petition in 1907 at the time of the visit makes 
no mention of representation. The petition summarised immigration 
restrictions passed against the Chinese; described their occupations 
and general characteristics, and suggested that the 1907 bill make 
it impossible to come to New Zealand in the first place or, for th~t 
matter, to re-enter New Zealand after an absence. The general tone 
was one that reflected the interests ofa settled population that 
wanted to become permanent residents, replenish their own community 
and have the right to come back to New Zealand if they should leave 
to visit home. Land ownership, naturalisation, hard work, payment 
of poll tax, minor offending and a decreasing population were the 
justifications for their request and proof of their commitment to 
permanent resident (see Appendix (XIX) clause 1, 2, 3, 4 and 15). 
The actual request was that the 1907 bill, described as 'not fully and 
adequately considered and discussed' and which had been reserved by 
Plunket, the Governor of New Zealand, should not receive the assent of 
the Crown. 
Both the Prime Minister and the firm of solicitors who had 
prepared the petition for the Chinese responded to the petition, 
sending letters to the Governor. The Prime Minister, Ward, made two 
major points, firstly that since there had been a long precedent of 
anti-Chinese legislation in New Zealand then surely this indicated 
sufficient opposition to justify yet another Act. Secondly, since 
numerous Acts had been passed without objections from Imperial 
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authorities then there was no reason to suppose that the New Zealand 
Parliament did not have the Constitutional right to legislate (see 
Appendix XX). This was a predictable response but to some extent 
contradicted by the solicitors submission. The two Wellington firms, 
Skerret and Wylie and O'Regan and Dix described the process of collecting 
the signatures. They noted that it was a unanimous response even 
though there were only 650 signatures. There had been misunderstanding 
in obtaining signatures since often only an employer would sign the 
petition on behalf of all his employees, a situation, if remedied, 
according to the solicitors would have led to considerably more 
signatures. There had also been problems in translation which had to 
be done to enable signatories to read the document before signing. As 
far as the petition was concerned they supported the claims of the 
Chinese maintaining: 
... that in their oplnlon there had been no public 
demand for a Bill which we protest is an 
infringement of the rights of these residents. We 
consider the measure is calculated to embarrass 
His Majesty's Government at a time when intimate 
diplomatic relations exist between His Majesty's 
Government and the Government of China, and when 
the public feeling of this country does not 
demand any such harsh legislation. 
(C.O. 418/62, 21 April 1908) 
They also objected to the fact that no provision had been made for 
the exemption of Chinese residents of New Zealand by the use of 
Ministerial discretion or a right of appeal (ibid.). 
While the petition was unsuccessful in its aim the previously 
requested Consul representative was appointed. The decision was first 
published in the 'Ting Wah Times' of Sydney which had received news 
from the Chinese ambassador in London that consuls would be appointed 
to Australia and New Zealand; it was later quoted in the New Zealand 
Times (NZT, 6 April, 1908). In May of the following year, Sir 
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Edward Grey M.P. received notification from Li Ching Fong of the 
Chinese Legation that Mr Liang Lan Hsu had been appointed Consul 
General at Melbourne and Mr Hwang Yung Liang, Consul for 
Wellington (NA, lA, 08/201).12 Customs was informed by Internal 
Affairs of Hwang's arrival, and permission was granted for the 
Consul to bring a servant as long as he departed with the Consul 
at the end of the former's assignment (NA, lA, 08/201). 
With the presence of diplomatic representation, the strategy 
of using the petition as a means of articulating the needs of the 
Chinese community was almost ended. Essentially, the effort had been 
directed at the New Zealand Government attempting to change legislation 
as regards immigration, gain the appointment of a representative or 
manipulate their own image amongst the dominant European society. In 
the end the appeal for representation was the issue that was 
successful, but this seems more the result of a change in China's 
foreign policy than the consequence of action in New Zealand. Of 
more importance, however, than the success or failure of these 
initiatives is the fact that Wellington became the center of the New 
Zealand Chinese community, and it was there that the leaders of the 
community formed the first organisation, largely as a response to an 
overseas Chinese movement. 
By 1905 Sun Yat Sen had started to consolidate his overseas 
following by creating the T'ung Meng Hui, based on a secret - society 
model, which had as its first three aims the 'expulsion of the Manchus, 
restoration of Chinese rule, and the establishment of a republic" 
(Schiffrin, 1968:358). In 1905 or 1906 the organisation started in 
Wellington under the guidance of Louis Kitt and Wong Kwok Mun, 
according to informants. While its organisation, membership and aims 
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have been lost, older members of the community have confirmed that it 
followed the aims initially set by Sun Yat Sen and was probably 
started here under the ,influence of the Australian Chinese community 
Sydney. 
The petitions had essentially therefore paved the way for 
formal associational activity providing the means whereby an emerging 
merchant elite with an increasing vested interest in an urban 
clientele, both European and Chinese, could establish power and 
authority over the community. In a sense the petitions had tried to 
mediate relations both within the community as well as those between 
the community and New Zealand society and China. Once associational 
activity emerged initi&lly specifically directed to po I events 
in China and later to the eradication of the factions created by this 
divided allegiance and a Consulate arrived, a formal organisational 
structure emerged within the community and henceforth it is this 
structure,through a number of organisations,which responded to the 
various relations that confronted the community. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
Auckland includes the Census Borough's of Auckland, 
Newton, Newmarket and Parnell for the purposes of this 
statistic. 
Thish~curious exaggeration. The Chinese population in 
1901 was 2,857 and had not been close to 4,000 since 
1891. 
Louis Kitt ~ }~ > was from Jung Sing and lived in New 
, Zealand with his wife and five children till they returned 
to China in 1916. According to one very old informant, 
both Louis Kitt and Shack Horne were part of Wong Shee 
and Company in Wellington. 
The reference to this petition in the Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives states that the 
Petition was from 322 Wellington Chinese, whereas the 
signatories in fact number 314 and are from 28 different 
communi ties in New Zealand (N .A. LEi, 1903: 11; 1903: 2053) . 
Although all occupations are not listed, enough are present 
to indicate the diversity. 
It was stated in the Otago Daily Times that Shack Horne 
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had been in Dunedin collecting signatures for this petition 
on behalf of the Chinese Reform Society. The article further 
noted that the petition was\being forwarded to the House of 
Representatives, since the Chinese Government was too 
'unprogressive' to move on such a matter (ODT, 4 March 1903). 
According to informants, Shack Horne's Chinese name was 
;{; ~~ , and he was an interpreter for the Seyip community. 
Greif (1974:38-39) asserts that this surname had been 'made 
to look European" on purpose and is probably 'Han or Hom', 
but informants have told me that the change is often a result 
of romanisation that occurred with Immigration authorities 
recording Chinese names. Once the name was written on the 
poll-tax certificate or re-entry permit, Chinese were bound 
to abide by the spelling. Shack Horne's name re-appears in 
1931 and 1933, when he attempted through petition to get four 
of his six children born outside New Zealand into the country 
exempt from poll tax. The petition in both cases '\las 
supported with over 200 signatures and received favourable 
consideration because he was 'a naturalised British subject' . 
and further because of his long residence in the Dominion and 
the services rendered by him, and in view of his son, Willie 
Shack Horne, having served with the New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force (AJHR, 1931,1-1:4). 
7. The other communities missed include Alexandra, Riverton 
and Invercargill. 
8. Unfortunately, only two of these remain, one from Auckland 
and the other from Christchurch. The former contained 36 
signatures (five merchants, 21 gardeners, six laundrymen, 
and four storemen) and the latter contained 33 gnatures 
(23 gardeners, five laundrymen, three storekeepers and two 
storemen). The notice of these petitions in the AJHR 
registers only 35 signatures from the former and 33 from 
the latter. (AJHR, 1901,1-2:7 and NA,LEl 1907:7). 
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9. In support of this, one can note the petition from Wah Lee 
and Sue Chong, laundrymen in Wanganui, who appealed against 
what they described as excessive fines (NA,LE 1 1904:9, No 
782). They had been fined £25 each for possession of opium, 
each for smoking it on two separate occasions and were 
now unable to pay the total fine, which was in excess of 
~OO (ibid.). The petitioners argued that they had not tried 
to induce Europeans to smoking and that possession and 
smoking should not be considered as separate offences. The 
petitioners were unsuccessful. 
10. The appeals concentrated on points of law: a) that lotteries 
under the 1881 Act could not be considered 'games of chance'; 
b) that before a conviction could be made against one running 
a gaming house or others who assisted, it had to be proved 
that one actually existed; c) that it took more than the 
presence of lottery tickets to establish this point, and it 
was seldom possible to prove that the lottery was going on, 
since the building involved would be used only intermittently 
(see NZLR Vol.24, pp 585-598 and 645-654). These ambiguities 
were to a large degree resolved in the 1908 Act, which made 
fan-tan and paak kop piu illegal (NZ Statutes, 1908-57, Vol. 
5:512). 
11. Attempts to locate Huang's report have met with little success. 
Diplomatic documents for the late Ch'ing (Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao 
shih-liao) were checked in Taipei and at the National Library 
of Australia, but all that remains is a reference to the 
report in a letter to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
from Wang Ta Hsieh (April 18, 1907). Wang's letter, while 
discussing the position of Chinese in England, Canada, America 
and Australia, mentions New Zealand only in passing. Hwang's 
report is acknowledged and the fact that he and Tan Yee Fan 
were sent to Australia and Canada respectively to 'take some 
measures to improve the situation' after 'harsher regulations 
[imposed] in recent years caused so much hardship that people 
sent cables continuously to the Embassy complaining' (Wang 
Ta Hsieh to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 18, 
1907:324) . 
12. Hwang Yung Liang was born in Anhui province, was a graduate 
of Yale University and had become a Methodist. He spoke 
English fluently CNA,IA 08/201). 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHINESE ORGANISATION AND THE CONSULATE: 1908-1935 
The next period spans the time from the arrival of the Chinese 
Consul through the depression of the 1930s. As in the past the 
external relations and internal dynamics of the Chinese community 
provide the impetus for continued developments. The Consul's role is 
important for it represents both the official link with China and the 
recognition by the New Zealand government of the New Zealand Chinese 
community. 
Initially the Consul was responsive to growing political factions 
in the community which emerged in reaction to differing political 
groups in China and attempted to hold the New Zealand community together 
under the aegis of a Chong Wah Wui Koon, which recognised residence in 
New Zealand as more important for membership than locality or political 
association. The Consul was also supportive of local Chinese concerns 
but the period under discussion shows a clear preference on the part 
of diplomatic representatives for the status of China and only 
merchants and intellectuals in the overseas community. The Chong Wah 
Wui Koon, while attempting to curtail factions failed, giving rise to 
further segmentation in the community as locality associations developed 
to deal with more immediate needs of individuals in addition to the CKT, 
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monarchists and KMT which maintained their following. The resolution 
of arguments between political factions was not terminated until the 
success of Chiang's Northern Expedition which, in conjunction with 
growing concern amongst the New Zealand Chinese over developing 
hostility from Europeans, led to the suggestion that a community 
organisation be established. By 1927 a growing merchant elite had 
developed and thrived partially helped by the Consul, but largely 
supported by a slowly growing established Chinese community. It was 
this group who now provided the direction for the community and 
achieved power and authority to do so. The Consul abided by their 
recommendations, and a second Chong Wah Wui Koon was established, this 
time on the basis of consultation with all existing associations. The 
new community association with a headquarters in Wellington successfully 
performed the role as a representative of the Chinese community both in 
terms of its position in New Zealand and vis-a-vis relations with China. 
Counter to this tendency towards centralisation in the Chinese 
communi ty however, there was also a move towards local community 
autonomy especially exacerbated by the need for survival during the 
depression and the emergence of somewhat isolated large Chinese market 
gardening concerns. Local communities tended to depend on their own 
resources for income and welfare during the depression. Double Tenth 
was celebrated by local communities as public events for the first time. 
While the Chong Wah Wui Koon, as a national association, represented 
the interests of all Chinese, local community branches developed in 
response to their own particular concerns. The kind of community 
structure that emerged during this period was extremely important,for 
the leadership and organisation that developed provided the basis for an 
organised community which would have to confront the continued assault on 
their existence in New Zealand and the war against Japan which would 
engulf their homeland. 
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In February 1909 the Consul arrived complete with family 
(Dominion, 4 February 1909). He was met by the press, who wanted to 
know what he thought about the immigration restrictions, and by a 
delegation of local Chinese, who said that the immigration laws were 
not as severely enforced on Japanese (ibid.). Hwang replied in the 
first instance that the Chinese did not like the restrictions and he 
wanted to learn more about them. He also said that China was developing 
and was going to take more interest in its overseas community, but he 
made no response to the local delegation. 
A month after the Consul arrived came news from China that 
Peking had terminated the right of overseas Chinese to hold dual 
citizenship despite the fact that they might already have done so. The 
issue of naturalisation had been difficult enough for Chinese in New 
Zealand, but now they were faced with pressure from China and the 
situation became more complex. Worst of all, it now gave the New Zealand 
government the justification it needed for terminating the right. Hwang 
was immediately contacted in Wellington to comment on the move. He 
insisted he knew nothing of the decision but, on the other hand, could 
equally well see no reason why overseas Chinese would want to become 
British subjects 'while they are held in contempt by the people who grant 
them the privilege' (Evening Post, 7 April 1909). Further, he 
maintained that he had looked at the position of Chinese carefully in 
New Zealand, and while they might make more money here, their purchasing 
power was small. Considering the recent developments of 'railway, 
manufacturing and mining' in China, they would do better to return home 
to be with their own people (ibid.). If Britain was friends with China, 
he argued, then surely the Chinese as 'free men' should not be subjected 
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to fingerprinting in New Zealand. He maintained that ' 
was for criminals' but then noted that the Chinese were 
industrious and poorly dressed, and this seemed to be an 'offence' in 
New Zealand .). Having said all this, the Consul then concluded 
that this was all his personal opinion: 'As a Consul I have nothing to 
say' ). 
curiously outspoken Consul's statements did not end with the 
above. Before long he had left Wellington to make visits to Auckland 
and Dunedin and the West Coast with his interpreter, T.H. Shah,l 
leaving Wang Chung Siang2 in charge (NA,IA 09/60~. Hwang's ches in 
Auckland and Dunedin maintained more or less the same stance, 
that was no further mention of repatriation. In most cases the 
Consul elevated the status of merchants, stating that they were 
traditionally honest, impartial and friendly and that the United States 
would from the provisions they had made for Chinese students, 
merchants and visitors (DDT, 1 and 21 September 1909).3 His role in New 
Zealand was clearly to represent the merchant's interest 'to develop 
trade' (DDT, 21 September 1909) - but not entirely to the of 
others in the community. In Auckland he had taken issue with Millar, 
the Minister of Labour, who had previously been approached by laundrymen 
in Wellington complaining that Chinese laundries were exempt from the 
of the Factories Act because they operated their businesses 
h ' 4 as partners IpS. The Consul refused to see the provision of the Act 
as the real issue and maintained instead that it was the fact that the 
Chinese were actually getting European clientele which the 
situation (DDT, 2 September 1909). In Dunedin he took the opportunity 
to make it clear that the situation of the Chinese in New Zealand was a 
product of the context here. What do you expect, he asked, from people 
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who have no 'social intercourse, few wives because of the poll tax 
and immigration provisions, and who get no encouragement to improve 
their appearance, social standing or English?' (ibid.). 
In the following year, after Hwang had returned from a trip to 
Greymouth, the Truth newspaper took him to task over his continued 
cism of New Zealand. Truth was alarmed by the sudden public profile 
of an American-educated Chinese man which had never existed amongst the 
Chinese that Truth knew. The paper described at length: 
We know him in New Zealand as a moral danger to our 
females. We know him to be lazy and vile in his 
habits. In his wake comes a pollution that is 
positively repellant to the clean living European. 
(Truth, 24 December 1910) 
According to the paper, this version of the Chinese deserved the 
treatment they had been accorded, and it was unfair of Hwang to suggest 
that Europeans would probably have as much trouble passing the language 
test as the Chinese did were they subjected to it. Truth recommended 
that Hwang familiarise himself with 'Public Opinion' , which would tell 
him that New Zealand was 'white' and that the 'cute capitalist Chows' 
were not wanted, since 'working women' have enough trouble holding their 
own as it is ) . Truth was caught in the unusual dilemma of 
reluctantly having to accord status to a Chinese person while at the same 
time castigatinghim as a supporter of the capitalist class who, to them, 
was exemplified by the small shop and laundry owners in the Chinese 
community, not the large merchant concerns whom Hwang would support. 
this, however, Hwang was the first publicly vocal Chinese 
advocate for the local Chinese community, described many years later in 
the following: 
When Hwang was appointed he didn't know where 
New Zealand was and then found it on a map two 
little dots a way in the south. However, he was 
prepared to come and he was quite conversant in 
Lbinese and English. He was quite a good organiser 
and d a lot of good things here. 
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(NZCGMJ, 1 September 1954).5 
Hwang's most important role, however, was his attempt to stop 
the Chinese community from dividing into two factions. Unfortunately, 
evidence of this rift is only scant, since the men alive during the 
events were either too young at the time to be aware or have long since 
died or returned to China in the early 1900s never to return. Despite 
this, however, informants have indicated that by the time Hwang arrived 
in Wellington the CKT, or Chinese Freemasons, was already operating in 
Wellington and Auckland. It was established in New Zealand in 1907 
following the ~nding of the T'ung Meng Hui, considerably later than 
its appearance in North American Chinese communities (Lyman, 1970 and 
Willmott, 1970).6 Its role overseas, Lyman maintains 
... unite (ed) various traditional solidarities into an 
organization, gave aid and protection to its members 
engaged in control over and sale of illicit goods and 
services-,-and provided an occupation and avenue to 
upward mobility for those unable to achieve success 
through legitimate means. 
(Lyman, 1970 :45) 
Paradoxically, the petitions that have already been discussed, seem to 
indicate that the more positive facts, namely the first and third 
activities, had been emphasised while the second was actively discouraged, 
but it has not been ascertained that the signatories to the petitions 
were all CKT members. If they were not supporters of the CKT it is 
probable that they may have supported the T'ung Meng Hui or the Chinese 
Reform Society. The link between these groups is important in the 
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overseas Chinese communities of the time, which were made up of 
Cantonese people, for both Klang Yu-wei as leader of the earlier 
reform movement and Sun Yat-sen as the emerging leader of the 1911 
revolution were Cantonese and relied heavily on hua-ch'iao for their 
support. While it is clear, in Schiffrin's opinion, that the Chih-kung 
T'ang initially supported the more traditional reformer by 1904, Sun 
was able to enlist the help of the organisation and divert some of the 
funds going to support Klang (Schiffrin, 1970:331-334). 
In the New Zealand case, however, the CKT emerged after the T'ung 
Meng Hui and seems not to have moved in its political stance from the 
more traditional support of Klang. In the opinion of informants, it 
represented another faction in New Zealand and was most probably opposed 
to the aims of the T' ung Meng Hui. 
It is unlikely that the small New Zealand Chinese community could 
get sufficiently organised at this time to offer collective support to 
either movement, as they would do later to help fight the Japanese in 
1937, but division in the community was apparent, and Hwang immediately 
took steps to encourage the founding of a Chong Wah Wui Koon. In 1909 
the organisation was formalised in a constitution which stated the 
following in its predi1]ble: 
History has borne out the fact that a wise emperor 
would always attach supreme importance to peace and 
well-being of the nation, and to achieve this end, 
solidarity of the people and of different strata of 
the society must be realised. We have not seen a 
divided nation that survives. 
His excellency Hwang Yung Liang has instructed us 
over and over again that to forge closer ties amongst 
the Chinese in New Zealand is now our over-riding 
task. To facilitate this goal we should work all out 
to establish an association of New Zealand Chinese. 
(Rules of the New Zealand Chinese 
Association, 1909:1, see Appendix XXI) 
Explicitly: 
but: 
The Association endeavours to forge better friendly 
ties amongst our compatriots, foster the spirit of 
mutual help, and play an intermediate role in the 
case where divergent or conflicting opinions arise 
among our people. 
(ibid.) 
This organisation promotes the progress of the 
society as a whole and is not involved in party 
politics nor religious affairs. 
(ibid.) 
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The paradox was complete, as an association created by the influence 
of factions with an aim of preventing conflict in the community was to 
remain aloof from politics and religion. 
The remainder of the document states that the association woilild 
be centred in Wellington and would provide a reading room and night 
school, the former to provide news of China and the latter to teach 
English and Chinese. The teachers were to be paid by the students 
taking lessons, whose tuition was to be£2 a year (ibid. :3). 
All Chinese would be eligible to join the association for a fee 
of 5/- per year, and those returning to China would be liable to a levy 
of £1 plus a commission of 10/- to be paid to the association for 
procuring their steamer ticket home (ibid. :2).7 
The executive of the association was to be in Wellington, with a 
president - in 1909 the Consul, Hwang Yung Liang - three vice presidents, 
three treasurers, three inspectors (one of which was the Consul's 
interpreter), one caretaker and fifteen commentators, all with specified 
responsibilities. S A committee of six from the executive was assigned the 
task of monitoring the affairs of those travelling to and from China and 
had the right to refuse to be guarantors for travellers 'should they 
think their honour was [sic] at risk' (ibid.:2). 
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While Wellington-based, the association did have delegates 
from sixteen other centres with no more than three for anyone 
centre, and it appears that the organisation was operating well by the 
time the constitution was actually framed, since they had a total of 
1,573 members, donations totalling £2,658.5.0 and the levy and 
commission from at least 25 men returning to China. Wealthy donors, 
like the Consul who gave ~10, an Auckland merchant who gave~25 and two 
Wellington merchants who gave £10 each, would have their names displayed 
in the Association hall, but many others obviously contributed what 
they could, and judging by the return, approximately 61% of the 
Chinese community were convinced that membership and possibly a donation 
. 'f' d 9 were Justl le . 
The success of Hwang and the Wellington executive must be 
interpreted in the light of three influences: the arrival of the Consul 
as the first representative of their interest, the existing factions 
responding to changes in China, and most importantly the emergence of 
community. The last aspect was founded on a particular type of socio-
economic structure which maintained the community and gave it the 
necessary base for survival. Hwang responded, at least partially, to the 
knowledge of its existence, so it seems germain at this point briefly to 
describe its most prominent aspects. 
The occupations of the gold-mining period had now given way to 
businesses with a stability only formerly attributable to a few concerns 
in Otago or the home village environment (see Appendix XXII). This 
stability meant a predictable income from a predictable clientele and 
for the first time the possibility of a planned life. Visits home, 
regular savings (in the context of an anti-opium and gambling sentiment) 
rotating managerships, contracting and expanding partnerships all became 
part of the fruit and vegetable, laundry and market gardening enterprises. 
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With this type of stability, however, carne a new type of 
responsibility. Unlike mining, the shop, garden or laundry had to be 
maintained over a period of time to ensure a constant return. Knowledge 
of the enterprises filtering back to horne villages stimulated a renewed 
interest in going abroad like other relatives, fathers, brothers, uncles 
or nephews who had already established themselves overseas. Pressure 
increased on those already overseas to support newcomers, but the cost 
of the passage and the £.100 poll tax selected against many would-be 
migrants who would have easily acquired the little capital it had taken 
in former years. Now the reliable and hard working ones were those who 
got family and overseas support unless, according to one informant, the 
family was wealthy enough to despatch wayward sons to be put under the 
authoritarian surveillance of a father or uncle. 
Two periods of renewed immigration regenerated the New Zealand 
Chinese community prior to and in the 1920s. The first period lasted 
from 1903 till the implementation of the language test in 1907, when 
995 Chinese carne in, each paying the £100 poll tax. The second period, 
which was even more dramatic, was that preceeding the introduction of 
the permit system and just after, when 1,743 Chinese entered from 1919 
till 1926 also paying poll tax (see Appendix II). This would have 
yielded £273,800 to the Consolidated Account and also represented a 
considerable drain on the local Chinese economy. This point is difficult 
to confirm, but a majority of informants maintain that the money for 
passage and poll tax carne from the overseas community rather than from 
the horne village, and from relatives who were in most cases hardly able 
10 to bear the cost. 
318. 
The Chinese population in New Zealand at this time was therefore 
the result of the above immigration pattern, plus a steady circulation 
of former residents. The economic situation of local Chinese was 
therefore variable and consisted largely of three categories of people. 
One category was in debt for poll tax and passage money, recently 
arrived and partially bonded to payoff the debt. Another category 
of people sponsored new immigrants and would have labour available, and 
the third category was people returning home with the intent of 
selecting worthwhile future immigrants or trying to finance immigration 
of their wives and children to New Zealand. 
Given the variables influencing this situation - the changes in 
China and the changing immigration restrictions - it is no wonder that a 
structured business activity emerged in New Zealand, particularly in 
the North Island. Structure in this situation refers to both a 
proliferation of businesses, increase in personnel involved and in the 
number of partners committed to anyone enterprise and a set of 
interdependent ties which linked occupations. 
According to informants, shops and gardens in the gold fields 
were of minimal size, with only the mining enterprise itself attracting 
large numbers. By the early 1900s these numbers were being duplicated 
in market gardening, where it was not unusual to find gardens ranging 
from a one-man enterprise with an acre of land to an enterprise of 
fourteen or more men working as much as forty-one acres (see Appendix 
XXIII).11 Don recorded the existence of such gardens in Nelson, Otaki, 
Wanganui, Fielding, Palmerston North, Foxton, Napier, Gisborne and 
Auckland. The largest were, even at this early date, in Wanganui, Otaki, 
12 Nelson, Auckland (Mount Albert, Parnell, Epsom and Mangere) and Foxton 
319. 
in addition to those already established in the South Island at 
Christchurch, Timaru, Oamaru and Dunedin. Similarly, shops and laundries, 
although to a lesser extent, were made up of partnerships (as many as 
four people for either business), each making a contribution to the 
capital costs and each drawing regularly on the revenue. Other employees 
without partner status, particularly youngsters and newcomers, would 
wait their turn or, frustrated by wages and the dwindling possibility of 
partnership, would strike out on their own, looking for a retiring 
shof~e~pe~ or someone returning to China who wanted to retain his shop 
and was willing to leave it in trustworthy hands. Partners also availed 
themselves of any opportunity to strike out on their own, representing 
in both cases clear emphasis on self-employment as an ideal which not 
only gave stability to their existence, but also status within their own 
community. 
While the constitution of these partnerships may have seemed fluid 
due to migration either within New Zealand or back to China, predictability 
was possible through limiting co-workers and partners to village mates or 
at least those from the same district or county. One notes that in cases 
where Don recorded partnerships or groups working together they 
invariably came from the same district, and in some instances from the 
same. village within the district. In some cases, Jung Sing, Poon Yu 
and Tung Goon people worked together, but Seyip people were on their own. 
People coming to New Zealand would seek out fellow district mates, often 
having received a name of a shop, garden or laundry before they left 
China. If they stopped off in Sydney on the way, they would stay in 
rooms or in a business owned by people from the same district or village. 13 
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Once the newcomer arrived in New Zealand, he would be placed 
under the control of a relative who would look after his welfare until, 
depending on the circumstances, he might be passed on to another 
relative who was wealthier or needed extra labour. 
Exceptions to the above arrangements would be the emerging 
Chinese fami , prevalent amongst some of the estab shed merchants 
and to a lesser extent amongst fruit and vegetable shop-owners whose 
premises and occupation made family life and habitation possible. 
There was a sense in which part of the community was 
occupationally linked together, since grower, and hawker all 
handled the same commodity and controlled its distribution. Those who 
grew the crops and retailed them for the most part constituted the 
younger proportion of the community, while older men carted the 
vegetables by hand or with dray and horse if they were still keen to 
earn a living. Others who had migrated to the urban centres as 
elderly men either passed away the hours in talking, gambling or smoking 
or took up part-time jobs if they needed cash for various things. 
Gambling was an activity which brought the Chinese trouble and some of 
their buildings an infamous reputation but viewed differently it could 
be described as one form of social service within the community which 
provided entertainment, a small income and c9mpanionship when employment 
by Europeans or other Chinese was impossible. It is notable that these 
places are dated by most informants from the turn of the century, playing 
a role in several urban centres from then till the end of the depression. 
Elderly, lonely men by this time had either passed on or returned home, 
and those who had suffered the full brunt of the depression had 
similarly survived to do other things or had followed the path of their 
elders. Wages could amount to £3 - ~4 per week from paak kop piu 
enough to provide for the cost of living in austere surroundings. While 
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the police seemed always to have considered this activity illegal, it 
was seldom the brunt of a wholesale effort on their part to close them 
down, un the situation with opium. Generally, attitude was 
one of curiosity, which in several instances led them to note the 
extent of the games played, the honesty with which the establishments 
were run and the large stakes that often exchanged hands (see Star Sports, 
29 April 1967). 
Shops and land were predominantly leased in the early years, 
while a hawker required capital for some kind of conveyance, and 
considerable energy. One hawker who had worked in Wellington described 
a six-day week involving three different routes, each visited twice 
during the week and with at least two of them in a very hilly terrain. 
Leasing, on the other hand, allowed the lessee to vacate the premises 
or land quickly or pass it on to another who would in turn take over 
the lease. This arrangement benefitted all, for it removed the 
Chinese from the necessity of heavy capital investment while yielding 
a tidy rent for the shop or land owner. The average investment 
for a shop owner would have been from~OO to ilso and for a market 
gardener Slightly less, depending on the existence of other gardeners 
who would lend equipment. The land in many cases was uncleared and 
non-productive, according to informants, so European owners found the 
arrangement attractive. Again, it is clear that while the Chinese may 
have to keep their options open as sojourners, the kind of 
economic structure they found themselves admitted to hardly encouraged 
permanent settlement or guaranteed stability: leases, after all, were 
word-of-mouth agreements and could be terminated at any time by the 
owner. 
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Shops were leased for between £2 to is per week, and land, 
depending upon its state of productivity, could be leased for seven 
shillings an acre for uncleared land in the first year, increasing to 
£.1 to 1.2 in the second year and perhaps £4 to £5 in the third year. 
This meant that the result of added value by the Chinese was an increased 
rent demand by the owner. 
Acreage leased, as already noted, depended largely on the number 
of men who were willing to work together. Hand- cuI ti vation, pI anting, 
weeding and picking limited the amount cultivatible by anyone person 
to two to three acres. Shops were more flexible and could be expanded 
or contracted by increasing the labour as long as space was available 
to clean and store vegetables. In this early period cleaning was solely 
the job of either the hawker OT retailer, since the auction system acted 
only as a clearing house and growers were many years away from waShed, 
and pre-packaged crops. While the shop may have been convenient, it 
was, according to informants, harder and more time-consmning than any 
other fo:~m of employment. One older ex-shop owner described it in the 
following way: 
The number of decisions that have to be made are 
very difficult and may cause the success or failure 
of the shop. You have to know when to buy and sell, 
how much to buy, how much you can store and what has 
to be sold immediately. You have to buy cheap and 
sell for a small profit so that you are competitive -
too much profit only sends your customers elsewhere -
and you cannot afford this loss, especially when one 
is Chinese. 
Besides the intricacies of the business, there was also the ever-
watchful bureaucracy and other shop owners who wanted to see that 
Chinese did not stay open past closing hours. While this suggests that 
evasion was the prerogative only of the Chinese, a judge noted in 1905, 
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before prosecuting a number of both European and Chinese shop 
owners, that none of the Chinese and only half of the Europeans seemed 
to be complying with the 1904 Shops and Offices Act (EP, 5 June 1905). 
The laundry business, like both shops and land, was usually 
passed on by each successive tenant or group of tenants. The newcomer 
and his partners, if he needed them for capital, would purchase the 
business for £300- £400, which would give them the basic- necessities -
large coppers for boiling water heated with coke,agas-heated roller, 
a wringer and some large, heavy irons. On top of this, they would pay 
a lease of perhaps three to five shillings per week for the premises. 
According to informants, laundries were hard work, but they had little 
trouble getting clientele - all European - who would drop their laundry 
in during the day. All laundries were in downtown areas close to the 
pedestrian traffic in a time when shopping and housing were much more 
centralised. Most of these people were fairly wealthy to be able to 
afford the service: fourpence for a starched collar, five or sixpence 
for a shirt, an amount in the early nineteen hund~eds that would have 
bought a sizeable piece of meat. Average earnings for a laundry were 
from i.fJ to £10 a week, or £300 totsoo gross a year before rent, rates, 
14 
overheads and remittances were subtracted. If one needed help, then 
one could hire a fellow countryman for £3 a week or have one's children 
help, although the latter were seldom required to do physical labour 
b 1 0k 1 h 1 0 h d k O h 0 k 15 ut more 1 e y to e p Wlt customers an mar lng t e tlC etso 
While the fruit and vegetable shops, groceries and laundries 
were essentially places for business, in many cases they were residences 
for the owners and some employees and also eating places. Some men who 
came to New Zealand in the early 1900s invariably shared the experience 
of living in business quarters and sleeping wherever there was room to 
place a mattress. The long hours of work, poor living conditions - which 
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often were rather a shock to some whose life as youngsters had 
slightly easier in China - and the often omnipotent authority of an 
older relative who had little patience for dissention made self-
employment and/or movement elsewhere very attractive. The consequence 
of this flexibility in economic structure was a highly mobile male 
population that was used to moving around New Zealand to locate in 
places where business activity was viable. As long as land was leased 
and the scale of retail outlets was small with minimal capital 
investment, there was no long-term cost to internal migration; on the 
contrary, considerable job experience was gained. The other of 
mobi was of course the continual stream of people going back to 
China, which was in excess of 200 per year in the period from 1908 to 
1938, a number only duplicated once previously in the period from 1873 
to 1881. The earlier period of increased departures seems to be 
explained by a fairly well-off community, who were able to afford the 
trip home with presumably enough money to ensure a welcome at the other 
end. The latter period seems similarly to have related to a secure 
economic base and the possibility of some surplus income, but more 
importantly changes in China and a youthful overseas community allowed 
more emphasis to be placed on the future of new families 11 Ch ' 16 lna. 
For those who had already been reunited as families in New Zealand, 
at 131 families in 1927, life was considerably , as 
children's education and home life had to be established (Mawson, 1927:3), 
The women who came often could not speak English, which meant that much 
of life revolved, of necessity, around the Chinese community, home 
and in particular. Their contact with European society was 
minimal, for at that time in New Zealand there was no help available for 
non-English-speaking immigrants. The husbands, or children as they 
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learned English, were responsible for all transactions with the society 
they lived in. The conditions that newly arrived women found were in 
many cases hardly the ideal for a family home. Men living in groups or 
alone seemed to have provided little in the way of home comforts, so 
with the presence of wives and children life changed considerably. 
However, some conditions remained much the same, as the following 
statement reveals: 
There was no doubt that life of the Market Gardens 
those days was primitive. They were work places on 
which men folk lived [sic] as cheaply as possible 
and not investing on buildings as the land was 
rented. Womenfolk and children later fitted into 
these camps and still with a very temporary atmosphere 
as without permanent stay in New Zealand no one bought 
land ... 
(New Zealand Chinese Association, 
Canterbury Branch, Annual Report 
1978:28). 
Once the family was established, however, another migratory 
pattern emerged, with the wife and children returning to the vi 
in China so that the children could be educated in Chinese and the 
17 boys could have future marriages arranged. Many of these children 
ly stayed in China for five or six years, returning to New 
Zealand alone to take up a job, and perhaps returning again to China 
still later to get married. This would mean that in the space of 
perhaps twenty years, a young Chinese male would have been back and 
forth to China perhaps as many as three times, sometimes alone and 
sometimes accompanied by an older person from the same district or village. 
In New Zealand they would try to learn as much English as they could, 
only to lose it when they returned to the dialect of their local village, 
making the transition back to New Zealand just as difficult the second 
or third time. 
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If one was to characterise the Chinese community of the first 
twenty years 1900, it would be of an extremely busy community 
in which an intense work ethic developed. It was also a community 
where relationships had many expectations attached to them as younger 
men came under the impatient tutelage of an elder. As described by 
one informant, 'You were only told once how to do a job - then you 
were expected to be able to do it'. 
Aside from these observations, however, it also becomes 
increasingly apparent that the Chinese community in New Zealand had 
a changed profile. By 1920 they were more exposed as their 
occupations and residence took them into urban areas and to increasing 
numbers of small towns where they of necessity attained a much more 
public profile, reinforced by the rapid changes that confronted their 
homeland. For the Chinese community, both these changes, in forcing 
their Ie to change, also made them more vulnerable. 
In 1911 the consul, Hwang, left for Australia to become Consul 
General, while Mr. T.H. Shah, his translator, was appointed Acting 
Consul for New Zealand and Vue Jackson (Yue Yun Wah) became his private 
secretary in April (Prime Minister's Department 1911/962).18 By 
July, Chow Lanchu was confirmed as the new Consul. He arrived in 
September from his previous post in the Philippines with his wife, 
one clerk, three man-servants and three maid-servants 19 . :1946). 
The new consul stayed only until April 1912 however, when he was 
replaced temporarily by Brandon (Barrister and Solicitor), who was 
appointed as Acting Consul, with Vee Yun Wah remaining in his post till 
1913 (NA,IA 1912/1014, 26 March 1911). When Kwei Chih arrived from 
London as the new Consul in 1912, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
appointed Vue as Secretary of the Consulate. 
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The year 1912 had not been good for the Chinese in New Zealand. 
According to Don, the market gardeners had had a 'ruinous summer' and 
the unsettled conditions in their home districts had affected the men, 
making them restless, which in turn led to increased gambling, 
especially, as he noted, from 'noon until midnight on Sunday' (McNeur, 
1951:31). When I asked informants about life in their districts in 
China during this time, they confirmed Don's contention in 1912, and one 
produced an appeal from his village to their overseas people asking for 
help in raising funds to complete four forts which would protect the 
village from bandit raids. 1be contents of the appeal (translated from 
the Chinese) are as fo11ows: 20 
Raising Funds for Building Forts to 
Protect the Sun Kai Village 
Bandit Raids 
To Overseas Chinese in Wellington 
Our Sun Kai Village commands important geographic 
features with a long history of several centuries. 
It is developing with increasing prosperity and is 
noted for the numerous overseas villagers now living 
abroad. Indeed, Sun Kai is enjoying a ation for 
wealth which few could boast of. 
Our village has been plundered by bandits. They caught 
us unprepared, rather by non-resistance. In the fight 
defending our homes, our fellow-villagers displayed 
commendable heroism, killing and wounding more than a 
dozen of thugs. 
However, we were completely swamped by their superiority 
both in number (which was estimated in the hundreds) 
and in weapons. 
The robbers have made it plain to us that they were not 
satisfied with the loot carried off, and they threatened 
to return. The residents are in a constant fear, and the 
well-to-do families have left to seek Should we 
not take action to strengthen our defence capability, 
our rich hometown will one day be deserted. 
The over-riding tasks now are to revamp law and 
order in Sun Kai, construct a number of forts and 
purchase new weapons. The cost of this project is 
estimated at £20,000. 
As we have no accumulated funds of any type, a 
general meeting of the Sun Kai members approved the 
proposal of raising funds by the following 
ways: 
A. by taxing each family according to the number of 
adult males; 
B. by taxing each family according to the area under 
cultivation; 
C. by means of donations. 
Despite unparallel fervour shown by the viI who 
have tapped their financial resources to the extreme, 
we still fall short of the planned figure. So far 
we have raised just over~IO,OOO. 
In the past, Sun Kai Village relied on brothers and 
sisters overseas and two rich families in our 
for money for public causes. We are sure that you will 
show the same enthusiasm as in the past in giving 
donations for this very important project which has a 
vital bearing on our home-town. Your deep nostalgic 
feeling will not allow thugs and robbers to overrun 
our homes. 
It is our earnest hope that you will do your utmost to 
support the schemes, and we would be more than 
delighted to see that, with your help, our target is 
overfulfilled. Thus, we will have the strength to 
repulse any armed attack. Even bandits in thousands 
will not have the heart to launch invasions upon us. 
While the former village resident was unsure of the amount 
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collected, he produced a photograph that confirmed the existence of 
the fort like towers providing a vantage point from which to survey 
the neighbouring area. Evidently the balance required was remitted. 
At the same time as these local areas were in jeopardy, China's 
national government moved towards chaos. Yuan Hsi K' ,creator of 
China's modernised army, the one who overthrew Kuang Hsu on behalf 
of the Empress Dowager and who, after displacement, was again reinstated 
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under the Regent, made a deal with the Republicans. He alone could 
unify China, and Sun Yat Sen relinquished his provisional Presidency 
to Yuan, who became the first President of the Republic. Yuan, however, 
had no intention of supporting the Republican cause and continued to 
maintain the structure of the vacated dynasty to provide for his future 
role as Emperor. A parliament was elected in 1912, but it was never 
intended to endure. Yuan's rule was brief, however, for while he had 
favour with those who wanted the return of the monarchy, he had not 
anticipated Japan's action in presenting China with her Twenty-One 
Demands. Unfortunately for Yuan, he faced a world hostile to the 
Republic who sided with Japan, particularly Britain and some European 
countries, and his hope for the monarchy faded. His credibility waned, 
part of his army revolted, and Yuan himself died in 1916. After his 
death several governments tried to assume power in the north and Sun 
Yat Sen re-established the Republican Party in Canton - but in name only. 
In the period between 1916 and 1925 the whole political structure 
of Chinese society as it had been under dynastic rule dissolved into 
what became known as the period of warlord rule. The army that had 
revolted against Yuan in Yunnan came south in 1916 to unite with 
southern troops opposed to the Peking regime, occupying much of Poon Yu 
one of the home districts of the New Zealand Chinese (Foreign Missions 
21 Report, 1917:14). When Yuan died, the gathering army turned their 
attention against the Governor of Canton, a supporter of Yuan, but 
Governor Lung's troops proved too strong, and in revenge they destroyed 
many of the local market towns as they pursued the retreating army 
(ibid.) . 
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Although civil disobedience and exploitation worsened, there 
seems also to have been a mellowing of attitudes towards foreigners 
in the Canton area. This generalisation is surmised from the extensive 
material recorded by the New Zealand Presbyterian Church in the Canton 
Village Mission, which had been inaugurated in 1902 and was based in 
Fa Yuen, Poon Yu and Jung Sing, all home districts for the New Zealand 
Chinese. In the early years the Mission faced considerable hostility, 
particularly from certain villages, and McNeur, an early missionary, 
recalled an instance which exemplified not only the hostility and the 
power of the local clan elders but also the use of land as the basis of 
clan hegemony. The first notice appeared in an Upper Poon Yu village 
in 1906, and its text, translated from the Chinese, is as follows: 
Prohibition of Christianity adopted and placated by 
the elders of Lau clan in Leung Tin village, Upper 
Poon Yu. 
All of our descendents must obey the traditional mores 
and regulations. They are not allowed to believe in 
the religion [Christianity]. Anyone who violates the 
regulations will be expelled from the clan including 
their descendants and predecessors. Their relations 
must also be stopped from being part of local ritual 
and the ancestral hall. 
Our area is not allowed to establish a church or help 
Westerners stir up the local area. If anyone offers 
land to establish a church, they, regardless of whether 
they are young or old, will dismantle it. No tolerance 
will be given to those, who with the help of Westerners, 
break the regulations. 
No one in the area is allowed to attend a sermon of 
Jesus because of its evil effect. Should anyone attend 
the sermon they will be fined 72 cents (Chinese coinage). 
This regulation is to be enforced. Everyone should ask 
their sons and relatives to abide by it. 
From Lau Hsu Lung Tong 
Kwong Shui 31st year of Kuang Hsu 
5th day of 10th month 1906. 
(McNeur Collection, Hocken 
Library) 
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The Presbyterian mission forwarded the notice and letters to 
the head of Poon Yu county stating that one baptised Chinese woman had 
already been mobbed and threatened with expulsion from her village 
and that if. this type of action spread there would be no place for 
the Christian church. In due course the church received a reply. 
I received and read your letter yesterday as well as a 
copy of the prohibition. 
The role of your church in this area was approved at an 
early date by treaty. It is, therefore, unreasonable of 
Leung Tin village and the Lau clan's elder to stop their 
people from believing the religion or expelling clan 
people from the clan or abolishing the ancestor's position 
in the clan. 
My bureau has now ordered Poon Yu officials to notify the 
elder of the Lau clan that they must inform their clan 
members to behave themselves. 
Concerning the sermon of your church in the village, you 
are advised to treat the clan people in peaceful manner. 
Whether or not they believe in your religion or choose to 
be baptised should be their own choice, for the purpose 
of good will. They should not befurced to do anything. 
My bureau also informed the leaders of the clan that they 
should tell clan members not to prevent any person from 
receiving baptism. 
(McNeur Collection, Hocken Library, 
translated from the Chinese) 
Perhaps the most striking features of this exchange, both the 
initial protest and the reply from the authorities,is the similarity 
it had with the New Zealand context with which many of these same 
villagers would have been confronted. To make this point clear it is 
worth setting the above events beside a particular incident that 
occurred in Auckland in 1921, when the manager of the Hippodrome Theatre 
excluded local Chinese from the premises. The manager, like the village 
elders, had posted the building (in this case) with notices stating 
'No Chinese are admitted to this Theatre by order of the Manager' (NA, lA, 
13/408, 11 April 1921). The local Chinese 'merchants and residents' were 
indignant and organised a meeting which, from some accounts, came close 
to 'a hostile demonstration' but instead settled for an appeal to 
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Consul Lin Shih Yuan for help. The Consul in turn appealed to Downie 
Stewart, Minister of Internal Affairs, stating that he had also 
received, aside from the above, a lengthy petition signed by the 
executives of all the 'Chinese societies' in Auckland and that he now 
wished for some help in the matter (NA,IA 13/408, 14 April 1921).22 
The significant part of the response sent to the Consul by 
the Minister was as follows: 
You will, I think, recognise that the question is 
not one for the interference of the government, but 
must be left to the taste and good feeling of the 
proprietor of a theatre. These proprietors are 
private citizens whose actions cannot be considered 
as representing the attitude or inclination of the 
government. It is to me a matter of regret that the 
action of a private citizen should hurt the feelings 
of a great and friendly State like China ... the 
Government did not associate itself in any way with 
the action complained of. 
(NA IA 13/408, 2 June 1921) 
Clearly the government would not have tolerated collective 
action against the Chinese organised by the theatre manager, a 
situation which has never occurred in New Zealand in any context 
regarding the Chinese. Similarly, the bureaucracy in China would 
not allow the collective action of the clan negotiated by the elders, 
but it did uphold the right of the individual clan members to decide 
on their own destiny as regards Christianity, much as the Minister of 
Internal Affairs protected the right of individuals to exclude the 
Chinese, in this case, from their premises. 
In regard to the opinions held by Chinese in their home 
districts about foreigners, one has only to look at the opposition 
the Presbyterian Church faced in 1909 when it opened a hospital in 
K'o Tong Village staffed by a European doctor and employing local 
Chinese women as live-in help. Within a short time of the opening, a 
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neighbouring llage organised and posted notices decrying the fact 
that Chinese women were being treated by a European male doctor and 
also the fact that Chinese women were living in the hospital. The 
notice equated the results of this situation with the treatment of 
North American Indians, Russian Jews, Japanese in Taiwan and the Indians 
under British rule. They forbade anyone to patronise the hospital in 
future on pain of a substantial fine. As far as the organisers were 
concerned, this situation, if allowed to persist, could only lead to the 
destruction of the whole Chinese race and its customs (see Appendix XXIV 
for full text). There seems little difference between this opinion 
directed against the Europeans and the remarkably similar opinions 
that the Chinese had faced in New Zealand from 1866 onwards. 
Despite opposition, both the hospital and the mission itself 
survived, but largely if not entirely because of the extensive links, 
built up through time, between the Chinese in New Zealand and their 
home districts by such people as Alexander Don and the Reverend McNeur. 
As individuals who went between the two countries, they could see quite 
clearly that the hostility they faced in China and the reasons for it 
were very similar to the hostility the Chinese continued to face in 
certain areas of New Zealand (see Chapter 5, pp. 238-41). 
While the New Zealand Chinese community may have been despondent 
in 1912, they still managed to celebrate the establishment of the 
Republic with an event in Wellington which was recorded the Maori-
land Worker. It was notable, according to the that all the 
local Chinese had once and for all removed the symbol of domination -
the queue, land Worker 1 March 1912). 
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The following year Britain recognised the Republic, which fact 
was in turn communicated to New Zealand and allowed Kwei Chih's 
credentials as Consul to be accepted (NA,IA 1912/4070, 11 October 1913). 
Kwei Chih was Cantonese and, according to at least one source, 
was instrumental with Yue Jackson in getting a re-trial for a Chinese 
man who had been found guilty on a charge of murder in Invercargill. 
The re-trial was successful, and the accused was acquitted, leaving 
both men with considerable status in the community (NZCGMJ, 1 September 
1954). The Consul's political sympathies, however, remain unknown, 
although the association started by his predecessor, the Chung Wah 
Wai Koon, became the KMT under the indirect influence of events in 
Australia. The situation in Australia, according to an older resident, 
had already manifested some of the political splits that were to be 
duplicated in New Zealand. After 1911 at least three groups existed, 
the CKT, the monarchists (Yuan Hsi K' ai $ ji.:jru) and the KMT. 
One of the early leaders of the KMT in New Zealand was Chiu Gok Jun, 
originally sent to Australia to be editor of the Mun Kwok Bow (the KMT 
publication). Opposition from the Chinese community in Sydney, ardent 
supporters of Yuan Hsi K'ai, led to an appeal to the Chinese Consulate 
in Sydney to have the man expelled. The Consulate complied, and the 
Australian government was informed, resulting in the departure of Mr. 
Chiu to New Zealand. To circumvent identification as a member of the 
KMT, despite the fact that New Zealand, by virtue of Britain's 
recognition of the Republic, also recognised the regime, Mr. Chiu 
entered New Zealand as a Baptist minister, according to informants. 23 
When he arrived in Wellington, the membership of the KMT was 
as yet very small, but Chiu Gok Jun and Luey Hung Jok, a local member, 
helped to increase the membership. According to informants, however, 
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it was not until a Wellington man, Tse Gay Fee, and three men from 
Canada took over the organisation that the membership grew more 
One of the men from Canada, Joe Bing Lum,knew Sun Yat Sen 
and was in fact the only New Zealand Chinese to have met him. 
By 1918 the KMT had spread to Auckland, being organised there 
by four men, one of whom was later to become head of the KMT in New 
Zealand. During this period the membership grew and the sation 
estab shed branches in other centres, but the headquarters remained 
in Wellington. Membership cost £3 per person, and from most accounts 
it had a community focus involving Chinese women and children and 
some Europeans who had become interested in China and supported the 
new Republic. Still later in the 1920s, the KMT branches in Wellington 
and Auckland established weekly papers (Mun Sing Bow) but none 
and in fact according to informants the papers closed due to al 
The divisions in the community that arose from allegiances 
by changing events in China, in addition to the hostility 
the people faced in New Zealand, began to take their toll by 1916. 
The Chong Wah Wui Koon, described by older residents as a largely Poon Yu 
group, 
district 
with the Poon Yu contingent reforming their traditional 
ation (including Fa Yuen) which they had originally 
organised in the gold fields. When people were asked why this 
happened, they made two responses. One indicated that the presence of 
in the community - at the time relating to the government in 
China often led people to be more concerned with personal interests, 
in this case the interests of people from one's own district. The 
association would, therefore, be responsible for helping Poon Yu people 
handle situations of contact with Europeans, ensuring financial support 
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if needed and celebrating certain occasions such as Ching Ming. This 
allowed members an alternative allegiance to that of the more 
encompassing Chung Wah Wai Koon or later the KMT. The other response 
related specifically to the antagonism they faced in New Zealand. 
According to those who are willing to talk about it, it was not pleasant, 
and each newcomer was told of the kinds of attitudes he (in most cases) 
would face, summed up in the two following statements which have been 
passed down as a summation of the European's opinion of the Chinese: 
and 
One foreigner can beat 300 Chinese - its easier 
than looking after a bunch of sheep. 
Nine Europeans said they would wipe out the whole 
of China. 
(NZCGMJ, 1 December 1965) 
The association, then, was to insulate the local community from this 
situation, consolidate its own group and perhaps maintain the links 
with the home district, avoiding the implications of factional politics. 
Four years later another district association, this time 
representing the people of Sun Wui (Seyip) and particularly the Wong 
clan24 of Auckland started the Kwong Chew Club. 25 The rationale for 
the founding of the Club is recorded as follows in a document, 
translated from the Chinese, prepared in 1967 to report on the 
expansion and renovation of the association building: 
The club was founded in the vicinity of 1923 
when New Zealand and the rest of the world were in the 
throes of economic depression. The vital factor which 
brought the club into being was the Wong Hsu-mei 
incident. The incident took place in Cook Street, 
Auckland in 1921. Wong Hsu-mei saw a black person 
having a quarrel with a Chinese and went up to mediate. 
However, he was beaten to death by the black person. 
The murderer was put on trial and was sentenced to 
two years imprisonment. The Seyip Chinese in Auckland 
were indignant with the Court's decision and felt that 
the punishment was too light for the murderer. They 
intended to refer the case to the supreme court and 
lodge a protest, but they lacked the leadership, 
organization and the support of the other Chinese 
communities. Some of the Seyip Chinese saw the 
necessity to form some kind of organization to weld 
the Seyip people together. That was how the Kwong 
Chew Club cam into being. Four founders of the Club, 
Wong 000, Wong Sing-fou, Sia Da and Wong Ko-yeing, 
arranged the finance and bought the club rooms for 
£2000. The subsequent years saw great expansion 
in the Club's membership and its influence in 
Chinese circles. 
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(First Report of Sun Wui Club, 
1967:1-2, translated from the 
Chinese) 
The association also offered accommodation to travellers to 
and from China, Chinese classes for children, relief funds for those 
who were sick or in need of assistance, and funds for the celebration 
of Ching Ming. 
Four years later, a third district association started in 
Wellington, the Tung-Jung Association which combined people from Tung 
Koon and Jung Sing districts. While the explicit events which 
generated this association are unknown, informants have agreed that 
it was stimulated by many of the same reasons that prompted the founding 
of both the Poon Yu and Kwong Chew Club. The principles included in 
the preamble to their constitution also affirm this: 
The principles of the association are cooperation, 
goodwill to help one another and to help in any 
difficult matters so that no harm may interfere 
with the general good of the community. 
(See Appendix XXVI, Tung Jung 
Constitution 1926:1, translated 
from the Chinese) 
The aims of the association were similar to those of the Kwong Chew 
Club in that the association provided accommodation for travellers to 
and from the districts it represented, care for aged or crippled 
members, and a funeral service for those who could not afford one (ibid.). 
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In addition, the association booked passages for members who paid it a 
commission for this privilege. If they failed to pay, the association 
terminated their privileges. The constitution also provided for the 
expulsion of any member but prohibited the resignation of committee 
members, who were required to serve their full term of one year 
Appendix XXVI). 
The effect of these three associations was to bring together 
at least five of the districts whence the largest segment of the new 
Chinese community had come and to ensure that those circulating between 
New Zealand and China received care and also made their contribution to 
the maintenance of the association. While this development appears as 
a collective response, these associations must also be interpreted as 
factions within a community which no longer had a clear-cut or single 
leadership, nor the authority of a Chong Wah Wui Koon. Lin Shih Yuan 
(previously Consul in Vancouver, Canada), who replaced Kwei Chih as 
Consul in 1918 (NA,IA 13/35/13, 22 January 1918), was much more 
concerned with KMT business than with the Chong Wah Wui Koon and spent 
much time travelling back and forth to Australia. Not unlike Hwang 
Yung Liang, however, he supported the overseas merchant elite, as 
evidenced by his activity regarding the Hippodrome Theatre in Auckland 
and particularly by his attempts to interpret their activities to the 
26 New Zealand government. 
The activities referred to included the importing business 
which developed in the early 1900s, often pioneered by the men who 
were or would become leaders in the community, forming the executive 
committee of its associations. 
Initially, the Consul became involved because of a Customs 
Department inquiry into the nature of Chinese merchant importing activity. 
The investigation of importing started immediately after the war in 1918, 
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when the number of Chinese merchants increased as well as the quantity 
f . 27 o lmports. The major problem that emerged from this concerned 
import duty and how Customs was to evaluate the 'real' value of the 
goods in order to levy the appropriate amount. Two things confused 
the situation. First, there were several forms of currency circulating 
in China: taels, of which there were Shanghai and Haikwan ones; 
Shanghai dollars; Yuan and Sun, which were the same denomination as Mexican 
dollars; and fine silver grain. Some of the conversions for these 
currencies are given below: 
1 tael 
1 tael 
1 (Haikwan) tael 
1 (Shanghai) tael 
1 
1 Mexican Dollar 
35/llYzd. 
1.38 Mexican dollars 
1.50 Mexican dollar 583 grains fine 
silver 
520 grains fine silver 
7.90 Mexican dollar 
35/6d. 
(NA, Customs 1/739/4, 23 September 
1911, 14 June 1919, 
September 1919) 
The second problem related to the way Chinese merchants organised 
their importing network via China, Hong Kong, and New Zealand. 
In 1919 the Consul Lin Shih Yuan tried to explain how business 
was carried out to the Comptroller of Customs. Lin suggested that the 
merchants deal directly with their own countrymen, therefore the 
invoices represented actual costs to the particular companies in New 
Zealand. 
The price may be lower than other invoices for 
similar goods to Europeans, but the Chinese being 
in closer touch with the manufacturers than those 
merchants who are obliged to deal through European 
middlemen in Hong Kong or Shanghai approximate more 
nearly to the fair market value of such goods when 
sold for home consumption in the principal markets 
of China. 
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(NA, Customs 1/1386, 5 March 1919) 
Customs were able to confirm some of the apparent anomalies that were 
occurring when they asked a local Chinese importer of fireworks why he 
was able to import them so cheaply when other importers showed a 
substantially higher cost. The response confirmed the Consul's 
contention: the importer was buying his fireworks through a brother-in-law 
who lived in Canton, direct from the factory, Faat Kee Co in Fati. The 
brother-in-law had lent the company money to get started, so they gave 
him goods at 30-40% of cost and he sent them to New Zealand without 
charging commission (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 15 August 1927). Similarly, 
in another case there was some argument about the import of silk to New 
Zealand, and it seems that there was considerable variation in price 
quoted from one merchant to the next. Again, the Consul made it clear 
that a European buyer would be charged at least 2Yz to 7Yz% by the 
European middleman-buyer, on top of which he would have to pay the 
Chinese commission middleman a commission in Hong Kong, whereas the 
Chinese merchant would deal directly with the company and their agents 
in Hong Kong and with the collecting and shipping agents. It was also 
pointed out to Customs that there were several varieties of silks, 
Kwangtung (White), Shangtung (Yellow), and silks of at least four other 
provinces, which were all distinctive. These would have different prices, 
and to compare them, according to Lin, would have been the same as 
'comparing the market for Merino wool with a market for cross-bred wool' 
(NA, Customs 1/1386, 21 March 1919). 
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lbe Customs officer in Dunedin contributed perhaps more insight 
when he presented a comparison of the value of foodstuffs from three 
centres and tried to explain some of the differences. He concluded that 
the varied with the method of buying and variation in quality 
and availability. Buyers who were closely acquainted with their New 
Zealand merchant's requirements often bartered with merchants in Hong 
Kong until a reasonable price was obtained, since price cutting was 
condoned (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 7 November 1927:2). Presumably 
also, merchants who dealt with their own parent company in Hong Kong 
achieved some savings, as did those who were attached to companies with 
. 1 ff . 1 .. h' h d' . 28 partlcu ar a 1 latlons to t elr orne lstrlcts. Quality varied in 
accordance with the place of origin, method of preparation or variety 
For instance, dried mushrooms could vary from ninety cents to 
~2.l0.0 a pound depending on the place it came from and the variety 
grown. Similarly, dried fish caught and dried quickly were said to be 
better and more expensive than those landed slowly. Scarcity was 
particularly a problem with rice in the northern winter months, when 
its ability to keep was in question and the price rose (six to ten cents 
'a pound), but by February and March when the first harvest occurred, 
the price was quite favourable (NA,Customs 1/1726/3, 7 November 1927:3). 
National es like Chinese New Year in February also caused 
shortages for certain goods, particularly fireworks, which inevitably 
increased the price. 
lbe solution to these complexities arrived at by the Customs 
Department was to add 100% to invoiced prices in cases where they were 
doubtful of the value stated. This was particularly the case with an 
Auckland importer whose import prices were doubled for duty purposes by 
the Comptroller of Customs as early as 1910. lbis situation prevailed 
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till 1927, when the importer questioned Customs, asking for a refund 
amounting to the excessive charge of duty over fifteen years. In 1927 
this would have been equivalent to some £800, and Customs investigated 
but could neither extract any records from the importer nor in fact 
find their own records as to the nature and implementation of the 1910 
decision (NA Customs 1/1726/4, 16 November 1927). The Customs 
legitimised their 1910 decision on the basis of the Customs Act 1913, 
which stated in sub-section 3 of section 17 that: 
If the Collector has reason to believe or suspect 
that the fair market value of the goods for purposes 
of duty is greater than the amount of the said 
invoice, after making such deduction as aforesaid, 
he may value the goods at such higher sum as he thinks 
proper, and assess the duty on that value accordingly. 
(NA, Customs 1/1726/4, 4 November 1929) 
They substantiated their refusal to consider the fifteen-year 
period for refund by referring to sections 147 and 148, which allowed 
the importer to make a claim against His Majesty for excessive duty 
'within one year and for not more than three years previous' (ibid.) .29 
At the same time, the Customs Department set about comparing the costs 
of goods to importers from several firms in New Zealand, including 
T.W. Doo, Ah Chee, Wah Lee, Jang Hing Loong, H.K. Leong, Kwong Kai, 
Wah Jang & Co. and Luang Fong Bros. of Auckland, and Sew Hoy and 
Shanghair Trading Company of Dunedin (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 7 November, 
1927).30 
In Wellington several discrepancies showed up as they compared 
the Chinese merchant prices with those of Flockton & Co., who also 
31 imported from Hong Kong through the Kinhai Trading Company. The 
discrepancy amounted to prices 20-25% less than those charged the 
European firm, and Customs threatened action even though they 
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increased the value of the goods for the purposes of import duty 
(NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 25 January 1930:1) .32 On the eve of Customs 
taking drastic action, a sub-collector in Wellington took action which 
averted a major confrontation. By this time, Yue Jackson, the 
Acting Consul, had become involved, and a meeting was arranged with him, 
as a shipment of goods had arrived for Wellington merchants which had 
substantially lower prices on their invoices than even the Auckland 
merchants (NA, Customs 1/1726/3, 30 April 1930). The Acting Consul 
called a meeting of all merchants and apparently emerged with the 
authority to negotiate, since an amnesty was concluded on condition 
that all future shipments would be correctly valued and that the 
Comptroller of Customs agreed to such an arrangement (ibid. :2). Yue 
Jackson also tried to get some assurance that retroactive action would 
not be taken by Customs against merchants who received past shipments 
'palpably undervalued', since the savings had been passed on to the 
consumers (ibid.). According to the sub-collector's rendition of 
the story, in support of the merchants he added the fact' ... that the 
Chinese had paid cheerfully whenever the goods had been assessed by the 
Customs, in fact, paid just what they were asked' (ibid.). Again the 
sub-comptroller deferred to the judgement of the Comptroller of Customs 
but said he would certainly support such a move. 33 
While this issue took ten years for the Customs Department to 
resolve it was also a crucial ten years in relation to an emerging elite 
within the Chinese community, for it was the merchants of these major 
companies who eventually formed the group who led the Chinese community 
through its crucial years of World War II. Their status as merchants, 
their rapport with the Consul and their networks, acknowledged 
previously by the Wellingtom Customs officer, provided the basis for 
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control and power over their local communities. It was also these 
men who to some extent controlled the vital link with Hong Kong which 
gave the New Zealand Chinese their entry to Kwangtung and home. 
At a more general level, however, one gains from these 
incidents, some insight into the attitude of the Chinese community 
towards authority, rules and sanctions. Similar to a situation that 
would occur many years later (see Chapter 10 p. 525), the Chinese 
merchants, according both to the documents quoted and to their own 
admission, did not set out to defraud Customs but viewed an opportunity 
as a gambler might view a chance hand. If you win, it is all to the 
good, and if you lose, then you pay up and say nothing. The cost of 
loss is not only in terms of sanctions levied by government or court, 
however, for the loss of status or reputation within the community can 
be devastating, diminishing only slightly with succeeding generations. 
Power was, therefore, fragile and could be assaulted within one's own 
community, in China, or by the government of one's chosen overseas 
country. None of the three contexts lent itself easily to rectifying 
the reputation of the individual. 
By 1925, Canton and the surrounding districts had survived the 
events of 1924, when the Merchant Volunteer Corps, originally developed 
to oppose the growing power of unions, was stopped forcibly by the 
Canton government troops and its members, who were armed, were chased 
into Poon Yu and Fa Yuen. Now the city faced the problem of the Yunnan 
and Kwangsi generals whose troops were initially brought by Sun to 
liberate Canton from the stranglehold of General Chen (Our Fields 
Afar, 1925:9). The generals had taken over the opium and gambling 
in the city and were now extorting money from the local government to 
pay the army, which in turn led to increased taxes. Finally, the 
Canton army, with Russian advisers, re-took the city in 1925, but 
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immediately following this event the wave of strikes and anti-
foreign feeling swept south initiated by the May 30th incident in 
h h · 35 Sang al. In Canton a large protest march filed past the French and 
British concessions which included a large contingent of armed cadets 
(McNeur, 1926:42). British and French troops were armed behind 
barricades, and in the course of the march shots were exchanged, killing 
100 cadets and wounding many Chinese civilians (ibid.). The event 
sparked an even more intense hatred of foreigners, especially the 
British, and by historic connection New Zealand was included (Our Fields 
36 Afar, 1926: 19) . McNeur made specific reference to this growing 
distrust of foreigners and its implications,at the Presbyterian 
Missionary Conference in 1926: 
The representation of our dominion Government at the 
Washington Conference by the Late Sir John Salmond, 
the participation of so many delegates in the 
Institute of Pacific Relations held at Honolulu last 
year, along with the enlightening articles on such 
subjects which appear from time to time in our best 
papers, have brought New Zealand's connection with 
China before the minds of many thinking people. But 
the average New Zealander has not begun to realise 
that the future of his country is in any serious way 
bound up with the happenings in China. China is 
awake. Is New Zealand asleep? 
(McNeur, 1926:49) 
New Zealand was not 'asleep', but nor was it awake in the way 
McNeur would have preferred it to be. Instead, it was developing 
its own virulent form of anti-foreign fervour for the third time since 
1895. The trouble began in 1925, when Chinese and Indian growers 
moved into the Pukekohe and Mangere districts near Auckland. The 
New Zealand Herald was quick to pick up the concerns of the European 
residents and maintained that it was impossible for these Europeans to 
remedy the situation once the 'Asiatics' were resident but that the 
government ought to take steps to restrict entry (NZH, 21 December 1925). 
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In the same month, the Pukekohe Branch of the 'White New Zealand 
, was formed, and they produced their first pamphlet, which 
included their aims, an explanation, supportive newspaper articles 
and the Franklin County Health Inspector's report (White New Zealand 
1926:22).37 1be introduction acknowledged the 'progress' of 
and Indians into agricultural and commercial life but 
maintained that this was at considerable cost to local residents who 
had to put up with their 'crude habitations', 'unhealthy environment' 
due to lack of sanitation, their method of working '18 hours a day', 
'frugal living', and 'generally our failure of [to] assimilate them into 
our population' (ibid.:4). 
The objects of the League were as follows: 
1. The exclusion of Asiatics from New Zealand. 
2. To secure, protect and preserve our heritage of a 
White New Zealand for our children, and our 
children's children. 
3. To maintain the purity of the Maori and the White 
Race and to preserve them from Asiatic contamina~ion. 
4. To procure provision by Statute to make leasing, letting 
or sale of land to Asiatics now resident in the Dominion 
subject to the approval of Local Bodies. 
5. To enlist the aid of Local Bodies and Municipalities to 
enforce the Public Health Act and compel the erection of 
suitable habitation and sanitary conveniences under 
the provisions of such Act. 
6. To secure legislation to bring Asiatics more rigidly 
under the provision of the Shop , Act and 
Amendments thereto, and giving particular attention 
to supposed partnership and compel same to be validated. 
7. To secure contribution by way of taxation for Defence 
purposes in lieu of personal from which Asiatics 
are at present exempt. 
8. To bring pressure to bear by constitutional means upon 
the responsible authorities to secure the consummation 
of the objects of the League. 
9. To cooperate with any other organisation having similar 
objects and to procure from and to communicate to such 
organisations such information as may be likely to 
promote the objects of the League. 
(WNZL, 1926: 3) 
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It will be noted that the polemic is much the same as that 
generated by the Palmerston North League in 1907 for the addition 
of two points Chapter 5, p.227) : the 1926 included Maoris 
as a priority for their concerns about racial purity and designated 
'Local Bodies' as the guardians of land use, health and habitations. 
The explanatory notes added little except to accuse the 'Asiatics' 
of having the ability to take over 'the means of production in this 
industry [market gardening] in a few years' and maintain that they are 
of no 'economic value to the Dominion' (iVNZL, 1926:5). The health report 
included contained only one report on a Chinese dwelling: 
Joe Shing Lee, Pukekohe Hill: The premises occupied by 
these Chinese are constructed of old timber, having a 
rough boarded floor. The building is occupied as a 
and a living room. A water supply and privy 
accommodation are provided. Built alongside the house 
a roughly constructed urinal, which holds two tins 
to into. At the time of the inspection both 
tins were partly filled. The waste water from the 
house thrown down an open ditch which runs partly 
under the house and alongside it. I consider that 
notice should be served to remove the urinal and 
fill in the drain, and that they be compelled to cease 
occupying the premises, also that a suitable house be 
erected on the premises. 
(WNZL, 1926:19) 
The problem, admitted by the health inspector, was that there were no 
building by-laws to control the erection of in the district, 
and in fact the Council had declined to develop them, since 
administration and enforcement would prove too great a task over such 
a large area (WNZL, 1926:21). The point the inspector made was that 
living in a room fourteen feet long, twelve feet wide and six feet high 
was plainly unhealthy, and the sanitation provisions were inadequate, but 
he did not engage in any speculation as to the desirability of the people. 
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The description of these premises was not, according to 
informants, an exaggeration for that period and has been confirmed in 
the following description of a Chinese market gardener's residence: 
In some market gardens the open fireplace was used for 
cooking. Across the open fireplace were two iron bars, 
barbeque style, on which pots and pans could be rested 
for heating. No such thing as shiny aluminium pots ... 
The kitchen was always warm in winter and impossible in 
summer. 
Many of us did not have electric hot-water systems till 
later in [the] 1940s. After the cooking a large 6-gallon 
potful of water will be placed onto the fireplace to 
utilise the remaining heat of the coalfire. Each person 
would take one or two dippersful of hot water from the 
pot into their own basins to be carried away for their 
own toiletaries. Next to the fireplace would be a soya 
sauce wooden barrelful of cold water from which water 
is replaced into the 6-gallon pot to replace the hot 
water taken out. 
Clean scrubbed - sometimes not so clean - wall-to-wall 
floorboards with the odd large wheat sack as scatter 
rugs. Truly rustic and "ethnic". Beds made from placing 
wooden planks across banana boxes can be relatively 
comfortable. 
(New Zealand Chinese Association 
Canterbury Branch, Annual Report 
1978:27). 
Clearly, the problem required by-laws, not a 'White New Zealand 
League'. In January 1926, a deputation from the League called on the 
Franklin County Council and received a sympathetic hearing. The League 
maintained that the Chinese and Indians now leased 200 acres in the 
surrounding area and were close to becoming a 'land-holding population' 
(Auckland Star, 23 January 1926). The Star evaluated the claims of 
the League and announced that their activity could not be described as 
'sensational scaremongering or racial animosity' and it supported 
their concern, maintaining that 'introducing alien views of life and 
standards of social conduct must inevitably tend in the long run to 
impoverish, to degrade and to disintegrate any white community in which 
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they form a part' (ibid.). On the other hand, given the immigration 
restrictions and the ministerial power over the matter, it could not 
see that the 'situation [was] in any way critical' (ibid.). 
It was 'difference', not 'inferiority', which legitimised 
exclusion. Almost as an after-thought, the article added: 
What this may mean in the long run in the sphere of 
international politics ... is not for us to predict 
or discuss right now. 
(ibid.) 
The movement spread, and in twelve months Auckland had a branch, which 
produced its pamphlet maintaining that the League now had the support 
of 160 out of 200 local bodies (representing 670,000 people) and wanted 
Asiatic immigration terminated for twelve months (WNZL, Auckland, 1926:1). 
The League included in their publication supporting evidence from 
Senator Dr. Jas. Phelan, Mr. John Fuller, governing director of Fuller's 
Theatres Ltd., the Right Rev. Dr. K. Stephen, Bishop of Newcastle, N.S.W., 
the late Mr. Massey, Sir Henry Parkes, Mr. Coates P.M., and Mr. S. 
McDermott, proprietor of the Graphic and director of half a dozen 
companies. The relationship, however, between the aims of the League 
and the quotations is debatable, Mr. Coates' statement being a case in 
point: 
There are calls on the community to assist in what is 
the duty of every true New Zealander. We want to see 
New Zealand populated by a strong, healthy, virile 
and intelligent race, New Zealand wanted to keep the 
race pure. She would fail in her duty if she did not 
help the Mother Country by taking as much of the 
surplus Home population as possible. 
(WNZL, Auckland, 1926:6) 
Generally, this document was more abusive than former ones describing 
Asiatics as people who enjoy 'all the privileges of British protection'. 
contribute 'nothing to defence' or the 'prosperity of the district' and 
'rob the soil of its inherent fertility as they farm for immediate 
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profits I . : 6) . If one leased land to these people, the pamphlet 
concluded, one would lose the 'goodwill and respect' of one's fellows 
and stand 'convicted of a deplorable absence of parochial pride' . : 7) . 
In 1927, a Wellington branch of the same organisation appeared 
with a similar pamphlet pressing the urgency of the matter; it used less 
space and more invective than its predecessors (WNZL, Wellington 1927). 
Although the position had strong support, it was not without its cs, 
one of whom responded to the New Zealand Times on behalf of Chinese 
market gardeners. Yang Kwei (foreigner), as the writer signed the 
maintained that, had it not been for the pioneering Chinese 
growers, vegetables would not have been available, and while the 
conditions of their existence might be uncomfortable, it was not 
necessarily because the Chinese desired it but rather because the 
'rapacious white freeholder' who leased the land (at £.15 an acre) 
refused to provide a bungalow for his tenants (NZT, 20 April 1926). 
According to the author, ' .. . the white [must] realise that his labour 
is worth only the market value of the work done, and that if he lives 
in a mansion and buys his vegetables he can never compete successfully 
with his fellow who lives in a cottage and grows cabbages in his back 
yard' (NZT, 26 April, 1926). 
While there is no remaining history of the League's activity, 
Ponton states that the government decided to withdraw the quota system 
1926 (see Chapter s,pages 225-6) but as noted before, there is some 
uncertainty that this occurred. The movement seems to have died in 
Wellington, but the Pukekohe situation fermented. 
At the time the New Zealand Chinese confronted the League's 
activity, they also had to face division within their own community.38 
An argument developed over organisation for the 1927 Double Tenth 
celebration in Wellington. The committee organised to handle events 
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was made up of the CKT, KMT and presumably the existant locality 
associations. Since the CKT and the KMT each supported a different 
government in China, arguments emerged over which was to be flown 
to show support for their respective governments. At the time, the CKT 
still supported the Peking government and wanted the five-colour flag, 
while the KMT wanted the white star on blue to be flown. According to 
press coverage of the events, the majority of the Wellington community 
were Peking 
committee 
, and the KMT was forced to withdraw from the 
39 12 October 1927). The paper maintained that the 
community did not want the 'revolutionary flag' and sided instead with 
the 'Neutral party', which was the Republic of China as far as Peking 
and the British Government were concerned (ibid.).40 Two flags were 
flown at the celebration, but according to the paper one group celebrated 
at Hutt Park .). In Christchurch a similar celebration was held 
at English Park with a thousand people attending the function. The 
flag of the Repub of China was saluted by 150 Chinese residents, 
who then listened to speeches by local elders. 1Vhile was a nationalist 
celebration commemorating a political event, the funds collected in the 
early years were given to local charity, in 1927 to the Citizens 
Unemployment Fund. By far the most dominant aspect, however, was the 
sports activities, which were to prevail at such annual gatherings from 
this period hence. were diverse events, including an apple-eating 
race, cycle race, sack race and blind man's buff, and there was also a 
football game between local Chinese teams, one of which had played in 
• • W II' 41 prevl0us years agalnst e lngton. Sport in this situation was 
important, for it was seen as a means of maintaining high morale and 
morality in the community. Being an acceptable activity to the dominant 
society, it became the first context in which the European public, 
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including the press, had access to the Chinese community in a situation 
which could not be criticised. During the depression which followed, 
the Chinese shared a similar economic condition, and their 
'11' . b d . 42. h ld h d Wl lngness to asslst y onatlon or In any way t ey cou ,elpe 
remove the stigma with which they had for so long been inflicted. 
The changed public profile of the Chinese community, however, 
was matched with a privatised profile in the existence of the district 
associations. According to informants, the hiding of internal conflicts 
and the provision of a group of people who could act as arbiters between 
themselves and the European community were primary reasons for the 
existence of these associations. The implications, therefore, of the 
political events in China represented in New Zealand by the KMT and 
the forced closer relationship with European society were manifested 
both in a public and private response and the development of appropriate 
structures to handle each context. Viewed historically and taking into 
consideration the organisations that emerged after a period of 
individual leadership at the turn of the century, one can discern a 
cycle of activity. Initially individuals responded to constraint and 
antagonism imposed by the New Zealand context and later organised 
themselves in response to events in China. The outcome of these two 
activities was the presence of a consul and factional interests in the 
community which were consolidated under the aegis of the Chong Wah Wui 
Koon. This represents the first phase of the cycle. The events 
following this represent the second phase of the cycle as political 
factions emerged, particularly the KMT and the CKT, undermining the 
Chong Wah Wui Koon and leading to the creation of district associations 
which attempted to calm the political differences in the community and 
ensure a mediated relationship with Europeans. The most important aspect 
of this stage of the cycle was the location of power in the community, 
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which clearly rested with a group of merchants and the consul. While 
merchants may have had consistent views on business and the Customs 
Department, their political allegiances and district affiliations might 
contradict any initiative for cooperation, which provided obvious 
problems for a community association like the Chong Wah Wui Koon. 
Given any disruptive change in the context of the community, however, 
this factionalised power might find itself forced to consolidate, bringing 
the various organisations under one representative body as had occurred 
in 1909. Clearly the events during the depression, 
later in China, with the influence of the Second World ~~ar 
on New Zealand, were to provide the catalyst, but with a more dispersed 
Chinese community it was not clear where the impetus for change would 
come from. The core of the Chinese community, generally assumed to be 
Wellington, seemed to be the locus of decision-making, but during the 
depression peripheral communities retained the prerogative to exercise 
power and influence over their own communities, since there is no 
evidence to suggest that the KMT functioned in a manner similar to a 
national Chong Wah Wui Koon. 
Before the cycle evolved further, however, events in the market-
gardening area around Auckland where the Chinese and Indians had settled 
became the focus of more national attention than the League's earlier 
attempt had succeeded in providing. The predominant issue of 1929 was 
'Racial Mixture' (Sun, 28 February 1929), 'Problem of the Half-Caste' 
(Evening Star, 3 April 1929), 'Native-Asiatic Mingling' (Sun, 12 June 1929) 
and 'Racial Purity' (Sun, 17 June 1929) - in short, miscegenation. A 
set of social facts had by the late 1920s coincided to produce a 
problematic situation. Initially the Chinese had been accused of 
separatism, immorality, failure to assimilate, failure to settle with 
their families and of taking accumulated capital back to China. Most 
of these characteristics were the very basis of the rationale for the 
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'white New Zealand' policy but by 1928 a New Zealand Herald article 
showed that they were not all still applicable. It appeared as though 
some Chinese were settling and even intermarrying. The article 
already quoted (see Chapter 5, page 258) had multiple titles: 'Race 
Alien Problem', 'Position of Chinese', 'Alarming Statistics', 'Rapid 
Female Increase', and 'The Race Firmly Planted' (NZH, 14 May 1928). The 
article noted that the government had stopped the issuing of permanent 
resident's permits in 19~6, in itself a debatable point (see Chapter 5, 
page 256), and as already mentioned in Chapter 5, spent much time 
dwelling on the increase in 'full blood' and 'half caste' Chinese women. 
It predicted that this situation could lead only to a multiplication of 
their numbers in New Zealand, the - 'race aliens have established a firm 
foundation' (NZH, 14 May 1928). The following year the Te Akarana 
Maori Association protested against the 'growing association between 
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men from the East and Maori women' (Sun, 28 February 1929). The 
essence of their statement was summed up in the following: 
In many North Island districts Maori labourers, many 
of whom are young girls are found to be working in 
groups in Chinese gardens, and entirely dependent 
for their livelihood upon their employers. Pleasant 
Otaki, near Wellington, possesses the doubtful 
distinction of being a centre where Chinese and 
Maori association is particularly pronounced. The 
Maoris who are forced to rely on Asiatics for an 
existence are mainly those who have lost their land 
possessions. 
(ibid. ) 
The result of the above situation was Chinese-Maori half castes, which 
the Association found abhorrent, especially since they considered 'Maori 
social life [to be] generally improving' (ibid.). While the issue of 
Chinese-Maori relationships dominated the above article the letter sent 
by the association to W.A. Veitch, Minister of Labour, suggested that 
living conditions, hours of work and wages were the important issue 
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(Sun, 12 June 1929), Andrew Ngawaka, 'a leading chief of the North 
Auckland , who visited Auckland, stated: 
I have noticed that many of them - women are 
living and co-mingling with Hindus and Chinese, 
and I have felt almost ashamed to acknowledge 
myself a Maori, 
12 June 1929) 
He maintained that 'the government and the people of New Zealand are 
neglecting their duty in allowing such conditions to 
The chief wanted a government inquiry, and the Association wanted 
legislation prohibiting the union of Asiatics and Maori women (Sun, 
15 June 1929). Sceptical reading of the newspaper debate that kept 
the issue in front of the public indicates that was being used to 
elevate the position of the Maori, defined as a group that lived in 
'amity' by side with white New Zealanders facing at some future 
time 'absorption', which, in the opinion of the writer, the Maori 
accepted: 
To the thoughtful Maori there seems to be nothing 
objectionable in this tendency. His attitude is 
determined by a perhaps subtle acknowledgement of 
the British as a superior race, yet at the same 
time as 'one of the family', 
(Sun, 17 June 1929) 
If the Maori accepted this, then: 
There is something humiliating in the idea that 
members of a race which New Zealanders are 
inclined to accept as equals should be reduced 
to squalid relationships with Chinese of a class 
which has no intellectual aspirations. 
17 June 1929) 
Clearly, Maoris were being enlisted in the attack on the Chinese, and 
as Worna11-Smith notes, '., .the general attitude of the mid-twenties 
ret.ained definite elements of assimilation theories prominent in the 
earliest native policies' (Wornall-Smith, 1970: 3) , 
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By July the Chinese were accused of actually 'canvassing' for 
Maori women in Auckland to go and work on their gardens, while at that 
time, according to the Te Akarana Maori Association, already 
four Maori girls were employed and living in Chinese 'quarters' 
44 12 July 1929). The consternation spread, and a reporter was dispatched 
to Thames and Kirikiri to investigate reports of similar activity. The 
that came back confirmed that Maori women did indeed work on 
Chinese gardens but that whole families accompanied them and there 
were no 'unfortunate results' as the euphemism went 7 July 1929). 
Wages were agreeable and negotiated frequently and the only dispute 
which had arisen concerned the sale of pea sticks and tomato stakes by 
Maoris to Chinese agents who in turn sold them, plus commission, to 
their compatriots. In this situation the commission was the problem 
29 July 1929). 
In the same month the National Council of Women joined with the 
Te Akarana Maori Association. Dr. Mildred Staley summarised their 
feelings: 
Chinese associations are dangerous, morally, 
spiritually and physically. Special efforts are 
needed to fight the evil ... The Chinese are riddled 
with disease. Drastic legislation is urgently 
wanted; it can be got now that the treaty ports 
are closed. 
(Sun, 26 July 1929) 
The NCW gave its support, inviting two Maori women to join their 
Auck 1 and branch .). Despite the alliance of Te Akarana Maori 
Association, The White New Zealand League, North Auckland Chieftains, 
the Treaty of Waitangi Maori Welfare League and the Maniopoto District 
Maori Council, the speeches of Sir Apirana Ngata in the House and the 
support of the National Council of Women the government was slow to move. 
The issue, however, stayed in the newspaper through July and August until 
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a commission was finally set up in the early part of September on the 
45 insistence of Sir Apirana Ngata. The Commission was made up of Dr. 
T.J. Hughes, Medical Officer of Health for Auckland, Mr. W. Slaughter, 
Officer in Charge of the Labour Department in Auckland, and Mr. Tukere 
te Anga, Native Department (AJHR 1929, G-ll:l) with the omission of 
any on for Maori women or the Chinese community. 
The Commission's mandate was summed up in the following: 
1. In the City of Auckland and its environs and the 
surrounding district to what extent are the Maori 
people employed either as servants or contractors 
of Chinese and other Asiatics or of Europeans in 
connection with market-gardening? 
2. Under what circumstances the Maoris are so employed 
as to their payment, housing and general health and 
sanitary conditions. 
3. To ascertain as far as possible how many female 
Maoris are living with Chinese or Hindus ,whether 
lawfully married or not. 
4. Whether it is in the interest of public morality 
that the employment of Maori girls and women by 
Chinese and Hindus should be permitted to take place. 
5. Generally to report such matters affecting the Maori 
race in any family or other connection with the 
Chinese or Hindus of which you think notice should 
be taken in the interests of the Maori or the public. 
6. If you are of opinion that the existing conditions 
require emendation, what remedy would you suggest? 
A.T. Ngata, Native Minister 
(ibid.) 
As the Commission started its investigation, a confrontation developed 
between the Chinese Consul, Ou Tsin Shuing43 and Dr. Mildred 
The Consul responded initially to the statement made by Dr. Staley 
(quoted on 356), presuming that she had 'outgrown the impetuosity 
of youth' and that her accusations were based on her own experience. 
He proceeded to ask her to respond to the following questions: 
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1. In what way are Chinese associations dangerous morally? 
By way of note I may say that the Chinese youth is taught his 
duty as follows: "At home a young man should show the 
qualities of a son; abroad, those of a younger brother. 
He should be circumspect but truthful. He should have charity 
in his heart for all men, but associate only with the virtuous". 
2. In what way are Chinese associations dangerous spiritually? 
Here I may ask you also to say what you mean by spiritually. 
If you mean from the point of view of your own particular 
religious dogma, then I would remind you that the Chinese 
place their national code of ethics governing as it does life 
on earth on a far higher plane than the Western code of ethics 
... To enable you to answer the question fully, I must tell 
you that the principal duty of a Chinese man is to pay a 
careful attention to every want of his parents and that in 
China there is no such thing as a parent applying for a 
maintenance order against a son. 
3. In what way are Chinese associations dangerous physically? 
4. What grounds have you as a medical graduate of the University 
of London for saying that the Chinese are riddled with disease? 
5. From whom or where did you learn that the five Chinese Treaty 
Ports are now closed to the British? 
6. I may add that the friendship between Great Britain and China 
is increasingly cordial, and such unfounded statements should 
not be publicly and lightly made. 
(Sun, 22 August 1929) 
Dr. Staley responded: 
1. Physically, because these Maori women on Chinese market-gardens 
have no 'trade union' to protect them from 'overtime', and long 
hours of overstrain with no facilities for rests in comfortable 
conditions etc. Also because we found so many cases of 
contagious diseases among these Maori girls as a result. 
2. Spiritually, because it is a disaster when young people throw 
over their traditional moral safeguards, the religion in which 
they were reared and which provides some special religious 
marriage ceremony that satisfies the womanly longings for 
puri ty ... Naturally this "irresponsible association" with 
Chinese that has had such results is regarded as a strain on 
their race by thoughtful Maoris who are quite aware that 
Chinese men coming here have been married very young in China, 
so that even civil marriage would be bigamous. It matters not 
what the religion is; a Hindu caste girl who violates her 
religious marriage-law by associating with a non-Hindu, has 
outraged her conscience, and is on a downward spiritual path. 
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3. Mentally it is dangerous, because you yourself will hardly 
maintain that these uneducated Chinese market-gardeners 
understand and foster Maori arts and culture, or that hard 
labour in the fields (under "slavery" like the "Mui Tsoi" 
system) is mentally elevating and gives time and opportunity 
to the Maori girls to revive and cultivate their great 
gifts of arts and crafts and music, etc? 
I trust that what I have very hurriedly written, quite 
frankly, will show that there is a real and acute problem 
for all of us to face, and wish to keep in on a high mental 
and spiritual level, and free from degrading habits. 
I hope also that you realise that all that the National 
Council wants is to help the Maoris to face their own problems 
wisely, as no doubt you also feel that the time has come when 
this matter must be settled, with the aid of common-sense 
and goodwill on every side. 
I am too busy to enter on any further correspondence, and I 
feel sure you will appreciate this clear statement of the 
Maori case as a help to your own cognitions on the subject. 
CS.un, 22 August 1929) 
The Consul was hardly satisfied with her response, which in his 
opinion evaded some of his questions and only reiterated her previous 
statements about the Chinese. He stated in response that the disease 
she referred to, dysenurry, had been in Pukekohe long before the Chinese 
arrived and that if 'facilities for rests in comfortable positions' were 
not available, then her deductions about results must be negated 
(Sun, 26 August 1929). He maintained that Chinese men had greater 
respect for women than 'men of the West'; that if Chinese market gardeners 
are uneducated because they can't speak English then her inability to 
speak Chinese must qualify her for the same accusation and finally he 
wondered whether European growers would have provided employment for 
those who needed work (ibid.) .48 He concluded: 
I presume that you have no objection to my handing 
this correspondence to the Auckland newspapers. 
(ibid.) 
Dr. Staley objected to the Consul's final suggestion, but he merely 
maintained that since she had made public her 'malicious charges' in the 
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place respecting Chinese market gardeners he saw no reason now why 
she should request immunity on the basis of her occupation .). 
The complete correspondence was published, with only one result: 
Graham of the White New Zealand League challenged the Consul's 
response to Dr. Staley, asserting that the Consul's description of 
Chinese ethics was perhaps more relevant to China than Pukekohe 
and that he could perhaps be of more use getting his own countrymen 
to the cause of some of the allegations, since local Chinese 
organisations had not responded instead of. attacking Dr. Staley (Sun, 
49 27 August 1929). 
In October, the report of the Committee on 'Employment of 
Maoris on Market Gardens' was sent to Sir Apirana Ngata. The members 
of the Commission had been to several areas where gardens were located 
and interviewed various people. Table 9 provides a summation of the 
substantive data gathered. The facts were allowed to speak for 
themselves in the report, and it was clear that Auckland and Onehunga 
were out of line as far as wage rates were concerned. As for the number 
working, it was noted that the Commission was investi the gardens 
in the off-season; numbers would have been higher had they visited the 
gardens in November-December (harvest time) or February. 
When it came to the discussion of accommodation, one important 
was revealed, although the Commission made little of it. It 
appeared that in Otaki, Ohau, Foxton and Wanganui the Maoris who were 
working for the Chinese lived in their own homes close by, while in 
Auckland and Pukekohe they depended on accommodation, they had to 
come some distance (AJHR, 1929, G-ll:3). It was only in Otaki that 
were six cases of children being born to Maori women, but it 
from the report that the Chinese men accepted (ibid.). 
TABLE 9: 1929 Survey of Chinese Market Gardens in Seven Areas of the North Island 
Place 
Auckland 
Onehunga 
Pukekohe 
Otaki 
Ohau 
Foxton 
Wanganui 
No. Employed 
Male Female 
80 69 
10 
40 to 50 (m and f) 
20 to 40 (m and f) 
50 
4 2 
24 (m and f) 
No. of Chinese 
Gardens (a) 
7 
6 
15 
3 
11 
Mode of 
Employment (b) 
Contract/male 
By day/female 
By day/female 
Contract/male 
Hourly/male 
Hourly/female 
Contract 
By day 
Contract 
By day 
By day 
By hour/male 
By hour/female 
Wages (c) 
8d + 1/3 per bag of 
potatoes. 
5/-
5/-
10 tons of potatoes/ 
acre 6d/sack 
5 tons of potatoes/ 
acre 1/ 3 sack 
1/3 
1/-
1/3 to 1/6 per sack 
of potatoes 
7/- to 8/-
1/- to 1/6 per sack 
of potatoes 
10/-
6/- to 10/-
1/-
9d 
(a) In Onehunga, Auckland (the number of gardens was not listed in the report) and Pukekohe there were 
both Hindu and European gardens; in Otaki there were European gardens, while in Ohau, Foxton and 
Wanganui there were only Chinese gardens. 
(b) 
(c) 
Contract work usually involved harvesting potatoes, while day and hourly work were weeding, hoeing 
and thinning. 
Daily rate in most places included food. 
Source: The above is abstracted from the Report (AJHR, 1929, G-ll:2-3) 
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In Auckland and Pukekohe the statistics flowed, but only from 
the Te Akarana Maori Association, who gave the Commission figures 
that showed 'forty-five half-caste children had been born to twenty-
seven Maori girls by Chinese during the past three years' and that 
'seventeen other girls had returned to their homes in trouble' (ibid. :4). 
Official statistics from hospitals, the Registrar of Births, Deaths 
and Marriages, the Registrar of the Native Department or the 
Government Statistician were unavailable, and the Commissioner of 
Police refused to help the Commission (ibid. :4). 
On !the basis of this information the Committee had no hesitation 
in stating that it was not in the interests of 'public morality' for 
Maori girls to be employed by Chinese and Indians, but at the same 
time it added: 
The only avenue of employment open to them is 
employment in the market gardens, which are 
controlled almost entirely by Chinese and to 
a lesser extent by Hindus. 
(AJHR, 1929, G-ll:4) 
The contradictions continued: 'indiscriminate intermingling of the lower 
types of the races,SO i.e. Maoris, Chinese and Hindus' will destroy the 
national life of New Zealand and the 'intermingling of Maori with the 
lower type of Chinese or Hindus ... will have the effect of lowering the 
Maori standard of living' (ibid.). After all this, however, the 
Committee recognised that the exigencies of the economic conditions and 
the fact that Chinese 'are deprived of the right to bring their own 
women into this country is bound to provide problems' (ibid.). 
Two sets of recommendations followed the report, and both addressed 
their respective areas clearly and concisely, although the second was 
not required by the initial mandate of the inquiry. The first suggested 
that suitable accommodation should be required of all market gardeners 
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employing labour and that the site of such accommodation on 
gardens be approved by local authorities (AJHR, 1929, G-11:5). The 
committee recommended that Maori females should be at least twenty-one 
before accepting employment in the gardens, that a minimum wage be 
fixed and scrutinised and that statistics should be kept by relevant 
bodies . :5-6). Curiously the fifth recommendation asked that the 
education test for the Chinese be revised and raised. The second set 
of recommendations pertained almost entirely to the Maori situation and 
suggested that agricultural education be provided for Maoris; that areas 
for 'farm1ets', 'dairy farms' and 'cattle and sheep raising' be made 
available; that Maori arts and crafts be encouraged with marketing 
facilities for the products and that domestic training be provided for 
Maori girls (AJHR, 1929, G-11:6). These met Sir Apirana Ngata's 
intentions for the Commission and would have helped a people whose 
population was recovering (62,781 in 1926 and 82,326 in 1936) but was 
young and forced to migrate to urban areas for employment (see Worna11 
Smith, 1970 and Kernot, 1972), but no change was to occur for the Maori 
in their employment on the gardens until the election of the Labour 
government in 1946. What is perhaps most curious about the whole 
exchange that occurred and persisted till the late 1930s over the issue 
of Chinese market gardens and Maori 1abou~ was that no attempt was ever 
made to collect information on land-leasing patterns - for instance, 
who in fact rented land to the Chinese or Indians - or material on 
Chinese housing conditions. The important relationship between these 
two aspects was made some years later by Ernest and Pearl Beag1eho1e 
(1946) when they ascertained that much of the housing and sanitation 
problem emerged because of the land-leasing pattern - predominantly by 
Europeans but some Maoris were involved - to Chinese. Leases, as 
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already noted, were short term, and Chinese gardeners had little 
incentive to set up a permanent residence when they were continually 
faced with moving (Beag1eho1e, E. and P., 1946:78). Obviously, it 
was in the interest of both Maori and European to lease land for 
horticulture, not only because of the rent gained especially during the 
depression, but also because, as mentioned by a number of market 
, the Chinese developed the land, making it particularly 
suitable for pasture once they vacated the gardens. 
other omission from the report is any kind of statement 
indicating the obviously drastic differences in the relationship between 
Maori, European and Chinese in the various situations where they all co-
existed. It is clear from the report that things were qualitatively 
different in Foxton, Otaki, Ohau and Wanganui, for instance, and 
definitely not as antagonistic as they were in Auckland and Pukekohe. 
Similarly, one can find other areas in New Zealand with a similar 
population and history and yet find no overt evidence of hostility. 
Ohakune and Taetihi were such areas, also in the North Island, opened 
up by sawmilling and settled by Europeans and Chinese who moved in with 
h 1 1 M · . 51 t e oca aorl communlty. This occurred at the turn of the century, 
when the Chinese man arrived, sponsored to New Zealand by a gold-
mining relative and bound to search out his own fortune. He noted the 
demands of a sawmilling community and the railway workers who came with 
the main trunk line as it pushed through, and opened up a general supply 
store. His success allowed him to sponsor his eldest nephew to New 
Zealand in 1908 who, after experiencing work in five other centres 
finally decided that his uncle's enterprise was perhaps the best 
possibility at the time. 52 The business grew, attracting other Chinese 
men, and finally a partnership was organised in 1914 to incorporate 
all the members. The uncle and two nephews controlling the business 
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in 1914 were all from the same village in China. At this time, they 
had experienced no hind~ance totheir activity nor were they to, as the 
business declined with the end of the sawmilling era and the syndicate 
53 
split and diversified into market-gardening by the 1920s. The gardens 
meant a closer relationship with the local Maori community, and 
eventually nine out of the original twenty members of the syndicate 
. d . 54 marrle Maorl women. 
This variety of response to Chinese settlement is never emphasised 
in historical accounts. Eighty-six local communities, apart from the 
four main centres, had Chinese residents in the 1920s, most of them 
relatively free from hostility, so the anxiety expressed was 
disproportionate, considering the extent of their distribution. 
While the market gardeners and the Consul were involved with 
this situation, events in China had progressed to a stage which 
stimulated the Chinese community, at least in Wellington, to reconsider 
its situation. 
In the spring of 1927 Chiang Kai Shek had almost achieved the 
intent of his Northern Expedition, which by April had occupied 
Shanghai and systematically set about exterminating all Chinese 
Communist Party members in the city. This asserted the might of the 
Knomintang, but at the same time destroyed the alliance that Sun had 
made with the Communists. Effectively, China had one government in 1928, 
but built upon shaky substance. Meanwhile, the effects of depression 
began to take their effect on economies and the lives of many people, 
including the Chinese residents in New Zealand, and with it came 
insecurity. If there had been any hope for peaceful times in their 
homeland, they were becoming increasingly infrequent, and the foreboding 
of an economic depression and a backlash of racism in New Zealand looked 
equally unappealing. 
Some Chinese in New Zealand - the actual locality or people 
involved remains unknown - became increasingly alarmed and decided 
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that a national organisation of Chinese was necessary both to consolidate 
the di that had emerged and to confront any major problems that 
would affect the community. In 1928, with the arrival of the new Cansul, 
an approach was made to him to secure support for starting a national 
organisation. A meeting was called by the Consul of entati ves from 
the various associations: it comprised the Poon Fa association (3), 
Tung Jung (3), Kwong Chew Club (3), KMT (2), GKT (1) and the Consul 
himself. 55 According to informants, an association was formed with Joe 
Lay Choy as the president and Chiu Gok Jun (see page 334) a Church 
minister as the Secretary. Initially, two branches were started, one in 
Dunedin and the other in Christchurch, both affiliated to Wellington, 
which remained the headquarters. 
In 1930 a third branch was started when the forty Gisborne 
Chinese in Gisborne formed a club which they all joined (Gisborne 
Association Minute Book, 1937-1944:1). The club was to act explicitly 
in a liaison capacity for overseas Chinese, resolve conflicts in the 
community and lp those who incurred any expense due to accidents 
(ibid.) . A description of this early association maintained it was 
'democratic', holding meetings every week, and if there was no urgent 
business a speech would be given to 'exchange wisdom and mutual 
encouragement' 
According to informants, this loosely organised national 
association had no official title, but has been called a Chung Wah Wui 
56 Koon like s predecessor. 
While the structure was loose, the Wellington and perhaps 
Auckland executives57 were able to respond to at least three issues 
between 1930 and 1932. 
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The first issue was a move on the part of the local Chinese 
community to have the 1911 temporary permit provision for students re-
activated. Ie is known of the original scheme, although there is 
some contention that it was discontinued either because it was 
impossible to supervise or because it was not used (see Chapter 5, p. 236). 
In 1930 the association and the Consul made representations to the 
government to institute the same provisions again, and the government 
complied under the following conditions: 
1. That the student shall not at the date of intended 
arrival in New Zealand, be under the age of ten years; 
2. that, except with the special authority of the Minister 
(of Customs), a permit shall not be granted to any 
person unless his father is domiciled in and is 
residing in New Zealand; 
3. that, except with the special permission of the Minister, 
nothing in the permit shall be deemed to authorise a 
student to remain in New Zealand after he has reached 
the age of twenty-four years; 
4. that, while the student is allowed to remain in New 
Zealand under the authority of the permit he will not 
in any work of any kind whatsoever other than 
study. 
(NA,L22/l/8l, Section 2:1) 
Predictably, accusations followed close on the provision of such 
a scheme, as it was that the Chinese would use a temporary permit 
system to get round the total restrictions imposed at the time. However, 
it must be noted that general wealth in the Chinese community was hardly 
more than the norm for New Zealand at the time, and the possibility of 
supporting a student or son for a prolonged period as well as a family 
in China was not a desirable situation. In fact, departures from the 
community during period 1927 to 1934-35, annually exceeded arrivals 
(see Appendix II). 
In 1931, the Wellington branch of the association was visited by 
Lin Sen, President of the Legislative Yuan (parliament) and member of 
the State Council (cabinet), along with Chan Yew Foon, Chairman of the 
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overseas Chinese communities in the United States, Fiji, New Zealand 
and Australia, to raise money for the construction of the new government 
building in Nanking. The response was favourable in New Zealand, and 
after a visit to Wellington and Auckland £200- ~OO was donated to the 
fund. 
In the following year the association was called upon to speak 
for the local community when a petition appeared signed by C.R. Lloyd 
and 1,456 others in Franklin County urging the government to repatriate 
all Asiatics, 'particularly Chinese and Indians', so that 'they may be 
replaced in their occupations by approximately ten to twelve thousand 
of our own men and boys who are at present unable to earn a living' 
58 (AJHR, 1933, I-I, No.16). 
The petition was presented to Parliament in September at the time 
that Ou Tse Shuing, the Consul, left to take up his new post in Melbourne, 
where he replaced Mr. Chunhow H. Pao who was to come to Wellington 
59 (NA, IA 1933/60/15, 18 August 1932 and 1 March 1933). In the interim 
until Pao took up his position, Yue Jackson, promoted to Vice Consul in 
1931 (NA, IA 13/35/13, 20 April 1931), was acting Consul. 
When the news of the petition reached the Chinese, both the Vice 
Consul and the major Chinese communities in New Zealand responded. A 
joint statement was printed in the newspaper signed by the leaders of 
the Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin communities (see 
Appendix XXIX). Essentially, the lengthy response described the petition 
as an unwarranted and falacious slander on the 'Chinese nationals' in 
New Zealand and on China itself (EP, 7 November 1932). It argued, 
contrary to the assertion in the petition (see Appendix XXIX), that the 
total population of Chinese was 2,854 and that of the Indians was 1,166; 
that a local Chinese would be lucky to send more than £50 home a year; 
that this money would not need to be sent home if the New Zealand 
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government allowed wives and famil ies to come to New Zealand; that the 
New Zealand population was not made up of the 'lower classes I but of 
professionals, agricultural, industrial and merchant classes; and finally 
that 'industry, thrift and cleanliness' did not add up to insanitary 
behaviour (EP, 7 November 1932) ,60 They stated they were proud of their 
country and that if this kind of behaviour persisted they would presume 
it would jeopardise trade relations between China and New Zealand and 
also make the life of British nationals residing in China as unpleasant 
as their own situation in New Zealand (ibid.). 
For the first time, the Chinese community responded collectively 
through their leadership, and the desired result was achieved. The 
issue died down, and even though the petition had to be submitted 
again in 1934, since it missed the hearing of the petitions committee 
in 1932 and 1933, little eventuated and no recommendation was made to the 
!~overnment. The only repercussion was another attempt by the National 
Council of Women in 1934 to get an improvement in the conditions of 
female labour in the gardens (P:::-ess, 21 April 1934), This time the 
Christchurch, Wellington and Aw:kland branches of the National Council 
of Women co-ordinated their effort but in the end changed the request 
to specify that conditions should be changed by all employers of female 
labour (~bid.). 
If the period of the late 1920s and the early 1930s was unpleasant 
for the Chinese, it was even wo:,se for many New Zealanders who faced the 
depression years with no sustenance payments for unemployment but 
instead a philosophy of 'no relief without work' which in the end reduced 
thousands to 'incredible penury' (Sutch, 1966:134).61 While the 
government's action was repressive, passing the Public Safety 
Conservation Act of 1932 outlawing almost any opposition, it was credible 
------~ .. -,~~ ~ 
that the European population did not seek out the Chinese as a means of 
venting their frustration, whicll was clearly justified for other reasons. 
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Other than the events mentioned above, it seems the Chinese survived 
the depression with their European fellows and not in a situation of 
opposition. Clearly from all accounts, the Chinese standard of living 
dropped considerably, and remittances home declined, but there is also 
evidence that mutual sharing and their own form of al security 
allowed them to help the surrounding community.62 It seems almost 
certain that most Chinese preferred self employment or employment 
within their own community which excluded them from any or 
Work Scheme. While it was clear they paid taxes, as pointed out by 
Andrew Chong, a Chinese born and educated in Auckland, he also 
maintained they were excluded from any form of help 11 January 
1933). According to him, at least one hundred Chinese were out of work 
and practically destitute in Auckland; receiving neither relief work 
nor rations, they were forced to depend on relatives and (ibid.) . 
In Christchurch, when the issue of Chinese unemployment arose, the 
officer in of the Labour Department stated that no h~ 
applied for , and as far as he knew none were unemployed (Press, 
12 January 1933). According to informants, businesses became labour-
intensive if only to provide room and board, but also gambling and opium-
smoking appeared to be widespread. This provided newspaper copy, but 
it appeared as news and not as indictment of the Chinese. 
In 1934, the Rev. W.W. Chan of the United Chinese Christian Mission 
tried to organise a gardening scheme in both Wellington and Christchurch 
to alleviate the unemployment. In the former he estimated there were 
about 400 unemployed and in the latter, 200, while in Auckland he 
suggested he would try to bring the !two tongs' together, which 
presumably associational conflict (Press, 8 June 1934).63 
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Chan's scheme never eventuated, as the Unemployment Board would not 
support the idea because it showed preferential treatment for the 
Chinese (Press, 13 June 1934). As far as the Board was concerned, the 
Chinese were to be treated as anyone else and would have to register 
before any assistance would be made available (ibid.). 
This endeavour on the part of the Reverend Chan and the publicity 
surrounding it produced some concern in the Chinese community, and the 
Reverend Y.S. Chau, a well respected member of the Auckland community, 
discretely contradicted Chan's contention, insisting, after his visit 
to the 'Southern Provinces', that unemployment in Dunedin, Invercargill, 
Timaru, Oamaru, Ashburton and l~ellington was not serious and, furthermore, 
'that the Chinese community always looked after its own in these sorts of 
times' (Press, 27 June 1934).64 
Throughout the depression, Double Tenth was celebrated in 
Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin with the KMT dominating in both 
organisation and speech topics. Calls were continuously made for closer 
ties and increased trade relations between East and West. But by 1932 
there was clear concern over China's apparently impossible position 
caught between Russian communism and Japanese imperialism (see Press, 
11 October 1932 and 11 October 1933). Consul Chunhow H. Pao made 
impassioned pleas on behalf of Chinese 'nationalism' and 'international 
justice' (ibid.). The New Zealand Chinese community's first university 
graduate, Ng Hor Gee (William Wah), became an exponent of the community's 
interests and spoke forcefully about the need for an internationalist 
perspective on the part of New Zealanders Ivhen speaking to the Christchurch 
Businessmen's Club and the Returned Serviceman's Association (Press, 
65 12 and 13 March 1934). 
Through the early 1930s, the situation in China steadily 
deteriorated: 
... the war situation worsened, the Koumintang's 
failure to deal with China's internal problems became 
the source of widespread disaffection. Criticism was 
repressed. All China's ills were blamed on the 
Japanese and the Communists. As the war dragged on, 
the Koumintang became more and more authoritarian. A 
process of alienation slowly set in, isolating 
Chiang's harassed government from the people it 
claimed to be defending. 
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(Schurmann and Schell, 1967:134) 
By October 1934 the entrapped Communists broke out of Chiang's 
fifth and longest anti-communist campaign and moved north on the epic 
Long March, which took them eventually to Yennan in the northwest. At 
the Double Tenth celebration in the same month in New Zealand, the 
retreat of the Communists was heralded with support for Chiang Kai-shek, 
while the local press reported Yuan Shih Kai as the new head of state 
in China (Press, 11 October 1934)! 
In Wellington the event was also celebrated, all shops, laundries 
being closed and work in the gardens ceasing for the day. Two to three 
hundred people attended, according to the Evening Post,gathering in the 
St. John's Ambulance Association hall (EP, 10 October 1934). The 
meeting was presided over by the president of the Chinese Residents 
Association, William Kwok, and speeches were made by the Consul, Vice 
Consul, Assistant Consul, and Chiu Gok Jun the Chinese Missioner in 
Wellington. In his speech, the Consul said nothing about the local 
Chinese but a considerable amount about the state of affairs in China. 
He described his country as one that had witnessed twenty-two years of 
trouble, including social, political and intellectual revolutions, a 
'struggle to remove the imperialist yokes' and 'out-of-date treaties', 
and finally struggle to overcome the effects of floods and famines which 
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had devastated six provinces (EP, 10 October 1934). In addition, China 
now faced the hostility of its neighbour, Japan, who had occupied 
four provinces; the Consul appealed to the world for cooperation so 
that China could achieve 'political and economic independence' .). 
'The Chinese people are willing to fight and die for their liberty', 
maintained the Consul, and if the world would help, ' ... a strong China 
will be a blessing to the world and is sure to solve many of the world's 
economic problems' .) . 
The second period from 1909 till the establishment of the second 
Chung Wah Wui Koon characterised by increasing complexity as the 
Chinese community responded not only to the New Zealand government, but 
now also to the divisions within its own community and the growing 
influence of China on overseas diaspora. 
It was already clear that events in China were being reflected 
in the New Zealand community as various people, at least in Wellington, 
aligned themselves with particular causes. Previously, the influence 
of the New Zealand government had been handled through the means of the 
petition. After 1909 the petition was replaced by appeals to the Chinese 
Consul, who in turn represented the interests of the community, or 
sections of it, to the government. It was clear that the first Consul, 
for example, had more concern for the merchants than for other segments 
of the community and was not particularly sympathetic to Chinese who 
changed nationality, accepting that of a country quite clearly opposed 
to his people's presence. In this light it was interesting that the 
Consul, while avowing a non-political stance, blamed the nature of the 
New Zealand Chinese community on the milieu in which they resided. 
The Consul's role also extended to the attempt to quell factions 
in the community, and to this end the first Chung Wah Wui Koon was 
established with regional representatives, but the factions, rather than 
diminishing,increased, due to changes in China, and the association's 
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authority was fragmented, giving way to the KMT, CKT and the monarchists, 
who all held strongly to their particular views on China's future. 
Following this development the community responded to its own political 
disunity with the establishment of informal non-political groups based 
on locality. The Po on Fa, Kwong Chew, Tung Jung and the 
associations, together with the KMT and the ageing CKT, effectively 
constituted the organisational structure of the community by the early 
1920s. It is these groups, for instance, which sponsored and organised 
the individual Double Tenth celebrations in the various communities 
where they existed. It is important to note, however, that communities 
retained their authority over local matters until at least 1928, when 
the second attempt, this time originating in the Chinese community itself, 
was made to establish a national organisation. This again was a response 
to both internal division, as the KMT and the CKT competed for hegemony 
over the community, and external influence such as the White New Zealand 
League and opposition developed to a growing market-garden industry. This 
time the Chong Wah Wui Koon had representatives from all associations 
rather than regional representation. While a national organisation 
failed to emerge as a powerful group, the initiation of this activity 
did stimulate some communities to develop their own local association 
which represented local interests but did not, at least as far as I have 
ascertained, attempt to represent any particular sectional interests. 
This was important, for it was these very organisations which became 
the model for a national association in the next period and proved that 
regional representation was a better model for organisation than the 
use of associational liation. In a sense it was a return to the 
1909 solution, but initiated in the more contemporary case by the local 
communities' needs and their own desire to define their existence 
rather than the desire of the Consul. 
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Two other points are important to mention as regards this 
period. Firstly, the Consul's place of origin and political affiliation 
are important variables. Consuls from northern China tended to have 
less influence in the local community, and their political affiliation, 
as time went on, meant that attempts to raise national pride and 
support for China amongst the overseas Chinese received considerable 
impetus from their presence. However, they seldom seemed to be directly 
associated with the KMT organisation in New Zealand except in the case 
of Lin Shih Yuan. While there were numerous Consular representatives 
from China, there was only one representative in the Consul's office 
from the New Zealand Chinese in the person of Yue Jackson, who maintained 
continuity of representation despite changes in the office. His unique 
role was to know the problems of the local community, which meant he 
was particularly valuable, so much so that his transfer was once 
opposed, according to informants, by local Chinese. 
The second point relates to the relationship between Chinese 
individuals and their families in China. In a very real sense each 
individual Chinese overseas was involved in a political quest, trying to 
increase the power and prestige of his family, village or lineage, and 
to this end he responded pragmatically to changes in China and New 
Zealand. This means that immigration restrictions, economic well-being 
in New Zealand, conditions in the home village - all must be weighed up 
when decisions are made as to a future place of residence, amount of 
remittances, or migration plans for family members. In this period the 
decisions became increasingly difficult to make, and the situation 
worsened in both contexts with civil strife in China and a depression 
in New Zealand. 
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Three responses were made to this situation. This period is 
the first in which the number of families increased in the Chinese 
community, predominantly amongst the merchant group, which represented 
a conscious on the part of some to settle in New Zealand, 
although it would have been no problem for wealthier members of the 
community to ate their families. 
The second response was to seek a remedy to the harsh immigration 
restrictions, since newcomers were excluded from the possibility of 
permanent residence. The alternative which the Chinese community 
pushed for through their Consul and associations, was temporary 
residence, and this was to be gradually extended to students, to 
replacement for shop owners who wanted to home, and finally to 
wives and children of New Zealand residents in the next period. Their 
efforts were not totally successful, but the immigration that did take 
place meant that New Zealand, given a change in external relations with 
China, had to make up her mind to either 
temporary residents as permanent residents. 
or accept its 
The third response was an attempt at another Chung Wah Wui Koon, 
this time representing the constituencies that were already represented 
by associations in the community. The ultimate form of the organisation 
was more like a confederation, for there was no compulsion for other 
communities to develop a branch and affiliate to the Wellington organisation. 
However, a number of branches did develop local organisations, and 
major branches in larger communities set about representing the interests 
of their local community vis-a-vis New Zealand and China. 
In the following years this organisation would become the 
collective core of the community as it faced World War II and the 
Japanese invasion of China. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1 There is no indication as to whether or not Shah was a New 
Zealand Chinese, but Hwang needed an interpreter since he 
was from Northern China, spoke Manderin and was not familiar 
with local Cantonese dialects. He did not need a translator 
since the written language was similar. 
2 Wang Chung Siang arrived in 1909 and was accorded free entry 
with his wife to become Secretary to the Consul (NA, IA 09/608). 
3 Provisions were made for these categories in 1910. 
4 According to the deputation made to the Minister, there were 41 
Chinese laundries in Wellington out of which only two paid wages 
to employees (which made them subject to the Factories Act 
provisions); the others all operated as partnerships which would 
divide revenue proportionately when needed. The Factories Act 
applied to the European because, as stated by the deputation, 
'Laundry work is ... essentially women's work', and therefore 
laundry proprietors 'must employ female labour' which required 
specific rates of pay, working hours, conditions and holidays 
(Truth, 7 August 1909). 
5 NZCGMJ will be used as the abbreviation for New Zealand Chinese 
Growers Monthly Journal, hereafter. 
6 See footnote 39 for further information on the Chee Kung Tong. 
7 The average wage for a Chinese person in New Zealand would have 
been between 15/- and 18/- per week at the time. 
8 'The president was responsible for 'general business, vice 
presidents for assisting the president or replacing him in his 
absence, secretary to live in the association, treasurers, to 
'manage all financial matters': inspectors to oversee all 
activity of the association, and commentators to attend regular 
meetings and constitute the quorum. The Secretary was the only 
paid executive member, receiving il. 7.6 a week plus 1i ving 
quarters. 
9 This figure of 61% is based on the subscription number only and 
calculated using the 1906 Census returns. 
10 While there is discrepancy in the totals resulting from the 
payment of poll tax in these two periods (see the amounts in 
Appendix IX and the calculations derived from Appendix II), both 
indicate that these two periods together made the largest 
contribution to the poll tax revenue in the history of the New 
Zealand Chinese. While the business community may have had 
considerable fear of the competition of the Chinese community 
and the revenue that they were deriving from their occupations, 
some careful calculation would have indicated that much of their 
surplus income was being returned directly to the government's 
consolidated fund. 
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11 Don recorded the names, occupations and county of origin in 
his visits during 1909, 1911 and 1913 to Chinese in the North 
Island so we can gain some impression of the various communities 
and the occupations of the people (see also Appendix XXII). 
12 The earliest gardens recorded in Auckland date from the late 
l870s located in Carlaw Park, Khyber Pass, One Tree Hill, Mt. Eden, 
Mt. Roskill, Meadowbank, Mt. Wellington, Panmure and the area 
from Surrey Crescent to Western Springs once known as Chinaman's 
Hill (see Coleman, 1967). 
13 One informant described his stay in Sydney en route to New Zealand 
in the early 1900s at the age of eleven as a pretty dismal 
experience. He landed in Sydney at Christmas time and stayed in 
a Tshang Sheng restaurant for three months sleeping on sacks in a 
room with fifteen other men. He worked in the restaurant for 
his room and board. 
14 Remittances were estimated to be, on average, £20 to £40 per year. 
15 The ticket system was originally a Chinese character which was 
written on a clip which could be torn in half - one half for the 
customer and the other for the bundle. Later when Chinese 
children performed this task they used Roman numerals. 
16 Some of the departures would have been older men, since, as indic-
ated in Appendix XVII~ the number of people over 45 steadily 
decreased in the period from 1906 to 1921. 
17 Depending on the family's wealth, according to informants, both 
boys and girls would have their future marriages arranged between 
the ages of eleven and fourteen, and all boys would have been 
betrothed before they went overseas. 
18 Yue Yun Wah (Yue Henry Jackson) was born in Roxborough in 1881, 
one of five children of a Chinese father and a Scottish mother. 
Hue's father (a storekeeper) died in 1886, and in 1890 the 
mother took all the children back to their father's village in 
Toy San district Seyip. They were met in Hong Kong after a 
month long trip by two uncles from the same village. Their father 
had been previously married in China, but had no children from 
that marriage. The mother's presence in the village and her 
attempt to remove ancestral tablets from the family home led to 
considerable trouble, and other overseas Chinese (from the U.S.) , 
had to be brought in to re-establish order. Yue Yun Wah described 
his early schooling in the village of Lee Yuen, where pupils 
ranged from 14 to 25 years old, as made up of the Trimetrical 
Classics. Later he went on to high school taught by teachers who 
had passed their first Literary Degree, and in 1899 Yue was sent 
to Diocesan Boys' School in Hong Kong upon the suggestion of Dr.· 
Kew Yee. He learned English at the school, and in 1904 he asked 
Alexander Don to arrange for his return to New Zealand. Once in 
Dunedin, he worked for the Yoon Lee Co. while at the same time 
going to Dunedin Technical School to learn accounting. He went 
to Greymouth in 1905 and the next year returned to China. After 
four years' work in Shanghai, he returned to New Zealand with his 
nearly three-year-old daughter (the mother had died in Shanghai 
of smallpox). In Dunedin, Yue took over Don; s work for six months, 
then went to Wellington to assume his secretarial duties for T.H. 
Shah (Jackson, 1917, MS 112). 
19 This chronology differs somewhat from that provided in the 
brief history of consular representation in the New Zealand 
Chinese Growers Journal. According to this source, Hwang 
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was replaced by Joe Lau (Cantonese) and Vue Yun Wah (Jackson 
Vue). The latter became the second interpreter for the Consul. 
Joe Lau left New Zealand in 1912 and was replaced by Gwai 
Jik, who arrived from London (NZCGMJ, 1 September 1954:6). 
20 Besides the text below the appeal also included a plan of the 
proposed four forts and a list of the village organisers. 
21 Hereafter the Foreign Missions Report of the New Zealand 
Presbyterian Church will be abbreviated to FMR. 
22 This is the first time that one can see clearly the emergence 
of two groups in the community separated to some extent by 
language, one bilingual and the other predominantly Chinese 
speaking - and also by affiliation to Chinese organisations. 
There was a tendency for those who were educated in New Zealand 
to remain removed from the intricacies of these associations 
until some years later. 
23 This was not a false role, for the person concerned had a long 
relationship with the Baptist Church and continued to do so in 
New Zealand. Mr. Chiu was in charge of the Baptist Mission 
in Wellington from 1916 till 1922. 
24 This is the only case in New Zealand where a common surname 
dominated an association, but it is not a clan association. 
While there are now large families of the same surname living 
in New Zealand who can trace their family back three generations, 
they have never, to my knowledge, organised a clan association. 
District and county have always been the most fundamental shared 
characteristics articulated by an association. 
25 The last of the strict associations, formed in 1936, was the 
Seyip association in Wellington, which, by its constitution in 
1947, allowed as members all persons born in or who had resided 
in Seyip. The aims of the 1947 constitution, as compared to the 
revised aims in 1949, are in Appendix XXV. The members who 
signed the ori application for incorporation included seven 
laundrymen, five fruiterers, one gardener, and three importers, 
two of whom were partners in the same firm, and also executive 
members of the New Zealand Chinese association during the war 
years. 
26 The exception to this selective support was Lin Shih Yuan's 
involvement with the appeal by the Chinese government for funds 
to ease the in Chi-Ii province. In 1920 the Dominion 
printed news of the famine but added this statement: 
The white element is doing all that is possible to 
alleviate the distress, but is practically powerless 
against the supine attitude of the Government and the 
Chinese view, which considers famine a visitation 
from Heaven to clean an overcrowded land. 
(Dominion, 11 November 1920) 
The Consul responded to the paper, maintaining that the Chinese 
were attempting to help by collecting money from overseas Chinese 
and placing a levy on their own officials and further that 
the tone of the article was enough to cause tension between 
380. 
the West and East (Dominion, 16 November 1920). The New 
Zealand government finally received a request from the 
British Famine Relief Committee in Peking, and in January 1921 
£1l37 was sent, £182 of which came from collections and the 
remainder from voluntary donations sent in response to 
advertising (NA,IA 13/388/6). 
27 The actual number of merchants is hard to ascertain, since 
Census returns after 1916 did not list them as a separate 
category. However, informants have maintained that this was 
the period when their activity became firmly established and 
can readily identify the ones named in the Customs Department 
correspondence. If one combines the categories for 'General 
storekeeping' and 'Sales, other goods', there is a clear 
indication of expansion between 1921 and 1936, but this does 
not account for partnerships, which were the norm (see 
Appendix XXVII). 
28 For instance, Kung Foon Chan was, according to some informants, 
a company owned by Jung Sing people which not only sold goods 
to overseas merchants but provided accommodation for people in 
transit, arranged passage tickets and the shipping of goods. 
According to some people it supplied goods to Wong Shee Co., 
Chung Wah Co., Sing On Ke Co., Yee Chong Wing Co. and Wah Kee 
Co., all of whom were run by Jung Sing people. 
29 Customs eventually paid the importer;l288.40.0. in 1929, one 
year's exces duty paid between July 1926 and July 1927, the 
time when the Customs Department discontinued the added-value 
policy. From July 1924 till April 1927, the duty paid had been 
~3S47.lS.0 and the amount of excessive duty was!872.S.l 
(NA,Customs/l/1726j4, 4 March 1933). The importer was 
unsatisfied with the result and petitioned the government in 1929 
without satisfaction, and again in 1932 (see Appendix XXVIII) . 
The resulting investigation initiated by the petition made little 
difference. Customs maintained that the importer's goods had 
been compared with goods of Chinese importers and his were 
considerably cheaper (ibid., 15 May 1933). At the time of the 
first petition the Department had sought accounts from the 
suppliers in Hong Kong, Quan Cheung Shing, before they would 
consider any more adjustments, but no records were forthcoming, 
since the exporter had moved and records had been lost. The 1932 
petition, while receiving favourable treatment by the Petitions 
Committee, was turned down on the advice of Customs .). Two 
years later the importer took up the issue again 
support, claiming£S84.l.l for the other two years. In the legal 
submission, the onus of responsibility was laid clearly at the 
feet of the Customs Department, since their policy was 
supposedly based on evidence which they retained and since, by 
discontinuing the policy, they in fact admitted to a discrepancy 
(ibid., 1 September 1934). The outcome is unknown. 
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30 Wellington firms were not listed separately, but according to 
informants they included Ching Ting & Co., Wong Shee & Co., 
Wong Wah Lee, Duk Lee, Kong Wai Cheong, Wah Kee Bros., Sing 
On Kee Co., and Chung Wah Co. 
31 The comparison was possible because F10ckton and Company was 
importing similar goods to some of the Chinese merchants, 
including such things as brassware, 1aquered goods, gong stands, 
chinaware, statues, plates, carved furniture, and silk. Otherwise, 
imports were largely foodstuffs from different companies, which 
included salt beans, dried oysters, dried mushrooms, salt eggs, 
peanut oil, egg noodles, salt fish, rice, medical liquor, dried 
fish, bean stick, canned bamboo shoots, water chestnuts, onion 
pickle and cucumber. 
32 According to the records of Flockton and Company, the average 
cost of imports from China in the pqriod between 1927 and 1929 
had decreased by about 5%, but even so, there was still a marked 
discrepancy between their import prices and those of the Chinese 
merchants. 
33 Action was taken retroactively against two merchants in Wellington, 
but in each case Customs opted for the minimum fine of £100, plus 
cost of storage and forfeiture of the goods. The alternative would 
have been a fine amounting to three times the value of the goods, 
f500 in one case. The rationale for this decision was based on 
two assumptions: (a) that it was hard to prove the actual value 
of goods in China and (b) that the Chinese had 'a wireless 
system of their own for obtaining information about one another's 
doings', so that news of the fine would spread quickly and 
would be sufficient deterrence against further infractions (NA, 
Customs 1/1726/3, 26 June 1930). 
34 'Our Fields Afar' was the annual Foreign Missions report of the 
Presbyterian Church of New Zealand published by the Foreign 
Missions Committee in Dunedin, New Zealand. 
35 In 1925 the Communist and Nationalist cadres in Shanghai had 
organised the Federation of Trade Unions which in May held a 
series of demonstrations aimed at ending extraterritoriality and 
the return of foreign concessions to the Chinese. In the course 
of the demonstrations, the British Settlement police fired on 
the demonstrators, killing several, which led to a boycott on 
British goods. 
36 These events plus others that occurred in 1927 led to the 
evacuation of the New Zealand missions on three different 
occasions. The anti-Christian movement which began in 1922 and 
the virulent anti-foreign feeling of 1925-1927 hastened the 
desire for self-determination by the Chinese church, which by 
1927 received complete control of the foreign mission activity. 
By 1930 only twelve Presbyterian missionaries remained on the 
staff. in China (see Murray, 1969: 38-40) . 
37 The White New Zealand League pamphlet will hereafter be 
abbreviated to WNZL. 
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38 Lin Shih-yuan, the Consul appointed in 1918 had been replaced 
in 1922 as he had been re-assigned to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Peking (NA,IA 13/35/13, 18 August 1922). His 
replacement was Li Kwang Heung, from Peking who according to 
sources, was not particularly liked in New Zealand (see NZCGMJ 
1 January 1966). Li died in office, however in 1928, and it was 
shortly before this that the underlying factions in the 
community came to the fore. 
39 It has never been confirmed that the newspaper report was correct, 
only that two factions did exist and were opposed to each other. 
It was only with news of Chiang's successful Northern Expedition 
that the CKT faction relented, and it is maintained by informants 
that the organisation more or less ceased active operation after 
1928, although a few members survived until quite recently. The 
Chee Kung Tang actually registered as an incorporated society in 
1923. At the time, the entrance fee was set at is.8.0 per person 
and membership at j).6.0. When the organisation was registered 
the fifteen Wellington subscribers signed the document including 
five merchants, x fruiterers, two launderers, one gardener and 
one labourer. The organisation had an English secretary and a 
Chinese solicitor from Auckland, who prepared the document for 
incorporation. In 1973 it was realised that this long since 
defunct organisation held considerable assets in its name. The 
CKT was reconstituted, and the capital of $81,000 remaining from 
land and presumably past donations was re-distributed in 1977 
amongst other sting organisations (see also Chapter lO,p.S77). 
40 The Consul, on hearing of the dispute, wired Peking for 
confirmation on which flag was timate and might be flO\ffi at 
the Double Tenth. Peking replied that the five colour was the 
flag of the Republic and also the only one accepted by Britain. 
The Consul was told to stop the 'Revolutionary Flag' being flown, 
but according to the paper the police took no action, although 
they were in attendance at Athletic Park (Press, 12 October 1927). 
41 The antiquity of football matches between Chinese teams in New 
Zealand is not known, but an early photograph an all-male 
group in Wellington (circa 1912) shows one one holding a rugby 
ball. 
42 Each year during the depression the Christchurch Chinese donated 
the proceeds of Double Tenth celebrations to charity, particularly 
the Public Hospital. 
43 Mere Newton, President of Maori Women's Welfare League, was later 
to describe Te Akarana Maori Association as the 'voice of 
practically (2) two people, one being a pure pakeha', and she 
maintained that Maori women should be consulted over the issue 
before the 'academic' decisions of the association were 
considered (NA, Native Minister, Asiatics and Maoris, 8 August 
1930). 
44 An article in the Lyttelton Times (20 July 1929) stated that it 
was in fact middle-aged Maori women who were canvassing among 
rural Maoris for young girls to work in the gardens (see 
Wornall-Smith, 1970:7). 
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45 Sir Apirana Ngata evidently precipitated the setting up of a 
committee because he was of the opinion that European agitators 
were generating the interest in Maori-Chinese sexual relations, 
and he could not see how one could possibly mitigate this 
situation by legislation (see NZPD, 1929, 221:489 and Wornall-
Smith, 1970:9). 
46 According to Wornall-Smith, no evidence was ever produced to show 
that Maori women were complaining about the situation on the 
gardens (Wornall-Smith, 1970:8). 
47 Li Kwang Heung had died in office in May 1928, leaving the post 
vacant for some months. By June, Yue Jackson, still the Secretary, 
was finding the situation more than difficult and contacted Internal 
Affairs to see anything could be done. He had already contacted 
Peking, but they would not accept any application unless it went 
through the Chinese Legation in London (NA, Prime Minister's 
Department 6/2661, 8 June 1928). Yue wanted temporary status as 
Consul so that he could issue passports, take care of deceased 
estates handed to him by the Public Trustee and generally handle 
the expenses of the Consulate which meant access to the bank 
account.. As it was, the deceased Consul's widow was not receiving 
any support (ibid.). The situation Was remedied with the arrival 
of Ou Tsin Shui as Consul, who had been detained in Shanghai when 
Peking fell and was then told to proceed to New Zealand and take 
up his Consular post. 
48 The Consul's contention was confirmed at a later meeting of the 
National Council of Women, when the representative from the Te 
Akarana Maori Association, Mrs. Bennett, stated that the girls 
who worked for Chinese got 'very good wages' and that the girls 
felt they were 'turned away from European occupations on account 
of colour' (Star, 27 August 1929). The statement resulted from 
a suggestion that Maori Is find work in European houses. 
49 No explanation has been found for the absences of associational 
response although there was a tendency at times to leave matters 
relating to European society to the Consul. Even in 1921, 
although Auckland Chinese responded through their organisations 
to the Hippodrome incident, it was the Consul who negotiated with 
the government. The KMT and the CKT never performed this role, 
and although locality associations claimed this as part of their 
function, they have never actually taken part. 
50 The Committee had the benefit of the wisdom of Professor E. Finch 
from Wilberforce University, who had attended the Universal Races 
Congress in 1911 and presented a paper which amongst other things 
stated: 
The dilution of the so-called high races by that of the 
so-called lower races will either set the species on the 
highway to extinction or cause a relapse to barbarism. 
(Quoted in AJHR, 1929, G-ll:6) 
51 I am indebted to Christine Chan and her paper 'The Lost 
Chinaman: A Study of the Assimilation of Chinese in the 
Lower King Country', unpublished, 1974 for this material. 
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52 This practice was commonplace for new arrivals, although ready 
explanations are hard to obtain. Some informants said that 
relationships like father/son or uncle/nephew meant close 
supervision and familial ties making freedom, mobility and self 
employment attractive. Others maintained that it was done for 
experience or related to the type of business. In the latter 
case the absence of accommodation or enough capital to support 
another employee might mean deferrment of employment until 
times improved or until accommodation was available. In this 
case (in text) the man had worked in Auckland, Dannevirke, 
Rotorua, Hamilton and Wellington which would indicate a 
experience of the north island and numerous contacts. 
53 The split was also due to internal dissension, since members 
had left the syndicate to return to China, placing excessive 
burdens on some of the organisers. One in particular thought 
this extra work deserved more reward and took his share to 
start his own business in a town close by. 
54 None of the original partnership, of the same surname and 
village, married Maori women, and initially those that did 
received little criticism from their fellow countrymen. In 
later years, however, with a more permanent Chinese community 
in New Zealand, there has been a tendency for this intermarriage 
to be frowned upon. 
55 The significance of the representation remains unknown other 
than for the manifest purpose of establishing a representative 
organisation. Most informants have maintained that the 
organisation reflected the strongest group anyway, so its 
composition would have varied from place to place. 
56 It is interesting to note that this organisation was initiated 
through a decision of existing organisations, whereas its 
predecessor was initiated in local New Zealand Chinese communities. 
57 No data has been collated on the origin of the Auckland branch, 
although informants confirm its involvement in these issues. 
58 The Chinese population in New Zealand was between 3,374 (1926) 
and 2,943 (1936). The petition estimated that each Chinese and 
Indian was able to send £100 home each year, which, according to 
the petition, would amount to £600,000 leaving the country 
annually (AJHR, 1933, I-I, No.16). This would indicate a 
population of at least 6,000 Chinese and Indians in New Zealand. 
With the Indian population between 987 and 1,200, and an average 
weekly income of £2 to i3 for Chinese in New Zealand the 
statistics can be seen to be exaggerated. 
59 Chunhow H. Pao was educated at Peking University and New York 
University and had previously served as Consul in Batavia, San 
Francisco, New York, Canada and Melbourne (Evening Post, 
4 January 1935). 
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60 The predominant occupation among the Chinese in the community 
(see Appendix XXVII) were market gardening, laundries and fruit and 
vegetable retailing. 
61 The situation grew so drastic that by January 1932 there was 
a riot in Dunedin, which resulted in '16 police and 200 civilian 
casualties' (Sutch, 1966:138). In May there were riots in 
Wellington (ibid.). In 1932 unemployed males numbered 70,000 
and in 1933 they reached their greatest number of the depression 
years, 79,587. 
62 Rewi and G.T. Alley described the situation of the Chinese in 
the 1930s: 
The whole thing was well organised, and those in need 
of help would travel from place to place and spend time 
as was convenient with those who were better off. 
But they also noted that: 
[older menJ ... hate to go to a government office even 
when it is a question of making application for the 
assistance which is their right. 
(G.T. and Rewi Alley, 1938:9) 
63 Yue Jackson, Vice Consul, reported in a separate statement 
that only 150 to 200 Chinese out of a population of 500 in 
Wellington were unemployed, and most were being provided for 
by relatives and friends during the winter months while 
working on the market gardens in the summer 9 June 1934). 
64 The Reverend Y. S. Chau was one of the important leaders in the 
Auckland community during the years of the Sino-Japanese War, 
when he was prominent in the collection campaign and edition 
of the Q-Sing Times. 
65 Ng Hor Gee (William Wah) graduated in Law and Arts from Canterbury 
College and was unable to get a job working for Europeans so 
was restricted to employment within the Chinese community. In 
later years he became the English Secretary for the New Zealand 
Chinese Association and interpreter for the community in 
Wellington. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CHINESE ORGANISATIONS AND CHINA AT WAR 1937-1944 
In the period that followed the depression, the responses to 
the tuation outlined in the last period continued to develop. The 
concern for families, still remaining in China, increased considerably 
after 1935 as the threat of war with Japan confronted China. The 
desire for settlement in New Zealand was seen as an increasingly viable 
alternat even if it was on a temporary basis and the New Zealand 
government was pushed to consider relaxation of their immigration 
provisions for the Chinese. While the Chung Wah Wui Koon remained in 
action it was the Consulate which initially obtained concessions for 
temporary immigration for wives, children and students prior to 1939. 
The Consulate also became increasingly concerned that the New Zealand 
support their homeland and instigated the commencement of a 
national association. This organisation was started in 1937 and 
became, as a result of a massive collection campaign, its national 
scope and its ability to impose sanctions, the nexus of power in the 
community. While the Chinese Consul in 1937 was hesitant to impose a 
mandatory contribution scheme on the New Zealand Chinese the executive 
of the association and its representative conferences held periodically, 
had no hesitation. The collection which lasted from 1937 to 1944, 
aided by the publication of two Chinese newspapers amassed a considerable 
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sum to refund to the chinese government with the approval of the 
New Zealand government. Most of New Zealand felt sympathy for the 
Chinese community and the extent of this sympathy resulted in the 
government instigating a refugee scheme to bring wives and children 
of Chinese men and allow them residence in New Zealand for the 
duration of the war. While the scheme was discontinued shortly after 
its initiation many Chinese families were reunited. The unintended 
consequences of this situation, with a prolonged war in China, however, 
led eventually, to New Zealand's acceptance of a permanently resident 
Chinese community but in 1939 repatriation after the war had been 
considered mandatory. In 1944 the New Zealand government finally 
removed the poll tax legislation from the statute books and despite 
some reluctance there was general unanimity in the decision. The 
reality of legislation both in terms of immigration and natura1isation 
however, lagged somewhat as will be indicated in the next chapter. 
The outcome of the intensive organisational activity in the 
Chinese community together with increasing numbers of young people 
and families was not, however, without consequences. The war years, 
as will be shown, provided the basis and impetus for a national 
association but the allowed hegemony of the association headquarters 
was of increasing concern as smaller communities developed and 
organised. The collection activity, its financial cost to fami1 
and its organisation also caused dissension and default, leaving after 
the war, as will be discussed later, numerous problems. The 
centralisation of power in Wellington together with its political 
control increasingly became an issue of discussion and later conflict. 
The community also, during the war years, underwent considerable 
demographic change which had begun in the 1920s but which increased 
significantly in the period 11 the end of World War II. 
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The presence of families and children produced new demands 
both financial and social which were different than those of a largely 
single male population. Families required economic security and 
stability and the young needed, as far as the community was concerned, 
to be contained especially under the increasing incidence of influence 
and contact with Europeans. In this period these concerns receive some 
attention but in a situation with unresolved conflicts it remained for 
the post war community to finally determine compromises which would 
resolve the conflicts and provide for the needs of a resident New 
Zealand Chinese community. 
In 1935 Consul Pao exchanged positions with the Acting Consul in 
.Johannesburg, Wang Feng (NA,IA 1933/60/15, 4 January 1935).1 Before 
his departure Pao was quoted at length in the Evening Post, which 
revealed his priorities regarding his role in New Zealand (4 Janaury, 
1935). He described New Zealand 'as a beautiful and glorious country 
populated by kind and most hospitable people' and maintained that in 
his office he had been able to 'foster the spirit of good will between 
New Zealand and China and to assist in the development of better 
understanding between the two peoples' (ibid.). He asserted that the 
local Chinese were 'endeavouring to do their part towards advancing 
the Dominion's prosperity' and finally closed the interview with an 
advertisement for investment in China, which 'has unlimited possibilities 
as a world market and welcomes foreign enterprise and capital as long 
as it is not made an instrument of political domination and 
imperialistic penetration or ruthless exploitation' (ibid.). 
While Consuls exchanged positions, Vice Consul Yue Jackson 
approached the government on behalf of the local community, asking 
that wives and children of New Zealand-born Chinese be allowed to come 
to New Zealand on a temporary basis (NZCGMJ,2 1 October, 1954:7), 
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since he estimated that there were less than 100 Chinese families in 
the country already (NA, L22/l/8l, 29 September 1950:2). The government 
in response introduced a concession of ten permits year for the 
wives of Chinese born in New Zealand (ibid.). Unfortunately, no 
documentation remains concerning this approach by the Vice Consul, 
and the background papers quoted (NA, L22/l/8l) above only speculate 
that the Chinese either anticipated that the government would permit 
the issuing of only temporary permits or, on the other hand, most 
Chinese would want to return after the war anyway, so permanent 
rffidence was not necessary (ibid.).3 Although no 
of actual applications remain, the statistics quoted in Chapter 5 
(see Appendix XI, XII and XIII) indicate a substantial 
in the number of women arriving in 1935-36 other than New Zealand 
residents returning. With the fear of encroaching war with Japan. 
and as a result of news spreading about the temporary 
provisions, large numbers of applications started arriving. 
Simultaneously, applications for student permits increased as local 
Chinese realised that under the 1930 Immigration Restriction 
Regulations they could legitimately bring young sons to New Zealand 
on a temporary basis (see Chapter 7, page 367). Table 10 (following 
indicates the trend. 
Under the influence of Wang Feng, the new Consul, and a wave 
of nationalism that was moving through the New Zealand Chinese community, 
a new association was constituted in 1935-36. The actual date of 
founding is uncertain, but the new association was registered as an 
incorporated society in August 1935 and at the same date filed a 
constitution. Sixteen men witnessed the incorporation: seven 
three importers, one silk merchant, two laundrymen, one Chinese 
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TABLE 10: Student Permits to Chinese 1929-1942 
Year Permits Issued Students Arrived 
--,-~-------------------------------
1929 
1930 9 
1931 11 
1932 3 
1933 1 
1934 8 
1935 11 
1936 16 
1937 25 
1938 66 
1939 112 
1940 40 
1941 27 
1942 1 
Source: (NA,L22/l/8l Section 2: 1) 
6 (originally on 
temporary permit. 
Transferred to student 
permit 1930). 
1 
6 
4 
1 
5 
10 
13 
22 
48 
83 
63 
18 
missioner and the Vice-Consul for China, Yue H. Jackson (Rules of 
the New Zealand Chinese Association, 1935), all of whom lived in 
Wellington. The filed version of the Constitution stated in its first 
three provisions the following objects: 
(a) To provide for Chinese residents in New Zealand 
the means of mutual helpfulness, social inter-
course, and rational recreation, and to promote 
the intellectual, moral, and physical well-being 
of the Chinese in New Zealand. 
(b) To establish schools and classes and to make 
provision for public lectures, addresses and 
debates for the education and entertainment 
of Chinese. 
(c) To provide halls, meeting places, clubs, 
buildings and premises where members can meet 
for any of the purposes of the Association. 
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(Rules of the New Zealand Chinese 
Association, 1935) 
The Association was also allowed by the constitution to raise 
money for activities of the Association, make application to bring 
either a Chinese student or person into New Zealand and provide the 
bond or deed required, and to recover any monies or security offered 
by the Association (ibid.:2). Membership was to comprise all 'present 
members of the Association' , which indicates its prior existence 
. :3). The Association could accept new members by three-fourths 
majority as well as expel members under the same conditions. The 
controlling body of the Association was to be nine members, which 
presumably included the seven officers elected at every annual general 
meeting and two others. 
The remainder of the constitution deals with administration 
of the A,ssociation and adds little to an understanding of its operation 
compared to the 1909 constitution discussed previously. Curiously, 
there is no mention of a subscription fee, which presumably was waived 
considering the levy to be imposed by the Anti-Japanese Movement 
collection. In s first year of operation for which accounts were 
registered, the expenses incurred included those for the National Day, 
Evening School, War Relief and stationery and postage, while the 
assets came from the Chinese student insurance fees, Chinese National 
Day collection and Chinese evening school fees, plus cash in hand. 
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Initially this Association did not have branches in other 
centres but did collect the first money to send back to China and 
organised the local Double Tenth in Wellington. The full-scale 
collection, however, did not really start until the Double Seventh 
incident in 1937. 
After the Japanese attacked the Marco Polo Bridge in Peking 
and then moved south, eventually into Kwangtung and the home districts 
of the New Zealand Chinese, the support of what became known as the 
Anti-Japanese Movement (Go Koh Kong Yut) increased in earnest. 
William Kwok, as the chairman of the association, was approached in 
early July 1937 to see whether or not a more combined front could be 
organised amongst the overseas Chinese. According to informants, 
the Consul was also approached but feared political recriminations, 
maintaining that you could not force a population to become involved. 
Despite this, a meeting was called in September and those who gathered 
decided to issue instructions that all areas in New Zealand should send 
delegates to a central meeting in Wellington a task that would not be 
difficult after the Chinese Consul had already completed a census of 
the New Zealand Chinese under instructions from Nanking (see EP, 23 May 
1936). The meeting included thirty-seven representatives as listed in 
Table 11 (following page). The number of delegates from each area, 
according to informants was decided on the basis of both population 
and influence, which would explain the discrepancy between the number 
of representatives from Dunedin and Auckland: Dunedin had a Chinese 
population of approximately 150, while Auckland's population exceeded 250. 
Dunedin's community leaders had played a seminal role in encouraging 
the formation of the model for a branch association and, according to 
4 informants, had the best organised local branch, matched only by Gisborne. 
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TABLE 11: Representatives at the first 'Save China Conference' 
26 September 1937, by Occupation, Place of Residence 
in New Zealand and Horne County 
I=! 
Q) 
'1j p... 
H 0 
H ell ,.q 
Q) 
'-' +J rJ) 110 me H >-. @ 
-----
Q) H +J H 
r-1 +J '1j Q) ,.q Q) H County ell 'n I=! ,.;.:: u u Q) 
+J ;j ~ H H 0 ,.q 0 H ell Q) H +J 
E-< p:.. ...:l ~ :E '-' 0 
Auckland 3 2 1 TK, JS 
Hamilton 2 1 1 JS 
Palmers ton North 3 3 JS, PY (2) 
Fielding 1 1 JS (1) 
Wanganui 1 1 PY 
Otaki 2 2 PY (2) 
Gisborne 1 1 JS 
Wellington a 6 1 1 3 1 JS (4) ,Py, (1) 
(1) 
Levin 1 1 JS 
Masterton 1 1 
Nelson 1 1 JS 
Greymouth 2 2 JS 
Christchurch 2 2 JS, TK 
Timaru 1 1 JS 
Dunedin 5 4 1 PY, JS (4) 
Other 5 5 
TOTAL 37 18 2 5 4 1 7, 
a Three of the representatives from Wellington were part of the 
Consulate, with only the Vice-Consul (Toy San) from the areas 
represented above. 
Source: Personal communication. 
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Wellington I S large number of representatives was clearly a 
reflection of their historic role in New Zealand and the presence 
of a number of other associations plus the Chinese Consulate. They 
essentially became the administrative head for the collection and 
the publishers of the New Zealand Chinese News which started 
in 1938 and continued until the end of the war. 5 It was also 
apparent that the localities represented by an association (Tung Jung 
Wui Koon and Poon Fa Wui K'Oon) dominated the organisation. 
At the first meeting of the All Representative Congress of 
the delegates, the collection was launched in full and the means 
6 
of implementing it laid down. 
The events were described at the Fourth Congress of the 
Chinese Association (1939): 
DECLARATION OF THE 4TH CONGRESS OF THE CHINESE ASSOCIATION 
The "7th July Inciden til has revealed the wild ambitions of the 
Japanese military imperialists to conquer China, but their 
action has awakened and mobilized the whole Chinese nation to 
rise to fight against the invaders. People from all walks of 
life, rallied around the government and their leaders, have 
engaged in battles. The overseas Chinese are no exception. 
Immediately after the 7th July Incident, the Chinese allover 
New Zealand launched an en thus campaign to donate money 
to help to repulse the invaders. A long-term system of 
donation was also worked out. Under the demand for relief 
work, the First Congress of the New Zealand Chinese 
Association was convened on 26th September [1937] in Wellington 
under the auspices of the Chinese Consulate General. More than 
30 representatives attended the Congress. A resolution was 
passed that the Wellington New Zealand Chinese Association 
was formed to function as the head office in charge of carrying 
out all the resolutions and other public welfare affairs. 
A regulation on a long-term donation system was established at 
the Congress. According to the regulation, each self-employed 
Chinese should donate ten shillings per week and each employee 
two shillings a month. 7 A penalty on those who refuse 
donations was adopted. The work was carried out 
success ly until the Chinese central government issued 
national bonds and offered the donors the bonds for their 
donations. The bonds and donation system caused some confusion. 
In order to solve the problem the 2nd Congress was held on 3rd 
July 1938. It was decided that all the bonds would not be 
returned to the purchasers. Instead, they would be sent to 
China in due course to help reI work there. A special 
committee was set up to take care of the bonds. However, 
great difficulties derived from the ponderous paper work. 
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It was impossible for the executives of the Association to 
carry out the scheme. Therefore, the 3rd Congress was 
convened ahead of schedule. It was decided that donations 
and purchase of national bonds would be dealt with 
separately. Donations were not to be exchanged for bonds. 
The Congress agreed to impose a more severe penalty on those 
who evaded or openly refused donations. 
Since the convention of the 3rd Congress, the New Zealand 
Chinese have become more closely united and more enthusiastic 
in implementing their policies. As a result, more 
achievements have been made in relief work. 
It was in the light of this favourable situation the 4th 
Congress was opened on 26 September. 
(Q-Sing Times, 1 October 1939) 
The meeting also decided that regional branches would be 
started in various centres as listed in Table 12, to aid the 
collection movement. 
TABLE 12: Regional Branches of the Anti-Japanese Movement 
Collective Campaign and the Home District of 
Counties Represented in Each 1939. 
Wellington PY and JS 
Auckland JS and Seyip 
Otago PY, Fa Y and Seyip 
Canterbury JS and Seyip 
Manawatu PY and JS 
Hawkes Bay PY and Fa Y 
Gisborne JS and Seyip 
Waikato JS and Seyip 
Hutt Valley PY, Y and JS 
Wairarapa S Yap and JS 
Ohakune PY, Fa Y and JS 
Timaru Seyip and JS 
Ohau PY and Fa Y 
New Plymouth JS 
Wairoa JS 
Levin PY and Fa Y 
Otaki JS, PY and Fa Y 
Taihape JS 
Dannevirke JS and Seyip 
Foxton PY and Fa Y 
Rotor.ua JS 
Greymouth JS 
Hawera JS, PY and Fa Y 
Nelson JS and Seyip 
Note: PY is Poon Yu; JS is Jung Sing; Fa Y is Fa Yuen; Seyip 
includes Toy San, San Wui ,Yun Ping and Hoy Ping wi th the 
first two being the most significant in New Zealand. 
Source: Personal communication-
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It can be seen that the Seyip people tended to be clustered 
in a few communities while people from other districts were dispersed 
throughout New Zealand. The result of the establishment of these 
regional areas was the fact that the groundwork was effectively laid 
for the creation of the New Zealand Chinese Association which followed 
and recommended the setting up of its branches in the same areas,8 In 
1938 the Dunedin branch representing Otago/Southland was formally 
established and the first annual meeting of the executives recorded in 
a photograph, 9 The composition on the executive is contained in 
Table 13. 
TABLE 13 Occupation and District of Origin of the Executive of 
the Chinese Association in Dunedin (1938),10 
Goon Poon Yu Totals 
Fruiterers 6 1 3 3 13 
Gardeners 1 3 4 
Merchant 1 1 2 
Laundry 1 1 
Labourer 1 1 
Total 8 2 7 4 21 
Source: Personal communication 
Similar to Dunedin, Gisborne also formalised their association 
and became a branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, setting up 
an , executive modelled on the Wellington format, and still later other 
branches organised and affiliated themselves to Wellington,ll 
In 1938 the collection process was activated with intensity, and 
under the suggestion of the Timaru association, branch donation boxes 
were to be placed in all shops and gardens for the collection of money 
to help the injured in the Chinese Army 2 January 
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1939).12 In order that the Wellington headquarters be reimbursed for 
their expenses in this and other matters, it was further proposed by 
the Canterbury branch that each overseas Chinese in New Zealand pay 1/-
a year which would in turn be sent to Wellington (ibid.). By October 
1938 the Chinese Minister of Finance had received $40,706 (Chinese 
currency) from New Zealand which was deposited in the Bank of China in 
Hong Kong (ibid.). The first itemised list in the Weekly News showed 
each branch's donation as follows: 
Otago ... Southland 
Wellington 
New Plymouth 
Nelson 
Taihape 
Wanganui 
Rotorua 
CC$ 9,639.00 
20,280.00 
1,787.00 
394.60 
1,948.00 
975.90 
492.00 
NZ£ 439.9.0 
928.7.0 
53.17.0 
18.0.0 
82.8.0 
44 .ll. 0 
19.12.0 
(CWN, 2 January 1939) 
From this time on, the _W_e_ek __ ~N_e_w_s_kept the local population 
informed about events in China and Canton as well as publicising requests 
from Chiang Kai-Shek or his wife for more funds or, for instance, cotton 
clothing (see CWN, 6 November 1939). Warnings were received from China 
urging local Chinese to beware of false requests which the Japanese 
occupying army had forced local Chinese in Kwangtung to write to 
overseas compatriots (CWN, 6 November 1939). The particular requests 
were for funds which the Japanese exchanged for army coupons or 
counterfeit dollars which turned out to be irredeemable .). The 
paper also reported at length on the Double Tenth celebrations held in 
Dunedin and Wellington, the only centres where they were organised, 
reporting the speeches and the various statements by the Consul, who 
continually stressed the importance of 'national unity' and 'strong 
determination'. By this time, the community's profile, at least in 
terms of Double Tenth and the appeal was public knowledge and dealt with 
sympathetically by the local press. 
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News Perhaps the most significant fact about the Chinese 
------------~~----
was that it was national and for the first time brought communities 
into contact with each other, at least in terms of news from China and 
the collection campaign. It could not be argued that people in the 
various localities around New Zealand learned much about each other, 
but it was clear that the publication of one's donations created 
notions of generosity and organisation or less generosity and apathy. 
Similarly, the publication of the names of individuals who had not 
paid led to a form of public chastisement and community shame that 
brought rectification quickly. In some cases people either avoided 
payment or simply could not afford the donation, and in both cases 
provisions were made for some payment. If the publication of names 
and continued warnings still resulted in a refusal to pay, the 
Association took to inform the National government in China 
that the persons concerned should be barred from booking passage home 
(CWN, 6 November 1939). 
At the end of 1939, the Chinese government sent notification 
of what they referred to as the 'Standard Donation Payment Method', 
which specified the mechanics of sending money to the government or to 
particular agencies by local Chinese (in China) and overseas Chinese 
(see Appendix XXXII). ~Vhile the document specified forms of 
that were to be issued and where money was to be sent, there was no 
concern with foreign exchange regulations imposed by various countries. 
New Zealand had, in 1939, set out new regulations to control foreign 
exchange, which placed all overseas funds under the control of 
Reserve Bank and prohibited anyone sending or carrying currency out of 
the country 15 May 1940). The Chinese Consul consulted 
with the government immediately, since such regulations interfered with 
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the remittances. The government then made special provisions for the 
local Chinese to continue sending money back to China, granting per-
mission for foreign exchange of up to £3, 000 each month (CWN, 18 
December 1939 and Times 
~-~----
13 1 October 1940). 
In 1939 the New Zealand Chinese also received a request from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China asking that a general boycott 
be imposed on goods manufactured in five Japanese factories in Shanghai 
(CWN, 25 August 1939). It was intended that local merchants stop 
importing goods made by these companies, which included cotton dye, 
steel, oil and cooking utensils. New Zealand also added to the long 
list of requirements by again imposing compulsory registration of all 
aliens. The Association received a notice drawing their attention to 
clause III of the regulation, which stated: 
All foreigners who stay in New Zealand must 
register at their nearest police station within 
fourteen days starting from the day of the 
announcement of the regulation (4 September). 
Please take note of this and inform your people 
in New Zealand to conform to 
(CWN, 25 August 1939). 
¥fuile this issue was resolved and publicised, the 'New Zealand 
authorities', as the Chinese Weekly News described the government, 
had, at the commencement of the war, authorised the inspection of all 
foreign letters going overseas. ¥fuen the 'authorities' found they were 
unable to read these letters, they then stipulated that they must be 
written in English or French; otherwise they would not be dispatched 
(CWN, 27 November 1939). The Chinese Association and Consul opposed 
the move, maintaining that it effectively cut off communication 
between 'our compatriots' and their families. The resolution to this 
problem was that: 
Letters in Chinese language are still accepted 
by the Post Office, but letters which are to be 
inspected have to pass through the Consulate for 
inspection after which they may be sent overseas. 
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(CWN, 27 November 1939). 
While the intensity of the war collection increased, and with it the 
organisation of the local Chinese, the issue of naturalisation and 
immigration again came to the fore with urgency. The Japanese were by 
1939 Kwangtung, and the home villages were now a battleground. The 
ambivalence over residence in New Zealand or China by those already in 
New Zealand was being forcefully resolved as it became clear they and 
their families would fare better in New Zealand or at least in Hong 
Kong. As already noted, there was a restriction on families being re-
united in New Zealand with the exception of ten permanent permits 
issued to wives of New Zealand-born Chinese or temporary permits issued 
for six months. This led to a barrage of applications and pressure 
from the Association and the Consul to extend the period of the permit. 
In 1939, the government changed the system, which resulted in the 
following: 
In 1939 Cabinet approved a concession by which the 
wives and children under 16 years of age of Chinese 
permanently resident in New Zealand were admitted on 
Temporary Permit for two years provided that the 
husband deposited~OO, lodged on unlimited Deed 
of Covenant executed by himself and two other persons 
regarding the maintenance of his family or their 
possible deportation, and entered into a bond for 
~OO guaranteeing that his wife would take away any 
children born to her while in New Zealand. 
(NA, L22/l/8l: 3) 14 
Ng 1959 described this as a situation where 'discriminatory 
restrictions against the Chinese were ... eased ... ', but one is inclined 
to a different view when one finds that the provisions were quickly 
withdrawn in 1940 'following complaints that Chinese fruiterers were 
employing their wives and children in their shops while their assistants 
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were starting own business, in some cases taking over shops 
vacated by European fruiterers who had joined the forces' 
(NA, L22/l/8l:3).15 Despite the excessive financial commitment in 
this arrangement, by December 1939, 240 husbands had made application 
for their wives and 244 children, of whom 146 wives and 147 children 
had already arrived (ibid.) .16 Considering that Wang Feng, the 
Consul, had estimated that only 150 Chinese would take advantage of 
the plan, the response was immense and one the government had not 
.. d 17 antlclpate . 
The Canterbury Branch of the Chinese Association responded 
immediately to the government's plan at the New Zealand Chinese 
Association I S Fourth All Representatives Conference held in Wellington 
at the end of September (New Zealand Chinese Association Report, 
September 1939). Their remit clearly stated that they felt the two-
year permit was too restrictive and that the cash guarantee required 
was more than most Chinese could afford. In effect, the restrictions 
were stratifying the community by allowing the reunification of 
wealthier members and their families. In a sample of 115 families from 
the 1939 group, the average number of children family was three 
18 
and the range was from one to eight including in many cases daughters. 
While this is hardly a sufficient indicator of wealth, it does allow one 
tf presume a number of visits to China, which necessitated a fairly well 
established existence in New Zealand. 19 Attempts to verify the background 
of those who took advantage of the provisions have not provided much 
substantive data, but generalisation would lead one to suggest the 
fruiterers and market gardeners were the predominant applicants, who 
were largely made up of people from Jung Sing and Poon Yu. The fact 
of the arrivals and their background, however, pales in significance if 
one asks what it was like for women to arrange transportation from their 
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local llages to Canton and then to Hong Kong and finally to New 
Zealand. If the cost of the permit was high, the cost of the above 
movement was even more and often fraught with the danger of extortion 
and capture. Granted, the long history of travel back and forth along 
this route made arrangements a matter of course, but in 1938 the area 
was occupied by the Japanese and more stealth had to be used in the exit. 
When these women arrived with their children in New Zealand, 
they found often that their new homes were cramped, inequipped for 
children, and in rural areas, sometimes nothing more than a humble tin 
shed which was to become home. Most husbands, as fruiterers or 
gardeners, would have had access to food,20 but limited financial 
resources, as their own poll tax, passage and bond money for their 
families and their own cost of living, remittances, and the war 
collection absorbed any surplus funds. If the women and children who 
came had to work, it was a necessity to make ends meet, and the ever-
present thought of forced repatriation was unpleasant. 
If the situation of relatively young families was difficult, the 
worry of those who were alone, wondering whether their families were 
safe in China, was considerable. The need for news was pressing, and 
the Chinese Weekly News of Wellington and the Times of Auckland 
-"--~---
translated and published material from the New Zealand papers and also 
received and included items from Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and 
Chungking. 
The older members of the community also suffered as they faced 
old age excluded from the Old Age Pension. In 1937, the government was 
approached again by the Chinese Consul over the issue of naturalisation, 
but the government stood firm, waiting for the 1936 Census data on 
Chinese and a report on whose who would be eligible (NA,IA 116/7, 
3 November 1937). When the data was produced in 1937, twenty-seven 
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applications had been received for naturalisation, twenty-one of 
which would have been eligible for the Old Age Pension and one case 
for Family Allowance. The calculations led to a total cost of 
£],290.18.0 for the Pensions and Family Allowance, according to the 
Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs (ibid.).21 
Finally, with the Pension Amendment Act of 1937, naturalised 
Chinese became eligible, but there was no attempt to change the 
naturalisation restrictions, which precluded the majority from access 
to the provisions (see Brocklehurst, 1969:32). 
The war collection continued until 1944, but the intensity of 
the first year waned, and less was collected in succeeding years. 
Feelings about this situation and the pressure for continuous 
donations led to declining enthusiasm. Christchurch and Timaru withdrew 
donations after two years of intensive effort, and Ohakune was sporadic 
in its activity. The latter case was explained as the result of the 
unsettled land tenure for the market gardeners, who leased land for 
three years and then were forced to move on, a situation that was 
replicated in Levin and Otaki, also predominantly market-gardening 
localities. Other areas were far more consistent, however, and Gisborne, 
Wairoa, Hutt Valley, Manawatu and Wairarapa all continued their 
donations rigorously. 
In some cases representatives withdrew from the annual conferences; 
some areas never sent a delegate, and Greymouth only participated for two 
years (see footnote 6, page 419) . 
At the start collectors visited people every week, then once 
every two weeks, and finally once a month. Each time the donation was 
recorded in a special book issued to each contributor by the Association 
for each year. The card allowed one to move in New Zealand and still show 
payment, thus avoiding condemnation for unpatriotic behaviour, but it also 
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became the vehicle for imposing sanctions on people who did not 
contribute. At the Fourth Congress of the Association, the Auckland, 
Wairarapa, Otago and Gisborne branches submitted proposals for 
penalties that would be imposed for 'undermining the National 
Sal vation Donations and defying long. term donations' (Q-Sing Times, 
1 October 1939). The following resolutions were passed: 
a) Request to the Chinese Consulate in Wellington to carry 
out the policy of long-term donation in the way that all 
members of the Chinese community who seek assistance 
from the Consulate must first be approved by the branches 
of the Association. Those who refuse to pay donations 
will have sanctions imposed against them. 
b) Any Chinese commercial agent or travel agent will be asked 
not to sell ship tickets for travelling to China to Chinese 
clients unless they can produce their donation book from 
the Association. If travel agents do not do this, they 
will be penalised in the same way as those defying 
donation regulations. 
c) Economic sanctions will be applied against those who do 
not donate. 
d) Those who do not donate are not to enjoy any rights from 
the General Assembly. 
e) Anyone who has special difficulties in making donations 
must apply for a grant of favour in advance from the 
Chinese Association. He may be given a reduction or a 
temporary exemption. After that, documentary evidence 
will be issued to him by the Association, which is 
necessary to prove that he is not an anti-donation 
element. 
Times 1 October 1939) 
'->..._---""-----' 
The largest proportion of the funds was given to the 'National 
Salvation Collection', but numerous other campaigns and methods of 
collection, including the ubiquitious donation boxes, brought in money. 
The extent of the collections is outlined in Appendix XXXIII, the 
total amount collected, £174,149, was equal to the poll tax the Chinese 
had paid to the New Zealand government between 1882 and 19l9,~177,730 
(see Appendix IX) . The New Zealand Chinese donations were the highest in 
the South Pacific and ranked second per capita among all overseas 
communities in the world (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1954). 
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While this represents an overall view of the mechanics and 
politics of its operation, the picture was far more complex. As 
already noted, overall support was neither totally forthcoming nor 
continuous, and opposition by individuals or communities led to 
obvious problems which had to be sorted out. Matters of individual 
refusal to pay were, as already noted, the subject of discussion at 
the annual representative conference, along with many other issues, 
but arguments of more substance seldom found their way to the conference. 
In Dunedin, for instance, there had been considerable opposition on the 
part of some to the forced nature of the collection and more directly 
to the person who enthusiastically initiated the collection. This 
person happened to be from Seyip, while the community was predominantly 
from Poon Yu and Jung Sing, so factions developed and an effective 
block to the collection ensued. The situation was smoothed out by 
discussion, but it was duplicated in other centres too, where it is 
not easily identifiable as a result of county or district enmity but 
more likely an argument about the nature of power within the community. 
It has been pointed out by informants that the collection 
became a vehicle whereby individuals involved could accrue power and 
contacts in the community in spite of their altruism and support for 
nationalism. Becoming part of the effort was important, as it gave 
one status in the community and also recognition in China. For instance, 
those who bought over CC$50,000 bonds (Bonds of Air Force Strengthening 
and National Salvation) were to be 'commended' by the Central 
Government and presented with a plaque containing the caligraphy and 
picture of Chiang Kai-shek 1 November 1940). Furthermore, 
an aeroplane would be named after them. 
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As for status in New Zealand, it was clear that the central 
executive in Wellington wielded considerable power and gradually 
emerged as a community elite which spanned two generations. Executive 
members in local communities also had status, both as local 
organisers and as representatives to the annual Congress. 
Clearly, this scenario lent itself to possible argument between 
the core (Wellington) and the periphery (other large and small 
communities), and just such a situation emerged in 1938. At the time, 
funds for the collection' were channelled to Wellington, and Auckland 
and Hamilton took issue with this. In March, Mr. Vee Wong, a Chinese 
resident of Sydney who was appointed representative of the Nanking 
government, came to New Zealand with instructions to change all the 
donations of the New Zealand Chinese into bonds. 22 The second annual 
conference of the Association passed this decision, but Auckland changed 
its mind and threatened to leave the Association if it complied with the 
suggestion. The Otago and Southland branch, hearing of their decision, 
asked that a conference be convened to sort out the differences, but 
even though one was called in August 1938, Auckland sent no 
representative. The conference, however, did decide to send a 
delegation to Auckland of representatives from Wellington, Canterbury, 
Otago and Southland, Gisborne, Wairarapa and Levin. The meeting in 
Auckland arrived at a compromise: Wellington retreated from its 
decision on condition that Auckland return to the Association and 
participate as part of the collective effort. 23 Shortly after this 
the Auckland community produced its own paper, which essentially 
contained the same news as the Chinese News in Wellington. 
------------~~----
In its first issue, sponsored by a donation of £151.9.0 the editor, 
Y.S. Chau, stated its aims: 
The Q-Sing Times is the official organ of the New 
Zealand Chinese Association (Auckland Branch) and 
has been launched for the purpose of fostering the 
spirit of Nationalism among the Chinese overseas. 
To this end arrangements have been made whereby 
all news matters relating to the Nationalist 
movements is obtained from accredited represent-
atives within the Dominion of New Zealand and 
abroad (including China). It will be published 
fortnightly, and in addition to the latest 
political movements in the Homeland will contain 
items. THE PROCEEDS OF ADVERTISEMENTS IN THIS 
PAPER ARE FOR THE CHINESE RELIEF FUND. 
Price six pence per copy. 
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(Q-Sing Times, October 1938). 
The paper clearly was used to encourage national consciousness 
and increase the donations to the various causes that were being 
publicised from China. Articles abound stirring the local Chinese in 
Auckland to 'Love yourself, love your family, but first of all love 
your country'; to support, for instance, the China Charitable Relief 
Society which had been started by the vice-president of the central 
committee on Overseas Chinese Affairs;24 and most of all to give money. 
If one was reluctant or unable to see how one could afford such 
donations, the editor provided the reason and the method: 
The Financial Responsibility of the Overseas Chinese 
when China is plunged into War. 
In peace time our financial responsibility is to pay tax 
to the country and to support our own families. But when 
the country is in war we have to give money to all kinds 
of activities, such as "donation to save the country", 
''donations for the war refugees", "donations to purchase 
aeroplanes", etc. If one has no increase in his income 
he will be plagued by donations and become unable to 
help his motherland and at last lose confidence in 
repulsing the Japanese and saving China. In order to 
overcome the financial difficulties I suggest that: 
First, one should seek every possible opportunity to make 
money, to seize every possible minute to make money, the 
more the better. Second, one should save money. In order 
to save money one should lead a very frugal life. It's 
futile to earn money without saving. Third, one should 
donate his hard-earned money to the country. In peace time 
after the accumulation of wealth one is encouraged to buy 
property, but in war time national interest comes before 
individual. Only then the nation is strong enough to fight 
against its enemy and win the final victory. 
(Q-Sing Times, No.3, 1939) 
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At other times the editor used the paper to complain of his 
compatriots' lack of commitment to the cause, accusing them of being 
motivated only by individualistic interests: 
Take our association for example; except for a few 
activitists many Chinese are phlegmatic. They 
rarely if ever come to take part in our meetings. 
Their attitude is selfish, peremptory and without 
discipline. It is unfortunate to see so many in time 
of war who do not understand the idea of devotion for 
a national cause or for that matter the notion that 
one would and should sacrifice for one's country. 
(Q-Sing Times, 15 January 1939) 
and reminding them that: 
The plight of the rich merchants along the sea 
coast should serve as a warning. Many of them 
had their wealth and property confiscated or 
turned into ruins. It is now time to make good 
use of our wealth. The cry of our compatriots 
in the occupied areas for help should induce us 
to donate more money for the cause of national 
salvation. 
(ibid.) 
Others also used the paper to encourage other sections of the 
community to become involved. Of importance was the realisation by 
the Consul's wife that there were now a significant number of women in 
25 the Chinese community, and it was their duty to help also: 
We should not be of the opinion that we, the 
overseas Chinese women are not involved in the 
war since the soldiers are the ones who are 
engaged in the fighting and the government I 
Ministers are taking care of the administration 
and planning for the nation ... 
We must get mobilised in our national salvation 
work and not succumb to inertness. Some of us 
do not want to take part in the work but are 
jealous of those who devote themselves to this 
glorious cause. This is not a time to seek 
personal gain or fame. 
(Q-Sing Times, 15 May 1939) 
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In the same issue, Miss Ku of Auckland responded, agreeing 
wi th the sentiments of Mrs. Wang and suggesting that Chinese 
women in New Zealand do not want to be mocked as the poet Du Fu 
of the Tang dynasty had done to the contemporary women of the court: 
Singing and dancing the courtesans present 
Imperceptible they are to the sorrow of being 
Under the yoke of foreign rulers. 
CQ-Sing Times, 15 May 1939) 
Through the remainder of the war till the Japanese surrendered 
in 1945, the larger Chinese communities celebrated Double Tenth 
and Double Seventh as times to encourage donations and maintain the 
support for Chiang Kai-shek even though, according to some informants, 
his popularity was beginning to wane by 1943 (see also Schurmann and 
Schell, 1967:250-251). Each year the national conference of the 
Association met, discussed remits from~vari-ous centres which related 
to both the internal structure of the community and the collection, 
and each year delegates returned to their centres to try and 
implement the decisions. 
Through 1940 the organisation continued its work, but for the first. 
time concern for their future in New Zealand became an In 
April, the Chinese Consulate General had been notified by the Customs 
Department that children of newly arrived families who were on a 
temporary permit were attending schools without prior permission from 
the Customs Department CQ-Sing Times, 1 March 1940). The crux of this 
issue was that under the student temporary permit scheme the Customs 
Department prescribed the school which the particular individual 
should attend, and they changed schools, they faced expulsion from 
the country. It is evident that the Department had lost control of 
young people who had come in under the refugee scheme and threatened 
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to confiscate the ~200 deposit unless they had received notification 
and granted approval. The New Zealand government was not alone in 
it~s concern for the newly arrived Chinese young people, as 
Wellington and Otago Chinese communi ties set out to establish youth 
organisations. An Auckland Chinese Young Men's Club was already in 
existence,originally founded after the 11 September Incident in 1931. 26 
However, after the Fifth Congress each main centre was to have a youth 
organisation which specified as its general aims the following: 
The aim of the founding of the league is to 
strengthen friendship, exchange experiences and 
knowledge among young Chinese, encourage athletic 
activities, carry out the work for national 
salvation more efficiently and promote friendship 
between the Chinese and people of other races. 
(Dunedin Youth League in Q-Sing 
Times, 15 December 1940. 
The Auckland club specified that young people should 'carry out 
academic study', which clearly emphasised the concerns of elders for 
the future of their young people. It was not clear at this point, 
however, whether their future was in New Zealand or China, although 
informants have said that there was some concern for young people to 
get a useful skill in New Zealand and then go back to China to help 
the war effort. 
In January 1940, however, the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
committee in China informed the New Zealand Consulate General of the 
following: 
The State Council has ordered the provincial 
government of Kwangtung and Fukien and other 
administrations concerned that any returning 
overseas Chinese who holds neither a passport 
nor a re-entry permit from the country where 
he formerly resided shall be conscripted 
according to the present conscription regulations 
after residing in China for two full years. 
Times 22 January 1940) 
'-"----""------' 
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It is unknown whether or not Chinese in New Zealand would have 
been willing to have their youngsters go back to China to fight, but 
from interviews it does not appear to have been a popular idea. 
Contemporaneous with the interest in youth, there was also a 
concerted effort to provide a physical structure that would serve the 
whole New Zealand Chinese community. At the Fifth Congress in 1940 
the Wellington Chinese Association placed a remit before all the 
representatives to initiate a campaign for raising money to buy an 
Association hall. The remit maintained that the rent was now too 
high and they were unable to pay for it out of subscriptions (Minutes 
to the Fifth Representative Congress, 2 August 1940). It further 
maintained that the war ended most Chinese would return home, 
leaving the remainder to pay the rent .). The solution was to 
purchase land, and they suggested that each of the 3,000 Chinese in 
New Zealand should donate 10/- which would provide enough 
for the first term instalment; thereafter they would use membership 
fees and also calIon branches to give money (ibid.). 
The suggestion was accepted, and in November the 
published the proposal in full: 
The Resolution for the Purchase of a New Bui 
The reasons for purchasing a new building are as 
follows: 
1. We have found it difficult to rent a venue on 
occasions when we need it. 
2. A new building of the New Zealand Chinese 
Association will bring about prestige to all 
the New Zealand Chinese who boast a long history 
and good reputation. 
3. A new building will rally all members of the 
Chinese community around their own organisation 
and close their ranks. 
4. A new building will provide proper space for a 
Chinese school and a library. A school is 
essential for the young Chinese to learn the 
Chinese language and culture. Relics of the 
pioneer overseas Chinese in New Zealand their 
historical evidence can be displayed in the 
library to inspire the younger generations to 
learn from their ancestors of their spirit of 
enterprise. 
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Immediately after this important resolution was passed, 
several hundreds of pounds sterling were donated. 
We hope that everyone of our 3,000 New Zealand Chinese 
compatriots will make his due contributions to the 
purchase of a new building. 
Apart from this resolution we should also do our best 
to carry out the resolution of increasing the relief 
fund, paying up funds in arrears and organising a 
"wounded soldiers' friends club" in the 4th year of 
the War Against Japanese Aggression. 
Fellow countrymen 
~~o refuse to be enslaved, 
It's high time to take action! 
(Q-Sing Times, 1 November 1940) 
lfuile this plan was accepted in 1940, after the war it became 
an issue which would be hotly debated and finally would lead to a 
partial disintegration of the national Association. Again, it would be 
seen as an attempt by Wellington to increase hegemony over the New 
Zealand Chinese, and it was not clear to other communities how their 
hard-earned money used in Wellington could be of lasting benefit to all 
Chinese in New Zealand. The excuse of indebtedness after the war 
seemed a flimsy rationale for the building, but obviously prestige, 
unity and concern for youth and history were more meaningful. 
It seemed clear that there was an expectation of permanent 
settlement in New Zealand, despite the suggestion of repatriation, and 
that some kind of preparation should be made for this eventuality. 
In March 1940 the Chinese community mourned the death of Mr. M. 
Savage, the Prime Minister since 1935. The Q-Sing Times devoted a whole 
page to his obituary and described him as ' ... the greatest friend of the 
Chinese people in New Zealand' 1 April 1940). With the 
413. 
death of Savage, Peter Fraser became Prime Minister of the continuing 
Labour government, and according to most Chinese, he too achieved the 
respect of the community for his humanitarian concern. In October 1952, 
Fraser was the first New Zealand Prime Minister to attend the Double 
Tenth celebration in Wellington, epitomlsing the sudden emergence of 
New Zealand into diplomatic activity after the bombing of Pearl Harbour 
in December 1941. 27 Fraser was welcomed warmly by William Kwok, 
chairman of the occasion, who drew the audience's attention to the fact 
that New Zealand was the only country in the League of Nations that had 
advocated resistance to Japan's aggression (EP, 12 October 1942). 
Early in 1942 Fraser had received a telegram from Chiang Kai-shek, who 
had commended New Zealand on her friendly ties with China and hoped for 
a continuation of these in the future (ibid.).28 In 1943 and 1944 
messages were reciprocated between the New Zealand Prime Minister and 
Chiang Kai-shek on the occasion of the Double Tenth and Double Seventh. 29 
The telegrams sent sympathy to the Generalissimo for the long protracted 
misery of the war with Japan and wishes for liberation (see EP, 
11 October 1943, 8 July 1944, 10 July 1944 and 10 October 1944). Chiang 
Kai-shek replied thanking New Zealand for its wishes and expressing 
hope that at the same time cooperation would be maintained between 
China and New Zealand during the war and in the period of reconstruction 
that would follow (EP, 10 July 1944). 
A more substantial indication of a changed relationship 
between the Chinese community and the New Zealand government occurred 
however, in 1942, when Fraser made a suggestion to the Chinese market 
gardeners that they organise themselves into a group to ensure the 
exchange of information and the provisions of needed supplies for growing. 
It was also a move on Fraser's part to fulfil New Zealand's obligation to 
the Pacific war, since it was now the main source of supply for the 
. 30 
American Pacific Fleet. 
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Not only did Fraser suggest the starting of what became the 
Chinese Commercial Growers Association, but he also offered ;300 from 
the New Zealand government to start the organisation. On 15 January 
1943, the Association cially began with the general objectives of 
protecting the growers' rights, uniting their efforts and increasing 
their knowledge (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1962). In order to accumulate 
its own funds the As ation levied the growers 1/- an acre and 
maintained the right to ask for as much as 5/- donation a year. More 
will be said of this organisation in the next chapter, but it is 
important to note at this stage that it represents the first case of 
recognition by the New Zealand government of a Chinese organisation, 
other than the Consulate. While this may seem at first glance to 
represent a case of co-optation, the history of the organisation is 
more accurately characterised by jealously guarded autonomy, free from 
constraints that might or could be imposed by European growers or the 
31 government. 
Further evidence of New Zealand's goodwill was an incident 
in 1944,when on 13 December Nash introduced the Finance Bill (3) into 
the House, which in clauses nine and ten removed 'the discriminatory 
clauses against the Chinese in the then current immigration Act' (NZ.PD, 
32 1944,267:724). The provisions erased the poll tax, tonnage 
restrictions and language requirements. Nash maintained in introducing 
the 11 that: 'We have no more right to ask the Chinese to pay a 
poll tax than we have to ask the Japanese the Germans, the Spaniards or 
the Norweigans' (ibid.). There was only one voice in the House that 
uttered the familiar cry, 'Will there be any check on the influx of 
Chinese?' and 'Supposing one thousand or two thousand come in regularly?' 
(Doidge, Tauranga, in NZPD,1944,267:725). Nash reiterated his point 
that the Chinese would now be treated like anyone else except of course, 
those of British birth or parentage. 
Nash's concluding remarks summed up the situation: 
I do not know of anything more pleasing from 
the Government's point of view, and from the 
point of view of anyone who understands 
international and racial affairs and knows a 
little of the history of the Far East and the 
Chinese people, than the removing of the blot 
on our legislation. We are merely saying that 
the Chinese are as good as any other race, and 
that we will not in future countenance any 
discrimination against them. 
(NZPD ,1944,267 : 725) 
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Finally, a provision which had caused the Chinese Consul in 1920 to 
write to the Prime Minister stating: 
The poll tax imposed on the Chinese is tantamount 
to suggesting that they are not human beings, but 
only animals or goods. Well they are human beings. 
The disgrace of such a tax recoils from the victim 
on to the imposer. 
33 (Ponton, 1946:56) 
~ad been removed, but it had taken sixty-three years. 
While the war had one. more year to go, this is a convenient 
place to end this section of the description in order to evaluate what 
had happened in the three periods discussed. Primarily, the first 
period was marked by a developing response from the Chinese community 
appealing for a change in their status as regards New Zealand. The 
predominant effort was by merchants, who variously enlisted the help 
of Europeans sympathetic to the Chinese. It also saw the rise of 
collective power in the Wellington community as di verged from 
Auckland. The conflict was between a Chinese community that felt 
unjustly treated and, on the other hand, the imposers of that treatment. 
The strategy used by the Chinese attempted to confront this situation 
in a number of ways. Through petitions the Chinese appealed, on the 
416. 
bas of international treaties, humanitarian values and their own 
ability to fulfil the normative requirements of life in New Zealand 
including their contribution to the economy, to have immigration 
ctions amended or cancelled, to maintain the right to 
naturalisation, and finally to get diplomatic representation. They 
tried demanding as well as humble petitions, and by 1907 had exhausted 
all avenues of appeal including the government, the Prime Minister, the 
Governor and ultimately the Colonial Secretary. If their success 
was minimal with the exception of the appointment of diplomatic 
representation, they did succeed in maintaining a profile that prevented 
the government from ignoring their Chinese minority population while 
perhaps preventing any more excessive action than had already been 
taken. In terms of the internal politics of the community, it allowed 
the emergence of a small group <flf leaders who became part of the 
organisation which linked the politics of the New Zealand community to 
the politics of their homeland. 
In the early nineteen hundreds the existence of the Tlung 
Meng Hui, the Chee Kung Tang and the Consulate provided the basis for 
internal factions within the community and an argument by the Consul 
for cooperation and a community organisation. The Consul 
viewed the survival of the community as requiring a Chung Wah Wui Koon 
which would represent Chinese communities, not factions within each. 
lfuile the organisation did exist, the rapidly changing events in China 
divided the overseas community into three factions, each of whom viewed 
their own survival in terms of particular strategies for the governing 
of China. These factions produced further divisions in the community 
whose concerns tended to counter those of the explicitly political 
groups. The locality associations cross-cut factions, providing 
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alternatives which had as their major explicit concern the well-being 
of their particular communities in New Zealand. While this was their 
stated aim, it is not apparent that locality associations ever spoke 
publicly for their own membership. 
In the second period, after 1905 when the Chung Wah Wui Koon 
was organised, negotiations with the New Zealand government or, for 
instance,. over the theatre incident in Auckland were left finally to 
the Consul. It was not until the second Chung Wah Wui Koon was 
founded in 1927, with representatives from all existing associations 
that it assumed a representative role for the whole Chinese community, 
albeit from only one urban centre. 
The importance of the Association was the fact that it mirrored 
events both external and internal to the community. The successful 
completion of the Northern Expedition gave added stimulus to support 
for the homeland, while conflict within the New Zealand Chinese 
community together with European hostility plagued internal relations. 
These situations together were suffi cient to provide a need for a 
national organisation. 
lhe Association successfullY responded on all fronts but its 
major role was to provide the basic foundation for a more enduring 
national organisation during the war years. 
]n the third period fro:n 1935 on till the end of the war the 
national Association organised a massive collection campaign to support 
China in their war against Japan. In this endeavour the Association 
managed, at least initially, to build a cooperative community around a 
collective effort, but once the latter was removed or interest waned, 
other agenda emerged which brought fragmentation. In one sense, local 
Chinese communities viewed themselves as distinct, guarding their 
autonomy in varying degrees, and although willing to abide by the 
418. 
hegemony of a national Association in the name of patriotism, they 
were not willing to accept its decisions on their behalf. There 
were, however, splits in these local communities which made their 
cooperative effort difficult. In most cases, the arguments were over 
the appropriation of money or the use of power, and in some cases, both. 
Money was important because of the extensive demands that were made on 
limited resources. The demands of the New Zealand government, 
patriotism, personal costs and family remittances were not trivial 
matters, nor was the possibility that the Chinese were using any of 
these demands to exploit their fellow countrymen. The legacy of the 
war collection was a certain group of individuals who achieved status 
and power in the community, a considerable amount of money that had 
been collected but never sent to China, a great deal of uncertainty 
concerning the fate of the war refugees, and those family members still 
ih war-torn China, and finally worry over their own young people growing 
up in New Zealand. The issues at stake provided justification for 
national cooperation of all Chinese and at the same time a tendency 
to elevate the importance of family and their own communities in 
New Zealand. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
1 Wang Feng was educated at the National University in 
Tientsin, had been Secretary at the Chinese Ministry of 
Communications from 1926 till 1928, when he transferred to 
Nanking to become First Secretary for China to the Buenos 
Aires government under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Following this he was appointed to Johannesburg as Acting 
Consul (NA,IA 68/12, 13 January 1930). 
2 The abbreviation, NZCGMJ, is for the New Zealand Chinese 
Growers'Monthly Journal and will be referenced as NZCGMJ. All 
references to this journal are translated, since was published 
in Chinese. 
3 The interpretation by the Department of Labour in 1950 was that 
the latter reason was more correct. However, considering the 
discontinuation of the option to bring wives and children here 
as permanent residents in 1926 so that the population would not 
increase naturally, the former reason seems more likely. 
4 In order to incorporate the Chinese in Otago and Southland, the 
Dunedin branch organised six groups including Dunedin, 
Southland (Invercargill) , Outram and Oamaru, with representatives 
from each. The branch had collected £14,000 from 200 Otago 
Chinese in a period of three years (see Appendix XXXI). 
5 Initially the Chinese Weekly News (henceforth abbreviated to CWN) 
was published with voluntary assistance, but after 1940 an 
editor was hired. During the entire period of the publication, 
300 to 400 copies were produced of each issue, the master copy 
written by hand then reproduced. This represented a levy of 10% 
of income per week, a considerable amount considering the slow 
recovery from the depression that they had just survived and 
considering the fact that many had paid poll tax quite recently 
and were probably also committed to remitting monies to their 
families remaining in China. 
6 In the eight years of the war effort from 1939 11 1946, eight 
conferences were held with a total attendance of 330 delegates, 
according to one informant. The same informant calculated that 
in all Wellington had 99 delegates, Otago and Southland 41, 
Auckland 33, Canterbury 29, Manawatu 21, Wairarapa 17, Hutt 
Valley 14, Gisborne 11, Hawkes Bay 9, Levin 9, Ohakune 7, 
Timaru 7, Greymouth 5, Wairoa 4, Waikato 4, Taihape 3, Otaki 2, 
Wanganui 1, Nelson 1 and the Association headquarters 14. No 
delegates from New Plymouth, Hawera, Foxton, Ohau, Rotorua, 
Dannevirke or Blenheim attended any meetings. Of the total 
attendance, over 75% of the delegates came from Jung Sing and 
Poon Yu, with the remainder from Seyip and one other county. 
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7 This represented on average, a levy of 10% of income per week, 
a considerable amount considering the slow recovery from the 
depression that they had just survived and considering the fact 
that many had paid poll tax quite recently and were probably 
also committed to remitting monies to their families remaining 
in China. 
8 Until 1940 this confederation of branches was under the control 
of the Wellington Chinese Association. In September of this 
same year, it was decided at the Fifth Congress to reform 
Wellington's Chinese Association and reconstitute as the 
New Zealand Chinese Association (Q-Sing Times, 10 September 1940). 
Wellington was to be the head office and to lead the work of the 
national salvation collection. Appendix XXX contains a list 
of the branches of the Association and their Chinese equivalent 
names. 
9 From this period on, annual executive meetings of all 
associations were recorded by photographs, although few came 
to the notice of the general public. 
10 Only eight of these men are still alive and only three of 
these still live in Dunedin. 
11 Both Dunedin and Gisborne were active before they were formally 
constituted, and in fact some informants have claimed that 
their existence preceded the institution of the national 
organisation by some years. 
12 Hereafter the Chinese Weekly News will be abbreviated as (CWN). 
All articles have been translated from the Chinese. 
13 There was also a problem with personal remittances by the 
Chinese. The Government in 1938-39 limited individual 
remittances to 5 at anyone time. To circumvent this, Chinese 
were going to several banks to purchase the:£.s money orders, a 
situation that was soon discovered by the Reserve Bank. From 
then on, the Chinese Association was required to check that 
people seeking to make remittances had bona- relatives in 
China and were abiding by the regulations. In order to do this, 
the Association issued identification cards which gave one's 
town of residence, address, registration number for the 
Association branch, registration number for head office, the 
holder's Chinese and English signature and the Head Office seal 
and signatures. 'Conditions of Use' were printed on the back: 
1. Not transferable. Must be used only by person to whom 
issued. 
2. Card must be presented on each application for a draft. 
3. Valid only in town named on the other 
4. Application to Association Head Office for of new 
card must be made on change of residence to new town. 
5. Valid only when bearing the seal of the New Zealand 
Chinese Association, and the signatures of at least 
two of the three members of the special sub-committee. 
And then only for the period stated on the other side. 
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14 The conditions under which this proVlslon was implemented 
for admission of wives and children are provided in 
Pondon (1946:119-120). According to Ponton, they were 
stringent in order to 'prevent abuse' :119). 
15 The review of this policy in 1950 resulted in this statement: 
This was rather a drastic step taken to solve a problem 
to which there appeared to be no easy solution. It is 
obvious, however, that the pre-war policy of allowing 
the entry of Chinese on temporary permits long 
periods was in many ways an unwise one ... 
(NA, L22/l/8l:4) 
16 According to the Department of Labour 249 wives and 244 
children were finally admitted to New Zealand before the 
provisions were withdrawn (NA, L22/l/81:3). 
17 Ponton (1946) described the large numbers that applied as 
'astounding' and concluded that they indicated a 'natural 
of the Chinese to have their wives with them' (Ponton, 
1946:121). However, he noted the tendency of legislators in 
the past to ignore this possibility and even oppose it on the 
basis that Chinese by definition were immoral, a position 
which he describes as 'little less than criminal' (ibid.). 
18 In 1974 I was given access to record books which listed the 
number of applications received in 1939 and 1940, but the 
total did not equate with those of Ng, 1959 or the ones 
provided in (NA, L22/l/8l:3), so they have been treated as a 
sample. Attempts to find these same records in 1982 to re-
check the data have failed. 
19 The Evening Post, quoting the New Zealand Herald, which had 
commented on the new arrivals, maintained that: 
... the women seemed to be of exceptionally high type 
while the children were happy, attractively dressed 
and well cared for. 
(EP, 17 January 1940) 
20 The availability of food was not a problem other than Chinese 
foodstuffs whose transportation was interrupted by the war in 
the Pacific. When the supply of rice ran short, the Consul 
and Association approached the government and were able to 
negotiate the provision of special import licences. Twenty-
six of these licences were issued to shops, eight in Auckland, 
four in Dunedin, eight in Wellington, two in Christchurch, and 
the remainder distributed in smaller centres. The provisions 
were in effect till 1945. 
21 Old Age Pension allowance was £1.2.6 per week and Family 
Allowance was 4/- per week per child in 1937. 
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22 The source of this move was a massive confusion amongst 
overseas Chinese. In December 1937, the Japanese set up a 
puppet in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei, and the KMT 
retreated to Chungking. This led to confusion overseas, as 
it was unclear whom they should support, since the Japanese 
forced Wang to encourage the purchase of a national bond 
issue among overseas Chinese. The KMT had to respond 
immediately and send representatives to South East Asia and 
the c to clarify the situation. It was not until 
1 May 1940 that the Auckland KMT responded by writing a letter 
to Chiang Kai-shek condemning Wang Ching-wei as a traitor: 
Such an unscrupulous renegade of the nation, a deadly 
enemy of the people should be severely punished. We 
the Chinese people in New Zealand stand solidly behind 
the central government in their effort to expel the 
Japanese invaders and bring the traitor Wang Ching-wei 
to justice. 
1 May 1940) 
23 Auckland the right to remit their own funds to ,Hong 
Kong or China and to take care of their own donations but 
felt obliged to consult the national executive before they 
tried to introduce a system whereby donations would be 
automatically deducted from employees within the community 
(see Times 15 May 1939). 
24 According to an informant, this committee sponsored Chen Y.S., 
a former resident of Auckl and who had returned to China and 
came back to New Zealand in the capacity of managing director 
of the China Charity Relief Society. He travelled around New 
Zealand people he had previously known and was able 
to collect £.400 from 200 people in Auckland, £300 from 200 
people in Wellington,jt200 from 100 people in Dunedin, 
£40 from 30 people in Timaru and £100 from 100 people in 
Christchurch. 
25 This was also stimulated by the involvement of Madam Chiang 
Kai-shek, who had sent letters of thanks to the New Zealand 
Chinese community for their 'patriotic enthusiasm' (Q-Sing 
Times, 15 March 1940). 
26 The event to was the Mukden Incident, when the 
Japanese invaded Manchuria, but it is more likely that it was 
the resistance offered to the Japanese army. by General Ma 
Chan-shen in October 1931 that stirred the national pride of 
the Auckland youth. General Ma was described as a hero who 
had saved China from the 'utter disgrace of cowardice' (see 
Clubb, 1964:168). Clubb maintains that 'Ma became "The Hero 
of the Nonni River Battle". His action did more than save 
the Chinese honour; it stimulated Chinese "volunteers" to 
oppose the invaders and their Chinese COllaborators in spite 
of Nanking's policy of nonresistance (ibid.). 
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27 In mid-1940, Britain had warned New Zealand that if Japan went 
to war it was unlikely that sufficient protection could be 
offered. Singapore had fallen in December 1941 with Pearl 
Harbour, so the strong British presence that had been New 
Zealand's hope was gone (Wood, 1958:194). On 23 December 1941, 
New Zealand had established formal ties with the United States 
to ensure the 'political integrity and economic well being' of 
Pacific communities (ibid. :195). However, the important aspect 
of this active role by New Zealand in the Pacific was that 
Fraser hoped that New Zealand would be consulted in future 
decisions about the area. He hoped that China, Britain and 
the United States would see this as important, but in December 
1943 these three powers approved the Cairo Declaration in 
which they agreed to take from Japan all territories seized 
during the war, without consulting either New Zealand or 
Australia ibid. :313). 
28 In 1941 and 1942 Fraser had been in London and Washington 
respecti vely and had met with Dr. Wellington Ku, Mr. T.V. 
Soong and the Chinese ambassador. The Evening Post noted that 
he had in both places maintained that the Chinese people and 
their diplomatic representation in New Zealand had represented 
China well. Fraser said that the people he met had lexpressed 
great pride in the part the Chinese community in Wellington 
had played in supporting the war effort of New Zealand and of 
their own country' (EP, 12 October 1942). 
29 Chiang Kai shek had also sent cables to the New Zealand Chinese 
commending them for their contributions and encouraging them 
'to continue to carryon their efforts to the end' (see 
Q-Sing Times, February 1940). This was used effectively to 
urge further donations, as the editor added a warning: 'Should 
China perish in the war the overseas Chinese would suffer 
great misfortune' (ibid.). 
30 Wood points out that the 'demand for food and services was 
increasing sharply as American troops poured into the Pacific 
area', while at the same time ten per cent of New Zealand's 
population were in the Dominion's armed forces excluding 
those under British command (Wood, 1958:243). 
31 The European growers already had their own organisation, the 
New Zealand Vegetable and Produce Growers Federation, hereafter 
referred to as the Federation. 
32 In addition to this, according to Philip Matthews, a journalist, 
there was a move in 1944 to allow Chinese students special 
grants in order to attend university. The move was made by the 
University of New Zealand,butI have been unable to verify the 
plan (see Matthews, 1946:4). 
33, Ponton made the observation that the Chinese Consul in 
responding th~s way had done 'very little good and only 
succeeded in raising the ire of New Zealand officialdom 
against his own people' (Ponton, 1946:56). 
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CHAPTER 9 
ORGANISATIONS AND POST WAR DEVELOPMENTS 1946-1959 
If th~ situation had been complex for the Chinese community in 
New Zealand during the war year$ and before, it was to be no less so 
after the end of the war. The celebration of the end of the war in 
1945 saw a relieved New Zealand but only a partially relieved 
Chinese community whose homeland was still embroiled in a civil war 
and would be for four more years. Even with the resolution of that 
dilemma in China, the New Zealand Chinese would then have to again 
confront the possibility of split loyalties which had plagued the 
community from 1911 till the late 1920s. The existence of the 
People's Republic and the Republic of China, New Zealand Vaccillation 
over which to recognise diplomatically, and the Korean war made the 
situation not only politically sensitive but also very difficult in 
fundamental ways for the vulnerable Chinese community in New Zealand. 
The end of the war left the Chinese refugee programme in the 
balance and New Zealand confronted with the problem of either accepting 
their Chinese minority or, contrary to all sentiments of international 
benevolence, refusing permanent residence and sending the wives and 
children back to China. While the former alternative prevailed, 
the machinations that emerged over the re-unification of families, 
in terms of immigration procedure, took many years to resolve, as 
did the remedies for the sex-ratio imbalance remaining as the historic 
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outcome of Chinese migration patterns and New Zealand's desires. 
Naturally, the issue of continued Chinese immigration to New Zealand 
met di receptions from the two political parties with their 
traditional positions on Chinese immigration, but it was also 
influenced by the political changes in China. Furthermore, it 
became increasingly ironic that a country formerly highlY critical of 
an all male Chinese population without any semblance of family life 
was equally critical of a growing resident Chinese population with 
families and many more who would want to bring spouses to New Zealand. 
The overwhelming desire of European New Zealanders for the Chinese to 
become assimilated would not tolerate the possible regeneration of 
Chinese culture through immigration of kin and spouses direct from 
China. 
While the above made the post-war external relations of the 
community di cult and unsettled, the internal dynamics of the 
community were equally difficult and unsettled. With cessation of 
the war there was a termination of the collection activity. Freed 
from the pressures of collective activity, the organisation was 
dismantled, leaving only the problems attached to the remaining funds 
which Wellington had kept and intended to use as the legitimate 
headquarters of the New Zealand Chinese. Other communities, however, 
felt differently about this assumed power to appropriate funds that 
had come from Chinese allover New Zealand, leading to considerable 
tensions being manifested between the core (Wellington) and the periphery 
as well as a loss of status for the national Association. 
The leaders of the community during the war years, now without 
the power and status of the collection organisation, turned their 
energy to an import/export company which accumulated capital from New 
Zealand Chinese shareholders. While initially successful, the company 
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ultimately became the basis of disagreement and dissati on, as 
company policy had to cope with political changes in China, some of 
which were unacceptable to local Chinese. 
The legacy of the war years was a community that had no clear 
direction either in the area of those who had power or in the area of 
associational activity and the even more generalised area of events 
like the Double Tenth. From its earliest years, the Double Tenth 
marked a clear political event which linked the New Zealand Chinese to 
their homeland,but in the post-war years its focus was blurred and 
complicated by the existence of two Chinese governments. In addition, 
the number of new families with young children growing up 
and educated in European society without the possibil of going to 
China for their basic education were considered at risk. 
If the cultural and political links were problematic for older 
Chinese, they were even more so for the young, who shared little of 
the experience that their parents had lived through. The pressure 
they faced was that of becoming part of New Zealand s , which, 
while condoned by elders as necessary for survival, led to fears on 
their part that not only would Chinese language competence disappear 
but also any trace of Chinese culture. This in the end, it was feared, 
would affect young and old alike. It was clear that government policy -
and, indeed, the prevalent ideology in New Zealand at the time -
supported this process, seeing it as a positive attribute on the way 
to complete assimilation. However, the Chinese community was reluctant 
to this fate. 
period after the war, therefore, was to become necessarily 
one where a number of issues had to be resolved. The community had not 
only to solve the problems attached to the legacy of former years but 
also to provide for the needs of both young and old in a changing 
context. The associational response and its development in this 
period indicated a clear process of the community trying to 
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reorganise and develop an appropriate set of strategies which would 
provide for its continued survival. The organisations had to hold the 
youth from complete assimilation, maintain some cultural coherence 
for the Chinese community and provide for future leadership of the 
community. While the needs were known, the articulation of these 
needs in the context of the community's past history together with its 
changing external influences, made the task increasingly complex and 
time-consuming, but in the end - with compromise - successful. 
In May 1945, the war ended with Germany and in August with 
Japan. In October the New Zealand Chinese Association gathered in 
Wellington at the Association headquarters to celebrate the events with 
speeches from the Executive, including members of the Consulate, the 
KMT, the Auckland branch and the local headquarters. Delegates from 
other centres provided entertainment which expressed local Chinese 
opinions of the Japanese and the performance by youth groups of 
Chinese national songs (see EP, 17 August 1945). Similarly, in other 
places the Chinese, like the Europeans, celebrated victory, with the 
young often joining in the local community celebrations. In the 
following month a three-day holiday was set aside by the Chinese 
community allover New Zealand to commemorate, in a more subdued 
fashion, the eight years of war. Europeans had only a day and a half 
holiday, but, as an informant explained, they had not been at war for 
such a long period. 
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In October 1945, Double Tenth was celebrated with local 
sports gatherings, speeches and dinners. 1 In Wellington the gathering 
was larger now, with an increasing number of young children and even a 
Boy Scout troup (EP, 10 October 1945). The speeches, while buoyantly 
encouraging compatriots to enjoy themselves and seek health and 
physical fitness, also carried a more subdued message that the local 
Chinese should make sure their countrymen's sacrifices were not in 
vain (ibid.). The Secretary of the Association said: 
... after today they would have to shoulder their 
responsibilities, realizing that neither the 
establishment of the Republic nor the gaining of 
victory over Japan completely achieved the end 
which this particular day commemorated - the 
spirit of freedom, of equality, and of political 
self-determination. 
(EP, 10 October 1945) 
The message was important on two counts. While the war had 
ended for the rest of the world, China had still to face an unresolved 
civil war, and the New Zealand Chinese as a consequence felt little 
security when anticipating returns to their homeland. On the other 
hand, if they were to stay in New Zealand, then the legal position of 
the refugees, students and business managers in the country under 
temporary permits, also remained unresolved while the government 
continued to extend the duration of the permits year by year. 
According to the agreement, repatriation of the refugees was to occur 
at the end of the war, but it had made no provision for the 
contingency of continued civil war in China. 2 
While the former issue could be met only by reaction, the 
latter became the focus of concerted action by Chinese and European 
churches, supported by the Chinese Association, the Consul and the 
local press. 
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The Chinese Anglican and Baptist churches in Wellington had 
survived the depression, and their joint mission, which had been 
established in 1932, lasted till 1949. 3 In this period the joint 
mission had been guided by a Baptist evangelist who had also been a 
prominent leader of the KMT in New Zealand. When he resigned in 1940, 
the Anglicans had their turn to designate a leader and appointed a 
minister newly arrived from China. Unfortunately, the minister had 
suffered heavily under the Japanese and died a year later, leaving 
mission activity to be shared between a Chinese lay reader and a 
Presbyterian missionary. In 1945 the Baptists waived their right to 
appoint, and the Anglicans, after some trouble, secured a new 
missioner from Hong Kong, ordained and with considerable experience. 
The new minister was to stay for five years, but within one 
year he had already rejuvenated the church and its buildings and set 
about organising a campaign for a new church. He visited his region, 
which included the area south of a line from New Plymouth to Gisborne 
and the South Island north of Dunedin. He also organised a choir in 
Wellington 
the church saw 
EP, 19 July 1947). Like the Chinese Association, 
future based on the young people in the community 
and a building which would ensure its status. 
The European church was represented by the Presbyterians, who 
by now had been able to return to the Canton 
affected by the war but not totally disrupted. 4 
which had been 
McNeur, who had returned on furlough to New Zealand from China 
in 1940, had remained in Dunedin and again taken up the South Island 
mission to the Chinese (Barton, 1955:30). In 1947, he drew the 
attention of the Dunedin Presbytery to the need for a Chinese pastor to 
continue his work and also to the plight of the Chinese refugees. 
McNeur maintained that if the refugees were forced to return to China 
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it would split families which had now become established (EP, 3 June 
1947). He further argued that these families had made a substantial 
contribution to New Zealand, and to repatriate them now would not only 
injure the possibility of future friendship between China and New 
Zealand but also cause needless hardship. McNeur recommended that 
they be granted naturalisation like European refugees, which of course 
would represent the equal treatment promised by Nash in 1944 (see 
Chapter 8, page 414)5 
Internal Affairs was also made aware of problems developing in 
the Chinese community both in regard to naturalisation and because of 
the refugee situation. In October 1946, the Governor General received 
a letter in Chinese from Christchurch, which was duly translated by 
the Secretary of the Wellington Chinese Association. The letter 
requested that Chinese refugees be allowed to stay in New Zealand and 
also that older Chinese businessmen who had returned to China should 
be allowed to send another person to New Zealand to look after their 
remaining interest. The author justified the request on three 
grounds: first, the cost of living had soared in China making it 
impossible for many, should they return, to live; second, China and 
New Zealand were 'neighbours and should be friends'; and finally, 
pressure on New Zealand Chinese to send adequate remittances was 
leading to fights in the community and illegal practices. 6 The latter 
situation was one, according to the letter, where individuals through 
intermediaries were attempting to get extra Identification Cards (see 
Chapter 8, page 420, fn 13) from the Chinese Association in order to 
increase their remittances. The Association refused to issue the cards 
and the Consul confiscated them, which led to accusations against the 
Association and the Consul. It was clear to the author of the letter 
that the kinds of pressure placed on local Chinese refugees by their 
immigration status were counterproductive for the whole community and 
should be dealt with immediately. 
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While the press wrote sympathetically about the Presbyterian 
Church's activities, one journalist in Auckland Philip Matthews, 
after gathering material for several years, published a preliminary 
report on the Chinese community in New Zealand (Matthews, 1947). 
report is interesting, for it was the only description of the 
Chinese community to appear since Mawson's 1927 pamphlet. Matthews 
did not confront the issue of refugees directly in this article. 
This especially curious since he had already written an article 
in an Auckland paper describing the departure of Auckland Chinese to 
China to look for their relatives (AS, 9 May 1947). The people he 
described, twenty in 1945 and about thirty in 1946, were middle-aged 
or older since they alone could get re-entry permits as permanent 
residents and were now on their way home to search for family. 
In the pamplet that followed this article, Matthews very 
obviously set about removing stereotypical assumptions about the 
local Chinese. He described their history briefly, noting that they 
'have not the political consciousness of the New Zealanders' and that 
more are supporters of the KMT than of the CCP (Matthews, 1947:4). 
Matthews then proceeded to the issue of Chinese immigration and 
took a contrary position, he ventured to suggest to that which would 
be supported by many New Zealanders. To the question 'Do we want 
Chinese immigration?', he gave a qualified 'yes' provided that, like 
any migration, it did not undermine the 'standards we have built up 
over the past century', neglecting to mention that these 'standards I 
were based on a principle of 'racial purity' (ibid. :5). He described 
the then current treatment of Chinese under the temporary permit 
system as unsatisfactory, maintaining that it made them neither 
citizens nor visitors 'but ... an unhappy mixture of both' .). In 
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regard to becoming New Zeal anders, Matthews argued that they would 
so as much as do British-born New Zealanders, but only if they had 
access to the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship. This 
according to Matthews, Je';}t for the ones that are at present in New 
Zealand and for those who in the future could be admitted safely, 
7 
under a quota system. 
The only catch in Matthews' benevolent ideas was his suggestion 
that all Chinese currently in New Zealand be surveyed and classified 
as to occupation, 'desire to become naturalised' and 'their 
desirabili ty as citizens' (Matthews, 1947,: 7). This would provide 
three groups, according to Matthews, which would 
... give a lead as to how future quotas should be 
distributed vocationally, enable due rights and 
obligations to be given to those who desire them 
and ... enable us to cancel the permits of those who 
have proved trouble-makers and send them back to 
where they came from. 
(Matthews, 1947:7). 
The publication of Matthews' pamphlet was followed by a meeting 
of the Public Questions Committee of the General Assembly of the 
Presbyterian Church. On the suggestion of the Dunedin Presbytery, it 
made a number of recommendations to government, some of which were 
exactly the same as Matthews had proposed (see footnote 1, page 
The church took a far more liberal stand over the refugee situation, 
however, appealing to the government to allow all refugee children 
and women to remain permanently (ODT, 13 June 1947). The resolution 
argued, as had McNeur previously, that it would be inhuman to insist 
on sending women and children back to a country torn by civil strife 
with a rapidly increasing cost of living and starvation amongst 
children. As for the Chinese in New Zealand, the refugee children were 
now well settled and were of educational value especially to New Zealand 
with its 'insularity and isolation' (ODT, 13 June 1947). It was in 
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the interest of New Zealand, the Public Questions Committee argued, 
to keep these families united, which would increase the value 'of 
their contribution to our national life' (ibid.). 
The branch of the Chinese Association in Dunedin responded 
favourably to this initiative. The president stated that he was 
'grateful for the kindness of New Zealand in admitting refugees to 
the country but that an assurance that their stay would be prolonged 
would be welcome' (ODT, 13 June 1947). The situation, the president 
maintained, was particularly hard for market gardeners who were unable 
to plan ahead for the corning year because of the uncertainty over 
residence. According to him, the Australian solution, which gave the 
Chinese either the option of returning to China immediately or being 
able to stay for another three years, was preferable to the 
unpredictable yearly renewal. 
The Wellington branch of the Association also supported the 
move of the Presbytery and particularly the fact that the issue of 
naturalisation was being taken up by New Zealanders on their behalf 
(Southern Cross, 13 June 1947). 
In late June or early July, a deputation met with Fraser, the 
Prime Minister, which was entirely made up of Church representatives. 
It included the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church and Reverend W. 
Gladstone of Wellington, Reverend McNeur of the Chinese Church in 
Dunedin and representatives who could speak for the Chinese Anglican 
and Baptist missions in Wellington (ODT, 22 July 1947).9 The meeting 
was reported as favourable, and the results confirmed the optimism 
reported. In July Cabinet met and approved the granting of permanent 
residence to approximately 1,323 Chinese, as follows: 
Refuge~ wives admitted in 1939 
Refugee children 
Children born in New Zealand to 
Refugee Wives 
Cbinese men admitted temporarily to 
manage businesses while the owner 
visited China and who had been here 
for at least five years 
Chinese male students who had completed 
their schooling and had been here at 
least five years 
249 
244 
437 
93 
300 (approx.) 
(NA, L22/l/8l:3) 
In addition to the above persons, 1,408 additional Chinese 
people on temporary permits, of whom nearly 1,000 had been born in 
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China, were also allowed to remain permanently .). A 1950 survey 
of immigration ation by the Department of Labour described this 
decision as I ••• rather a drastic step taken to solve a problem to 
h ' h h d b 1 ' 1 10 w lC t ere appeare to e no easy so utlon . 
The Chinese community response was one of covert relief. Thirty 
years later it is still remembered as a significant event in the history 
of their people in New Zealand. This, more than the 1944 Finance Act, 
signified and confirmed that the New Zealand government had at last 
changed its stance regarding their presence in the country, changing 
the status of the Chinese from problems into permanent residents. 
Shortly after the decision was announced, other Chinese took the 
opportunity of sending requests to the government to allow them to 
bring their wives and children to New Zealand. (IA,116/7, 16 March 1948). 
The same year the government decided to grant permits for such cases 
under the provisions of the Immigration Restriction Act 1920, with 
the following conditions: 
a) that the Chinese concerned arrived in New Zealand 
before 30 April 1928, and has resided in New 
Zealand since that date except for brief visits 
to China. 
b) that the Chinese concerned has applied for and is 
considered suitable for naturalization in New 
Zealand. 
c) that minor unmarried children only who are the 
lawful natural children of the Chinese concerned 
will be admitted to New Zealand with the wife; and 
d) that the Chinese concerned will be required to make 
a statutory declaration regarding his arrival in 
New Zealand and period of residence and particulars 
of wife and minor children and to produce a marriage 
certificate in respect of his wife and birth 
certificates in respect of minor children or 
satisfactory evidence in lieu of such certificates. 
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11 (NA, IA 116/7, 16 March 1948). 
In a communication sent to the Chinese Consul informing him of 
the above arrangements, it was also stipulated that not all cases 
would automatically receive a permit and, further, that only fifty 
permits would be issued for 1948 and preferably to those who had been 
married longest (ibid.). 
The provisions made for 1948 were extended in 1949, a situation 
reminiscent of the temporary permit system. By the end of 1949, 
100 wives had been admitted with III sons and 42 daughters. The age 
distribution of wives was as follows: 
Age Number of Wives 
35 - 39 26 
40 - 44 33 
45 - 62 41 
(NA, L22/l/8l:5) 
The criteria used to select those married the longest meant that 
the most recent marriage had been in 1934 and the earliest in 1898 
(NA, L22/l/8l:5), and it was estimated in 1950 that if the concession was 
extended the date of marriage would not be later than 1922 and the wife 
would be about 44 (ibid.). 
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As regards the children who came in 1948-49, there was a 
in favour of males over females, which was not evident either in 
the 1939 cohort or, for that matter, amongst the children born to the 
wives in New Zealand. It was also noted that a number of the 
families reunited had sons already in New Zealand under the student 
temporary permit scheme, which had continued to operate (see Table 14 
below). 
TABLE 14: Permits Issued and Students Arrived under the 
Temporary Permit Scheme 1946 - June 1950. 
Year Permits Issued Arrivals 
1946 2 
1947 37 10 
1948 58 54 
1949 57 57 
1950 7 18 
(NA, L22/l/8l:5) 
The above indicated that the sex imbalance in the population would be 
maintained and also that marriage partners for single males would be a 
12 problem in later years. 
The issue now most closely related to continued immigration was 
naturalisation, which was taken up initially by the Chinese Consul and 
later by the Presbyterian Church. In late April 1948 the Consul went 
to Internal Affairs to make representations. Initially the Consul 
merely clarified the policy of the Chinese government regarding 
nationality, stating that dual nationality was acceptable. However, he 
also added a recommendation that Chinese desiring to become British 
nationals should obtain release from Chinese nationality (NA, IA 11 6/7, 
28 April 1948), a simple procedure according to the Consul. 
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The second point of clarification by the Consul, however, was 
far more sinister as regards the Chinese in New Zealand. He maintained 
that the large majority of Chinese in New Zealand had greater affinity 
for China than for Britain and that their applications for naturalisation, 
which had increased, were nothing more than a gesture to enable them to 
get wives and children into New Zealand .). The Consul stated that 
the Chinese, if naturalised, would treat British status as an empty 
formality, and he recommended that 'high standards' be used in selecting 
who should be allowed to bring wives and children to New Zealand and 
further that this issue should be separated from naturalisation 
applications (~bid.). The Assistant Under-Secretary who talked to the 
Consul and later described his discussion with him attributed his stand 
to 'personal and national interests' but did not elaborate this point. 
The Minister of Customs had wanted, by including a requirement for 
naturalisation in the provisions, to extend the requirements of standard 
of living and character to actual membership in the community .) . 
Internal Affairs, however, had reason to believe that if the Consul 
doubted the sincerity of an application for naturalisation he would 
refuse to send his recommendation for release from Chinese nationality 
when it was forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior in China. In 
order to avoid this, was proposed to the Minister of Customs that 
the word "naturalisation'! be removed from the requirements. In the 
meantime, however, Internal Affairs requested direction from the Prime 
Minister's department, 'as to the desirability of assimilation, its 
nature, and its extent' and as regards naturalisation, whether or not 
it would be wise to incorporate a provision in the proposed Treaty of 
Friendship with China allowing release for Chinese residents in New 
Zealand who desired naturalisation (NA, Ik 116/7,28 April, 1948). 
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The Prime Minister's department responded that the Consul had 
made release from Chinese nationaIi ty appear more easily obtainable than 
it actually was according to evidence from Canada (NA,IA 116/7, 21 June 
1948). In regard to assimilation, the Permanent Head of the Prime 
Minister's department stated that: 
In brief: 
... 1 am not able to assist you. At present the Chinese 
appear to prefer to remain within their own community 
and this may well continue to be so if wives are 
permitted to come here. The young generation appear 
to be diligent and intelligent but handicapped in this 
matter of assimilation by economic ties. I understand 
that the Chinese are unwilling to employ European 
assistants in shops and that the work accordingly 
devolves on members of the family. Contact with out-
siders is, therefore, precluded in most instances. 
There may be a few cases of marriage with Maoris, but 
the total is bound to be small and is likely to 
remain so. 
I do not feel that the Government, in the absence of 
sufficient information to work on, would be prepared 
at present to lay down a firm policy in this matter ... 
(NA, IA 116/7, 21 June 1948) 
The Under-Secretary of Internal Affairs reported the following 
to his Minister: 
Despite the importance of the Chinese colony in our 
domestic life we have practically no knowledge of the 
ways of life and thought of the local Chinese. We do 
not know whether the best potential citizens are those 
wi th European wives or those who are bachelors. We do 
not know whether the Chinese should be encouraged to 
mix socially with the general community or whether it 
would be better for national welfare for them to be left 
to themselves. We do not know in what sense, if at all, 
they identify themselves with New Zealand, or how their 
attitude towards New Zealand compares with their attidue 
towards their native land ... 
In most cases it is impossible for me to judge whether a 
Chinese with a wife and family in China and himself 
Ii ving in a bach in Chinatown is suitable for natural-
ization or not; his poor living conditions may mean merely 
that he is giving the maximum of help to his family, his 
poor English may denote merely lack of opportunity to 
mix with New Zealanders, and in fact none of the general 
problems of assimilation arise until his wife and family 
are settled here and the children are attending our 
schools ... 
(NA, L22/l/ 81: 6) 
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The most interesting ct of this dilemma was the enlightened 
admission by a government department that its knowledge of a group 
who had lived in New Zealand foreighty-three years was minimal. On 
the other hand, the more odious suggestion was contained in yet another 
paragraph: 
8. In the light of a11 the above factors the way appears 
to be open for a policy of grant naturalization to 
certain very limited categories of Chinese nationals, so 
removing the stigma of racial discrimination without 
committing ourselves to any action- the scope and effects 
of which cannot be estimated in the light of our present 
inadequate knowledge of the Chinese. 
The limited categories in question would be, essentially, 
persons who are becoming detached from the fringes of the 
very compact Chinese community in New Zealand and who are 
tending towards a British way of life. The types that I 
have in mind are the man with a British wife (whether Maori 
or European) whose children are being brought up in a 
mainly European (or Maori) manner; also, in a lesser 
the man with a Chinese wife and children resident here, if 
the children have passed through our schools and are 
drawing their parents out of the rather primi ti ve domestic 
and social conditions of the local Chinese community; and 
finally, the most important category from any viewpoints, 
any young people who have passed through our schools and 
who need the assistance of naturalization in order to break 
out of their Chinese environment with its stock occupations 
of fruit retailing and laundering, and to get themselves 
accepted by the European community as tradesmen, office 
workers, or members of the professions. It may be possible 
to go beyond these three categories as our experience 
widens, but I think you will agree as to the types that 
are known to be assimilable, even though this involves 
rejecting a certain number of applicants who are of good 
character, but whose way of fe follows the Chinese 
pattern. It is thought that the number of quali ed 
applicants in these categories will not exceed a score 
yearly. 
(NA, lA 116/7, 12 July 1948:2) 
From the above, contrary to the opinion expressed about lack of 
knowledge, there seems little doubt as to structure of the Chinese 
community as far as the Under-Secretary is concerned, nor is there any 
doubt that the 'impact of the Chinese community' with its 'rather 
primitive domestic and social conditions' should be counteracted. 
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There is a strange sense in which the secretary is arguing for total 
assimilation and biculturalism at the same time, and in ways that 
were previously (1929) abhorrent to many European New Zealanders. 
Biculturalism, however, was not an issue in 1948, but the unintended 
consequences of assimilation were in some ways destined to lead to 
this and to a new leadership style in the Chinese community. In 1948 
however, New Zealand had to make up its mind as to the position the 
Chinese would occupy or more precisely have its mind made up for it 
by an effective lobby. 
On 27 September 1948, a deputation from the Inter-Church Council 
went to see Nash, then Minister of Customs, concerning increased 
allowable earnings for pensioners, employment accommodation for 
displaced persons brought to New Zealand during the war, and finally 
the status and position of the Chinese. The two members of the 
deputation who made statements were the Bishop of Wellington and the 
minister from the Chinese Anglican Church. The Bishop introduced his 
comments by stating that the Council viewed the matter of the Chinese 
from a moral standpoint (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:2). It was 
on moral grounds that families ought to be reunited and that the 
overall number of Chinese wives permitted to arrive should be increased, 
which would mean substantially changing the requirement of twenty 
year residence in New Zealand before application (NA, IA 116/7, 
27 September 1948:2 3), The Chinese minister added that he had 
gathered information from the Chinese community and that there were 
2,000 married Chinese males in New Zealand of whom 400 had wives with 
them, leaving 1,600 still without families (ibid.). He described the 
situation of these men in the following way: 
Out of that 1600 they had found that a certain 
percentage were employed in the gambling trade and 
in many other not very respectable professions, 
the main reason being that they had not a family 
to look after or which could check them. Most of 
them stayed in New Zealand for such a long time 
without going back to China. They tried to get 
back to China, but could not save the money. There 
were also a large number who did not send money 
back to China. He had received letters from their 
wives in China saying that the husbands were not 
sending them money. Some sent money back, but it 
hampered their livelihood in New Zealand. They had 
to keep two homes going, one in China and one in New 
Zealand. Due to the fact that the could not 
come to New Zealand there were mixed marriages and 
cases of Chinese living with other women. 
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The Chinese missioner maintained that the old who still felt 
some sense of kinship obligation would return to China,13 and there 
were others who did not care, but there was a substantial number who 
had come after 1928, and it was these people who now wanted to bring 
their families to New Zealand (ibid.:3_4).14 They were, according to 
him, people who had businesses and who, rather than having Someone 
manage it while they returned on a visit to China, needed their 
families to help run and maintain what they had already started. As 
an example the minister pointed to the situation amongst the market 
gardeners of Gisborne, Otaki and Taihape who had to decrease their 
acreage because of labour shortage (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:4). 
Before the war these gardeners had been able to hire Maori labour, but 
now they could not get any help and were facing difficult times (ibid.). 
Nash responded indirectly by repeating the history of legislation. 
He reviewed the temporary permit scheme, which he suggested had not been 
fully utilized by the Chinese, including the war provisions and the 
concession granted in the post-war period. He offered to review the 
situation in March 1949, but in the meantime he suggested that 
preference should be given to residents who had been in New Zealand 
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twenty years. The government, he maintained, did not want to 
discriminate against any Chinese, that is why the matter of 
naturalisation had been dropped from the requirements (NA,IA 116/7, 
27 September 1948). As for labour short , it was a condition that 
applied to Europeans as well as Chinese. 
Government acted with more expediency than Nash had 
intimated, and Cabinet on 15 October 1948 decided that: 
... the naturalization of the nationals of China be now 
resumed on like conditions as to zens of other 
nations, grants to be limited for the present to the 
most highly assimilated types. 
(NA, IA 116/7, 22 June 1950:2) 
However, Internal Affairs seems not to have moved on the decision till 
June 1950, when the following provisions were suggested: 
Grants to be limited for the present to the most highly 
assimilated types, namely men with British wives, parents 
with children attending New Zealand schools, and young 
people educated in New Zealand; in the case of married 
men the case to be considered in the light of its effect 
on the whole family, i.e., wives and children. 
No grant to be made unless the applicant is considered 
to stand closer to a New Zealand way of life than to 
that of the Chinese community in New Zealand. 
All grantees to subscribe to a unilateral declaration 
of renunciation of their Chinese nationality. 
(NA, IA 116/7,22 June 1950:3) 
By March 1951 Cabinet had approved the revised policy and issued 
the following statement, which also included a justification for its 
contents: 
That, unless there are good grounds for believing that 
the applicant's primary loyalty being given to New 
Zealand, naturalization as British subjects be denied 
to Chinese residents, and that, to naturalization, 
Chinese be required to conform to the ordinary conditions 
of naturalization, to show that they are closer to the 
N.Z. way of life than to the Chinese, and to subscribe 
to a unilateral declaration renouncing their Chinese 
nationali ty before a Stipendiary Magistrate when the 
oath of allegiance is taken. 
(NA, IA 116/7, 3 January 1952:2) 
The justification for the form the minute took was based on the 
following: 
Firstly, it endeavoured to ensure that only those 
Chinese were naturalized who had assimilated to a 
reasonable extent into our community and whose 
traditional to their homeland had weakened to 
an extent that they regarded as their horne and 
gave their allegience to New Zealand rather than 
China. 
Secondly, by the requirements that a declaration 
of renunciation of Chinese nationality be made and 
the oath of allegiance subscribed before a Stipendiary 
Magistrate, it hoped to impress the applicants by a 
degree of solemni ty in the completion of the grant the 
importance the step they were taking. 
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. 15 (NA, IA 116/7,3 January 1952:2). 
While the Prime Minister's office may have had little idea of what the 
assimilation of a minority involved, it is clear that Internal Affairs 
did, and further that they understood what process and characteristics 
constituted an assimilated individual. Cabinet obviously took their 
prescription and made it into policy assuming that the process and 
characteristics of assimilation were finite and irreversible. 
Assimilation became a rite de passage marked by naturalis,ation as the 
final ritual before entrance to European society. 
It had taken forty years for the Chinese to get back the right 
to naturalisation, but it would take another four before the first 
Chinese were again naturalised in New Zealand, although none would 
have equated the act with becoming assimilated. However, there were 
signs in the activities of the Chinese community which indicated to 
some Europeans that assimilation was in fact occurring. 
In August 1948 the 12th Annual New Zealand Chinese Association 
Conference was held in Wellington, where the 1947 proposal by young 
people in Auckland and Wellington to hold an annual Chinese sports 
tournament was discussed and approved. Shortly afterwards a committee 
was formed in Wellington, who by virtue of their central position in the 
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country would sponsor the first meeting held in October that same year. 
The representatives who attended that first meeting came from Auckland, 
Hamilton, Hawkes Bay, Man awatu, Wellington, Canterbury, and Otago (see 
programme for 3rd New Zealand Chinese Annual Sports Tournament, 1950:21). 
The gathering was successful although mainly male with only the Wellington 
community able to put up women's basketball and table-tennis teams .)16 
The tribute paid in 1950 to this occasion thanked those who stayed at 
home in order that others might attend the meeting. It further stated 
that 'the social contacts gained were invaluable' (ibid.). 
Matthews, who had written previously on the Chinese, heralded the 
event in the Auckland Star as an indication of assimilation. He maintained 
that previous celebrations of Double Tenth had included a musical concert, 
play or feast, but now sport had become a major emphasis, bringing 
Chinese together from allover New Zealand (AS, 9 October 1948). He 
maintained that 
The sports tournament is signi cant because China is 
not regarded as a sporting nation like New Zealand. 
Although the Chinese play games, they are seldom team 
contests. To go outside sport for an easily under-
stood son, they play mah jong and we play 
bridge. Yet two of the three sports to be played 
in the Double Tenth are team games. 
(ibid.) 
However, Matthews also noted other changes which he attributed to 
assimilation but which were also the result of a younger population, 
educated in New Zealand who could make use of their environment for 
recreation as well as an occupation. As article noted, 'Chinese 
children and adults are going to pictures, to public dances or private 
parties, to the races [and are] ... taking part in church activities, 
musical evenings and in the summer swimming and fishing' .17 Their 
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occupational diversification had increased considerably into surgery, 
dentistry, engineering, law, nursing, chemical research, agricultural 
science, radio construction, motor mechanics, commercial flower-
growing, cabinet-making, dry cleaning, commercial art, accountancy and 
clerical work - occupations most of which would have been inconceivable 
even prior to the war. According to Matthews, 
European New Zealanders must take a deal of 
the blame for the lack of greater lation. We 
have erected many barriers, statutory and social, 
to prevent the Chinese entering fully into the life 
of the country ... 
(ibid.) 
The change was real, but it was less accurately explained by 
the concept,assimilation, than as the product of the emergence of 
fmuily life and leisure time, both and after the 
introduction of the temporary permit system. Pictures of the Double 
Tenth celebrations in various centres during war, particularly 
Dunedin and Wellington, show evidence of a growing younger population, 
who had been to European schools and on to university. Whereas there 
had only been one Chinese university graduate at the commencement of 
the war, by 1950 were at least six, all of whom were well known 
18 in the community and overseas. The group of younger Chinese, both 
males and females, constituted a new type of community with the support 
of their elders. However, while their situation was one of relative 
unity and cooperation, the war had left a legacy in some 
communities that produced factions and distrust. 
By the end of the war several communities, although nominally 
still members of the New Zealand Chinese Association, disbanded their 
local groups, which had become divided largely over the issue of the 
collection monies. Christchurch had faded, and Auckland had applied to 
Wellington to have their contributions returned. In fact, a considerable 
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amount was returned, and this eventually was divided between support 
for Taiwan and their local community centre. In Wellington factions 
developed over where to locate their Association building, which led in 
1949 to a five-member committee being set up with representatives from 
Auckland, Otago and Wellington. They decided in 1949 to buy a 
building in Wellington, but Auckland refused to contribute funds. 19 
Of the wartime leaders, one sold out his importing agency to a relative 
I 
and left for Taiwan, another eventually returned to Canton, and another 
lost his status and reputation within his community. Others retired 
or went back to their respective businesses. The last flurry of 
activity, a company formed during the war to promote trade with China 
and capitalise on China's reconstruction and New Zealand's export 
potential, was largely responsible for the demise of the wartime leaders. 
This was the Kin Wah Company, formed in New Zealand but linking New 
Zealand, Australia, Hong Kong, and Canton through its parent, Yu Kiew 
Company in Hong Kong. The activities of the Hong Kong company were as 
follows: 
1) Trade: dealing in imports and exports, agencies for 
various forms of foods and agencies for national products. 
2) Financial transactions: dealing in overseas remittances, 
operating all savings and deposits accounts, undertaking 
securities for transactions of land or properties, setting 
up productive industries. 
3) Tourist trade: setting up hygenic travel lodges, cargo and 
baggage transits, catering for overseas Chinese returning 
home, catering for immigration needs. 
(Minutes of Shareholders 
Meeting, 7 August 1950) 
Its general situation in 1950 at the first shareholders meeting is 
summarised in the following: 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
Shareholders 
'few' 
37 
106 
192 
328 
Share 
HK $ 50,000 
150,000 
310,000 
560,000 
670,000 
(ibid. ) 
From 1946 to 1948 the company had shown a deficit of HK$41,000, but 
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in the period following till the time of the meeting it had declared 
a profit of HK$256,000. In New Zealand the Kin Wah Company had seven 
directors three from Wellington, two from Dunedin and one each from 
Christchurch and Auckland - who had all been instrumental in 
publicising the company's activity and selling shares. These men, 
however, were at the same time extensively involved in the national 
collection and the New Zealand Chinese Association. While the 
predominant number of shareholders was from New Zealand, at least 
forty were distributed amongst a number of other countries including 
Australia, Canada, West Indies, New Britain, America, England, 
Singapore, British Guinea, Hong Kong, and Argentina (List of Shareholders, 
circa 1950).20 
~fuile import and export was slow to develop, by 1949 the company 
was importing woollen material from England, America and New Zealand, 
all of which sold briskly in Hong Kong and China. The company also 
exported Chinese foodstuffs from China and Hong Kong to New Zealand 
and Australia, which produced a steady profit. The Chinese in New 
Zealand exported fish, sharks fin, soft fungi, deer's tails and antlers. 
The company handled remittances in Hong Kong, exchanging 
sterling for Hong Kong currency at the rate of f1 = HK$15.80. It had 
been able to drop the HK$2 commission rate operating with the above 
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exchange rate. Together with commissions from immigration 
applications and travel agency commissions, which were not as 
extensive as those from the remittance business, the company had 
shown an income of over HK$187,000 in 1949. The travel agency 
department of the company had also done well, maintaining full 
bookings in their lodges for people travelling back and forth to 
China. Then in June and July 1949 the trade changed. With 
stabilisation in China, availability of cheap commodities and internal 
security (under the CCP) , many Hong Kong Chinese moved back to China. 
Hong Kong's tourist and business trade collapsed rapidly and the company 
quickly looked elsewhere as China imposed strict import restrictions. 
The company's decision was to invest in a dye factory to be built in 
Canton with the expertise of a man who had already in 1949 set up two 
such factories in Hong Kong. The secretary of the company in 1950 
described the decision in the following: 
After the liberation of Canton, Mr Li and I went on 
a tour to mainland China and, seeing the government's 
efforts, zed that the setting up of factories in 
China would have a bright future. From that time 
forwards we intensified preparatory work, revisiting 
the places several times for additional information, 
reviewing the government's pol on industries and 
making contacts with friends in associated industries. 
We decided that the setting up of factories is ideal 
and with the necessary supervision, Is and 
machinery, we can export great amounts of profit. Thus, 
we discussed this again with various executives in 
the company and those shareholders in China, and we 
have decided to invest HK$300,000 in Canton to set up 
the Yu Kiew Dye Factory. 
(Minutes, 7 August 1950) 
The decision to move assets into China in 1949, according to 
informants, had no immediate effect on the New Zealand Chinese. Once 
China nationalised all industries, however, it was realised that no 
gains would ever accrue to the overseas community but instead would 
have to remain in China. According to shareholders here, many handed 
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their shares over to relatives in China, for there was little else 
to do. The demise of this enterprise caused a split and left the 
Kin Wah Company and its Australian counterpart defunct by 1949 and 
effectively brought about a change of leadership in the New Zealand 
Chinese Association. 
In the meantime, the Labour Government, which had done a 
considerable amount to alleviate the Chinese community's immigration 
problems, met its demise in the 1949 election, when the National 
Party took over. The following year the Department of Labour, faced 
with 200 applications from Chinese who had arrived prior to April 
1928 to bring their wives and children to New Zealand and the 
possibility that 300 ex-students now with permanent residence might 
want to arrange for spouses to come, carried out the first complete 
review on Chinese immigration. The problem was to estimate the 
influence a continued influx of Chinese to New Zealand would have on 
the local community and on New Zealand, and this was seen to be related 
directly to the possibility of assimilation. 
On the one hand, the report noted that the re-united families 
and Chinese students, who had most of their education in New Zealand, 
and the fact that visits to China for education, to see relatives or to 
get brides would be seriously hindered by the change of government in 
China. It therefore supposed that the Chinese would look toward New 
Zealand for their identity and allegiance. On the other hand, the 
continued arrival of Chinese wives and children, unlikely to move 
much outside the Chinese community because of cultural and linguistic 
difficulty, would most likely reinforce their cultural links with China. 
\ 
Furthermore, the tendency for older Chinese to insist on brides from 
China for their sons would also maintain these links. 
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It was noted that the application of husbands for wives and 
children to come invariably brought more male children than female 
children. This was blamed on the system of arranged marriages before 
the age of sixteen which, the document argued, meant that female 
children would more likely be obliged to stay in China. The effect 
on New Zealand was that it maintained the sex imbalance and would 
eventually lead to the predominantly male children applying to bring 
f ' . 21 out lnancees or Wlves. 
Two points were made in the report before the conclusions 
and recommendations were spelt out. The first merely reported without 
clarification or accusation the fact that remittances were still being 
sent out of the country by the Chinese. The report contained the 
figures shown in Table 15. 
TABLE 15: Remittances of the New Zealand Chinese to China 
for Nine Months - October 1949 to June 1950 
October, 1949 
November, 1949 
December, 1949 
January, 1950 
February, 1950 
March, 1950 
April, 1950 
May, 1950 
June 1950 
~5 ,000 
26,000 
20,S59 
2S,747 
13,645 
19,201 
14,463 
13,729 
39,326 
TOTALL190 ,970 
(NA, L22/l/Sl: 10) 
The Reserve Bank advised that 2,500 Chinese were sending an 
average of£20,000 out of New Zealand each month, which amounted to 
£S per month per person or~96 a year.22 This meant that about 72% 
of the Chinese population born in China (3,446 out of a total of 5,723 
in 1951) were able to remit money, but the number and amount were 
escalating, especially to Hong Kong, where the cost of living had risen 
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considerably, forcing families who had moved there in anti ion of 
to join their kin overseas to return to China, where the monetary 
on had stabilised (ibid.), 
The second point relates to the 1946 report of the Dominion 
Population Committee of the House of Representatives, which with 
'non-assimilable European types' and by inference was now extended to 
cover the Asiatics in New Zealand (NA, L22/l/8l:l0). The 
maintained that more immigrants were going to be accepted in New 
Zealand, then they should be of 'such a character as will within a 
ly short time, become completely assimilated with the New 
Zealand population and have a distinctly New Zealand point of view' 
. :11). The non-assimilable southern Europeans specifically 
mentioned as tending to 'remain segregated into groups' included 
Yugoslavs, Italians and Greeks, but 'must apply even more to Asiatics' 
. : 10-11) . 
In the light of the above, the report concluded with the 
following 'signi cant factors' which it maintained should be t 
into consideration in future policy decisions: 
1. The non-assimilable characteristics of the Chinese 
2, The fact that even when the wives and children of all 
the married Chinese men now in New Zealand are brought 
there would be no foreseeable solution to the 
problem of finding wives in New Zealand for the surplus 
unmarried males here 
3. The duality of the Chinaman's national interests and the 
dangers which may attend immigration from a Communist 
controlled country in the future 
4. The traditional opposition by Europeans to any increase 
in the Asiatic population of the country which is partly 
based on the fact that they monopolize certain 
occupations. 
(ibid. :11). 
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If further permits were to be granted, 'it would probably be 
advisable to consider only the older applicants and to defer policy 
decision in respect of the younger men until the matter becomes a more 
pressing one' . : 13) . 
The policy that eventuated from this in March 1951, although 
apparently not laid dOlffi by the Department of Labour, in effect 
allowed men to apply to bring their wives to New Zealand if they were 
married before March 1951. The policy was an 'endeavour to bring 
Chinese migration to New Zealand to a halt', and it was apparently 
thought at the time that 'Chinese permanent residents in New Zealand 
(other than New Zealand born) who wished to marry outside New Zealand 
after that date would have to leave their wives overseas or else 
themselves leave New Zealand' (L22/l/ll5, 23 Memorandum, 7 May 1953). 
This was a continuation of the allotment of 50 permits granted in 
1949, but in 1951 and 1952 provision was made for over 300 permits to 
be issued which would, it was hoped, clear the backlog of applications 
anticipated. This arrangement was intended to be secret, presumably 
so that it could be changed without causing too much trouble 
(L22/115 J 2 February 1954). However, it was made known to the Chinese 
through the Chinese growers' Journal (see page 459) described by an 
officer of the Department of Labour as a 'Chinese newspaper which is 
read by practically all Chinese in New Zealand' (ibid.). The May 
issue of the Journal in 1951 contained the correspondence between 
the Consul and the Department of Labour. The response from the 
Minister of Immigration stated the following: 24 
Your letters on the question of bringing in family 
members from China have been transferred to me by my 
predecessor Mr. Baldwin, the former Minister of 
Customs. Decisions on the matter have been reached 
and are stipulated as follows: 
1) Some 150 new Chinese immigrants are to be issued 
with entry permits this year, as permanent 
residents. Consideration will be given to those 
married before 13 March 1951 and their children must 
be under 16 and unmarried by the time they arrive 
in New Zealand. 
Priority will be given to cants according to the 
length of time in New Zealand as permanent residents. 
The applicants must satisfy the department that the 
following conditions are met: 
a) their wives and children are healthy and their 
conduct is good 
b) the moral character of the applicant is acceptable 
c) the applicants are in a position to maintain their 
family members 
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2) As for New Zealand-born Chinese, ten applicants will be 
issued with permits each year for their fami to 
come to New Zealand. They must satisfy the department 
that the above conditions are met. 
No decision has been reached on those who were married 
after 13 March 1951. 
3) Permits for children to come to New Zealand to study will 
no longer be issued. 
4) Those who have obtained temporary permits to &ay in New 
Zealand before 13 March 1951, and whose parents are 
permanent residents of New Zealand must apply for permanent 
domicile New Zealand. The Immigration Department will 
consider individual cases on their merits. 
The New Zealand government has decided that the re-entry 
permits issued by the Department of Immigration is valid 
for eighteen months from the date of issue. 
(NZCGMJ, 1 May 1951) 
The results of this programme are shown in Table 16 (following page) . 
As indicated by the numbers in the latter period, the 
concession had been fully utilised and by the end of this period the 
government considered that all legitimate applications has been made. 
TABLE 16: Permanent Residence in New Zealand 
Wives granted permits 
Children granted permits 
Wi ves and Children on 
Temporary Permits now 
Permanent 
Others granted permanent 
residence 
TOTAL 
March 1947 
to 
March 1950 
157 
206 
1230 
121 
1714 
March 1950 
to 
March 1953 
307 
331 
4 
642 
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(L22/1/115, Memorandum- 1953, 
no date) 
While the immigration issue was of general interest to the 
community, it was of specific interest to Chinese growers, who found 
themselves with labour shortages after the war. The growers in 1949 
had taken their own request to government for more gardeners to be 
allowed in from China. The two recommendations made by the growers 
were consistent with the previously successful temporary-permit 
concessions. They asked that either Chinese be allowed to enter while 
resident growers visited China or that temporary resident permits be 
issued so that labour could enter New Zealand on a temporary is 
(NZCGMJ, 1 September 1949). The Minister of Customs met the delegation 
from the growers' Association, including the chairman, and an 
executive member. They got a sympathetic hearing, and the Minister 
promised to pursue the matter, although he suggested as an that 
it was sad Chinese from Fiji had overstayed their temporary permits, 
a situation that had apparently halted the policy of issuing such 
permits (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1949). At a meeting the following June, 
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the Department of Labour informed the growers' Association that they 
had completed their own survey on the needs of Chinese growers and in 
fact could find no labour shortage other than in Dunedin (NZCGMJ, 
1 July 1950). However, the Department was willing to reconsider the 
situation if the Association could provide proof of need and a 
guarantee that they would take responsibility for the immigrants. 
The essence of this proposal was that the government was willing 
to grant a temporary concession if the Chinese growers" Association 
acted as guarantor for the temporary workers, monitoring their 
residence in New Zealand and their departure (NZCGMJ, 1 July 1950). 
The Association was unwilling to accept this arrangement and appealed 
to the Minister of Agriculture to approach Cabinet with the problem and 
ask that temporary permits be issued just as a 'relief' measure (ibid.). 
Nothing eventuated from this for several years, for the Korean War was 
to undo alliances in the community and the relationship between China 
25 
and New Zealand. 
The New Zealand Chinese had become increasingly caught in a 
bind between support for nationalism and the political machinations 
of post-war developments. During the war, the issue had been clear, 
as support for the war against the Japanese was initially unquestioned. 
However, towards the end of the war and certainly by 1949, their 
allegiance was waning, and it split between those who supported China 
in the name of nationalism and Sun Yat Sen and those whose allegiance 
went to the exiled KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek. This 
situation was further complicated by the PRC involvement in the Korean 
war in October 1950 and their signing of the Pact of Friendship and 
Alliance with Russia, which reinforced anti-communist fear in the 
Western world. The blatant anti-American stance of the PRC also did 
not help, as overseas Chinese in most Western countries found themselves 
again under scrutiny. The politics of the KMT versus the CCP, 
therefore, intruded into former loyalties, and communities in New 
Zealand reflected these factions. 
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The Auckland branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, for 
instance, maintained its allegiance to the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek 
despite accusations of mismanagement and exile of the government. 
When the Wellington headquarters of the Association, in order to 
increase their capital available for the purchase or construction of 
a headquarters bui , decided in 1949 to appropriate remaining war 
collection funds, Auckland objected. 26 In the first instance, it 
maintained that the money belonged to the Auckland Chinese community, 
and secondly it was not clear that they condoned the support of an 
Association centre in Wellington. The Wellington executive relented 
and, according to informants, returned the money to Auckland. The 
amount, however, that was returned varies depending on whom one talks 
to, but it has been variously estimated at between £6000 andi22,000. 
While the Auckland association branch obj ected to Wellington's initial 
proposal, a considerable number in the Auckland community were to 
object to Auckland branch's decision to return a portion of this money 
to the KMT and Taiwan. The money, the objectors maintained, belonged 
to all the Chinese in the Auckland area, and the association had no 
right to appropriate it without consent, especially when it could have 
been used to provide local facilities for Chinese youth. The amount 
returned to Taiwan is unknown, but estimates place it a~ound £)2,000, 
for which the Association branch received the "Formosa Cupl! to be 
awarded at the annual sports tournament. Many informants have alluded 
to the fact that it was a very expensive cup. 
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The alternative interpretation of the Auckland situation was 
that t~e factions which appeared over this issue a 
pOlitical left and right within the community as younger members felt 
more allegiance to China, but it is arguable that this all ance 
represented a continuation of nationalism, rather than having direct 
relation to the activity of the CCP. 
In Wellington factions emerged, but they were 1 concerned 
with the purchase of a site or building for the Association headquarters. 
Eventually arguments led to the appointment of a five-person committee 
after the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Association. The 
committee, with three members from the Wellington executive and one 
each from Auckland and Otago, decided on the purchase of a private hotel 
for~46,000 which was renovated and opened in 1951. At the opening of 
the building, described as a 'hostel' to serve Chinese students and 
, the Consul General spoke of the fact that Europeans and 
Chinese shared the same ideas: 'Both people loved freedom and peace, 
and desired good will towards all men' (EP, 21 August 1951). The 
meeting was attended by over 100 people including several members of 
the Wellington City Council. Like the money that was returned to 
Taiwan, the expense of the newly acquired headquarters was also 
cised, since, according to opinions of many informants, it was 
not clear what the building was to be used for. 
loss of status of the national Association allowed, if 
not forced, the emergence of some solidarity, and it appeared within 
the Dominion Federation of Chinese Commercial Growers Association 
which, the New Zealand Chinese Association, had representatives 
in each growing area, which covered all of New Zealand (see Appendix 
XXXIV). They held annual conferences and in August 1949, put out the 
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first issue of the New Zealand Chinese Growers to 
'strengthen the unity of the Chinese growers, to information on 
growing techniques and market gardening knowledge, to improve grower's 
living standards and to spread Chinese culture' (NZCGMJ, 1 August 1949). 
In its first year of operation the Journal obtained the services of a 
former school teacher from Kwong Chew Club of Auckland who had also 
written for the New Zealand Chinese Association. 
At the Eighth General Meeting of the Chinese growers 
it was clear that the Association had attained considerable status, 
perhaps more than originally anticipated, and that it's activity was 
d · . f h . 27 Th d" Iverse, representIng most segments 0 t e communIty. e Irector 
of the executive committee on the above occasion of the 
organisation: 
and of the 
Both the New Zealand Government and the Chinese 
people here look upon us with great expectations 
as we are the only organization in the Chinese 
communi ty which is granted a regular allowance 
from the New Zealand Government. 
-=-====-
You will agree with me that the monthly is an 
important tool for communication. It is 
indispensable not only to our members but to all 
the New Zealand Chinese. We must realize that 
this is the only Chinese magazine in New Zealand. 
We should do our utmost to keep it going. 
(NZCGMJ, 1 July 1950) 
In the time between August 1949 and the June 1950 meeting, the 
executive of the Association with the Deputy Consul General had visited 
28 three growing areas in the North Island and four in the South Island; 
29 
met with the agricultural worker's union over wages and union fees; 
consulted with the Department of Labour over the possibility of bringing 
Chinese agricultural workers to New Zealand; and with the Department of 
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A . 1 h 1 f bl d d b 30 . d h grlcu ture over t e supp y 0 00 an one; re-negotlate t e 
annual government allowance to the Association; 31 and opposed the 
imposition by the Wellington vegetable auctions of a charge on vegetable 
containers .) .32 
In addition, the Association had aided in the purchase of 
appropriate machinery and helped those who wanted to travel to China33 
as well as keeping growers aware of changing requirements in the 
. d 34 ln ustry. \fuile many of the issues seemed to have concerned all 
growers in New Zealand (not only the Chinese) and while there was 
continued cooperation over such issues, the Chinese growers appeared to 
have guarded their autonomy jealously. In June 1949 the first suggestion 
of a merger was put forward at the annual New Zealand Growers Association 
meeting, but the attending president of the Chinese growers rejected the 
proposal (NZCGMJ, 1 August 1949). 
The Journal also carried a considerable amount of overseas news 
and did not hesitate to record the entire speech of Mrs Gioh-fang D. Ma, 
professor of social work at the National Normal University in Peking 
and Nanking University. Professor Ma had accompanied her husband to 
New Zealand, as he was lecturing in microchemistry at the University of 
Otago, and in October 1950 she was invited to attend the Double Tenth 
sports tournament in Dunedin, where she participated in the opening 
ceremony. It is clear from the text that she supported the changes in 
China, and she expressed,in the conclusion of her speech,the hope that 
she would meet the New Zealand Chinese in China on a similar occasion 
in the future (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1950). Of more immediate importance 
to the New Zealand Chinese in the 1950s, however, were four 
observations she made about the local community: 
In the first place, I come to see how pleasant it is 
for my countrymen to settle in New Zealand. There is 
very little discrimination against the Chinese as a 
race. From my personal experience I can see that the 
New Zealanders want to know about China and wish to 
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understand us. They have only good remarks to make 
whenever I mention the Chinese groups in this country. 
But, wherever our overseas Chinese come to settle, they 
have the tendency to be too self-sufficient and to pay 
too little attention to the community at large. Whereas 
we should remember our origin, I hope that you will also 
feel you are a part of the community in your adopted 
country. Often there is misunderstanding between the 
Europeans and the Chinese simply because the Europeans are 
not given the chance to have daily continued contacts 
with the Chinese. Almost as soon as they become well 
acquainted with a few Chinese, such misunderstanding 
disappears. Therefore, I suggest that everyone of us, 
especially the young generation who has no language 
difficulty, should take it as responsibility to 
participate in community activities as much as possible. 
Such participation will surely reduce the racial barrier. 
Secondly, I am very happy to see the organization of 
Chinese youth clubs in many cities, the general interest 
in sports, and the delightful dancing party Sunday night. 
It shows that you have already absorbed part of European 
civilization, which is a good thing. At the same time, 
though, I wish to remind you that while we adopt Western 
customs, we should also adopt the ideas and principles 
behind them. For instance, when we have organization we 
must also have the spirit of cooperation; when we have 
sports, we must not lose sight of the ideal of team-work 
and sportsmanship; and when we hold dances, we should also 
learn their social etiquette and moral standards. In this 
transitional period in China, we have been criticised for 
having learned only the superficial things from the West so 
that we cannot have fundamental reforms. Now that you are 
living here, you have plenty of time to study the essentials 
of Western civilization. I hope that you will not overlook 
this point. 
Thirdly, while we try to acquire the European civilization, 
we cannot neglect the Chinese culture either. Especially 
the young people, you have your clubs and sports, may be 
a good opportunity to study China when you meet. As I try 
to look for reference material for my many speaking 
engagements, I discover that there are a great many books 
on China in the libraries. So I hope that my young friends 
may start some study groups. If each takes it in turn to 
read one book and report to the others, it should not be 
too difficult. China, with its long history covering 
several thousand years and an area spreading over several 
million square miles, is really a very interesting subject 
for study. 
Fourthly, I went to Christchurch to attend the Jubilee 
Conference of the National Council of Women of New Zealand 
last week. I saw how those ladies discussed various health 
and social problems. While my speech on the status of 
Women in China was well received, I was deeply impressed 
by the Conference. Among many other thoughts that are 
stimulated by that experience, it seems to me that whether 
it is in China or New Zealand, the posltlon of women 
will become more and more important as time goes on. 
Therefore, speaking as a woman, I hope that my country~ 
men will proper attention to the education of the 
young generation, including both boys and girls. I 
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also hope that the girls will not think that your future 
is limited to housework. Girls, as well as boys, have to 
represent China wherever you are; you must shoulder your 
own responsibilities. 
(NZCGMJ, 1 November 1950). 
By the 1950s even from Professor Ma's ahistorical viewpoint, New 
Ze.aland appeared free from discrimination, but the Chinese community, 
described as self-sufficient and to some isolated from their 
environment, did not reflect this situation. It was not apparent to 
her that the legacy of prior restrictions could well have resulted in 
the kind of community she experienced. Furthermore, it is interesting 
that she saw the removal of the 'racial ' as the responsibility 
of the Chinese community. 
In one sense, the community according to Professor Ma, was to 
become part of their adopted country, absorbing its 'spirit of cooperation', 
'ideal of teamwork', 'social etiquette and moral standards', but at the 
same time Chinese culture should not be neglected. The crucial point 
of the seeming contradiction apparent in her remarks, however, was the 
fact that the situation confronted the very young people she would 
watch at the sports tournament. It would be young people who 
would have to negotiate a path between Western customs and Chinese 
culture under the surveillance of elders, a particularly complex task 
for the Chinese women, who were urged by Professor Ma to 'shoulder your 
own social responsibi As for 'representing China', again, it would 
be the elders affiliation and also New Zealand's foreign policy that 
would determine which China one would represent. While Professor Ma's 
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intentions were obviously positive, her statement was classic in 
the sense that it represented what ought to be but took no cognisance 
of what had been and what issues now affected the internal and external 
relation~; of the Chinese community. 
The kind of compromised situation in which the New Zealand 
Chinese found themselves was exemplified in two decisions, one in late 
1950 and the other in early 1951, the first concerning Chinese cultural 
training for young Chinese born in New Zealand and the other, the 
poli tics of the local community as regards the PRC. 
In October 1950, the growers 1 Journal reported that there had 
been a noticeable increase in the New Zealand-born young Chinese 
population of the South Island and expressed concern because there were 
only two Chinese schools operating at the time, one in Christchurch and 
the other in Dunedin (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1950). This meant that Chinese 
cuI tl.::re, especially language, would lapse, in the opinion of older 
Chinese, since trips back to China for education were unlikely. The 
Journal organised a correspondence eourse through its pages which would 
be supplied with necessary material by the Chinese consulate 
(NZCGHJ, 1 August 1950). 
The concern for young Chinese children in rural areas without 
Chinese schools - for instance, Waimate and Ashburton that together 
had thirty-two children - was curious, for many years later it would be 
argued that into these same areas had come mothers with no English, 
essentially confined to the horne because of this, and that the 
children. at least up until school age, had been totally immersed in 
Chinese language and culture. In 1968, an article on a market-gardening 
area in the South Island noted that many of the women could still not 
speak En!~lish and that the children spoke only Chinese till they went to 
school, which, according to the local headmaster, put them at a dis-
advantage (New Zealand Woman 1 s Weekly, 7 October 1968:8). 
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l~lile the language problem may have hindered the children, the 
lack of English also meant that the wife could have little contact with 
European society, and the father was invariably responsible for all 
communication outside the family. 
However, the Chinese school situation was viewed differently 
from the point of view of the New Zealand government. During the war 
there were eight Chinese schools located in Christchurch, Dunedin, 
Wellington, Levin, Otaki, Palmerston North, Gisborne and Auckland. 35 
Some were run by private tutors, while others were run by the 
A.ssociation. In 1951 the Minister of Immigration requested information 
from the Chinese Consul on the schools that were currently operating. 
In 1949 the Minister of Customs had been advised to discontinue 
issuing temporary permits to teachers,36 and by 1951 the community felt 
the provision should be available to them to bring teachers to New 
Zealand. The Consul stated in his report that there had been four 
schools in operation, one each in Auckland (est. 1948), Gisborne 
(est. 1943), Christchurch (est. 1950), and Dunedin (est. 1947). Only 
the Gisborne and Dunedin schools were operated by the New Zealand 
Chinese Association, while the one in Auckland was run by the Kwong 
Chew Club and the Christchurch school by 'leading members of the 
Chinese residents' (L22/l/ll5, 1 February 1951). The Dunedin school had 
fifty pupils in 1950, employed one teacher and ran its classes on 
k . h 37 wee nlg ts. Gisborne had twenty-one pupils, was open four nights a 
week plus all day Saturday and Sunday morning, when physical culture 
classes were held. Christchurch had only a small number of students and was 
the process of closing, with the teacher arranging to depart for 
China. The Auckland school had thirty pupils, but the teacher had been 
ill for a year and the school had closed (ibid.). This situation 
reflected the differential solidarity of the war years, with Dunedin and 
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Gisborne better organised than other centres. The Consul, in his 
concluding remarks, made an appeal for more teachers on the grounds 
that a school could prove it had need (at least thirty pupils) and 
resources (funds and materials) (ibid.). The Consul also maintained 
that any teachers brought in would have proper and verifiable 
qualifications. He justified the request by the following argument: 
Chinese residents in various cities born of parentage 
of the Chinese race should be given some knowledge of 
the language and culture of their race. Knowledge of 
Chinese culture in addition to their English school 
education is all the more desirable in good character 
building. Quite apart from the of bringing up 
Chinese children into a separate foreign group in New 
Zealand, the chief purpose of opening these Chinese 
schools is to guide the children into the ways of good 
citizenship in this country. 
(L22/1/115, I February 1952) 
The fear of the government was, precisely as the Consul had acknowledged, 
the possibility that such schools would reinforce Chinese insularity and 
hinder assimilation. It had not, nor would it, occur to those concerned 
that a grounding in their own language was perhaps a necessity before 
biculturalism and bilingualism could be readily encountered or even 
accepted. 
The situation did not apparently move the government to action, 
and the Chinese communities therefore assumed individual responsibility 
for the provision of such schools despite the concern of the Chinese 
growers' 
The second issue which affected the politics of the Chinese both 
internally and externally was the Korean War, more specifically, the split 
it caused in the community, which had come to the attention of the public. 
The Auckland branch of the growers' Association took steps quickly to 
stop the issue developing by proposing that all Chinese growers adopt a 
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resolution 'to support the United Nations action for safeguarding 
world peace' (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1951). The Association branches 
supported the move, but of the twelve branches, three abstained and one 
voted against (ibid.). The resolution was justified in the following: 
It is absolutely important for us Chinese immigrants to 
adopt such a method to protect ourselves when the current 
poli tical situation is tense and delicate. We left China 
and travelled thousands of miles to New Zealand in the 
hope of starting a new and prosperous life in a foreign 
country. We have neither the desire nor political power 
nor the interest in party factions. Our only wish is to 
settle down to a happy life and have a harmonious relation 
with the local people. We are fully aware of our status 
and take care that we do not contradict the national policy 
of the New Zealand government, and under no circumstances 
do we wish to have any conflict with the local people. 
Now we are watching closely the difficult situation in 
which the American Chinese have landed themselves at the 
moment. We are concerned about the New Zealand government's 
attitude towards a certain Auckland Chinese organisation. 
It has been reported that in the South Island disturbances 
occurred between some Chinese and local people. The 
incidents were caused by one or two Chinese shop-keepers 
who had made some unthoughtful remarks about current 
international events. We callan all New Zealand Chinese 
to be cautious. Imprudent words and action precipitated by 
emotion are dangerous. 
(NZCGMJ, 1 March 1951) 
Clearly, there was some concern as to how authorities in New 
Zealand would treat the Chinese as China's politics and her relationship 
to Russia influenced former friendly ties. The events in Christchurch 
did not appear in the local press, however, and there is no mention of 
an Auckland Chinese organisation in government correspondence. The only 
organisation that did appear was a Chinese Cultural Society made up of 
young Chinese who had recently come from China and were keen to keep up 
with developments. Their activity was largely concerned with the 
distribution of news to those who were interested and showing of 
film's on China's development. While their attitude was open, and 
obviously there were others who were at least interested, news that came 
via the Chinese Consul at the end of 1951 tarnished the interest. 
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The Consul General in November, had received news from Australia 
that certain Chinese there were sending information back to China 
about the wealth of local Chinese so that pressure could be placed on 
their relatives in China to ask for more remittance money (Press, 
25 November 1951). Two days later the Consul General received evidence 
from local Chinese that relatives of at least one family were being held 
for a ransom of ~500 28 November 1951).38 The relatives in New 
Zealand had refused, and the family members had been tortured and beaten 
publicly, according to the informants in Hong Kong who passed the news 
on to New Zealand (ibid.). In response to this 'a Chinese leader 
in New Zealand' had written to Mao Tse-tung protesting against 
'blackmail letters sent to overseas Chinese families in China by party 
officials' (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1952). Radio Peking reported the communication 
and replied that the 'Council of the Overseas Chinese Affairs in 
Communist China had said that these letters were sent out by the KMT 
and its U.S. imperialist masters' (ibid.). The Consul General in 
Wellington refused to accept this explanation and described the response 
as an 'insult to common sense' , but he had seen a number of these letters 
personally and they had been identified by their relatives in New 
Zealand . , see also Press, 24 April 1952). 
In the following year a special envoy, General Lowe Li-shang, 
arrived to mobilise overseas Chinese to form Anti-Communist Leagues for 
Saving China (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1952). According to the report of his visit, 
Taiwan had dispatched a number of such envoys to countries where 
overseas Chinese lived, and General Lowe, from Jung Sing county and a 
previous resident in New Zealand, was given the mission. The stimulus 
for this action in Taiwan, he maintained, came from the considerable 
worry that was developing in overseas communities about relatives in 
China .) .40 The Taiwan government was endeavouring to convey 
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support to these people as well as inspecting the affairs of the 
overseas Chinese (ibid,_)' General Lowe met with the Consul General 
on arrival and scheduled visits to local Chinese communities. 
The result of the visits was the founding of the Anti-Communist 
League in Wellington and Auckland. In Wellington the New Zealand 
Chinese Association convened a meeting and passed a resolution forming 
the League, sent a message of greeting to Chiang-Kai-shek and gathered 
l:200 from its 100 members (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1952). A week after the 
League's formation a nineteen-member executive was convened in 
Wellington with the Consul General's wife as deputy president, and in 
Auckland a similar executive of fifteen members was organised (ibid.). 
In the following years the organisation maintained its profile and 
consistently appeared publicly alongside members for the Wellington and 
Auckland New Zealand Chinese Association, the KMT branches still extant 
and the Consul General. 
However, two of its strongest benefactors in 1952, the current 
Consul General and his wife, were withdrawn from New Zealand the following 
year, which caused some consternation in the Chinese community and to the 
41 New Zealand government. The Chinese community reacted to the 
knowledge with a fear that their increasing ties with Taiwan would be 
severed, but with the arrival of the new Consul General in October 1953, 
their fears were allayed. The new incumbent, Tien Eng_sheng,42 was 
strongly anti-PRC and maintained the image of Taiwan as the fatherland, 
encouraging New Zealand Chinese to take the opportunity to go there and 
study, since, according to him, places were not available in New Zealand 
universities (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953).43 As regards the Chinese in New 
Zealand, he was willing to give them all the assistance they needed. 
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The New Zealand government, on the other hand was less confident 
about the new appointment and had requested a curriculum vitae from the 
previous Consul General. External Affairs sought advice from the New 
Zealand High Commission in England, who in turn visited the Foreign 
Office (NA, PM, 61/1/1, 18 August 1953). The specific questions had 
to do with Britain's withdrawal of recognition from the Republic of China 
while at the same time maintaining a Consulate in Formosa. External 
Affairs was advised that the ce in Tamsui, Taiwan, was for de-facto 
relations and to protect Britain's interests rather than a diplomatic 
post (NA, PM, 61/6/1, 18 August 1953). New Zealand was concerned 
about the fact that it might move to recognise the PRC (NA, PM, 61/6./1, 
10 August 1953) and stated in a letter to the Consul General in New 
Zealand that: 
.. . in view of the uncertainty of the present 
international situation in the Far East, the New 
Zealand Government would like to take time for 
consideration before coming to a decision on the 
question of the admission of a successor to the 
post of Consul General of the Republic of China. 
CNA, PM, 61/6/1, 21 August 1953) 
The New Zealand High Commission in London, however, informed 
Internal Affairs that acceptance of the new representative would in no 
way interfere with a withdrawal of recognition, so visas were issued in 
Taiwan. The Consulate of the Republic of China in New Zealand now had a 
Consul General, a Deputy Consul and Secretary, the latter two being 
Cantonese while the Consul General was from northern China. 
The Consul General's arrival was relatively uneventful, but 
within the year of his appointment he was to inherit a situation which 
his predecessor had initiated. The previous Consul General had sent out 
a circular in 1953 which contained the following information: 
1) A Chinese who had acquired domicile in New Zealand and 
was married before 13/3/51 may still send in his 
application to the Director of Employment for a permit 
to bring his wife and minor children to New Zealand, 
but he must give full explanation to the Director as 
to why such application had not been submitted 
before 13/12/1952. Should the Director be satisfied 
with the explanation he would then give consideration 
to the application. 
2) Any Chinese who has acquired domicile in New Zealand 
and whose marriage took place after the 13/3/51 will 
come under the following three categories: 
One who has been married by proxy, but whose marriage 
is not recognized as legal. Should he first legalize 
his marriage in conformity with the law he may then 
apply to the Director of Employment for a permit 
to bring his wife to New Zealand. 
One whose wife has died and who has remarried in 
China may apply to the Director to bring his wife 
to New Zealand. 
One who has a fianc~e in China and who wishes to 
complete the marriage procedure in conformity with 
the law and then bring his wife to New Zealand may 
now send his application to the Director of 
Employment. 
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(L22/1/1l5, 31 July 1953).44 
\fuile section (1) complies with the provisions made in 1951, 
section (2) appears to have been a fabrication, or the Consul General 
had received notification of a memorandum provided for the Minister of 
Immigration by the Department of Labour and Employment in May 1953. 
That document was sent in response to a request by the Minister who 
wished to know how many applications the Department had received for 
people married after 13 March 1951 (L22/1/115, 7 May 1953). 
The contents spelled out the situation that had developed since 
the Cabinet decision in 1951 and concluded that, although the sex 
ratio had improved from approximately males to one female in 1936, 
to a situation in 1945 of two males for one female, marraige partners 
would still be in short supply for Chinese men. Although there were 
young New Zealand Chinese women who could get married, it appeared that 
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their parents wanted sons-in-law with adequate wealth, making 
marriage very hard for poorer young men. It was in fact only the 
rich who could marry the rich, which would not help young Chinese 
trying to establish themselves. The recommendation was to recognise 
marriages after 13 March 1951 and allow permanent residents to apply to 
bring these wives to New Zealand. This policy would have to include, 
the report continued, marriages contracted in Fiji or Hong Kong as well 
as those from mainland China. It seemed clear by the contents of this 
memorandum that some latitude was being offered. 
The following year, however, another memorandum was sent from 
the same office to the Minister of Immigration, this time initiated 
by a request from the new Consul General, which indicated that as far 
as the Department of Labour and Employment was concerned no policy 
change had been accepted. It stated that there was no reason to accept 
application from New Zealand-born Chinese women who wanted to bring 
their fiancees in, nor was there any reason to accept applications 
from Chinese women who were permanent residents. The major problem, 
according to this document, was the fact that young Chinese males in 
New Zealand who had been brought up in China, or at least had some 
of their education there, wanted women who would 'accept the status 
afforded to Chinese wives in China', which was not the case for women 
born and educated in New Zealand (L22/l/ll5, 21 June 1954). The 
corollary to this was that Chinese males educated in New Zealand had no 
problem finding wives regardless of the sex ratio. The solution, 
according to the memorandum was for Chinese males who wanted wives 
'to adopt the New Zealand way of life' and that young Chinese girls 
who had fiancees overseas or whose parents wanted them to marry a husband 
from China so that they had an 'immigrant worker prepared to work in 
New Zealand under Chinese conditions' would have to realise that this 
contravened accepted policy that the 'woman is expected to join the man 
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in his country (L22/l/ll5, 21 June 1954).45 The report concluded 
that the Chinese had reached a 'relatively high figure' in New Zealand, 
5,723 in April 1951 'compared to the total in Australia which is under 
10,000', and that calculations from the following: 
Males 
Full blood under 16 804 
Full blood and under 45 1029 
TOTAL 1833 
Females 
639 
699 
1338 
showed that there was a deficiency of only 495 females (ibid.). 
The Minister of Immigration refused to change policy, which 
prompted the Consul General to follow a suggestion from the Minister 
of Immigration to collect a list of the Chinese who could marry in 
Hong Kong and who wished to bring their wives to New Zealand. The 
Consul General sent out a circular requesting the information, and by 
June received eighty-four replies from twenty-four towns throughout 
New Zealand with the larger numbers from Wellington (14), 
Christchurch (9), Otaki (8), Oamaru (7), Gisborne (7), Ashburton (5), 
and Dunedin (5) (L33/l/ll5, 8 July 1954). The predominant age range 
was from fifteen to thirty three with two men fifty five years old 
and one boy only five (ibid.). The occupations and incomes were also 
included in the list sent to the Minister of Immigration, which are 
summarised in Table 17. 
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TABLE 17: Applicants by Occupation and Income Range in 1954 
(in Pounds Sterling) 
Number Occupation Yearly Income Range 
27 Market Gardeners 1516 to i:524 (a) 
27 Fruiterers 364 to 624 (b) 
8 Shop Assistants 208 to 520 (c) 
2 Fish and Chip Shop 416 to 546 
2 Laundry 364 
1 Merchant 780 
5 Factory Workers 468 to 598 
3 Mechanics 520 to 598 
1 Assist. Chemist 520 
1 Wireless Service 624 
1 Ci vil Service 494 
(L22/l/115, 8 July 1954) 
(a) There are two exceptions for market-~ardening incomes, both from 
Pukekohe, where incomes ranged from1ll508 to ~560 per year 
due to mechanisation and increased acreage. 
(b) There was one exception for fruiterers, a case where a fruit 
shop and garden were owned by the same person, which gave a yearly 
income of £1404. The lowest incomes in this occupation came from 
Gisborne. 
(c) The lowest end of this range represented minors. 
The Consul General concluded his request for reconsideration 
of the policy with the following: 
You would not, I know, like to see them dissatisfied 
and in bad health, which would surely be the result 
from their remaining unmarried when they wish to have 
a wife. Besides I feel it is most important and only 
fair that New Zealand born Chinese and domiciled 
Chinese should be given equal chances in this matter. 
(ibid. ) 
While the above statement would hardly seem to allay the fears expressed 
by the Department of Labour officials concerning the probable status of 
wives brought to New Zealand, the Minister of Immigration modified the 
po~icy in accordance with the Consul General's wishes so that 
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privileges extended to Chinese born in New Zealand would now be 
extended to all domiciled Chinese, as soon as the latter attained 
citizenship. While the change was appreciated, the requirement of 
naturalisation meant that applications could be held up for as long as 
sixteen months till the papers were granted (L22/l/ll5, 13 September 1954), 
and Internal Affairs would not grant naturalisation to aliens whose wives 
or minor children were resident overseas at the time of application. 
Unfortunately, in the midst of negotiation over this, an ele on took 
place and, although National stayed in power, the Minister of Immigration 
changed, G.R. Hanan taking the portfolio. His initial response to the 
negotiations was rather less lenient than his predecessor, and he 
maintained that the concessions won were adequate regardless of the 
delay (L22/l/ll5, no date). In fact, it seems as though this stop-gap 
provided by the delay in naturalisation formalities and the expense of 
travel and arrangements to Hong Kong for such a marriage were, in the 
eyes of the Department of Labour, necessary to uphold 1951 Cabinet 
policy. In a document prepared in 1955 by the Department of Labour, 
the policy is reiterated and supported by calculations on the cost of 
the Hong Kong marriages. It was estimated that it would cost a Chinese 
bridegroom £,pOO to have the marriage in Hong Kong and then return to 
New Zealand with his bride (L22/l/ll5, 14 April 1955). It was 
maintained that: 
The present 'high price' keeps the number down which 
is precisely what it is intended to do, the cardinal 
aim of the policy approved by Cabinet being to end 
immigration altogether. 
(L22/l/ll5, 14 April 1955) 
and further that: 
/ 
As long as we allow the Chinese to bring in 'China 
trained' girls who will be completely subservient 
to their husbands and who will either work like 
coolies in market gardens or else live in fruit shops, 
so long will we continue to have an alien Chinese 
'cell' in New Zealand. 
(ibid. ) 
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The report suggested that, since there were not enough Chinese females 
'to go round ... some Chinese males must either remain bachelors or else 
marry Maori or other Polynesians' a situation that it went on to describe 
as a 'good cross' (ibid.)47 In summation, it recommended that it was 
, ... most desirable that all possible pressure should be exerted towards 
assimilating the Chinese' and maintained that 'it can definitely be done, 
but not if it is made easy for Chinese to bring in wives from China' 
(L22/l/ll5, 14 April 1955). 
The situation was paradoxical: historically the Chinese were 
criticised for their totally male overseas population with its attendant 
habits, and now that they had settled permanently with their wives, roles 
within the family were the offending characteristic. It was claimed 
that they did not assimilate in the past due to the absence of families, 
and now they would not assimilate due to presence of families, yet the 
government wanted them to assimilate and even inter-marry, something 
which was totally unacceptable at the time of the market-garden 
investigations of 1929. 
It was not only in this area that the Chinese received pressure 
to assimilate. In 1953 the Chinese Growers Association issued a press 
statement complaining about the problems some of their members 
experienced in trying to understand developments in the industry that 
were communicated in English. This was particularly the case for those 
developing and expanding their enterprises. Internal Affairs picked up 
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the statement and suggested to the Chinese Growers Association that it 
was in the interest of Chinese growers to learn English and that they 
should make use of the adult English classes provided by the Department 
of Education in many centres (NA, IA 116/7, 17 July 1953).48 Internal 
Affairs also communicated their feelings to the Department of 
Agriculture, linking the language problem to naturalisation. The 
Department maintained that since naturalisation was available to 
'suitable Chinese in certain strictly defined categories' which included 
those with an 'adequate knowledge of English' the Chinese should not be 
offered material in their own language. Both the Department of 
Agriculture and the Dominion Federation of New Zealand Chinese 
Commercial Growers Association responded to the suggestions. The 
national secretary of the growers 'Association pointed out that the 
president of the Association, a Justice of the Peace in New Zealand, 
was totally in favour of Chinese learning English and being loyal to 
New Zealand. However, he added, the market gardeners referred to in 
the article were largely middle-aged Chinese who had been in New 
Zealand for over twenty years, were hard-working and law-abiding, but 
now needed help to increase their productivity. The secretary maintained 
that it was because of the government arid the country's needs during a 
time of war that the Federation was started in the first place, and now 
they should be assisted. In conclusion he stated that: 
We have no desire to foster an exclusive community, 
but we must be realistic and deal with the situation 
as it ,namely that the majority of Chinese growers, 
as already stated, cannot be educated in the manner 
suggested. It is linguistically impossible for Chinese 
in later years to grapple with English, which is so 
fundamentally different from their native language, 
both in pronunciation and grammar. 
They are engaged in a most hazardous industry and would 
be physically incapable of the strain entailed in 
attending night cl as ses. It is not that they do not wish 
to know English, on the contrary they, for the sake of 
their own convenience, are all keen to learn but unequal 
to the effort entailed. 
49 (NA, IA 116/7, 27 July 1953). 
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The Director General of the Department of Agriculture 
responded also, explaining to Internal Affairs the nature of the 
Chinese growers organisation. He confirmed the points made by the 
secretary of the growers'Association regarding the existence of their 
organisation and affirmed that the Chinese justified its continued 
existence and autonomy from its European counterpart on the basis of 
, 
special needs of the Chinese. He added, however, that the organisation 
was affiliated to the Dominion Council of Growers by virtue of an 
annual grant made to the Chinese on the basis of the number of Chinese 
growers in proportion to the total. This grant had beenl350 in 1944 
and £475 in 1950, but in 1952 and 1953, the amount had been reduced by 
the Dominion Council to lioo per year, and the Chinese resented this 
. 50 
actl0n. The Dominion Council had justified their decrease of the 
grant on the grounds that there was no need to support a parallel 
organisation, but the Chinese were still bound to pay their 
registration fee by the Commercial Gardens Registration Regulation of 1943 
(NA, IA 116/7,27 August 1953). The Director General correctly saw the 
whole language issue tied to the future existence of the Chinese 
organisation which,the Chinese growers could argue,had a right to 
autonomous existence, for they had no guarantee that they would receive 
anything for their registration fee should they agree to disband. 
While the Department of Agriculture made no attempt to provide 
material in Chinese for the growers, its horticultural field officers 
in various districts were instructed to encourage Chinese to learn 
English because it was 'Government policy' and also it would enable 
information to be exchanged (NA, IA 116/7, 27 August 1953). 
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As regards the immigration situation, the issue of Chinese wives 
was to linger on, but gradually policy changed. In 1956 it was 
announced that both naturalised permanent residents and New Zealand-
born Chinese could apply to bring their wives to New Zealand in order to 
married, which the Secretary of Labour noted would provide 
considerable savings to the Chinese concerned. 5l In 1956 Internal 
Affairs recommended that the right to naturalisation be extended to 
older Chinese, since the applicants prior to 1956 had been from a younger 
group but now older people were applying (NA, IA 116/7,20 November 1956), 
and in 1958 it was recommended that Chinese naturalisation be covered 
under 'normal statutory conditions' of the British Nationality and New 
Zealand Citizenship Act 1948 (NA, IA 116/7, 18 February 1958). Although 
it has not been ascertained that these recommendations were actually put 
into practice, naturalisation was becoming less of an issue for the 
Chinese in New Zealand as time went on, despite events in 1957, an 
election year which brought Labour back to power. This was the year in 
which illegal immigration activity was uncovered. The news broke in 
April 1957, and the Press picked up the story (see Press, 18 and 20 
April 1957). The accusation was that Chinese were getting into the. 
country illegally with false entry permits, but the Secretary of Labour 
denied rumours that government officials were involved (ibid.: 18 April 
1957). Immediately all permanent entry permits were changed to 
temporary permits, arid the investigations went on with the police 
involved. The Chinese leaders were divided in their allegiance, with an 
Auckland leader refusing to 'betray' another Chinese to the police, even 
he was dishonest and the secretary of the Wellington branch of the 
Chinese Association stating it was the responsibility of the Chinese as 
citizens to cooperate with any investigations into illegal practices 
(ibid.) . 
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The activity was also reported in the Chinese growers' 
Journal in which was maintained that two Chinese, one from Wellington 
and one from Auckland, and a government official were involved in 
providing the permits for a fee of £1200 each (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1957). 
The situation was discovered by a lawyer who was applying on behalf of a 
Chinese client and whose application was turned down, and consequently 
he asked the Department of Labour to investigate. Once the situation 
was discovered, the police were called in, but according to the growers' 
Journal, the Chinese were saddened to think people had to resort to 
this extortion which would cost two years' income .). The article 
further maintained that most Chinese would not condone such activity, 
but those who had paid could not of course go to the police and reveal 
what had happened for fear of being deported J. Further, it noted 
the concerns of the New Zealand government about the po cal background 
of immigrants. Already in 1953 and 1956 there had been some indications 
that contact with the PRC was being maintained in New Zealand. In 1953 
films. from the PRC were shown in Wellington at the time of Double Tenth, 
and a number of local Chinese went to see them. In 1956 the President 
of the Chinese Building Workers Union visited New Zealand, and the Anti-
Communist sent out a circular warning local Chinese not to assist 
the visiting delegate, who was at the time in Auckland, if they were 
loyal to the Nationalist government (EP, 9 June 1956). It also maintained 
that: 
heartbreaking indeed to watch these 
and abetting the Communists in total 
to the dictates of their conscience. 
In the interests of the future of our country and 
that of the Chinese community here in New Zealand 
we therefore warn our compatriots not to be caught 
unawares and fooled by these people. 
(ibid. ) 
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In Wellington the New Zealand Chinese Association refused to allow 
their premises to be used for the reception of the visitor. Despite 
these events, however, the growers' Journal maintained that the 
government had not found any Chinese who were 'actively broadcasting 
communism' (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1957). By June the Press divulged that 
Chinese had been 'allegedly' visiting the PRC even though passports 
would not be issued for this purpose (NZCGMJ, 31 January 1956 and 
31 May 1957). The article in the Press said that Chinese were obtaining 
visas to go to Hong Kong and then contacting the PRC Travel Agency 
in Hong Kong to arrange visits to the mainland (Press, 10 June 1957). 
They apparently could enter China via the New Territories and leave via 
Macao so their passports would not be stamped, and at least four young 
Chinese had been in China attending school in Peking and Canton for two 
years .). Despite this, it appears that the Consul General was 
more concerned about these visits than was the New Zealand government, 
for there was little the latter could do to stop visits to the mainland. 
Australian authorities however, did stop Chinese getting visas to go via 
Australia, which meant a number of people were stuck in Hong Kong 
31 May 1957). 
Further repercussions were minimal, f9r the exposing of the 
illegal procedures led to the voluntary resignation of a senior official 
in the Immigration Division of the Department of Labour. As for the 
Chinese involved, it was claimed that at least one became a 
persona non grata in his own community, which led to an ostracised 
existence until he died. 
If the growers' Journal provided a medium of national 
communication which kept people informed, especially those who read 
Chinese, it was the Double Tenth celebration which was expected to 
typify the unity of all segments of the community. It was clear that 
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Double Tenth had increased in popularity both as a local activity and 
as a national sports day as more Chinese were able and willing to 
participate. In a real sense, one can see a dual process of collective 
and factional activity coinciding. Double Tenth sports tournaments, 
for instance, became increasingly important, uniting large groups of 
Chinese at least once every year. As more communities could send 
participants and competitions involved more events, the gatherings required 
more organisation. Businesses had to be closed and arrangements made for 
large gatherings. In 1952, Wellington, Auckland, Dunedin, Hamilton, 
and Gisborne all closed their businesses to celebrate the Double Tenth. 
The gatherings were large: 500 people in Wellington, more than 50% 
of the local population, and 200 in Dunedin, nearly 75% of the population, 
gathered together in the respective centres. The sports tournament 
held in Hamilton that year, a centre some distance from South Island 
participants, brought 200 players together from allover New Zealand 
(NZCGMJ, 1 November 1952). In the following year, ten centres sent 
participants, and the event was sufficiently well organised to collect 
~532.ll.0 for the New Zealand Chinese Association, which made an annual 
~200 grant to the centre hosting the event. The other activities at 
the gatherings sometimes included films and cultural performances, 
especially by such groups as the Auckland Tung (musical association), 
and often would draw more of the community together. 52 While the 
theme of unity was always the ideal, the reality of the occasion was 
far more complex, as it was expected not only to pull the young and old 
of the community together, celebrate an historic political event and 
support Taiwan, but also to develop the moral and physical strength of 
the local Chinese and present an acceptable image to European New Zealand. 
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To this end, the New Zealand Chinese Association and the Consul General 
yearly exhorted the community to remember all these aspects in their 
celebration. For instance, in 1950 the Chinese Association sent the 
following message to the Dunedin gathering: 
Competition in sports will stimulate greater interest 
and fellowship within the Chinese community and win 
commendation from the New Zealand people. 
Sports are not limited to the bounds of physical 
fitness, but they are also conducive to mental 
development and to cultivation of patriotism. We 
must do all within our power to safeguard the 
security of our motherland and our compatriots. We 
must carry forth the glory of the Republic of China. 
(Third N.Z. Chinese Annual Sports 
Tournament, Dunedin, 1950:3).53 
and the Consul General sent this statement: 
The Double Tenth sports tournament not only plays an 
important role in developing athletic talents of the 
young Chinese; it exerts even greater signi cance in 
their moral construction. Many of the young Chinese 
left China in their childhood. It is important to 
cultivate their patriotic feelings. A gathering on 
National Day is an occasion to promote such a cause. 
Sports also play a part in bringing the Chinese youth 
who are scattered all over NZ closer together and 
strengthens their mutual understanding. We well 
appreciate the fact that unity is the cornerstone of 
the great cause for the whole Chinese community and 
for a strong and prosperous motherland. 
The sports meeting plays an important part in 
strengthening the unity of the Chinese youth all 
over NZ and also enhances the understanding of the NZ 
people about the Chinese. For instance, the NZ people 
were so deeply impressed by a visiting Chinese soccer 
team some twenty years ago with its outstanding skill 
and good sportsmanship that even today the memory of 
this Chinese team is still alive in many for their 
performance. Through it they can see the excellent 
character of the Chinese youth. It is not a sheer 
exaggeration to say that this very soccer team has 
enhanced the friendly relations between the Chinese 
and the NZ people. We can appreciate ever more the 
great impetus in sports. 
I sincerely hope that all the athletes taking part 
in this tournament will maintain the high levels of 
sportsmanship previously shown in the tournaments. 
Prizes and placings are not the ultimate goal in 
competition. Our vision should be brought to focus 
on more important and rewarding factors - the 
strengthening of unity and friendship among the 
Chinese youth and the promotion of the understanding 
between the Chinese and the NZ people. 
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(Third N.Z. Chinese Annual Sports 
Tournament, Dunedin, 1950:3) 
In 1954 the message from the Auckland branch of the Chinese 
Association was similar; amongst other things it said: 
In his Double Tenth message President Chiang-Kai-shek 
instructed us last year that we celebrate the Double 
Tenth National day in that the Double Tenth brought 
us the glory of opening a new era - the founding of 
the Republic of China. Now history challenges us with 
the solemn responsibility of saving and .restoring our 
country. 
(Seventh Annual N.Z. Sports 
Tournament, Auckland, 1954:2-5) 
By 1960 the message from the new Consul was even more blatantly 
political, exhorting the local Chinese to moral re-armament: 
We celebrate the "Double Tenth tl Anniversary today. The 
10th of October was the date on which the Republic of 
China was founded, 49 years ago by the youth of China, 
led by Dr Sun Yat-sen. This Republic is now facing the 
gravest test in its history. With its back against the 
wall, this Republic must be reborn and give the superior 
answer to the people on the mainland, or all of us - free 
China and the free world - will either perish or lose our 
freedom. Once again the youth of China can lead, this 
time to national rebirth through personal revolution. 
This revolution calls for personal change and commitment 
to the absolute moral standards of honesty, purity, 
unselfishness and love ... 
The Moral Re-Armament of youth everywhere - China, New 
Zealand and other nations - will win the world and usher 
in a new era under God. 
(Thirteenth Annual Chinese Sports 
Tournament, October 1960:5) 
The chairman of the organising committee, while happy to welcome 
all the participants, also offered a more subdued note on the reality of 
Double Tenth and the internal relations of the Chinese community in the 
following: 
In 1957, Jack Chan, our Chairman during that year, 
made the following comments about the Double Tenth 
Tournaments: 
"Just what is so memorable about it? And 
from it, what have we actually achieved?" 
Without doubt these Tournaments serve ideally in 
bringing together the youth of New Zealand and the 
friendships made and pleasures experienced during 
these Tournaments are long-lasting. Naturally, too, 
it is pleasing even to be able to represent one's 
province and to match skills against other teams 
from other parts of New Zealand. 
Although these Tournaments serve many purposes, it 
is not possible to have more functions such as a 
Youth Conference or some such function, to discuss 
problems relating to the Chinese Community in New 
Zealand. Admittedly problems are few, but one that 
is of concern, we believe, is the general lack of 
unity in the Chinese Community in various centres. 
By this we mean that when a Tournament such as this 
is being staged, instead of the Chinese in that 
centre forgetting their differences and endeavouring 
to give all their efforts towards the running of the 
Tournament, organization is left to certain factions 
of the Chinese Community. We feel that the Chinese 
should forget their differences in dialect and customs 
and should pull together for the good of the Chinese 
as a whole. Perhaps it may be hard for people to do 
this - but why should it? 
(ibid. :6) 
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In Wellington the organising committee, according to the chairman, 
had a dispute with the Chinese Association over rules which they had 
formulated for the future organising of the tournament. The Association 
refused to accept them. Part of the problem came from the large number 
of teams that were attached to particular organisations. Coordinating 
and representing their interests while at the same time maintaining 
diplomacy became an onerous task. To look in more detail at the 
situation that had developed, one has only to look at the numerous 
groups which had emerged within the Wellington community 
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In 1951 under the influence of the Chinese Progressive Club, 
the Eastern Club was started, but according to informants, the key 
members of the Progressive Club, dominated by one family, lost interest, 
and it was the Eastern Club that persevered with another group, the 
Northern Soccer Club. These two clubs represented two of the most 
popular sports, basketball for the former and soccer for the latter, 
which were to dominate local activity and the Double Tenth. The inter-
pretation of this situation is based on a growing polemic in the 
community between those who saw sports as the most important group 
activity which would provide community, cohesion and reduce the chances 
of inter-marriage and on the other hand those who tended to see an 
emphasis on culture as a more appropriate activity to achieve the same 
results. In the early years culture and sports co-existed easily as 
club members readily participated in organi social activities and 
the relative expense of either was kept to a minimum. However, the time 
came when the cost of the sports represented only 20% of the total cost, 
and arrangements of social function became not only a burden for the 
organisers. but also excessively expensive. The other significant 
point about the two sports clubs was the fact that they purposefully 
remained aloof from affiliation with other groups. 
In addition to these two organisations involved in sport, there 
was also the Seyip Youth group, which had started in 1950 after the Seyip 
association had re-organised in 1947, and the Delta Club (Wellington 
Chinese Youth Club) started in 1957 and combining sports and social 
events (see NZCGMJ, 30 September 1958). 
On the side of culture and social activity, the most cant 
groups were the Anglican and Baptist Chinese Churches. As already noted, 
the Anglican Mission had the benefit of an active pastor who in 1949 had 
already set about raising money for a new Chinese mission (see EP, 
15 October 1949). Reverend Cheung was able to enlist considerable public 
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support and raise a large amount of money from bazaars which sold, at 
least in 1949, 'a precious cargo of exquisite handkerchiefs, table 
linen, bedspreads' which had 'arrived for the Chinese Missioner' (EP, 
13 September 1949). The newspaper noted that this type of material had 
not been seen in New Zealand since before the war. The minister also 
displayed his own private collection of 'precious pieces dating back to 
Yuan and Ming dynasties' (ibid.). Aside from raising money, however, 
the missioner was also instrumental in starting a language school for 
teaching Chinese, a task for which he was eminently sui ted as the 
previous translator for the 'Wah K'iu Yut Po' (Overseas Chinese Daily 
Newspaper) in Hong Kong. 54 In 1950 he had twenty-five students, 
twelve who had no primary education in China, eight in an advanced class 
who were recent arrivals and five advanced university students 
13 July 1950).55 The aim of the school was to teach Chinese how to 
read and write their own language, which would help them correspond 
with home a point, the article noted, which had received some 
criticism as yet another example of separatism and the 'fostering of 
unhealthy nationalism' (EP, 13 July 1950). Reverend Cheung argued to 
the contrary, that such knowledge would facilitate the transmission of 
Chinese culture for the benefit of all New Zealanders and introduce the 
notion of Oriental studies to the country, still lacking in the 
universities in the 1950s. By the time Cheung left in 1951 he had 
raised £4,500 for the new hall, of which £1,500 had come from local 
Chinese and a pledge ofi3,000 to come from the Williams Trust in 1954 
56 (EP, 13 July 1951). 
In the same year, the Chinese Baptist Church was formed in 
Wellington after its split from the combined Anglican/Baptist mission 
(1932 to 1949). The membership of twenty-six Chinese Baptists, 
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including the son of its earliest leader, now had Reverend Peter Fung, 
who had arrived from Hong Kong in 1950. The occasion of its formation 
was attended by the new Anglican missioner, Reverend T. Mak, and the 
Consul General , 15 October 1951). 
From this time on, the two churches in intense fund-
raising and cultural activity in the Wellington community. In 1953, 
the Anglican Mission received permission to proceed with its building 
plans, and the missioner and his assistant continued the fund-raising 
started by their predecessor. The Anglicans showed films, made 
available by the Chinese Film Corporation, and the Baptist Church Youth 
Drama Group presented concerts and plays to the public (see EP, 
57 3 September, and 23 December 1953). The Anglican Youth Club 
collected L180 for an Old Persons' Home in Wellington and by 1954 the 
Chinese Anglican Church had accumulated!8000 towards the cost of their 
new hall, while the Baptists had collected~5000 towards theirs,58 
In May 1955, the Chinese Anglicans commemorated the laying of the 
cornerstone of new hall and the middle of July 1956 celebrated its 
opening (EP, 9 May 1955 and 19 July 1956).59 The building was unique, 
being both a hall and a church, the latter being achieved by having the 
altar behind doors on a stage. Otherwise the facility was described as a 
'community hall' complete with all amenities including a kitchen 
(EP,19 July 1956). 
In August 1957, the Wellington Chinese Baptist Church was opened 
and the growers' Journal printed the following information, indicating the 
network used to draw donations from other centres: 
Money Raised for the Wellington Chinese Baptist 
Church 
Wellington 
South Island 
Otaki, Ohau, Levin 
Foxton, Fielding, 
Palmerston North 
Woodville, Dannevirke, 
Hastings, Napier, Gisborne 
Auckland, Hamilton 
European Friends 
NZ Baptist Mission 
£... 
5,332 
546 
162 
211 
250 
133 
546 
3,000 
£10,180 
(NZCGMJ, 30 June 1957) 
The building was a church which could seat 300 people, although the 
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permanent membership of the church was only thirty-seven in 1955, with 
eighty-eight enrolled for Bible Class or Sunday School (EP, 30 July 1955). 
Besides the Anglican Chinese School, there was also in 1957 a 
Wellington Chinese School, which was using the Tung Jung Association 
facilities as a classroom. The affiliation of this school is unknown, 
although it had very obvious ties with the Consulate, as it was 
registered in Taiwan and received textbooks (1,600 especially for 
overseas Chinese) from the Taiwan government (NZCGMJ, 31 May 1957). This 
school had seventy-five attending students and ninety registered (ibid.). 
~~ile the development of groups seems particularly noticeable in 
Wellington, it was also happening elsewhere. 
In Auckland the KMT was sti 11 active and in 1953 had sent £400 
to help the Taiwan army (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1953), and the Kwong Chew 
Club collected substantial amounts and built a new building which opened 
on 2 December 1954. 60 There was also the Auckland Opera Club, which 
earned a considerable reputation and toured the country (see NZCGMJ, 
61 29 February 1957 and Chapter 10), and the Auckland Chinese Sports Club 
which had started again in 1947. 
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The Gisborne community's branch of the Chinese association 
continued its work, offering classes and encouraging Chinese culture 
in the community for which it was awarded a merit certificate by the 
Taiwan government (NZCGMJ, 1 December 1954). In June 1954 a Canterbury 
Chinese Cultural Society was started in Christchurch with over 100 members 
and an executive of six intent upon starting a Chinese school and 
encouraging Chinese music, films, drama and art as well as providing a 
milieu in which young Chinese could meet New Zealanders (NZCGMJ, 
1 June 1954). In the same year Dunedin had its own sports club and a 
Chinese school which taught both English and Chinese on Saturday and 
Sunday (NZCGMJ, 1 July 1954). Four years later the Hutt Valley branch of 
the Chinese association opened their own school. In attendance were 
the Consulate staff, representatives from the head office of the Chinese 
association and the Chinese Baptist Minister (NZCGMJ, 30 June 1958). The 
school had sixty-two children and also ran classes on Saturday and 
Sunday afternoon at times when young and old alike could get away from 
other obligations, particularly work and school, to attend. 
The early fifties were busy and active times in nearly all Chinese 
communities as families established themselves, their children attended 
school and the adult community tried to contain its youngsters as demands 
from European society increased. The community also had a public profile, 
since the Anglican and Baptist community projects and various items 
about Chinese growers became newspaper copy, and some journalists 
attempted to predict the future course of the Chinese community. 
In 1952 an article written by Paul Hegal appeared in 
The New Zealand Observer, entitled 'How Little is Known of Them, New 
Zealand's Chinese Do Not Lurk in Dark Alleys with Knives, They have Much 
to Impart to Those Who Would be Friends' (NZO, 12 November 1952).62 
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The gist of the article is spelled out in the title, and it was 
essentially an introduction to Chinese customs and norms which were to 
make the European feel at ease. It explained the Chinese propensity 
for hard work as a result of a feeling of obligation; large dinettes in 
new Chinese houses as a product of hospitality and contemporary 
Chinese relationships as always governed by what has gone on in the 
past (a point highly pertinent to the history of associational activity 
New Zealand but not the intended object of the article). The article 
maintained that gambling in Auckland was restricted to a small group 
and that there were only seventeen opium smokers (ibid.). Chinese 
children, it asserted, did not learn a word of English till they were 
fi ve, fathers and grandfathers were the unquestioned heads of households, 
men shared in household tasks, firecrackers were equivalent to flowers in 
European society, and the colour red was good. 
While these represented the more c aspects of the local 
Chinese community, there were three points made which were relevant to 
the transformation that was actually taking place in this conservative 
milieu. The first point related to children, who, according to the 
informant the journalist used, ' ... are becoming Westernized so fast 
it is difficult to keep up with them' . ) . Second, although a 
large number of the Auckland population was in fruit and vegetable 
shops or on the land, there was also a growing number in the professions 
and in many other trades. Third, the educational experience and diversity 
of occupation represented amongst the young people was breaking down the 
rigid hierarchical system of authority and the younger people, now 
experienced in the European world were asked for advice by their 
elders. All three points represented the second innovation in the family 
structure of the Chinese community in twenty years, the first being the 
presence of increasing numbers of women and therefore complete or nearly 
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complete families. Now children were reaching maturity who, in the 
absence of early education in China, had the equivalent experience in 
New Zealand. 
In 1958, another article, 'Growing Prestige of New Zealand 
Chinese' (EP, 26 May 1958), made similar observations about the role 
f h · 63 o young C lnese. Specifically it drew attention to the ten Chinese 
who were in medical school in Dunedin and the others who had entered 
professions or who were currently in educational institutions. It stated 
'Scholastically, the young Chinese have been a credit to their country 
of adoption' and: 
Traditionally, young Chinese are noted for their 
eagerness to learn. This stems from the very real 
desire of the parents to give their children the 
best education possible to assist them to earn a 
livelihood and at the same time bring honour to 
their parents. The scholar has always been respected 
in China. 
(ibid. ) 
Regardless of the status of a scholar, which to some extent was 
replicated in the New Zealand context, wealth and self-employment were 
more important. The article obviously portrayed and perceived young 
Chinese as becoming part of New Zealand and interpreted the role of the 
New Zealand Chinese Association not only as the 'chief' association and 
creator of the Chinese market gardening industry but also as one 
organisation which developed 'better relations between the Chinese people 
and New Zealanders' (ibid.). The other associations mentioned, including 
those based on locality, sports and the churches, were variously described 
as 'social centres' and 'outlets for youthful activity', but there was no 
mention of the KMT or the Anti-Communist League and only passing reference 
to immigration restrictions which, according to the article, began in 1905. 
The Chinese in New Zealand, according to the author, 'have long 
appreciated the fairness with which they have been treated in New Zealand' 
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and had shown it in generous support for appeals and donations 
gi ven on such occasions as the Queen's visi t in 1954} when the Wellington 
Chinese collected £)000 for a fireworks display. Understandably, the 
author had not heard of the fact that the issue of the Queen's visit 
had caused a minor argument in the community, since some felt that the 
collection and the display were in fact a political statement and wanted 
to know who had decided this on behalf of the whole community (see 
NZCGMJ, 1 September and October 1953). In fact, the Consul had been 
approached by the Mayor of Wellington, and it had been on his 
initiative that the community had been organised into the collection. 
The point here is that both articles in their own way were glossing 
the history of a Chinese community, both in its relations with New Zealand 
and as it was developing at the time. The Chinese community was being 
presented as a community without problems, without internal or external 
constraints, which would merely continue to exist and adapt. 
In 1960 yet another article written by Walter Brookes appeared in 
the New Zealand Listener, 'The Changing New Zealand Chinese' this time 
passing as a review of Ng ckleen Fong's book The Chinese in New Zealand, 
written by a New Zealand Chinese and published the previous year. While 
the author refused to deal with the sociological side of Ng's 
interpret on, he did provide a general coverage of the history, but 
the focus -of the article was on an adapting community. The author 
of the article maintained that 
... we have in the last few years seen a reasonably 
adapted community with New Zealand ways and Oriental 
faces ... 
who are 'in fact turning into New Zealanders' since the 'prosperity 
and easy going ways of New Zealand are proving very seductive' but 
'the young are perhaps adopting them too wholeheartedly for the approval 
of their elders' (NZL, 22 July 1960:4). 
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While there is some selection in the generalisations the 
author elaborates, the message is generally consistent with that of 
Ngsbook. She argues that integration and assimilation are not only 
possible for the Chinese in New Zealand but desirable. As noted in 
Chapter 1 (see page 19), there is a sense of inferiority appended to 
the Chinese community New Zealand for paucity of Chinese 
culture, explained by the peasant background of the early migrants. 
While this might have been true for the very early years, in the fifties 
it an acknowledged deficiency, as evidenced by the cultural groups 
that appeared to remedy the situation. There is also a sense in which 
both the article and Ng's book exclude the community organisations as 
part of Chinese 'culture' although uniquely modified to fit the overseas 
situation. 
On the one hand, European New Zealanders had always wanted a 
Westernised (assimilated) Chinese minority. On the other hand, some 
individuals in the Chinese community f had, in fact, started to 
rationalise their own ethnicity and gloss their own history in New 
Zealand. It was as if they had been given a new identity, as 
exemplified by the stereotypes presented in the articles, and that 
identi~y became their new reality. This was particularly the case 
with the younger Chinese socialised to a greater extent within European 
institutions during their formative years, who would have to confront 
their ethnicity only at marriage, when family could again exert its 
influence. 
Although one can argue that there was some accuracy in this 
description of the Chinese, it was by no means totally true either as 
an explanation - that is, they were becoming Westernised - or as a fact, 
for as long as the structure of the Chinese community was excluded from 
the cussion, alternative explanations or evidence of changing social 
structure was not apparent. 
The evidence previously noted, of continued segmentation 
within the community after the war, goes some way to dispel 
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the notion that extant or emergent organisations were no more than 
archaic remnants of the past or innovations in a European idiom. 
Furthermore, the stereotypes ignored the reconstitution of Chinese 
family life and the effect this would gradually have on the profile 
of the community. It would be some years before families could 
actually settle down into some kind of routinised life following the 
periods of separation, final re-union and then the task of having to 
face the maintenance of economic stability in addition to the 
increased demands on their income for housing, education and the 
general cost of living. 
The problems for the community, while to some extent now free 
from continual changes in immigration restrictions and economic 
insecurity, were still apparent. A diversity of groups existed, both 
the heritage of past factions and also the result of more recent 
innovations, but it was unclear how these would be able to articulate 
the changing needs of the community. The New Zealand Chinese 
Association and the Consulate had assumed the headship of the community 
in its various relationships with both China and New Zealand, but both 
these contexts had changed, giving rise to considerable uncertainty 
over the ability of the Association and the longevity of the current 
diplomatic representation. The national Association, the KMT, the Anti 
Communist Union in addition to persistent locality associations 
represented an older cohort in the community, many of whose members 
had been part of the collection campaign during the war years. Their 
lives, if they had shared in the overseas experience for any length of 
time would have exposed them to the depression, the war, the cost of 
visits home and the possible repatriation with their families in New 
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Zealand plus a considerable effort in the maintenance of their 
overseas economic position. There were also however a growing number 
of younger people in the community, many of whom had come before the 
war under temporary permits as students or during the war years as 
refugees. These people were now part of a driving force in the numerous 
sports groups that flourished during and after the war. While some of 
these groups were attached to locality associations their orientation 
was clearly addressed to the immediate context in which the community 
existed rather than to the overseas relations of the community. 
At least part of the organisational structure therefore seemed to 
represent a number of distinct interest groups that had appeared in the 
community. It was clear that old and young were divided with fferent 
orientations but in addition there were also divisions between those who 
supported sport as opposed to Chinese culture as an acceptable idiom 
through which to provide for community cohesion and those who felt 
affinity for the more traditional associatioffias opposed to others 
orientated towards the contemporary needs of the community. The latter 
including young people and their sports activity were often interpreted 
as part of a pattern of assimilation and this, to older people, meant 
a loss of their own community. 
While this for divisions provided two groups of associations 
there was also a third alternative of organisations that seemed to bridge 
the above divisions as well as that between the Chinese and dominant 
host community. The Chinese Anglican and Baptist churches and Chinese 
Cultural Society and, to some extent the Chinese growers' Association, ful-
led this role. These organisations by virtue of their marginality to 
main associational activity and the political aspects of their own 
community were able to represent a segment of the community that cut 
across age and existing al ances or divisions. While their marginality 
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made them the basis of criti sm on the part of some the fact that 
they existed and persisted offered an example of innovation that would 
legitimate associational activity which would emerge later. However, 
in addition to the complex organisational situation there was also 
another trend in the community which can be summarised best as a move 
towards decentralisation of power and authority. The experience of the 
war years, the presence of increased numbers of families and the growth 
of smaller communities with a resident and stable population led to 
community-based local organisations. These catered for local needs and 
represented a, statement of autonomy. 
However, there were also other problems, particularly the concern 
with the results of the wave of apparent assimilation that was sweeping 
the community. Assimilation was a perceived prerequisite for stence 
in New Zealand, an opinion supported by government and its public 
advocates. It was this aspect alone that interested the European 
community, and this became, as already noted, part of the expectations 
of young Chinese. Educated in New Zealand, freed to some extent from 
the demands of their family life and keen to experience Western life, 
they moved further away from the commitment to the life of the community 
that their parents of necessity had to have. The cultural intensity, 
formerly present in the community due to frequent visits home, 
associational activity and collective action, were gone. The obligations 
of children to obey and parents to control and support their community 
were now relaxed. The parents felt less desire to control and in turn 
had less impetus to be attached to community activity and little 
opportunity to reinforce Chinese culture in their children. The result 
was a group of young people alien to the1r own community but at the 
age when they were old enough to take responsibility in it,and a group 
of elders unprepared for the future with no younger Chinese trained to 
497. 
take over their ion and no thought of how they could hold their 
communi ty together and stem the tide of what they saw as assimil ation. 
The position of the young people as seen from their perspective, is 
made clear in the conclusions written to a 1982 local community history 
(included below).64 The history was put together by five young 
Chinese New Zealanders from the Christchurch Chinese community and 
while chronologically out of order indicates a clear link with the 
concerns of the 1950s. 
Cultural Conflicts 
In so today, the Chinese invariably experience some 
cultural conflict of one form or another as a consequence 
of in a country other than their true homeland. In 
this chapter we would like to discuss some of these 
cultural conflicts which the Chinese youth of today may 
The conflicts felt today do not necessarily 
apply to future generations and in all probability will 
not do so, but they too will need to with different 
conflicts that arise. In this discussion of the cultural 
attitudes and conflicts experienced by the Chinese youth, 
it must be appreciated that no definite conclusions can 
be drawn, as with all sociological studies of this kind. 
One of most visible cultural conflicts of today's 
society is evidenced by the difficulty the younger 
generation have in speaking both English as well as fluent 
The majority of those born or raised in New 
Zealand have adopted English as their first language, which 
is not unnatural considering they live in a European 
society and undoubtedly want to do well within it. It is 
therefore only to be expected that one language (just as 
in other cultural matters) will emerge as the dominant one. 
However, the youth do realise that it is advantageous to 
maintain as much of the Cpinese language as possible. It 
is cial to them, especially in situations when 
talking with the elders of the Chinese community, as it can 
be embarrassing to be laughed at when struggling through a 
simple conversation. 
It is obvious that if parents speak then it is 
fitting that their children speak Chinese, but in the 
majority of cases found, this does not occur. Often, the 
children reply, in part if not solely, in English. The 
reason for this may be attributed to the fact that 
children who have attended English speaking schools 
invariably tend to continue speaking the language at home. 
Parents have generally accepted the gradual introduction of 
English as the main conversational language of the younger 
generation, mainly because it would be unreasonable to 
demand otherwise. 
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It is difficult for the elders of the Chinese community to 
maintain many of their traditions and customs, and relay 
the importance of them to the younger members of this 
small Chinese community of Christchurch. What is needed 
to realise this is to have a large concentration of 
Chinese in one localised area, as in the Chinatowns of 
Sydney or San Francisco where such a congregation has been 
more successful in retaining Chinese language and culture. 
The loss of many traditions can be attributed to a lack of 
interest and knowledge of the reasoning behind them. The 
children of today often practice these traditions for 
their parents l sakes, while themselves having scant 
knowledge of the causes for or aims of these acts. This 
will inevitably lead to a total disappearance of the 
customs which are currently being practiced after such 
parental insistence ends. 
The traditions among the Chinese are basically alike, 
although are differences between dialectic groups 
in the ways they are carried out. In the keeping of these 
traditions it is evident that there are distinctive roles 
for the males and females to fulfil. For example, the 
females are expected to be naturally domesticated, 
traditionally a much-respected trait, whereas parents 
place a importance on their sons obtaining a good 
education and achieving goals set by them, whether personal, 
business or academic goals. 
In the course of fulfilling these expectations, children are 
expected to live at home, especially females. This is 
usually because the parents wish to have their offspring 
with them for as long as possible, generally until they get 
married. These strong family ties make mixed marriages 
unacceptable, and if this was to occur, it would result in 
a partial or total alienation of the children from their 
families and the Chinese community, Where children do 
finally go against their .parents l wishes, their actions 
are generally condemned by the community, which usually 
results in gossip concerning the child and his/her family. 
The majority of the younger generation, however, realise 
that this more often than not affects the parents more than 
the children which is an undesirable outcome. 
For these reasons then, parents are very much against their 
children mixing with the Europeans socially, and on the 
whole do not hesitate to emphasize this. 
In conclusion, we can say that the members of the younger 
generation are faced with many conflicts, only some of which 
we have mentioned above, such as language, maintaining 
Chinese traditions, socialising with Europeans, mixed 
marriages, living at home as opposed to flatting, and the 
choice between entering a professional career or carrying 
on a private business. The conflicts mentioned so far are 
only some of the many, although these would be prominent 
conflicts which are felt. The younger genetation are torn 
between two varying cultures and where it is difficult 
to reach a compromise, they may be forced to make a 
choice which may lead to an estrangement with their 
parents and the community. In the generatioI)s to come, 
the conflicts they may face will not be the same as 
our own generation and it is hoped that the community 
will be able to change with the times ... 
(Sue et al., 1982:57-59) 
The legacy of the past and continuing changes within the 
Chinese community led in the 1960s and 1970s to a number of 
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developments, which reflect Chinese urban communities organising for the 
problems that confronted them. Basically the changes that were to 
occur were a compromise which retained the integrity of the 
associational structure but at the same time provided for the needs 
of growing communities. The former however, involved the sorting out 
of legitimate representation in the community as regards both local and 
national needs as well as the political overtones that were to come 
with changes in diplomatic representation. The changes that best 
exemplify the above occur in the two major Chinese urban centres 
and one smaller urban community. The former includes the complex. 
developments that occurred in Auckland and Wellington which together 
held 64% of the total Chinese population in 1960 and 55% in 1976, 
and the latter example is from Christchurch where the Chinese 
community had increased from 516 1961 to 1,760 in 1976. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
1 The KMT celebrated with a separate evening meal attended by 
100 people. According to reports, it commemorated the 
birthday of Sun Yat-sen and his role as a great leader 
(see EP, 13 November 1945). 
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2 The Evening Post reported in early 1946 that, since shipping 
had become progressively easier, many of the refugee women 
and children were speculating on the possibility of having to 
return to China. While older members of the community might 
want to return,the article continued, younger re-united 
families were happy in New Zealand, and it was thought that 
many of the wives would not want to leave (EP, 22 March 1946). 
At the time, the government was content to renew permits as 
it had done during the war. 
3 A detailed description of the Wellington Anglican Mission is 
contained in a pamphlet written by Reverend F.C. Long, which 
traces events and appointments from 1900 to 1950 (see Long, 
circa 1950). 
4 The Canton Missions were not under the control of the Church of 
Christ in China, but the Presbyterians were able to stay and 
work in the church until 1950, when they officially withdrew, 
realising they were an embarrassment to the Chinese church (see 
Murray, 1969:65-67). 
5 The matter of naturalisation for Chinese had been before Cabinet 
six times (1912, 1921, 1923, 1935, 1937 and 1939) since the 
decision to decline naturalisation on 4 February 1908. In 1946, 
the issue was raised again when ten applications were received 
by Internal Affairs, and the Minister decided that policy 
should again be reviewed since the reasons for the ban had been 
partially eradicated by the Finance Act 1944 (NA, IA 116/7 
24 June 1946). The signi cance of the poll tax provision 
eradicated by the 1944 Finance Act was that it legitimised 
unequal treatment for the Chinese. 
6 NA, IA,116/7, October 1946. The communities referred to in the 
letter were Dunedin and Christchurch, and in the latter centre 
the conflict was such that a court case was pending, according 
to the letter, but this has never been substantiated; an appeal 
to European authorities or to the courts to resolve internal 
conflicts within the Chinese community is unusual. 
7 Matthews' quota system would select those who had some 
capability in English, were young, healthy and had a fair 
education (Matthews, 1946:6). 
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8 Matthews also recommended that New Zealand have a Minister 
China, Chinese information bureaux in each of the main centres, 
Departments of Oriental Studies in each of the University 
COlleges as well as the availability of Chinese language 
(Matthews, 1946:7). 
9 It has been impossible to ascertain whether or not any Chinese 
representatives from the community attended this meeting, 
although judging from informants and the lack of any meeting 
of the Chinese Association Executive prior to the deputation, 
it seems unlikely. From all accounts the Chinese were happy to 
allow the Presbyterian Church to speak on their behalf. 
10 NA, L22/l/8l:4. This event while it seemed 'drastic' in 1950, 
was in 1947 consistent with New Zealand's new status. In 
November 1947, New Zealand adopted the Statute of Westminster, 
giving New Zealand for the first time complete control over 
internal affairs and external policies. New Zealand was the 
last dominion to accept this status, and according to Fraser, 
Prime Minister at the time, it would end the subordination of 
the New Zealand parliament to that of Britain (see NZPD, 1947, 
279:531-64), 
11 There are a number of peripheral points that might be made about 
these provisions. , the use of the year 1928 as a cut off 
date for arrival in New Zealand seems largely to have been an 
attempt to ensure that the women involved were older and beyond 
child-bearing age, as the following illustrates: 
It will be seen that most of the wives admitted are past 
child bearing age and their admission should not result 
in an increase in Chinese births on as large a scale as 
that which followed 1939 concessions. 
(NA, L22/l/8l:5) 
Second, it is curious that naturalisation should be part of the 
provisions, since naturalisation would not be granted to the 
Chinese again till 1952. Third, to a large degree the 
eligibility of each applicant was apparently based on a police 
report which was required of each applicant. The report would 
contain information on the 'conduct and character of each 
applicant, and his ability to support his family and to provide 
them with suitable accommodation' (NA, L22/l/8l:4). A brief 
discussion of their procedure in the 1950 report on Chinese 
immigration (see reference) maintained that the police evaluated 
the applicant as part of a Chinese community and not on the basis 
of being New Zealanders, which meant that the police reports were 
in almost all cases favourable or, as the report adds, the 
applicants were all from a 'better class of Chinese' (ibid.). 
Fourth, the stipulations concerning naturalisation were to cause 
major problems in the Chinese community. They were advised that 
they could not apply to bring their wives and children to New 
Zealand till such an application was made. Misunderstanding the 
meaning of naturalisation and making the application had led, 
according to the Chinese minister, to some 'unscrupulous' 
dealings (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948:9), and inquiries 
and submissions to the Chinese Consul General. This 
structured a situation where Chinese were accused of doing 
the right thing but for the wrong reasons and forced the 
Consul into making a statement. government, for its 
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part, used the report filed by the police concerning this 
requirement as a means of sorting the cases where applications 
had been made to bring wives and children to New Zealand. 
12 The Labour Department's response to this in 1950 was to suggest 
that it was a 'problem for which the Chinese themselves are 
greatly responsible I (NA, L22/1/8l: 5) . 
13 Reverend Cheung reported that the Consul General's office had 
informed him that 508 Chinese had applied for passports to 
return to China up to 1946 (NA, IA 116/7, 27 September 1948). 
14 This comment on the characteristics of the male Chinese 
population is remarkably consistent with that expressed by 
Alexander Don when visiting the Chinese in the Otago gold 
fields in the late 1800s. 
15 Under these provisions the administrative responsibility fell 
entirely on the Minister of Internal Affairs, who alone granted 
or refused applications. Naturalisation was granted at the 
discretion of the Minister, and there was no right of appeal or 
review in any court, nor was any reason necessary for granting 
or refusing an application. NA, IA 116/7, 3 January 
1952, enclosure 'Naturalisation Procedure
'
). 
16 The exception of Wellington already having women's teams is 
attributable to the organisation of the Chinese Progress Club 
established in 1947 by three prominent Wellington families who 
had a large number of daughters. The Club was ally almost 
entirely for social gatherings to ensure that appropriate 
marriages were arranged for eligible daughters. Later the Club's 
activities turned to sport and contributed teams for the Double 
Tenth tournaments. 
17 Ibid. While not wanting to seem uncharitable towards Matthews' 
sentiments, I think he wrote this article in 1948 with some 
relief after he had taken a pub and supportive stance on 
Chinese immigration the previous year. 
18 Most of these men were from Jung Sing and graduated in 
accountancy, mathematics or agricul tural science from Auckland, 
Massey or Victoria. One graduate achieved distinction, getting 
a Ph.D. from Cambridge, and another was an agriculture graduate, 
chosen by the United Nations Re and Rehabilitation 
Administration to take a shipment of sheep to China in 1946. 
19 The original plan was documented previously (see Chapter 8, 
pp. 411-412). 
20 The Yu Kiew shareholders from mainland China remain unknown, 
since it has been assumed that the list from which this 
information comes covers only the overseas Chinese. 
21 In 1951 there were 58 Chinese females to every 100 males 
(Census, Vol. 7, 1966:4). 
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22 Remittances had almost doubled in amount since the early 1900s, 
when it had averaged £20 to £40 a year per person. 
23 There was a provision already available whereby Chinese men born 
in New Zealand with wives overseas could bring them to New 
Zealand at any time provided the application fell within the 
annual quota of ten. This provision was introduced in 1935, but 
according to the 1950 Department of Labour report on Chinese 
immigration, it had never been fully utilised (NA, L22/1/81:13). 
24 The rationale for the Department of Immigration using the journal 
to disseminate this information had, as already noted, to do with 
the status and distribution of the journal, but also with the 
notion that 'clan' and 'reputable Chinese agents' would not 
handle cases where illegitimate claims were being made. It is 
significant that the Department concerned now accepted the 
legitimacy of the Chinese community's knowledge and authority 
over that of, at least in Some cases, European solicitors 
(L22/1/115, Memorandum, 1 February 1954). 
25 The one exception to this came in 1951, when the then Minister 
of Agriculture, K.J. Holyoake, was quoted at length in the 
growers' Journal. The text was actually a message to the 
Chinese growers which he praised them for their increased 
production (in 1951 one third of the area under production was 
worked by Chinese) in the face of labour shortages and increasing 
costs. He suggested that both problems might be met efficiently 
with increased mechanisation and that the Chinese should also 
make considerable use of scientific advice provided by the 
Department of Agriculture. The issue that emerged from this 
later (1953) was the fact that the scientific information was 
all provided in English. 
26 In 1945 the national Association was dissolved as an 
incorporated society, much to the annoyance of people from other 
centres who requested immediate access to a balance sheet. One 
such request received a balance sheet from 1938 - the last 
entered into the file as an Incorporated Society (Records of 
Incorporated Societies, Justice Department, N.Z. Chinese 
Association file). The dissolution of the Association was 
declared invalid, however, two years later. The collection 
offi ly began in 1936 with the contribution of iJoo each 
from seven members of the executive from Wellington and Dunedin. 
27 In 1950 delegates came from nineteen areas including Auckland and 
Pukekohe (6), Hamil ton (2), Gisborne (2), Ohakune (2), Hawkes 
Bay (2), Manawatu (2), New Plymouth-Hawera (1), Wanganui (1), 
Foxton (1), Levin (1), Otaki (2), Wairarapa (2), Oamaru (2), 
Otago (2), Lower Hutt (1), Nelson (1), Christchurch (2), 
Timaru (1) and Ashburton (1). By the Ninth Annual meeting, however, 
the number of areas had been reduced to the first fourteen districts 
above and also Appendix XXXIV for the major areas with 
district of origin and nearest auctions for respective areas). 
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28 On visits to growing areas, they not only discussed growers' 
problems but also anything that was of concern to the local 
community. The presence of a consular official was important 
in' this regard. 
29 Negotiations over wages reached a decision that wages should be 
increased from 2/6 to 3/6 per hour and that cauliflower cutting 
on Sunday would be paid at ordinary rates. The agricultural-
worker problem has already been discussed (see pp.455-56). 
30 The shortage of blood and bone was resolved by rationing the 
8,000 tons to be imported in 1950-51 to each growing area. 
31 The annual government allowance to the Chinese grower's 
Association amounted to 20% of the total registration fee 
collected from all growers. In 1950 the Chinese growers assessed 
their share at l4 72 .12.7, but were willing to accept £350. 
32 The commission charged by the Wellington Auctions on vegetable 
containers had been removed in 1945 as a gesture of good will, but 
had been re-instituted after the war. The Price Control 
Commission ruled that, contrary to the Chinese and European 
grower's view, the auctions had a perfect right to do this 
(NZCGMJ, 1 November 1949). 
33 The Journal notified local Chinese that Chinese leaving for 
overseas destinations could obtain passports at the Chinese 
mission in Macau (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1950) and that visas for Hong 
Kong were available from the United Kingdom High Commissioner 
in Wellington rather than the Department of Internal Affairs 
(ibid., 1 July 1950). 
34 For instance, growers were informed that all produce in a,' 
container should be of the same size and quality throughout 
and that all gardens except those growing onions, sweet potato, 
potato and taro must register with the Ministry of Agriculture 
every October and those with onions every February (NZCGMJ, 
1 February 1950). Also, growers were noti that the 
Minister of Trade and Industry announced that potatoes would 
no longer be subjected to price control (ibid., 1 March 1950), 
and furthermore, that the government would no longer buy the 
main crop each year (ibid., 1 May 1950). 
35 Informants have stated that schools began in these particular 
areas because diversity of county of origin was minimal, 
providing no problems communication or collective support for 
the enterprise. 
36 The reference to this was contained in the 1950 report on 
Chinese immigration, but the report itself does not say whether 
it was implemented. The rationale was to stop any means of 
regenerating Chinese culture in the overseas context among 
younger Chinese (NA, L22/l/8l:7). Informants maintained that 
the provision was withdrawn at least temporarily but was later 
re-instituted. 
37 An article in the Evening Star in 1949 publicised the 
existence of the Dunedin School, complete with a picture. 
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The article stated that most of the children were from primary 
school and attended Chinese classes each day after school until 
they entered high school, when they found the work load too 
much (Evening Star, 8 October 1949). 
38 According to the Press article, thei:l,500 was equivalent to 
25,000 catties of rice or HK$22,500 (see Press, 28 November 1951). 
39 While the growers I Journal contains information on events in 
Kwangtung, was no news of persecution, although it did 
report anti communist feeling in Canton as increased taxes were 
levied on commercial circles and fact that people in Toy 
San (Seyip) were instructed to hand in lists of relatives 
living in Hong Kong (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1952). 
40 Another concern which might have stimulated such a movement, 
although unsubstantiated, could have been the establishment of 
the New Zealand China Friendship Society in Auckland in 1952. 
Although the national organisation was not formerly organised 
until 1958, when ~uckland, Napier, Christchurch and Wellington 
branches united, it was nevertheless operation. In 1956 it 
sent a delegation to visit China and in 1956 organised a tour 
for a Chinese Opera group in New Zealand. A Christchurch 
society was started in March 1956, but it did not become a 
branch until 1958, when the NZCS was established 
(personal communication from W.E. Willmott). 
41 Wang Feng, the Consul General, took a position in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Taiwan (NA, PM 61/6/1, 18 June 1953). 
42 Tien was forty-eight years Old, from Hubei Province, a graduate 
of Peking Economics and Commerce Institute who had also studied 
in London (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953). In London he had become 
first secretary to the Consul, later to be appointed to the 
Department of External Affairs in Taiwan (1941) and first 
secretary to the Consul in Portugal in 1947. He had four 
children, all studying in America, and came to New Zealand with 
his wife d.). 
43 Tien was welcomed on his arrival by the two ministers from the 
Chinese Anglican Mission, the chairman of the Chinese Association 
and the departing Consul General. Later he was welcomed at the 
Seyip Association hall and following this gave his own 
reception, which included the Minister of External Affairs, other 
Members of Parliament, and representatives of the New Zealand 
Chinese Growers Association, Poon Fa Association, KMT, Jung Sing 
Association, and both churches (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953). In 
regard to education in Taiwan, the community was later informed 
that a test would be required and also evidence of residence 
overseas for seven years or more (NZCGMJ, 30 June 1957); this 
latter requirement presumably excluded those who had contact 
with the PRC after 1950. 
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44 The Department of Labour and Employment obtained a copy of 
the circular in Chinese and had it translated before sending 
it on to the Consul General for verification. He rejected 
the translation and submitted this text. 
45 The concern for the situation of Chinese women in New Zealand 
had also arisen because a number of Chinese girls who signed 
themselves as 'Chinese New Zealanders' had written to the 
Customs Department complaining that young Chinese 'boys' were 
going to China to marry lmd then were allowed to bring their 
wives to New Zealand, although they were not, the letter claimed, 
born in New Zealand (L22/l/ll5, 21 August 1953). The letter 
was duly passed to the Department of Labour and Employment. 
46 The ten missing cases have no income data and include six 
students and four market gardeners. 
47 The New Zealand Chinese Grower's Monthly Journal carried a 
slightly different report of the resul ts. It stated that 
domiciled Chinese were now entitled to bring their wives to 
New Zealand but added that Internal Affairs was willing to 
grant naturalisation papers at the same time as the application 
was approved. It also added that Chinese growers had approached 
the government through the Consul General to be allowed to bring 
their future wives to NeN Zealand with the payment of a bond of 
.£200 which would be deposited with the government and refunded 
after the marriage, but the government refused to accept this 
(NZCGMJ, 1 October 1954). In December 1955 the Department of 
Labour required a deposi,: of .£.150 before Chinese males departed 
overseas to go through the marriage ceremony (L22/1/ll5, 
2 December 1955). 
48 Classes were organised in some cases by the Principals of 
Technical Colleges or, where there were none, by the headmasters 
of district high schools or local primary schools. Both the 
Te Aro school and the Technical College in Wellington were 
offering such classes in 1953, using the rooms of the Chinese 
sports club (NA, IA 116/7 , 17 July 1953). 
49 Shum' s survey in 1956 confirms that market gardening is indeed 
more hazardous than one \wuld expect. Al though Chinese market 
gardeners are usually fit, he described them as often weary, 
sunburned people who suffer from severe colds and influenza, 
chronic bronchi tis amongst older gardeners and who are 
constantly faced with knife wounds, scalds, accidental falls, 
mus cular strains and foreign bodies in eyes and hands. The cuts, 
falls, strains and forei;5Jl-body injuries invariably result from 
poor lighting and cold hands due to the hours of work (Shum, 1956: 
18). In the period of a year Shum recorded the fact that thirty 
workers suffered 114 physical injuries which resulted in 145 
days off work (ibid.:20). Shum also maintains that part of the 
problem has to do with their neglectful attitude towards treatment 
and prevention. There is a fee ling Shum maintains, that entry 
into hospital is an indication of the extreme gravity of an 
illness, so when one does go it is bad and things will probably 
get worse (ibid.: 110). This has been confirmed by informants, 
who also maintain one goes to hospital only to die. 
507. 
50 The money came originally from a levy of~3 per market garden 
that the Dominion Council was authorised to collect order 
to cover expenses of the organisation. According to the Journal 
of the Chinese growers the Dominion Council reduced the amount 
to £200 in 1953 and then to LIOO in 1954. The Chinese 
organisation then approached the Minister of Agriculture to ask 
for an increase to£350 to which the Dominion Council acceded 
in 1954 (NZCGMJ, 1 November 1953 and 1 February 1954). 
51 In 1955 the Presbyterian Committee on International Relations 
considered the situation of Chinese immigration, particularly 
the case of wives and families, having temporary dence 
converted to permanent residence (especially Chinese pastors), 
and the speeding up of the naturalisation process. The 
submission noted that only twenty-three applications for 
naturalisation had been approved the right was re-introduced 
1951, which made the 1954 provisions seem empty. The response 
from the Minister of Immigration merely reiterated policy but did 
add the point that children over sixteen of permanent residents 
would be admitted to New Zealand for two years on a temporary 
permit, which could be converted to a permanent status subject 
to their 'good behaviour and satisfactory reports' (L22/l/ll5, 
no date, 1955). The issue of naturalisation was a matter for the 
Minister of Internal Affairs, according to the Minister of 
Immigration. 
52 In 1954 the Auckland sports tournament hosted 700 participants, 
but the film evening drew a crewd of 1,500 people together 
(NZCGMJ, 1 November 1954). 
53 All passages from Sports Tournament booklets are translated from 
the Chinese. 
54 Reverend Cheung's job was to translate American and British news 
for the paper. 
55 This school continued even after Reverend Cheung departed, and 
in 1955 it had expanded its curriculum to include reading, 
writing, speaking of Chinese and Chinese history. It was 
organised into three terms per year at £5.0.0 per person per term 
(NZCGMJ, 1 March 1955). 
56 The Williams Trust was established by Archbishop Samuel Williams, 
founder of Te Atutu College, to commemorate his father and 
uncle, who were both pioneer missionaries (see EP, 19 July 1956). 
57 One novel form of collecting money was suggested by the Anglican 
Chinese Missioner, who had requested members of the church that 
in the case of a death the money intended for flowers should be 
donated to the church instead, resulting in donations of .£116 
on one occasion and £300 on another (see EP, 15 July 1955). 
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58 Both halls were estimated to cost about £.12,000 before 
completion. In 1954, the Baptists had bought a section for 
~2,600 and the Anglicans already had land provided by a loan 
from the Anglican S~od for the missioner's house. The Baptist 
Church had received tl, 000 from the Baptist Church in New . 
Zealand andf3,OOO in donations, £1,000 of which came from 
one person (see EP, 26 October 1954 and NZCGMJ, 1 July 1954). 
59 In 1955 Yue Jackson (Yue En Ho), -who had red from his post 
as Consul General in 1948, died. The Consul General at the 
time, Tien Fang Cheng, stated: 
I speak for the Chinese of this country when I say that 
he will be sadly missed as a good and faithful friend, a 
wise counsellor, and a generous benefactor of good causes. 
(EP, 18 November 1955) 
60 There had been a decline in the activities of the club for 
some years prior to this event, explained by 'disunity and 
contradiction that divided our members' and the added fact 
that the Health Department had condemned the club room (Report 
on Kwong Chew Club 1967:2). Unfortunately, although 
considerable effort was coordinated to build a new building, 
the report mainains that the: 
club leadership did not seize the opportunity to rally 
all the people around it for the well of the New 
Zealand Chinese. Before long disappointment bred 
negative attitudes among the members. The development 
of the Club was once again bogged down. 
. ) 
61 This was originally the Tai Tung (Universal Brotherhood) music 
group that had started before the war as a small social group 
and then expanded during the war to become a substantial 
company of 30 people which performed to raise money for charity 
in New Zealand as well as for the war effort in China. After 
the war members dispersed, and it was not until 1954 that some 
of original members got together again to perform Cantonese 
opera. They were involved later in fund-raising for the 
Auckland Chinese Hall. 
62 Curiously, the article also had a picture which showed a South 
Korean family watching the U.S. Air Force doing practice 
paratroop drops in South Korea. 
63 This article was translated and entirety in 
the New Zealand Chinese 30 June 1958, 
64 The following paragraphs formed the conclusion of their study of 
the local community through documentary research and interviews 
in the summer of 1982 under the Department of Labour's then 
available Student Community Service Programme Scheme. 
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CHAPTER 10 
HISTORIC CONFLICTS AND CONTEMPORARY 
ORGANISATIONS: 1960-1976 
The last period in this study covers the years from 1960 to 
1976 when the Chinese population in New Zealand increased from 6,731 
in 1956 to 14,860 in 1976. As noted in the conclusions to the last 
chapter the population, due to a changing occupational structure, had 
become increasingly urban. The immigration provisions which had re-
united families,in addition to a generally improving socio-economic 
context in post-war New Zealand, led to a stable, developing and at 
least administratively acceptable Chinese minority. 
By the 1960s naturalisation as well as welfare provisions were 
available to the Chinese and the presence of families with a 
substantial population under twenty-one years of age (see Appendix 
XXXV) meant that residence pattern became sedentary. For all the 
stability and acceptance that were apparent however, unresolved and 
newly emerging issues created the necessity and context for change 
in the community. The impetus for some of these changes have already 
been alluded to in the last chapter including the dilemmas presented 
by the threat of assimilation submerging the identity of the 
community and its youth as well as unresolved arguments that had their 
origin during the war-time collection. Essentially these issues had 
led to an increasing tendency towards a proliferation of organisations 
which intended to provide for the specific needs of the community and a 
desire on the part of local Chinese communities to seek autonomy from 
any national control. 
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The proliferation of organisations was not a unique response for 
it had occurred previously whenever unresolved conflict and unmet needs 
coincided but after the war the associational response included not only 
the original organisations in the community but additional ones which 
stood in a unique relationship to their own community, The Chinese 
growers' organisation, the Chinese churches and to an extent the 
Chinese Cultural Society were all marginal to the Chinese community yet , , 
i 
providing for specific needs within this community. The period after 
1960 therefore saw a complex organisational structure including the 
above organisations, the ubiquitous sports groups, the locality 
associations, the national organisation as well as the KMT and the 
Anti-Communist League all in a position to organise segments of the 
community, but none capable of wielding sufficient influence to produce 
national unity. 
Issues resulting from the activities of the war-time 
collection, its leadership and the national organisation were sufficient 
to give prominence to local over national issues, a desire for a new 
leadership instead of the old and a concern to avoid becoming 
susceptible to political labels; while at the same time encouraging 
the cultural integrity of future generations. The successful 
resolution of these issues and conflicts, while preserving the integrity 
of the organisational structures within the community at national and 
local levels is the subject of this chapter. 
The situation in Auckland had developed over a long period of 
time and, as already suggested, had given rise to factions and to 
uncertainty as to how the future would be handled (see Chapter 9, page 457). 
In 1948 an Auckland Sports Club had been started, co-existing, as far 
as has been ascertained, with the Kwong Chew Club and the KMT-
dominated branch of the Chinese Association. There had been suggestions 
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to buy or build a community hall, but arguments over funding led to 
postponement until it was clear that some of the money collected and 
returned to Auckland had in fact been sent to Taiwan. There was certain 
indignation about this but also concern for changes that were taking 
place in the community which apparently were not being confronted. 
Specifically, the concern focused on the absence of cultural activities, 
loss of contact with China, and the lack of Chinese education for the 
1 young. 
Two groups existed in the Auckland community already in 1950 who 
were going some way to remedying the cultural deficiencies. Prior 
to the war the Tai Tung(Chinese Music Club) as noted in the previous 
chapter, had been started and was important in helping with the 
national endeavour to support China and while it had dispersed after 
the war, it had started again in 1954. 
The second group was a Film Club set up in 1954 which was 
established because: 
and 
... the overseas Chinese in New Zealand are very 
scattered and thus very difficult to unite. Some 
far-sighted Chinese had the idea of setting up an 
Association which would not only provide a place 
for recreation, unity and welfare of our friends 
but also for spreading Chinese culture. 
(Auckland Chinese Hall, 1961:52-53)2 
.. . we felt that overseas Chinese had little 
opportunity to be exposed to their motherland's 
culture except through the sermons of some 
churches given in Chinese and the Chinese groweIS' 
Journal which reported agricultural news. 
(ibid. ) 
It was decided that film was the best medium to fulfil their aims, 
since education would be contained within entertainment. In brief: 
The Film Club has a double meaning: 1) to help the 
establishment of an Association and subsidize the 
expenses that will be incurred from such an 
Association, 2) to provide good entertainment for 
our friends and also guide the children familiarizing 
them with their own motherland's culture. 
(ibid.) 
The Film Club organised itself formally with a constitution and 
newsletter and set about showing films to the community every week. 
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Eventually the Club issued shares and had share capital of~4,075, with 
89% of the local Chinese community investing in the Club (ACH,196l:52-53). 
In 1950 a further development took place when it was decided to 
start the Auckland Chinese Hall (hui sor).3 The report quoted above, 
written in 1961, described the events in the following way: 
The increasing number of Chinese in New Zealand has 
thus stimulated the idea of setting up an association. 
Though there is a Branch of the New Zealand Chinese 
Association here to co-ordinate local Chinese, there 
has been no permanent place for meetings or large 
gatherings. This is due to the lack of an Association. 
The branch committee members and some people who are 
concerned with Chinese welfare here have for a long 
time been contemplating the setting up of such an 
association, but the idea was hampered by objective 
circumstances. 
In the winter of 1959, the State Theatre that had been 
used by the Film Club for showing films was put up for 
sale, forj[30,OOO. It was estimated that the re-building 
expenses would cost anothert7,00-~,000. The State 
Theatre, it was thought, would be an ideal facility, 
since it was close to transportation and could accommodate 
a large audience. 
The Committee members thus immediately discussed the 
issue and initiated the campaign for buying the theatre. 
The first meeting of all local Chinese was held at the 
Chee Kung T'ang, which was at the time used by the New 
Zealand Chinese Association Branch as a temporary office. 
There were many Chinese in attendance. A chairman was 
elected, and several members of the committee explained 
the idea for the purchase of the theatre. The idea was 
unanimously supported, and the name Auckland Chinese Hui 
Sor was adopted. 4 The name is suitable because it 
acknowledges the priorities of welfare and unity for the 
local Chinese and frees it from manipulation by any other 
association's politics. Every person of Chinese origin 
has the right to join. 
(ACH, 1961:52-53) 
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The reception to the announcement of the plan was encouraging, 
a committee of thirty-one members was set up, and the purchasing 
committee started ing money. Initially substantial amounts came 
in from individual donations, which received specific acknowledgement 
for the husband's and wife's contribution. They also had £.8, 000 on 
hand from previous fund-raising affairs and the Film Club, but this 
was still short of the £.30 ,000 needed for purchase and the £10 ,000 
d d f . 5 nee e or renovatlon. The shortfall was met with three schemes which 
firmly tied the Hui Sor to the Chinese community. The first scheme 
was to act as an investment organisation whereby Chinese individuals 
would loan so much to the organisation and receive interest at bank 
rates. The second was an appeal to the Branch of the New Zealand 
Chinese Association for a loan ofl:5,000, which was seen as equivalent 
to the amount originally belonging to the community from the war 
collection. The third was to organise a "Debt Maintenance Committee" 
which would collecti2 a week from members over a period of 
three years which would be considered as a loan until such time as the 
debt could be paid back out of revenue (see ACH, 1961:24-25). 
The hall was purchased but not without all three schemes being 
put into operation and particularly the last, which meant that a small 
number in the community actually contributed a considerable amount to 
h . 6 t e malntenance. After it was purchased it was renovated, complete 
with kitchen and dining lities and a stage, but no sports 
facilities. In the first year of its operation, the Hall was able, 
through generous donations, rent from three shops on the premises, the 
hiring of the hall to a 'Western' dance company and the Film Club, 
membership fees and borrowed money, to payoff over £36, 000 of the 
debt, leaving just under £4,000 to be paid. 
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The community had a hall, which served as a social gathering 
place for the next nine years, but it was not able to provide for a 
school until 1968, for only then did the financial situation allow 
for this development. Furthermore, it had not provided any faci 
for its young people, a point that was to have repercussions in 1969. 
The Chinese growers' organisation meanwhile faced considerable 
pressure, not only for amalgamation with the Federation of Growers 
dominated by Europeans, but also later from declining cooperation 
within its own ranks. 
In 1954 the Federation tried to withdraw the subsidy from the 
Chinese growers, which amounted to £350 a year. This money was collected 
annually as a registration fee from all commercial growers in New 
Zealand by the Department of Agriculture and redistributed to the two 
organisations. While the Federation relented in 1954 and paid the 
money to the Chinese, by 1957 this practice had been officially 
discontinued, although the registration fee was still paid out, by this 
time directly to the Federation rather than the Department of Agriculture. 
Growers were informed that in 1956 they would be levied £3.0.0 per 
market garden, which providedfB,400 from a total of 2,800 growers of 
which the 523 Chinese growers had contributedi:l,569 while receiving 
little tangible (see NZCGMJ, 1 January and 1 June 1955). 
The Chinese growers sent their objections to the Minister of 
Agriculture, Mr. Ho1yoake, who told them that as far as the government 
was concerned there was only one growers' organisation and if there 
was any dispute it had to be settled by negotiation between Chinese 
and European growers' organisations (see NZCGMJ, 31 May and 30 June 1957). 
The loss of government recognition and the withdrawal of the 
subsidy left the Chinese commercial growers no other choice but to take 
the offer of sending two representatives 7 to the Federation's annual 
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meeting (non-voting positions) and increasing their levy to cope with 
the financial deficit. 8 The consequence of the former was an increasing 
impatience with the constrained position they found themselves in, 
attached to the Federation, and of the latter, an increasingly difficult 
financial situation as regards the funding of their own annual 
meetings and the maintenance of the Journal which had since 1952 converted 
to a type-set copy after type had been purchased in 1952 by donations 
from each area (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1952). Aside from these problems, 
there were other issues9 which complicated the situation, summarised 
in an article by a Palmerston North grower in 1958. 
In the article the writer maintained that the Chinese growers 
neither knew much nor cared much about their own organisation because 
they felt it had failed in negotiationsto get their share of the levy. 
and failed to protect the interests of the Chinese growers, both of 
which had led, with the presence of Federation branches in different 
areas, to Chinese supporting this organisation instead of their own. 
He argued that it was not the fault of the Chinese growerS' organisation 
that they had lost the levy, because they were given only twenty-four 
hours notice before appearing before the government sub-committee which 
acted on the question; since the President of the Chinese organisation 
and their own sub-committee were in Auckland at the time, they could not 
make it (NZCGMJ, 31 December 1958). Besides, according to the writer 
'the government was adamant that there be only one Commercial Growers.' 
Association' (ibid.). As for the work done for Chinese growers by the 
New Zealand Vegetable and Produce Growers Federation, the author argued 
that 'any changes brought about in the past to benefit the Chinese or 
all growers were the product of a combined effort, and therefore the 
English growers were not right in their boasting' (ibid.). If Chinese 
growers thought they could rely on this organisation to represent them 
in future, then they should go to the annual meeting, where they 
would realise that the issues of the Chinese growers were never 
discussed (NZCGHJ, 31 January 1959). 
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The Chinese commercial growers acknowledged that they now had 
little bargaining power, although an argument emerged from some 
information given by the auctioneering firms to the Chinese that they 
supplied 75% of the fresh vegetables to the auction system (NZCGMJ, 
31 January 1959). This percentage was to be used for many years, but 
it was never proved or researched either by the Chinese, the Federation 
or the Department of Agriculture, so it could never be used as a strong 
argument for re-instituting the subsidy system for Chinese growers. 
In 1960 the Federation attempted to se the levy, and again 
the Chinese objected but received little support. Instead there was an 
attack on their Journal by the Hinister of Agriculture, who said it 
contained too much political news and that if it was not deleted in 
future the publication would be stopped (NZCGMJ, 30 June 1960).10 
Although the newly arrived Consul General ll went to the 1960 annual 
general meeting of the Chinese growers, never, either in 1960 or before, 
did the organisation receive help from the Consulate, although, as 
noted before, Journal was used to distribute information that 
emanated from that office. 
At the same time that political news in the Journal became an 
issue, there was rumour of New Zealand recognising the PRC, which 
caused an immediate division amongst Chinese. The growers' Journal 
maintained that it would destroy the favourable relations New Zealand 
had with the Taiwan government and force an end to the fight against 
communism (NZCGMJ, 29 February 1960), Taiwan at the time portrayed 
itself as a bastion of opposition that would one day take over the 
mainland again, a point constantly made by each successive Consul 
General from Taiwan. Responses to the initial article in the 
Post that started the debate were divided, even from the 
---""'---
Chinese, some of whom argued that the conditions in China and the 
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evidence of refugees in Hong Kong would surely stop recognition, while 
others maintained that recognition of a government was not necessarily 
recognition of a system (see EP, 10, 12, 13 and 20 February 1960). One 
letter from a Chinese suggested that people should read Rewi Alley's 
article on China, since he had been there for thirty years (EP, 
20 February 1960). Rewi Alley was in Wellington at the time and had 
given a talk on China indicating the positive developments during the 
time he had lived there, but more importantly, he gave a talk to the 
Chinese Cultural Society. This organisation had been started in 1951 
by a group of young Chinese in Auckland, and by 1960 it had members 
in all the major centres. 12 They brought in films from China, the 
first being I The White Haired Girl', and they sold Chinese literature 
including the Peking Review. Eventually in 1953-54 they held a 
1st October celebration. 13 In 1960, Rewi Alley's address was 
summarised in the growers' .Journal, which noted that he had started to 
speak in Mandarin but none of the local Chinese understood, so he 
had to speak in English (NZCGMJ, 31 March 1960). The Consul General, 
soon to be promoted to an Ambassador and his office to an Embassy a 
month later, wrote a letter published in the growers' Journal 
maintaining that Alley was spreading propaganda for the PRC. He argued 
that in the past foreigners in China who served the people had been 
missionaries who 'dared' to teach Christianity, but Alley was there 
'to teach Karl Marx and Lenin whose philosophy was to destroy freedom' 
(NZCGMJ, 30 April 1960). Alley's motives, in the opinion of the Consul 
General, were the opposite of the missionaries, and although China was 
not a Christian country, their values of respect for virtue and 
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tradition were similar (NZCGMJ, 30 April 1960). The Consul General 
also attended the 1960 annual general meeting of the New Zealand 
Chinese Association and spoke strongly against the recognition of the 
PRC (NZCGMJ, 30 August 1960). The following month he held an evening 
gathering for 200 Chinese youth in Wellington at the Chinese Anglican 
church, and in October he gave a special Double Tenth reception 
attended by government officials and the Prime Minister (NZCGMJ, 
30 October 1960). The Double Tenth celebrations in 1960 seemed 
unusually large, with 500 people attending in Christchurch, 300 people 
in Wellington, 1,300 in Auckland. Picnics were also held in Dunedin, 
Oamaru, Hawkes Bay and Hamilton. Although not a contention which is 
unanimously supported amongst informants, it appeared that Taiwan 
was increasing its attention to the overseas Chinese. In 1959 there 
had been a visit from the Economic Council of the Taiwan government, 
and in 1960 the Consul General had encouraged New Zealand Chinese to 
invest in Taiwan with no tax on their investment for the first five 
years and only 18% on the return after that (NZCGMJ, 31 December 1960). 
As for the new editorial policy of the growers' Journal,now devoid 
of political news, it became more directed towards the local community, 
taking a much more apolitical stance while attempting to emphasise 
cultural aspects and examine the organisational behaviour of local 
Chinese with balanced scepticism. 
The comments on local Chinese were 1 directed tml/ards the 
status system as it operated through the associations. The editor 
noted with considerable circumlocution that some local Chinese talked 
when they knew little, and became leaders of associations with little 
ability. He maintained that the old seemed to have little to do other 
14 than read comics, work and go to the T.A.B. and that, surely, there 
was more to life than this (NZCGMJ, 1 May 1962). The young had become 
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Westernised and others continually saw private needs as more important 
than the public good, using associations for personal motives and 
monetary gain (NZCGMJ, 1 March 1963). He argued moreover, that members 
of the Chinese community had no loyalty: they only did what suited 
themselves (see NZCGMJ, 1 April 1963 and 1 July 1965).15 Organisations, 
he suggested, should have a common purpose with operations known to 
all, and those involved should be able to separate personal ambitions 
from things that are done for the community (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1963). 
Taken in isolation, this comment seems unnecessarily harsh, but in 
the context of the post-war community, there was an inflexibi 
about the community and competitiveness between individuals and 
associations. 
From the perspective of an historic view, the community 
appeared to be gradually succumbing to the pressures that confronted 
it. On the one hand, the concern for the young had led to attempts 
to rebuild Chinese culture and social groups in the New Zealand 
idiom as well as allowing the young people to organise their own 
activities. The organisations which promoted cultural and educational 
activity, however, remained firmly the hands of a group that had 
been in control ever since the war years and seemed reluctant to step 
aside. On another front, the desires of European New Zealanders regarding 
the ethnicity of its minorities was ever present. Furthermore, the 
probability that the Chinese would have to adapt yet again if New 
Zealand changed its diplomatic stance in regard to the China it 
wanted to recognise not only divided the community but also provided 
an uneasy situation for diplomatic staff and the allegiance of the 
Ch ' . 16 1nese commun1ty. 
The period since the war had developed as one full of anti-PRC 
speeches that punctuated every public or private occasion, and the 
continued pressure for allegiance to Taiwan kept the KMT alive, other 
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associations contributing whenever they were requested. For 
instance, the Tung Jung Association and the New Zealand Chinese 
Association both collected money to send to Taiwan for flood relief 
in late 1959 (see NZCGMJ, 30 November and 31 March 1960). However, 
the unanimous support became more guarded by 1962, and even the 
Ambassador's consistently vehement opposition to the PRC was deleted 
from his New Year's article for the growers' Journal (NZCGMJ, 
1 December 1962). 
The editor's concerns were also supplemented with a reiteration 
of the history of the Growers' Association and its achievements, which 
was intended not only to maintain interest in its existence but also 
to avoid interpersonal disagreements that might cause neglect of the 
more important issues for which the Association and Journal were 
'bl 17 responsl e. 
In September 1965 a set of events unfolded which epitomised the 
concerns and fears of the Growers' Journal editor. At a special meeting 
of the New Zealand Chinese Association, a disagreement dev~loped over 
the number of representatives to be appointed to the executive. Each 
year the Association met prior to the AGM to select delegates for the 
national meeting, but invariably Wellington and Auckland disagreed. 
In this particular case, the numbers for and in the argument 
meant that no decision was made. One of the leaders of the national 
Association was not re-elected, and he maintained that the whole 
procedure was invalid (see NZCGMJ, 1 September 1965). Finally, there 
was an agreement that there be seventeen representatives, many of whom 
would be in Wellington to represent the Chinese Association, and the 
formerly excluded leader scraped in as a representative. It was also 
I 
decided, however, to investigate the properties of the Association, 
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since there had been allegations that some were using the deed of the 
Association headquarters as security for personal financial transactions. 
In the following issue, the editor of the growers' Journal reiterated 
some of his previous points, especially emphasising the inappropriate 
use of public property (the Association which belonged to the whole 
18 
community) for private purposes (NZCGMJ, 1 October 1965). 
By October a meeting had been held by the committees of the 
Association, and two men tendered their resignations. The accounts of 
the Association were handed over to an accountant to be done every 
month in the future, but the previous accounts were held by one of the 
resigning men, whose wife had previously done the accounts (NZCGMJ, 
1 October 1965), In November the Association asked the growers' Journal 
to publish the minutes of their meeting, which included a decision to 
hand over the investigation of the title deed to a solicitor (ibid., 
1 November 1965). By December there was still no sign of the deed, 
and the Association put a notice in the press stating that the 
Association was not responsible for any debts owed or money raised 
through the use of the deed as security (NZCGMJ, 1 January 1966). 
In January the Journal contained an article which gave an 
outline of associational history. It was an interesting exercise that 
had never appeared anywhere before, but its main purpose seems to have 
been to alert people to the conflict that periodically emerged in the 
community due to the activity of associations and their conflict with 
each other. Firstly, it noted the demise of the first Chung Wah Wui 
Koon, of which the article said the following: 
On the surface they thought they were doing 
good things, but they were actually destroying 
the unity of the community. 
(NZCGMJ, 1 December 1965) 
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It then went on to talk of the New Zealand Chinese Association during 
the war, which, according to the article, had charged a fee for the 
handling of remittances, a task which it had been assigned by the 
New Zealand government. Some did not like having to join the 
Association so they could remit money, but the only alternative was to 
go to a solicitor and payi5, but he in turn would have to go through 
the Association. 
The next installment of the history went back to the founding 
of the ~4T and the 'political fight I that eventually developed between 
the Chee Kung Tang and ~4T, culminating in a dispute over the flag to 
be flown at the Double Tenth celebrations. This again, according to the 
author, brought about the downfall of the Chung Wah Wui Koon and led to 
the organising of the locality associations including the Tung Jung, 
Poon Fa and finally the Seyip Associations. The history ended at that 
point without explanation, but it had already clearly pointed out the 
vulnerability of associations when any problems arose. 
At the 1966 annual meeting of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 
unity prevailed, and it was decided to offer a £25 scholarship to the 
Chinese student who got the highest marks in School Certificate 
examinations for each year; students who had taken them in 1965 were 
asked to forward their marks for comparison (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1966).19 
The Association also wanted to increase the size of the hall, carry out 
a census on the New Zealand Chinese, re-structure its branches and write 
a history of the New Zealand Chinese (ibid., 1 June 1966). The new 
deed was now lodged with a solicitor, and in future the signatures of 
half the executive committee plus the seal of the Association would be 
required before one could get the deed. It was also decided that the 
Association should go to the government to ask for an increase in the 
allowance for food imported from mainland China .). In the 
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following months the growers' Journal carried news of New Zealand 
Chinese Association, the Tung Jung Association, the Poon Fa Association, 
and their own association, which by May was thinking about investing 
in their own ece of property, but there was no capital available 
"May 1966), 
By 1965 the Poon Fa Association had moved from the business 
premises of one of its members to an hotel owned by Poon Yu people as 
a joint investment, The Seyip Association had a hall, as did the Tung 
Jung Association, which made the unprecedented move of allowing women to 
join and participate in the affairs of the association (see NZCGMJ, 
1 October 1966), 
In 1966 the Chinese Anglican Church embarked on a further fund-
raising campaign to extend the facilities already lable and provide 
a chapel, missioner's house and more area for church and youth activities 
20 (see EP, 12 August 1961), Although the plans had been drawn up in 1961, 
and an elaborate two-day bazaar held in Wellington, opened by the 
leader of the Labour Party then in opposition, had proved successful 
(see EP, 2, 5, 11 September 1961),21 they were still~2,700 short of 
their required amount (EP, 10 August 1963), In 1967 shortages were 
still apparent, but the extent of the scheme had by then expanded into 
a five-storey complex of 36,000 square feet to be built adjacent to the 
existing humble hall. (see EP, 12 July 1967). This was primarily 
described as a youth hostel for Chinese students who had come to 
Wellington to study, but it was also to have a 1m room and library 
plus full es for weddings and social functions. According to 
the minister, the emphasis on the youth hostel stemmed from the problems 
Chinese youth were experiencing in finding accommodation in Wellington 
(EP, 12 July 1967). While the plans received considerable support,wHh 
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£'3,00022 from the September bazaar (EP, 4 October 1967) there 
were some who felt that the youth activities of the church were merely 
providing a marriage-introduction service. It was estimated at the 
twentieth anniversary of the Youth Club in 1967 that over 20% of its 
former members had found their future spouses at the meetings of the 
Club. While the criticism was debatable, the social fact that this 
otherwise occurred was very apparent, but it was not only the Chinese 
Anglican Church who could be accused of providing a place to meet future 
spouses. In fact, the Double Tenth Sports Tournament and the social 
activities of other associations also provided a socially acceptable 
context for meetings and the exchange of information about available 
and eligible marriage partners, as did the elaborate weddings that 
became a feature of the Chinese community in this period. The 
weddings were particularly important, for they often included 
anywhere from 200 to 700 guests from all parts of the country, becoming 
23 
mini-conferences for social and economic planning in the community. 
vlliile the Chinese Anglican Church was planning future, 
other groups in the community also began to suggest similar programmes. 
As it turned out, the Seyip Association wanted to build a hall, as 
did the Eastern Sports Club, who had already approached the Wellington 
City Council for land. The situation inadvertently now gave rise to 
competition for the legitimate right to provide a facility. The question 
remained as to where people's loyalties would lie and what kind of 
hall should be provided. 
Before any of this was determined, however, the rural segment 
of the Chinese community, specifically the market gardeners, found 
themselves under attack. This story is part of the folklore of the 
community, and although verified by many informants, the details remain 
blurred. In 1966-67 a market gardener from one of the North Island 
growing districts went to the bank with a considerable sum of cash to 
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take it out of the country. The bank, somewhat astounded over the 
amount (12,000 is the figure most of the informants quoted) coming from 
a mere market gardener questioned the source and inquired about the 
particular person from the Internal Revenue Department, whereupon it 
was covered that the amount he had did not coincide with the declared 
income of his tax return. Receipts were apparently checked at the 
auction where he had taken his vegetables, and these confirmed a more 
substantial income than that declared. The outcome was a full-scale 
investigation into the tax returns of growers, and the subsequent 
publication of the name of all offenders and their fines. The fines 
were considerable, ranging in the Wellington area from £200 to £.2,500 
and the list even from this area was extensive (see EP, 23 June 1967). 
The extent of the deviance was such that little was made of the event 
either in the Chinese community, or for that matter, outside, where the 
press for once seemed to have remained neutral. 
As for the Chinese community, was a question of paying up 
without complaint, for it had always been known that it could happen 
at any time. Even the children of parents who were fined found some 
consolation in comparing notes rather than feeling total shame, but 
there was some speculation that it did not help the relationship between 
urban and rural Chinese. Rural students who were attending university 
at the time, have commented on the attitude of urban Chinese to their 
presence and the fact that they were often shunned. 24 The government 
took no action other than to subject the Chinese to fines. In fact, 
negotiations over the rice shortage in 1967 between the government and 
Chinese Ambassador, the Growers' Association, and the New Zealand 
Chinese Association succeeded in extending the import quota to avoid 
serious shortages in the future (see NZCGMJ, January, February 1968).25 
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While the income tax situation punctuated the events already set 
in motion over the provision of community facilities, it did not stop 
them. In 1967 the Christchurch branch of the New Zealand Chinese 
Association, reformed in 1961, attempted to start a collection for a 
Cultural Centre, but it received little support, and disagreements 
brought it to a stop. 
In 1968, the still operating Auckland Chinese Hall started a 
school to teach Chinese,26 and later in the same year the market 
gardening area of Pukekohe set up its own school. The Auckland 
initiative had been forced on the Hall organisation by the presence of 
an alternative group, also formed in 1968, called the Chinese Club 
(Auckland). This group was formed very quickly to remedy what was 
perceived as a stagnant stage in the Hall association's activity. The 
latter organisation was, according to informants, happy to sit on a large 
bank balance rather than move to introduce its programme for Chinese 
youth. Even the Sports Club of the Auckland Chinese Hall had not 
provided a basis or an impetus for change because, as some argued, 
the older people were still in control and opposed to change. The Club 
organised in response to provide an immediate solution to the short-
comings of the existing situation, but the absence of clear-cut aims, 
the emphasis on sports rather than a diversity of activity including 
things that were both cultural and educational, and the initial high 
membership fee of $20 limited support, and even the wealthy were 
reluctant to give their full support. While the intended consequences 
were never met, the Club existed and more importantly produced 
immediate action on the part of the Auckland Hall group as part of the 
unintended consequences. The starting of the free school drew the youth 
as well as parents towards the Hall group and also moved the latter to 
start providing facilities for the young people. 
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In Wellington the newly arrived Ambassador27 stated that he 
was keen to give the New Zealand Chinese cultural and diplomatic 
assistance in starting schools and trade with Taiwan (NZCGMJ, 
28 January/February 1969). In May the Ambassador arranged for a teacher 
of Chinese to be brought to Wellington to start a school there, and 
the growers' Journal had an editorial on the importance of such schools. 
It praised the efforts of the Auckland Chinese school and went on to say: 
Other places have not yet followed suit. What is 
more, it is disappointing to hear some people say 
that there is no real need to have Chinese schools 
in New Zealand and that it is not very practical. If 
people think like that, then what will their children 
be like? 
Over the years there has been a number of Chinese 
schools set up in various places including Wellington 
and Dunedin over ten years ago, and also one in Gisborne. 
Due to a variety of reasons these schools have closed 
down after only a few years in stence. This 
indicates that starting a school is easy, but to carry 
on is difficult. 
The recent publication about the schools in Auckland 
and Pukekohe seems to have created some concern in 
other centres and could possibly change the view of 
some people about Chinese schools and the need to 
teach Chinese children culture and education. 
(NZCGMJ, May, June 1969) 
By 1969 the Auckland Chinese Hall started its own journal,29 
and the issues of education and culture formed the major concerns the 
first edition. Basically there were two concerns; the first was the 
perpetuation of leadership in the community in a situation where the 
next generation was not equipped with the cultural background needed. 
The concern is expressed in the following: 
The new generation in this town is mostly brought up 
in New Zealand rather than .China. Some can speak Chinese, 
but their Chinese is horrible and not fluent enough. To 
expect them to take up the responsibility of the 
association and to look after the welfare of the overseas 
Chinese here is not very easy. This is because they are 
not used to this kind of work and also they lack any 
nostalgia for China. Does this mean the association has 
to rely purely on our generation? The answer is negative. 
The reason is that the young generation will live 
longer than us, and sooner or later they will have 
to bear the responsibility. They are no doubt alien 
to the association at the moment. This is because the 
association does not provide suitable interests for 
them. Every young person likes activities, every sort 
of sport and other social gatherings. So we should 
make use of this opportunity to assemble them together 
and to enlighten them as to the relationship between 
overseas Chinese and encourage the of unity. 
(Auckland Chinese Journal, 
No.1, November 1969).30 
The second concern was over cultural values. The article 
quoted above maintained that the New Zealand Chinese did have a 
feeling of being Chinese: they practiced Chinese culture at home, 
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eating Chinese food, refusing to let children inter-marry, spending 
a lot of money on weddings and feeling a genuine loss when a Chinese 
person was kil on the roads even though one did not know the 
person (ibid.). However, this was all in the context of the past, 
and as the writer noted, it was a much more complex situation for 
young Chinese in contemporary New Zealand. The elders had taken 
Chinese culture for granted as being a part of the community without 
realising that it would have to be taught seriously, since all the 
things the young would experience would be quite contrary to Chinese 
culture. The author summarised the kind of attention he thought the 
new generation should be given in the following; 
1. Do I always use Chinese to converse with my children? 
Do I teach them Chinese at home? 
2. When my children use English to ask me questions or to 
convey some information, do I stop them immediately and 
also explain to them why I am not willing to use English 
to converse with them even if is more convenient for 
them or myself? 
3. Our history has a lot of stories about historical figures, 
about the rise and fall of dynasties. They are all very 
impressive and they can be used to stimulate national 
culture. Do I often tell them? 
4. Unfortunately, I am not at home in Chinese history, 
and it is quite impossible to follow, but my child-
hood and the customs of my village are also quite 
interesting. Do I often tell them? 
5. Do I like to send my children to the Chinese schools 
established by the Association or the church which 
has organised a Chinese class for learning Chinese? 
6. Although I find that my own business is above all the 
most important thing and that money is also of great 
importance do I think that Chinese culture for my 
children is equally important? 
7. I am not cular about money. I have a firm 
economic base and a stable life. I should sacri ce 
some of my time to help make my children really Chinese. 
8. I must remember the struggles and suffering of my 
ancestors. I have to spare no effort to preserve the 
next generation and therefore not disappoint our 
ancestors. 
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(ACJ, No.1, November 1969) 
If this was advice to each individual family, and particularly to the 
men of these families, the association also had advice for the 
community. The article admitted that the Auckland Hall, which had 
operated for eight years, had neglected the interests of a growing 
number of young Chinese in the community who had a 'lot of Western 
ideas in their brains' (ibid.). The solution was to be found firstly 
in the Chinese school started in 1968 and secondly in a proposal for 
another hall to be specifically for young people to use for sports 
and social gatherings. The association felt they must adapt to their 
environment by providing a venue for Chinese youth where, by virtue of 
existence, they would tend to do things with each other rather than 
with Westerners: 
Whenever the young people have a specific gathering 
place, they will naturally unite and make friends 
with each other and become Chinese forever. 
(ibid. ) 
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The place was to be a community centre, described as follows: 
1. The Community Centre is a branch of the Association. Its 
objective is similar to the Branch, that is, the welfare 
of the overseas Chinese. 
2. The Community Centre will become a centre for moral wisdom 
and physical health as well as cultural activities. This 
will allow the objective of Chinese making friends with 
Chinese and help preserve our nation once and for all. 
3. The Community Centre will be reserved purely for our own 
use. The original hall will not be rented out except for 
several times a year when we shall use it. This will allow 
us to cover the expenses of the Association and increase 
our income. 
4. The Community Centre is about two acres, and there are about 
10,000 square feet of building for a basketball court, 
lecture rooms, and kitchen. The basket ball court can also 
be used as a ballroom and for other sports such as table 
tennis, and other areas will become a car park and tennis 
courts. 
5. The Community Centre will most probably be in Mangere, since 
that place will in future be on the motorway and be no 
problem for transportation. 
6. The Association has a detailed and complete building project, 
a sub-committee will be organized if necessary, and we will 
seek the help of Chinese youth here to help build the 
building so we can decrease our building expenses. 
7. The building expenses are estimated at $60,000. This amount 
apparently seems very large, but considering ation now 
and also the strong economic position of the Chinese here, 
this $60,000 equivalent to 50% of its value ten years ago. 
The Association is going to start a $200 weekly salary 
campaign whereby a family contributes one week I s wages to the 
project. The Association is confident that the overseas 
Chinese will support this campaign. After all, this community 
centre is for our children. They are the benefactors. This 
help for the Association amounts to helping themselves. In 
future the names of the d~nors and amounts of donation will 
be displayed on the wall. 
CACJ, No.1, November 1969) 
There were a number of paradoxes that immediately became apparent in 
discussion of the above project. In the place, the initial 
articles, and in fact English equivalents, spoke in benevolent 
terms of the youth in the Chinese community, what had not been done 
for them in the past and what should be done now. However, the actual 
structure of the organisation was very much one that had to be directed 
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and constructed by the elders. In one instance, it had been suggested 
that the young people start their own committee, and the task was 
assigned to older Chinese school students, but they were described 
'as not very capable of organising', so the association set up a 
Youth Club (ACJ, No.1, November 1969). The Club had a committee of 
six and was organised to provide various sporting and cultural 
activities on Sunday afternoons, including drama for the end-of-school 
celebrations. Primarily however, it was to provide leadership for the 
future, now guided by older members of the community (ibid.). 
It seemed clear that some in the Chinese community perceived 
their youth as a problem, the cause of which was Western influence, 
which came particularly from those with whom their children associated. 
The solution here was to provide a hall, a place where they would be in 
the company of other Chinese youth. In a sense, the situation required 
coercion to control the use of leisure time in the absence of 
obligations present in former years which would have made it mandatory 
that children contribute their labour to whatever economic activities 
were being undertaken. As the English section in the Journal confirmed: 
During the last several decades, we have become 
wealthy and successful businessmen in managing 
our own thriving businesses. We are enjoying a 
degree of prosperity that the first generation 
of Chinese that came to New Zealand never 
experienced. 
(ACJ, No.1, November 1969) 
Things were relatively affluent in the Chinese community to the degree 
that benevolence towards their youth could prevail, but they were also 
expected to help. As noted in the brief outline of the project, young 
people were expected to contribute their labour, a point curiously not 
made in the English article describing the project. Furthermore, a 
free school was provided, students were expected to attend and be on time. 
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This was an issue that merited a full article in the Journal 
chastising young Chinese for capitalising on the idea of 'Chinese 
time' which, according to the article, Westerners found laughable 
(ACJ, No.1, November 1969), 
In brief, paradox was between an intent on the one hand to 
be concerned and benevolent while on the other hand to do it in such 
a way that it implied mandatory action. 
The other paradox related to the attempt by the Hall, as opposed 
to the Auckland branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, to start 
a collective project which was to involve the whole community and be 
explained in the Journal. The format fulfilled stipulations concerning 
proper activity in the Chinese community as laid out previously by the 
editor of the growers Journal that is, they should be open and 
explained, However, by the second issue the legacy of former splits 
between associations became apparent, and the Journal had no choice but 
to argue its own case, 
In the second issue of the Journal, some correspondents 
were already inquiring as to why the organisation was separate from 
the local branch of the Chinese Association, and in a lengthy article, 
Journal staff argued that did not matter, since it was started to 
involve and represent all Chinese, just like the New Zealand Chinese 
Association (ACJ, No.2, February 1970), but it also noted that the 
branch constitution and organisation was far less representative. It 
was argued that, although the organisers of the Hall were perhaps 
'stupid' for assuming all this responsibility 'without much education', 
nevertheless they had 'determination', 'conviction' and: 
we as a group work for the public, we work together 
and cooperate with each other. We don't consider our 
interest and our prestige. We will not in any sense 
make use of others. 
(ACJ, No.2, February 1970) 
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By innuendo at least, the reason for a separate organisation was made 
abundantly clear. other point, although by no means made clearly, 
was that there were certain benefits to be had from financial 
independence, although the article maintained that construction and 
maintenance were going to be very expensive. The Hall was not worried 
about raising the money, since 'the Chinese economic base is stronger' 
and the property already owned by the association provided an economic 
foundation for the envisioned project. If anything, the article 
concluded, the branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association should be 
happy, since they will not have to provide for maintenance every year 
(ACJ, No.2, February 1970). 
was a 
If this issue was not enough, according to the Journal, there 
... small minority group in our community who 
deliberately tried to hamper or not cooperate with 
our plans because of their self-conscious 'village 
mentality' or because of the interest of their 
private group or association. Because of this they 
have set up a separate faction. We will not be blinded 
by this kind of plot. We work for·our next generation. 
(ACJ, No.2, February 1970) 
\~ile such a group did exist, it was not at all clear that they 
threatened the envisioned project, although they did persist in the 
establishment of their own club facilities. It was evident by 1970 
that the free school, the minimal membership fee, the diversity of 
activities planned and the re-organising of the Youth Club had gone a 
long way to legitimising the right of the Hall group to undertake the 
community centre project. It was also apparent by 1969 that the 1eader-
ship of the Hall group had changed ideas and was more concerned with 
the future and less conservative about extending its aims. 
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Three months after the statement about minority opposition, the 
Auckland Chinese Club invited representatives from the Auckland 
Chinese Sports Association, the Auckland Chinese Hall Youth Club and 
the Auckland Chinese Hall Association to a meeting, which was attended 
by fifty people and set about resolving the differences that were 
evident between various groups. The explanations about the Community 
Centre project were evidently successful and the general feeling of 
the meeting friendly and cooperative (ACJ, No.3, May 1970). In the 
following months, the Auckland Chinese Sports Association dissolved 
their organisation and joined the Hall group, bringing with them $2,000 
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of their own accumulated funds (ACJ, No.4, August 1970). The Tai Tung 
also joined the Hall group, donating their remaining funds of $200 
(ACJ, No.4, August 1970) and in November a more intensive collection 
campaign was started with each of the twenty-five committee members 
contributing an average $280 for a total of $7,000, which was considered 
outstanding, since many of the contributors were 'representative of 
the older or near-retirement working-class group' (ACJ, No.5, November 
1970).32 Those who contributed had their names printed in the Journal, 
and those that did not became the subject of subtle but pointed 
comment in the same pages. 
An example, directed particularly at the sectional interests of 
the locality associations, came in the February issue and is included 
below: 
To for Great of All New Zealand Overseas Chinese 
There are small and big associations, and there are 
differences of interests in every association. This is the 
reason for this article. For instance, an overseas Chinese 
who went to a concert and very much appreciated the 
performance might think of joining that musical association. 
However, he might not be able to get in because the 
association was a small group and this group had the last 
say on membership. 
Another case is that of a patriot who hopes to sacrifice 
himself so that he may serve the people; he might be 
prevented from doing this simply because he offends 
the old patriots who are the leaders. 
535. 
The above two cases are only imaginary stories. Let me 
talk of some real stories. I have once had the opportunity 
to talk with Mr. Wong and Mr. Lee. Both of them are 
committee members of the Kwong Chew Association. I asked 
them, if there were two old overseas Chinese, one a Kwong 
Chew person and the other a Jung Sing person, both of whom 
sought help from the association, then what would the 
association do? Mr. Wong and Mr. Lee answered, 'We will 
help both of them if we have enough relief funds available. 
However, the member of our Association (Kwong Chew) has 
the first priority if we don't have enough funds'. 
Certainly, the Kwong Chew association is a charity 
organization, but because of the shortage of funds they 
have to set up certain priorities. Mr. Wong and Mr. Lee 
are very enthusiastic about overseas Chinese affairs. 
They deserve credit for serving the village association 
and its sectional interests. From there they move to 
serve all overseas Chinese. 
(ACJ, No.6, February 1971) 
The article went on to describe a similar situation in Wellington, where 
the New Zealand Chinese Association had their annual general meeting. 
They were to discuss the problems of all overseas Chinese in New Zealand, 
but the only people there were from the Wellington branch, the National 
I 
executive and the Embassy (ibid.). One of the executive members stated 
sadly: 
Our association (referring to locality association) 
managed to get about one hundred participants at every 
meeting. However, overseas Chinese are not interested 
in the New Zealand Chinese Association representing all 
Chinese. What are we going to do about the welfare of 
all overseas Chinese? 
(ibid. ) 
The aim was to acknowledge diversity but to encourage it. not to stand 
in the way of new ideas or the unity of the community. One article 
even noted that associations had changed through time, particularly 
from 'tongs' to 'gwan',indicating a shift from the specific membership 
requirements of surname or dialect to more universalistic criteria. 
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These indicated to the writer of the article that the Chinese in New 
Zealand had patriotic ideals and that their cultural background was 
deeply rooted the overseas Chinese mind (see ACJ, No.6, February 
1971). The latter was particularly exemplified by the collection 
during the war, it noted, when local Chinese gave considerable amounts 
(between £.40,000 and £So ,000 from Auckland alone) which could have 
built many community centres (ibid.). Now the community asked for 
only one centre, and yet, even in a situation of relative wealth, some 
were reluctant, a situation the author found shameful (ibid.). The 
criticism, while harsh, was well founded, especially considering local 
Chinese expenditure on horse-racing. An article the following August 
extended 'sympathy' for the Chinese who had lost on their bets and 
'congratulations' for those who had won, expressing surprise at the 
fortune of wealthy overseas Chinese and 'their generosity in the habit 
of spending money recklessly' (ACJ, No.8, August 1971). 
Despite the above however, the project continued to accumulate 
money, and by November 1971, had $50,000 (ACJ, 9 November 1971). As a 
result of elections for new committee members in 1971, at least half 
of the thirty-two positions were to be occupied by young members. The 
Journal emphasised that they should not be under-emphasised, but the 
young members themselves should at the same time not over-emphasise 
their own experience (ACJ, No.8, August 1971), The Journal, as the 
growers' Journal had done before, continually published articles that 
chastised those who confused private and public roles, but also asked 
the pub c not to condemn a committee member for working hard or 
suspect his intentions, since one was hardly likely to criticise a shop-
owner who worked hard (ACJ, No.3, May 1970). The obvious point made 
here was that private hard work for personal gain was considered 
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meritorous for both individual and family, but hard work in a public 
organisation was suspect, which often resulted in reluctance to become 
involved. 
At the same time as the Auckland Chinese organised their 
community project, the new minister of the Anglican Chinese Mission 
in Wellington decided~and finally convinced his vestry and a large 
number of the community,that a Chinese centre was needed. 33 Furthermore, 
34 he suggested that the ACMC would take responsibility as the co-
ordinating organisation. In November 1969 the ACMC vestry passed a 
resolution approving the building of a 'parish hall', and in January 
of the following year a public meeting was organised by the ACMC to 
put the suggestion to the rest of the community. Most organisations 
and a number of individuals were represented at the meeting, and 
there seems to have been both enthusiasm for and opposition to the 
project even at this early stage. The opposition came mainly from 
the Eastern Sports Club, who could not accept that such a complex and 
its functions would be ultimately under the control of a church despite 
attempts by the church to dissuade them from this opinion. As far as 
Eastern was concerned, events and organisation would be interspersed 
with church work, and other groups would always have to rely on the 
grace of the church to get access to the hall. Eastern feared that 
at a time when their own membership was declining it would only be 
further eroded, since people would be more attracted to the ACMC centre 
with its 'Dragon' sports club. Then, as far as they were concerned, it 
would be this group who received all the credit for organisation. The 
unintended consequence of the ACMC's activity, however, now stimulated 
the Seyip and Eastern groups to think seriously about building their 
own halls despite the fact that the latter group had applied for land 
previously from the Wellington City Council but had failed to receive 
any help. 
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In early 1971 the ACMC, 'with help of and for the benefit of 
the whole Wellington Chinese community', put on an 'Orient Evening' 
at the Wellington Town Hall for 700 paying guests (see EP, 5 May 1971). 
The event included a Chinese meal and concert and then a 'Western-style' 
ball, all of which was specifically toraise money for the ACMC centre. 
It was stated clearly at the time, however, that while the project 
included a church and vicarage, the money ($5 per person) collected from 
the evening would be used only for recreational, cultural and social 
amenities (ibid.). 
Encouraged by the support from this evening, the ACMC tried to 
purchase the land needed for their centre adjacent to their existing 
hall but found zoning regulations made such a plan unfeasible. Instead, 
they bought land elsewhere in the city, but this also proved unsuitable 
and was again sold. 
While the church set about organising itself for the project, 
another group appeared which was made up of the Eastern Sports Club, 
now more enthusiastic about a venue for sports, and the Ambassador from 
T . 35 alwan. The Ambassador had arrived in 1968, and by 1970 he had 
, 
already established, with help from Taiwan (see page 527), a Chinese 
school in Wellington complete with a teacher, which was arranged 
through the Embassy, according to informants. In 1971 this school had 
over sixty students and had opened a branch school in Otaki, a market-
gardening area north of Wellington. In the same year, Eastern had 
meetings over a proposal for a hall which the Ambassador seemed to have 
been involved or at least known about. It was eventually planned that 
the Ambassador would call a meeting of all interested groups for 
September which was to include all organisations within the Chinese 
community. Before this took place, however, news ltered back from 
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Taiwan that an article had appeared in the Central Dai News 
(Chung Tang Ji Pao) describing the 'Orient Evening' as the ACMC's 
response to a call for support of the 'Sports and Cultural Centre'. 
The ACMC responded angrily to news of this, stating that such an 
arrangement was impossible since the Sports and Cultural Centre 
. . d'd . 36 organlsatlon 1 not as yet eXlst. In effect, this created a 
situation of antagonism between the Ambassador and the future Anglican 
Chinese Centre organisation which was never fully resolved. 
The September meeting was held by the Ambassador, and the ACMC 
were invited but declined. IVhile unfortunate, this nevertheless seemed 
a clear situation; but it was anything but clear. The Sports and Cultural 
Centre had published a newsletter in August, before the meeting, stating 
that the ACMC had declined an invitation from the Ambassador to attend 
the September meeting, but the ACMC maintained they had received no such 
invitation. In the October newsletter from the Sports and Cultural 
Centre group, they maintained that the ACMC was invited but was unable 
to attend. By this time, the issue was complex and almost totally 
antagonistic. 
The meeting that the Ambassador had called went ahead with some 
success, but it was clear that it was much more than a preliminary 
meeting of interested groups. The Ambassador announced that he had 
already consulted with the Mayor of Wellington using the name of Eastern, 
and had an undertaking that land would be made available for the Centre. 
However, he was quick to state that the use of Eastern's name by no 
means gave them ownership or management rights over the project. He 
suggested instead that the Wellington and Hutt branches of the New 
Zealand Chinese Association should be brought in as the founding 
organisation for the project. This move, according to informants, 
allowed the Sports and Cultural Centre to be seen, at least officially, 
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as representing the interestsof all local Chinese, since the New Zealand 
Chinese Association was defined as fulfilling just such a role. This 
would also, it was hoped, defuse factional dissension, but the two 
branches, while willing to support the building of the centre, never 
took on the role suggested and, along with the Eastern Sports Club, 
the Chinese Baptist Church,37 the Chinese Language School, the ~1T and 
the Mui Shuit Society, only affiliated with the project. According to 
the booklet put out by the Centre outl their proposed building 
project, the Tung Jung and Seyip Associations were also liated, 
but this, according to informants from both groups, was a debatable 
statement. 
In October the Sports and Cultural Centre was formally 
constituted as the Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre 
[WCS & CC] and in November an executive committee was elected with a 
president who happened to be closely associated with the ACMC. In early 
1972 the Ambassador moved the project along by promising a donation of 
$5,000 and later imported a substantial number of Chinese paintings to 
be auctioned, from which 40% of the proceeds would go to the project. 
Apparently the Ambassador had his own trade licence which allowed the 
import of goods from Taiwan, excluding the paintings, out of which he 
also promised a certain percentage of the profits. In 1971 the Trade 
Span Company was started in Wellington, and some have argued that this, 
too, was under the initiative of the Ambassador, who designated that 
part of its activity would be directed towards funding a trust to 
f h f ' 38 f h d 1° f operate on a percentage 0 t e pro lts rom t e company an ~ 0 
the profits from the Eddie Shipping Company owned by the Ambassador. 
By 1972 the Chinese community in Wellington had two groups, both 
purporting to provide community facilities for the whole Chinese 
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community which would encompass recreation, education, social 
gatherings and cultural functions and would be under control of the 
local Chinese. 
The following two quotations give their stated aims in 1973 
when, first the WCS & CC and then the ACC, published their plans to 
b . h f d ... 39 egln t e un -ralslng ln earnest. 
Background and Aims of the Centre (WCS & CC) 
For several years, members of the Chinese Community in 
Wellington have been striving for the erect~on of a 
building complex with adequate facilities to completely 
cater for the recreational and cultural needs of the 
local Chinese community. However, in the wider sense, 
the Centre will also be a valuable asset for the whole 
of the community, as it has been designed to allow for 
a wide variety of uses ranging from exhibitions, 
conferences, receptions, concerts and dances to general 
recreational uses ... 
The Centre will not belong to any particular splinter 
group but will be in the property of the whole Chinese 
community. Any person or group may use the Centre by 
applying to the management committee and all may 
participate its administration by becoming members 
and obtaining the full voting rights stipulated in the 
Constitution. 
(Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural 
Centre (Inc.) Proposed Building Project, 
1973:4) 
The plans in 1973 included a large mUlti-purpose recreational sports 
area, kitchen, changing rooms, cultural, educational and club rooms, 
squash courts and car park. 
What are the Main Purposes and Aims of the Chinese Centre (ACC) 
A. To promote Chinese ethics, morals and culture in the wider 
New Zealand Society. 
B. To serve the Chinese community. We do not distinguish 
between district of origin, beliefs or even age groups -
there are no barriers of any kind. The work is not 
confined geographically, nor it confined to Chinese 
Christians, in fact non-christians receive the most 
benefit. 
The of our activities is comprehensive and extends 
from the present day living to Eternal life, body and 
mind, childhood to old age, from small to 
In short, all good things and needs in the 
community are readily catered for in the CHINESE CENTRE. 
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(Anglican Chinese Centre Souvenir 
Brochure for Building 
Funds, 1973:12) 
The quotation continues with a detailed description of what the Centre 
will provide for the elderly, middle aged, youth, juniors, visitors and 
overseas In 1973 the plan therefore included a large hall, 
an old people's home, a guest house, student hostel, Chinese garden, 
outdoor recreational areas, church and vicarage. 
While the ACC scheme appears far more grandiose than the other, 
the initial funding was to go specifically for the hall and vicarage. 
Excluding the vicarage however, the hall was to be used for essentially 
the same functions as the WCS & CC proposed building. Neither document, 
however, contained much financial information except the need for 
$300,000 on the part of the WCS & cc and an initial $150,000 on the 
part of the ACC. Both groups claimed to be supported by, and 
representative of, the whole community, but the WCS & CC did have group 
membership, which allowed several existing groups to 1iate, whereas 
the ACMC recognised the groups but encouraged individual 1iation, 
which did not depend on a previous commitment to Christianity. The 
complicating factors were obvious. First, the representativeness was 
questionable and problematic from the beginning, and more obviously, 
there was a sense in which both groups wanted for the sake of status to 
be the one that completed the task. It was also the case that no 
matter how representative each group claimed to be neither of the 
finished results would be owned entirely by the Chinese community. The 
ACMC project was still attached to the church, and the WCS & cc project 
was still attached to the local city council by virtue of the land 
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agreement. The question that formerly emerged in the Chinese 
community as regards the purchase of the New Zealand Chinese Association 
building in Wellington again emerged as people wondered about the use 
of their donations for projects that might not even fully belong to 
them in the end. 40 They also wondered why and how two projects could 
be justified with a local population of about 3,500 people, a large 
percentage of whom were under twenty-five and most likely to make use 
of the facilities, but as yet unable to support it financially. 
The questions of course led to speculation and a variety of 
interpretations that have endured through time. Some argued that the 
intensity of the whole movement on the part of the WCS & CC and the ACC 
was the result of two strong and determined men. This lS a view 
particularly followed by Wong (1973) in his thesis on the Wellington 
Chinese community. However, he makes no attempt to explain why their 
energies were so determined in this direction. Other informants have 
suggested that the Ambassador was keenly aware at the time that the PRC 
would be recognised shortly and that the Republic's embassies would be 
withdrawn wherever they were. It was necessary to establish ties 
before this occurred, and to this end, it was explained, the Ambassador 
set about leaving his mark on the community in regard to both the 
WCS & CC and the companies and trust which were directly involved with 
funding. He found the Eastern Club who were supporters of the Republic 
in need of facilities at the time and he used their organisation as a 
lever with which to move the community. 
Like the Ambassador, the leader of the ACMC and the ACC was 
noted for his strong personality and uncompromising position on some 
issues, but aside from his OiVU role the efficacy of the Church's role 
must also be acknowledged. As noted previously, the ACMC had a notable 
history of providing community facilities, and a number of its dynamic 
544. 
leaders had envisioned similar centres and set about organising 
people and funds to recognise their aims. However, their visas always 
expired before their expectations were fulfilled, which the current 
situation did not occur. Other than this, one would have to suggest 
that the marginal position of a church amongst Chinese organisations 
might be enough to produce this kind of determination, especially 
when confronted by these organisations. In a segmentary system, 
allegiance always tends towards the smallest unit when conflict 
arises, making it increasingly hard for a community-wide organisation 
to maintain its following, even more so when connected to a European 
organisation. The connection to European society, however, was more 
freely acknowledged by the WCS & CC than by the ACC. The former 
group's document contained a foreword from the Mayor of Wellington (a 
member of the Free China Society)4l and the information that land had been 
obtained at reasonable rent from the Council. Even so, there seems 
to have been less argument attached to this aspect of the WCS & cc 
than to the fact that they claimed they represented all Chinese in the 
Wellington area. 
The actions of the ACC and the WCS & cc were not the only events 
which affected the community in 1972. The year also began with the 
continuation of an immigration matter from 1971. In early 1971 the 
representative of the Chinese growers to the Federation had joined a 
Labour Party national executive delegation to South East Asia (NZCGMJ, 
March/April 1971). In the course of this trip, during a visit to 
Queensland, Australia, he was given only a seventy-two hour visa 
even though he carried a New Zealand passport, while others were 
automatically granted a three-month visitor's permit (Sunday Times, 
42 3 October, 1971). The argument that ensued between the Chinese New 
Zealanders and Australian immigration officials received considerable 
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press coverage and finally exposed a situation where Chinese had been 
singled out, for their New Zealand nationality was not recognised. In 
December 1971 the New Zealand Chinese Association sent a delegation of 
five men to the Australian High Commission in Wellington, where they 
received some indication that action would be taken - which satisfied 
the delegation sufficiently to call off its proposed demonstration. 
In 1972 the New Zealand Chinese were granted equal rights of entry with 
other New Zealanders. 
lfuile the above issue was being resolved, New Zealand was 
preparing for a national election, and the Ambassador went on a tour 
of various towns, speaking particularly to Rotary Clubs, where he 
explained the current situation in Taiwan and how it had been deserted 
as other countries began to recognise the PRC. He was also quick to 
point to Taiwan's growth and then to condemn the political activities 
of the CCP (see EP., 23 May and 13 April 1972). Two months later the 
first television documentary of the Chinese community was aired four 
days before the arrival in Wellington of table tennis players from the 
People's Republic of China. The programme gave a brief history of the 
Chinese community and some indication of the various activities that 
were going on in 1972 and then interviewed two local Chinese, both of 
whom were involved in the New Zealand-China Society. The immediate 
response was two articles in the Otago Daily Times. One was a review 
of the programme which accused the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation 
of presenting a very biased, pro-Peking view of the New Zealand Chinese 
community, maintaining that 'the other side which carried at least 
academic authority was ignored' (ODT, 16 July 1972). The 'authority' 
was S.W. Greif, who had just completed a survey of the New Zealand 
Chinese which showed conclusively, according to the ODT correspondent, 
that the 'overwhelming majority of Chinese New Zealanders did not want 
546 . 
Peking to be represented in New Zealand' . ) .43 According to 
Greif, this did not mean they were necessarily pro-Taiwan but rather 
that they were definitely anti-communist (ibid.). The second article 
was an interview with Greif in which he confirmed the statements in the 
review. The debate over the programme did not end here,44 however, for 
in the intervening period two advertisements appeared in the Wellington 
press on the day the Chinese players were to arrive. first was 
signed by the secretary of the Free China Society and the KMT and the 
President of the New Zealand Chinese Anti-Communist Union and stated 
the following. 
PING PONG DIPLOMACY 
THE PUBLIC MAY BELIEVE AFTER SEEING THE GALLERY PROGRAMME 
ON THE VISIT OF THE CHINESE TABLE TENNIS TEAM THAT THE 
MAJORITY OF NEW ZEALAND CHINESE ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE VISIT. 
Many of the New Zealand Chinese Community are opposed to 
Mainland China and will not welcome the visiting team. They 
believe that the visiting table tennis players are not 
solely a sporting tea~ but are also politically motivated 
in visiting this country. 
It should be realized that most of the Chinese who watch 
the players in New Zealand will be attending the games 
only because of their interest in table tennis and not 
because they support Mainland China. 45 
(Dominion, 17 July 1972). 
The second was endorsed by the New Zealand China Society, New Zealand 
Chinese Cultural Society, the New Zealand University Student's 
Association and the Asian Studies Society and contained a welcome to 
the table tennis 'delegation' and wishes for friendship and unity 
between the people's of China and New Zealand (EP, 17 July 1972). 
In the first case, the KMT had broken its long tradition of silence 
and spoken on behalf of the Chinese community, a mandate historically 
the prerogative of the New Zealand Chinese Association. It was also to 
maintain, through the announcement of its secretary the following day, 
a boycott of the games, but on the other hand it would help any member 
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who wanted to defect (see Dominion, 18 July 1972). With the Free China 
Society and the Anti-Communist Union also speaking out, it was clear that 
political sides had been taken The unintended consequences of the 
television programme and the visit had been the unleashing of a 
political undercurrent. Despite this, however, it was not clear that 
any of the other groups who welcomed the team were adamantly pro-CCP but 
could be described more accurately as strongly committed to an interest 
in China at a variety of levels. While the Prime Minister46 had made 
it clear that the players would be welcomed only as 'sportsmen 
irrespective of their country and of their political and ideological 
backgrounds ... just as a Springbok team would be welcomed', others' 
perception of those who welcomed the players was entirely different 
(see Dominion, 17 July 1972): clearly to some, these people were 
politically aligned with the PRC. 
\fuile the matter of political factions in the Chinese community 
appears not to have surfaced again in 1972, it was clear changes were 
taking place. Double Tenth in 1972 was held in Christchurch, and 
the editor I s foreword to the programme was perhaps indicative of this 
change: 
Even though the orlgln of Double Tenth must not be 
forgotten the annual event has taken on much wider 
significance. There is no other single institution 
on such a scale to develop and strengthen bonds 
between our communities from different centres. 
The Sports Tournament is largely a youthful affair. 
Less apparent but no less in enthusiasm are those 
of a11 ages who contributed in knowledge, money and 
spirit. This a tradition we should cherish. 
(New Zealand Chinese Double Tenth 
Tournament, October 1972:1) 
The Ambassador's foreword predictably emphasised the fact that the 
celebration commemorated the sixty-first National Day of the Republic 
of China and thanked the Wellington Chinese community for their efforts 
on behalf of the Cathay Life girl's basketball team who had also visited 
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New Zealand in 1972 (ibid.:3). In his last sentence he expressed the 
hope that all teams would have improved when they met again in October, 
1973, but with the Labour victory at the polls in November and the 
recognition of the PRC by New Zealand on 22 December, there was no 
possibility of such a meeting. The Embassy of the Republic of China 
departed, leaving only an unofficial contact through particular trading 
companies in Wellington and Auckland. Before their departure, however, 
a curious document appeared in a paper called the Voice of China, 
which outlined the history of the WCS & CC project up until that time 
(see Appendix XXXVII) . In this version, it was clearly 'Chinese community 
leaders' who initiated the school and the request for the school teacher 
(Voice of China, 1 December 1972:3). It was also under their initiative 
that the Embassy approached the Wellington City Council for land to 
enable the Eastern Chinese Sports Club and the Chinese Mui Shuit 
Society to have adequate facilities. Once this was organised it was 
the local leaders who organised a committee, called the meeting of 
'nine and then ten small community organisations' and elected officers, 
a list which excluded the Ambassador (ibid.). The article talked of 
the collection of money, referring to the auction of Chinese paintings, 
the pledge from the Eddie Steamship Company and a donation from the 
Taiwan Fertilizer Company - all without mention of the Embassy or its 
involvement. Finally, it noted that the Centre will belong to 'no one, 
no particular splinter group' . :4), yet the Ambassador had stated 
in his Double Tenth message in 1971: 
Upon completion this Centre will be the home of the 
Eastern Sports Club, the Chinese Mui Shuit Association 
the Chinese Language School and all other cultural and 
sports groups as well. 
(Annual Chinese Sports Tournament 
Programme, October 1971:5) 
549. 
~~atever effects the departure of the Embassy had, did not stop 
the progress of both hall projects. In 1973 the WCS & CC changed its 
president again, electing a man previously connected with the ACMC. It 
held two major fund-raising events: a Chinese Ball and a Chinese market 
day EP, 21, 22 and 25 August 1973). The ACC Women's Guild held a 
banquet attended by 200 guests (EP, 24 November 1973) and the ACC 
received permission to build on their newly purchased hill site which 
was, it turned out, adjacent to the PRC Embassy building. 
The previous Ambassador's departure was followed by a summary 
statement about the situation of the New Zealand Chinese made in an 
interview for a Dominion reported in Wellington. The article quoted 
one of the organisers of Eastern Club, who praised the work of the 
former Ambassador and regretted his expulsion but maintained that the 
new staff would receive a welcome since 'political considerations are 
secondary to the Chinese who are working to improve their lives here' 
(Dominion, 29 January 1973). He further stated that the former 
Ambassador did not have a political relationship with the community and 
that those who were coming would be met only with curiosity not hostility. 
The New Zealand Chinese are: 
... servants of New Zealand now ... so on the political 
side of things we will be extremely docile. 
(Dominion, 29 January 1973). 
This did not mean, however, that the new Embassy would not test the 
feelings of the New Zealand Chinese after they had arrived. 
If there was animosity towards the PRC presence which arrived in 
1973, there was no apparent manifestation either towards the new staff 
or between the so-called Nationalist and PRC supporters. In August it 
was made clear that the Chinese community was thinking of asking the 
new Embassy for help in getting relatives into New Zealand from mainland 
China (see Dominion, 7 August 1973). At the time there was 
550. 
considerable concern over increased bureaucratic restrictions on the 
issue of visas for other Chines= to visit relatives in New Zealand. In 
1972, OnE' Chinese person, an important organiser of the ACC, took the 
problem to the press, and a lengthy article appeared in New Zealand 
:rruth_ elaborating on the requirements then levied by the Immigration 
Department (NZ Truth, 30 October 1972). The actual case was a request 
for a. visitor's permit for an uncle to come to New Zealand from Hong 
Kong for a visit, which in the end took a year to issue, and was given 
only after three declarations had been sent to the Department. These 
were made by the visitor's employer and two relatives in New Zealand, 
each sped fying that no extension would be requested for the six-month 
permit even though the immigration Act permitted a visitor to request 
an extension to their permi t (~bid_. J. The article in Truth issued a 
public challenge to the Minister of Immigration, who was accused of 
discrimination after a long exchange of correspondence. A month later 
the government changed, and Labour, perceived as the traditional allies 
of the Chinese community, took over. Consequently, the Chinese 
communi t y wasted no time in usi ng the opportuni ty to ask the party 
to comply with its manifesto dE,claration that: 
New Zealand should make it clear by its method of 
deciding whom to admit that it is concerned that ... 
it accepts close relatives of those already settled 
here. 
(quoted in Dominion, 7 August 1973) 
The issue of immigration now extended beyond the issue of 
visi tors and including bringing relatives to New Zealand as permanent 
residents. From the outset, however, it was unclear who would represent 
the interests of the Chinese community now that the former Ambassador 
had gone. As it turned out, appeals came from four sources. 
Tni tially there was an attempt on the part of a Wellington group to 
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form The United New Zealand Chinese Action and Advisory Council. It 
was organised to protect the rights of New Zealand naturalised and 
resident Chinese over specifically immigration and naturalisation 
matters as well as any other issues that might have influenced their 
well-being. The organisation as proposed was to have representatives 
from Auckland (It) Wellington (1) Christchurch, Ashburton and 
Timaru (1) and one other for Oamaru and Dunedin. The organisation 
never got beyond a preliminary stage, however, since the New Zealand 
Chinese Association saw it as essentially duplicating their efforts 
and expressed the opinion that current immigration provisions were 
adequate (see Dominion, 7 August 1973).47 
Contemporaneously one individual and two other groups were 
involved in attempting to negotiate with the government on immigration 
issues. In Wellington a European man, Thomas Romain, had unofficially 
set himself up as a go-between for the Chinese community over 
immigration and naturalisation matters. In 1973 he said that he had 
been acting in this unofficial capacity for the Chinese for twenty-eight 
years and had seen 740 Chinese naturalised due to his efforts 
(Dominion, 7 August 1973). His specific interest in 1973 was the 
plight of the thirty-two Otaki market gardeners who cultivated 376 
acres and were facing crucial labour shortages, especially since many 
of the children in these families were attending school and university 
and were no longer available to help. His submissions argued that the 
fresh-vegetable industry was crucial, that mechanisation was impossible, 
leaving the supply of additional labour as the only alternative to 
discontinuing gardening and selling the land for subdivisions. 
While this submission went for the Otaki growers, the Chinese 
Growers' Association made their own submissions on behalf of all 
Chinese growers. The organisation represented 486 Chinese market 
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gardeners of whom, it argued at least 75% still had close reI 
in China 30 August 1973). Between 1963 and 1973 it was 
estimated that 78 Chinese growers had left the industry (see McCallum, 
1971:2). The exodus, according to the organisation, was due, as already 
noted, to the fact that labour was short and children were now unlikely 
to help, involved with education and other occupations. Many were 
old and, without children to inherit the garden, felt there 
was nothing to do but quit, unless of course they could get the help of 
newly relati ves, for whom they would guarantee a job and housing 
and who 'would immediately become useful and productive members of New 
Zealand society' (Dominion, 8 August 1973). 
At the same time as the growers sent their request, submissions 
were also sent by Thomas 000, a Chinese merchant in Auckland on behalf of 
the New Zealand Chinese Association. The major points included general 
opposition to the discretionary powers that were held by the Minister of 
Immigration in granting or refusing applications for immigration and a 
request for a quota system which would clearly layout priorities 
and numbers. It was suggested that relatives be evaluated as prospective 
immigrants on the closeness of blood relationship. Suggested priorities 
were ranked in order of preference as follows: 
i) a) parents 
b) unmarried sons and daughters 
c) married children and families 
d) grandchildren 
e) brothers and sisters. 
According to special skills and trade 
iii) Students for secondary schools upwards 
iv) On compassionate grounds. 
(Submissions to the Honourable F.M.Coleman, 
Minister of Immigration, on Behalf of the 
New Zealand Chinese Association 
Incorporated, 28 August 1973:5-6) 
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It was also made clear that, although there had been 
entering New Zealand continuously (see Appendix II), the numbers 
admitted were not proportionate to other groups, particularly Europeans, 
and further many who came were not relatives of New Zealand 
The submission maintained that out of the 3,512 Chinese who had 
arrived between 1956 and 1970, only 250 were relatives of the New 
Zealand community, in most cases spouses or those engaged to be 
married . :4). 
The concluding part of the submission noted that the current 
immigration situation had not been created by the Labour government but 
rather inherited and that it hoped something could be done about the 
situation. 
following year, despite confusion in the Chinese community 
as to who represented their interest, it was announced by the 
Minister of Immigration that fifty market-garden would be 
allowed to enter New Zealand. They would be selected on the basis of 
applications from their sponsors (relatives in New Zealand) which would 
be co-ordinated through the Federation of Chinese Commercial Growers 
and would be finally selected by the Immigration Department (Press, 
23 July 1974). The Leader of the Opposition attacked the decision in 
Parliament and denied that there was any demand or need for such labour 
and that the plan was ill thought-out and could possibly lead to people 
for political attitudes and the ability to introduce 
such attitudes into New Zealand' (ibid.). was also an accusation 
of patronage, since the Secretary of the growers'> organisation 
was also on the national executive of the Labour but this was 
vehemently denied (Press, 25 July and 14 August 1974). The Leader of 
the Opposition also emphasised the last point and added that already the 
Chinese Embassy was pressuring local Chinese to leave the ACMC, which 
implied in his mind that some of the fifty immigrants would be sent to 
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New Zealand to subvert the local Chinese population (Sunday Times, 
28 July 1974). 
While the scheme went ahead, it was to take until September 1976 
before the first immigrants arrived, a period sufficient for another 
change in government. When the National Party took office in 1975, 
there was obvious fear that the Labour Party agreement would be 
terminated but the new Minister of Immigration reluctantly agreed to 
honour the scheme while not allowing it to become a precedent (see 
Press, 17 March, 20 and 22 September 1976). 
In the interim, the Hall projects continued to push ahead in 
Auckland and Wellington, but rising costs and inflation meant altered 
plans and more pressure on the respective communities to honour pledges 
and support projects. The WCS & CC began construction of their 
project in April 1976 after two years' delay, but now heavily 
subsidised by the Ministry of Recreation and Sport, who had unexpectedly 
48 given them a grant of $74,530. The ACC, under sure for funds and 
believing that their plan offered more than just a sports facility, were 
shocked by the event. When the announcement came, the president of the 
WCS & CC expressed complete surprise but emphasised in his appreciation 
for the grant the fact that his group 'represented the whole Chinese 
community' 9 January 1976). This blatant statement about the 
representativeness of the WCS & CC did not pass unnoticed, and at least 
some members of one of the affiliated organisations took umbrage at the 
declaration and sent a letter to their executive committee which included 
in its summary the major points of their argument: 
We can summarize what we have said into the following 
points: 
The Centre has no right to claim to be representative of 
the Chinese people in Wellington. The reasons are as 
follows: 
1. The "Centre" has made no contribution to the Chinese people. 
2. The "Centre" is completely devoid of Chinese culture. 
555. 
3. The "Centre" shows no respect to other Chinese 
organizations nor to the Chinese community as a whole. 
4. The "Centre" is not designed for the convenience of the 
Chinese people. Very often the facilities are rented out. 
5. We declaim against the huge loans by the "Centre" under 
the name of "Chinese", 
6. We recognize the Chinese Association as the only 
representative of the Chinese people in New Zealand. 
We declare that financial involvements of the "Centre" 
have nothing to do with the whole of the Chinese 
community nor with any other Chinese organization. 
In the interest of our club (Tung Jung) , we address this 
letter to the executive committee. We look forward to 
positive steps taken in the near future. 
Yours faithfullY 
A group of Tung Jung members 
(translated from the Chinese)49 
While some of the claims were obviously , especially 
points 1, 2 and 3 in the summary, the crucial points were the right of 
representation and the Centre's relationship to other associations. It 
was, in fact, a return to the status quo, where the New Zealand Chinese 
Association was the recognised representative of all Chinese and each 
association had the right to its own autonomy. the opposition 
and the escalating cost, which had risen from $100,000 to over $375,000 
in 1977, the building was finished in March 1977 and opened in May (see 
EP, 28 January 1977). The following year the Auckland Chinese Community 
Centre was opened in Mangere near Auckland, again helped by a grant of 
50 $30,000 from the Ministry of Recreation and Sport. Two issues plagued 
the Auckland project however, one being the result of internal politics. 
This problem, according to informants, started Chinese who were 
labelled as the 'left' had attempted to take over the executive of the 
organisation from the elders who had held the for a number of 
years. Faced with this prospect, a new executive was elected comprising 
mainly professionals and businessmen ,but they have been unable to move 
the community any faster than their predecessors. 
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same accusations about the influence of the left were to be 
found in other centres, especially in Wellington where the local 
branch of the New Zealand Chinese Association, the Tung Jung 
Association and the Seyip Association were deemed by some to have been 
taken over by the left, which was then proceeding to infiltrate the 
WCS & CC. Clearly from all reports, the New Zealand Chinese Association 
had come under new influence in Wellington, resulting in the Double 
Tenth celebrations, after a year of indecision (1973), being rescheduled 
as the Easter Sports Tournament, but it was hard to interpret this as 
anything more than the emergence of a new group of who wanted 
to achieve credibility through their involvement with the associations. 
The for identifying these people as part of the 'left' in the 
1970s considerably from their counterparts in the 1950s, for it 
now to be one of guilt-by-association rather than guilt by 
action. Many of those who are labelled as part of the 'left' have freely 
availed themselves of goods from China or actually sell them, while 
others have visited China and still others feel a much stronger 
attraction to their homeland. The range of is extensive, as 
are the reasons of interest and in the end the fact becomes useful 
only as an aspect of gossip and accusation. 
The Embassy of the PRC has, as is policy, remained aloof 
frominter-associationa1 arguments and from intervention in the 
community or its relationship with the New Zealand government. However, 
this has not stopped them from maintaining an interest and attending 
Chinese organisational meetings when invited. Friendship with local 
seems to have occurred on a personal s and as such has led 
to certain people being identified as having ties with the Embassy or 
getting some benefits regarding trade licences, but little else has 
eventuated. In 1976 there were innuendos in a stener article by 
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Vernon Wright that the WCS & cc had received $40,000 from the Embassy, 
but this was vehemently denied both by the Secretary of the WCS & cc 
and by the Embassy, as was the suggestion that the project had received 
help from a Taiwan shipping company and the Taiwan government 
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, Vol. 84, No. 1929, 1976:14-15; and Listener, Vol. 85, 
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No. 1937, 1977:12). 
The unintended consequences of any so-called 'left' 
in particularly the Wellington community during the late 1970s, was 
felt most strongly by the ACMC and the members of the ACC organising 
committee, who felt slighted not only by the grant given to the WCS & cc 
but also sceptical about the detrimental influence the 'left' might 
have on their project (see page 553 and the Leader of the Opposition's 
statement on the ACC and the PRC Embassy). 
This concern, plus the fact that the WCS & CC was already under 
construction, led to a massive effort in 1976 to raise more money for 
the ACC. The year began with the organisation of a 'China Night' by 
the ACMC to raise money for the new Wellington Town Hall, which was 
done to repay the city's 'hospitality and friendship' to the Chinese 
(EP, 1 March 1976). In September of the same year, two large bazaars 
were organised by the ACMC, which raised a total of $44,000 
EP, 6, 7, 10, 13 September 1976) and gave sufficient capital to allow 
the st of construction in the same month (see EP, 2 September 
1976). By the end of 1978, the first stage had been finished and the 
centre opened at a cost of $500,000. The Department of Internal 
had contributed $25,000 to the project by 1979, which removed 
the stigma of preferential treatment for the WCS & CC and the 
Auckland project. 
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During the time of their development, the Hall projects in 
Auckland and Wellington became a major topic of discussion in the 
Chinese communities allover New Zealand. They provided a delicate 
alliance between groups and a collective effort in the community at the 
time, but as much as it brought groups together it also provided the 
basis for disagreement. With the completion of the Halls, the sceptics 
were to some degree temporarily silenced, only to re-appear again when 
discussions of continuing maintenance of the facilities arose. 
Regardless of the costs, however, they do provide facilities for 
the Chinese community, and they continue to function. The example they 
set in fact stimulated other centres to follow the pattern, and the 
Palmerston North, Dunedin and Christchurch Chinese communities all 
became involved in less grandiose but equally complex projects after a 
period when little, as far as community organisation,had been organised 
other than annual picnics. Each in turn, however, had difficulties 
relating in some cases to the re-emergence of subdued locality enmity, 
arguments over who had authority to organise such activities and fund-
raising, a certain reluctance on the part of elders to let the younger 
people take over authority and a host of other problems that have to do 
witll the mechanics of building or buying a facility for community-wide 
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use. 
In Christchurch, as noted before, there had been no branch of the 
New Zealand Chinese Association since the early 1940s, but in 1961 the 
central executive sent a representative to Christchurch to re-establish 
the organisation. Six years later the branch attempted to form a 
committee for fund-raising in order to build facilities for the local 
community, but it failed. At that time the local population was 
approximately only 500 people, and it was not until ten years later, 
with twice the population, that the local branch of the New Zealand 
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Chinese Association assigned to a sub-committee of four the task of 
investigating the possibility of getting a community centre. In 1977 
the sub-committee set about its task in earnest and visited between 120 
and 140 fami , hoping to pledges of $1,000 from each family. 
They had been given the authority by the branch to ascertain the 
53 feasibility of the project and to arrange finance through the pledges. 
The Annual Report of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 
Canterbury Branch, announced the "Community Project" in 1978, and 
the sub-committee justified the need for such a centre in the following: 
Such a centre is a necessity for central communication; 
for our Chinese school; and for a permanent venue 
catering for general functions and youth recreation. 
(Annual Report, 1978:37). 
This was further supported in an article by a person who described 
himself as an 'oldie': 
In my opinion, we Chinese here have got nothing to hide, 
nothing to be ashamed of, and perhaps a lot to be proud 
of. Most of us have managed to adapt ourselves into 
the European way of life quite well, and since the days 
of the gold rushes, a lot of environmental changes must 
have taken place within the Chinese community in New 
Zealand; but our attitudes and our traditions have 
dogmatically remained basically the same. Our Oriental 
culture is being perpetuated by the existence of an 
organisation called the New Zealand Chinese Association, 
an event called the Annual Chinese Sports Tournament, 
and, insignificant though it may be, a little food item 
called 'rice'. Even my little six-year-old girls seems 
to prefer her rice dish. In fact, to most of our Chinese 
people, a meal not a meal without that bowl of rice. 
Then there is the magic of our Chinese cooking; and hence 
the thriving business of all Chinese restaurants everywhere. 
Those are the things which will help to constantly remind 
us of our Oriental heritage, which we must endeavour to 
preserve. 
The Chinese community in Christchurch have already been 
hoping that one day we may be able to build a suitable 
permanent structure which we can identify ourselves with 
the benefits of our Chinese culture, and at the same time 
the general public at large from allover Christchurch (or 
from allover New Zealand for that matter) can share our 
facilities by taking part in cultural, recreational and 
sporting activities. Such a forlorn wish is now no longer 
just a pipe dream! 
With collectivo enthusiasm, cooperation and 
determination, and for the sake of our future 
generation, we must try our utmost to succeed. 
So when the time comes for fund-raising, in 
preparation for the building of our long awaited 
Chinese Cultural and Sporting Centre, I sincerely 
hope that the generosity of everyone concerned 
will match the spirit of our RICH CHINESE CULTURE, 
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(Annual Report, 1978:34 in English) 
The sub-committee did their work thoroughly, drawing on the 
professional Chinese in the community for legal, accounting, engineering 
and architectural help and also enlisting the support of their local 
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available through an arrangement made between the M.P. and the Minister 
of Lands and Survey, and the building cost was estimated to be around 
$100,000. In their enthusiasm, the sub-committee organised a large 
fund-raising banquet where local members of the Chinese community and 
local dignitaries were in attendance, but the total raised was only $250. 
The committee realised that it was in financial trouble, unable to 
raise the money for the building. Lands and Survey, who had provided 
the land, became impatient and wanted to know whether was going to be 
used, and the local residents in the area where the proposed building 
was to be erected threatened to barricade the street and stop the 
project. The sub-committee had planned to meet with the residents 
and explain the project as they had done to their own community members, 
but before it could be done they decided to drop the project. The 
local ation branch was unperturbed: they had no financial or 
other commitment at the time. 
In 1979 the same sub-committee with renewed vigour proposed an 
even larger scheme costing about $400,000 with elaborate sports and 
meeting facilities. The Chinese community was to raise $200,000 through 
pledges and a loan, and the government Labour Subsidy Scheme would match 
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it with an approximately equal amount through the provision of labour 
for the project. The community was even more enthusiastic, despite the 
size of the project, and the sub-committee had no trouble getting 
pledges for $110,000 by September. \~en attempts were made to get 
finance, however, none was available, and without land they had no 
chance of raising further money. The plan therefore lapsed. 
At the end of 1979 a disappointed sub-committee re-directed its 
sights to existing facilities and old halls that were for sale, thinking 
that this would be more realistic. In December they found a hall that 
was available and within their financial capability. The sub-committee 
contacted ninety-six families to come and look at it and twenty-six 
carne, but the committee was sufficiently confident and went ahead with 
an offer of $68,000 for the building. The offer was accepted, and the 
committee arranged for a special meeting of the local association to 
announce they were going ahead. At the meeting, however, some members 
of the local branch took exception to way the sub-committee had gone 
ahead without consulting them. The opposition of older Chinese 
maintained they had been bulldozed into a decision made by the sub-
committee even though that committee had been empowered by the local 
branch and its members were also members of the Association. 
While considerable anger between the two sides persisted, it 
has faded with both groups now cooperating but the financial side of 
the community centre is handled entirely by the Canterbury Chinese 
Sports and Cultural Centre (Incorporated). 
The Association branch supports the community centre on a purely 
voluntary basis. If money is needed for a particular purpose or if 
organisation is required, the Association may willingly come to its aid, 
but at another time when a decision has to be made relevent to the 
community centre, the Association will defer responsibility to the centre 
committee, refusing to become involved. 
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When one asks about the argument over the H.all, it is 
explained as a split between young and old, with the latter reluctant 
to let go of their authority and power. 55 The sub-committee, to them, 
was seen as a group of ambitious young people who wanted to have their 
own way and had organised their own centre under the wing of the 
Association, yet separate. The separation was similar to that which 
had occurred in Auckland in the early 1960s, and there, as in 
Christchurch, there was a sense in which local community groups wanted 
to be part of, but at the same time retain financial autonomy from, the 
New Zealand Chinese Association. 
The committee that runs the Christchurch centre is now made up 
of members of the New Zealand Chinese Association,but they are young 
men and women, and it is the Association branch that provides the role 
of guardian. As it is, the young can serve their time as members of 
the Centre committee, where they can innovate and develop, but it will 
always be under the more or less watchful eye of the elders. Now that 
the hall exists, despite its shortcomings in terms of space and 
adequate provisions for Chinese language classes, both young and old in 
the community give it their support. The language classes, considered 
a vital part of the local community, are taught at more appropriate 
venues and now, after some years of experimenting with formal 
teachers, are run by roster system of parents who both write and teach 
the lessons, including songs and other activities to keep up interest 
in learning. 
Both the centre and the local branch of the Association are, 
by virtue of membership, part of the national organisation, but the 
New Zealand Chinese Associa~ion exists as a body only during the 
Annual General Meeting tD which, despite rumours of disinterest, all 
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twenty-six branches send delegates. Although the hegemony of 
Wellington and Auckland is still apparent, with their nine and seven 
delegates respectively compared to three from Christchurch, there has 
been no attempt by either centre to force decisions on local branches, 
although branches admit to being continuously wary of this happening. 
The national organisation has no membership levy and allows branches to 
collect their own membership fee, which is done with considerable 
seriousness in a few branches including Christchurch, where membership 
lists are published each year. Similarly, financial matters devolve 
to local branches, although the national body expects to be told of 
decisions if not consulted beforehand. The relationship of the branch 
to the national Association is much like the previously described 
relationship between the Centre and the local branch in Christchurch; 
the latter in both cases acts as a watch-dog over the former. In a 
sense, as the statement from 'Oldie' maintained, the New Zealand Chinese 
Association is still acknowledged as the parent body. It acts as 
benefactor of the annual sports tournament and annually acknowledges 
the academic scholarship of its younger generation by providing prizes 
for the highest School Certificate results on a national basis. 56 
The Easter Sports Tournament is still the major event of the year 
for New Zealand Chinese, as it is the one occasion, other than large 
weddings, which brings a large portion of the young Chinese population 
together in a major centre for sports competitions. In most years the 
larger centres have dominated the competitions, but this does not deter 
the participation of other centres nor the enjoyment of the activity. 
As in the past, however, the concentration on sports competitions still 
provides a basis for disagreement. This emphasis, which has dominated 
the annual sports tournaments for over sixty years, aside from the 
speeches and annual ball, has led some to comment on the lack of cultural 
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activity. While the critics would never under-estimate the 
necessity for sports, they feel that there is also sufficient cultural 
interest and ability in the community to have other competitions, for 
example, in art or speech-making. However, these comments come from 
middle-aged Chinese, and it is not clear that the younger members would 
favour or attempt to organise alternative cultural competitions. While 
in the past such suggestio~by elders would have been implemented 
regardless of others' opinions, now there appears to be much more 
discussion between age-groups and far less stern direction from the 
older generation. If there was bitterness in the 1950s and 1960s 
between the young and their parents, the 1970s have seen reconciliation 
(see Fraser and Ng, 1958). 
In this last period discussed (Chapters 9 and 10) which covered 
just over thirty years, the Chinese community of New Zealand was able 
to resolve successfully a legacy of problems which derived both from 
internal and external relations of the community. 
Finally in the post-war era, the Chinese were accepted as 
an ethnic minority in New Zealand which changed their status from that 
of being a problem group to that of permanent residents signalled 
especially with the removal of the poll tax provisions in 1944 and 
finally by the restoration of naturalisation rights in 1948. The 
community that received this acceptance was by the end of the war 
considerably changed, especially demographically. Increasing numbers 
of families had been reunited and growing numbers of children were 
present in the community. Significantly occupations were beginning to 
change as they tended to reflect the more normative pattern of New 
Zealand in contrast to the formerly stereotypic Chinese occupations. 
Both children and students of Chinese families resident in New Zealand 
had in this last period considerable experience within the New Zealand 
school system and this with occupational diversification meant increased 
contact with and influence of the European dominant society. 
Coincident with this situation was the spreading acceptance of 
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assimilation on part of the dominant host society which was seen 
as the desired goal for all ethnic minorities. Unfortunately the 
concept was accepted and turned into policy without careful thought 
about the implications which presented a formidable threat to the 
Chinese who already witnessed the growing gap between generations 
in their own community. Increasingly both government and conventional 
wisdom hoped that the Chinese minority would be totally assimilated 
and New Zealand education, the severing of familial ties with China, 
permanent residence and the absence of visits to China would speed up 
the process. 
Besides above pressures the internal relationships of the 
Chinese community had also been left in a state of conflict. 
A number of problems gradually emerged after the war which 
indicated that not only were there new groups with special needs in the 
community but also that the existing associations under an ageing 
leadership and some cases diminishing status, manifested little 
flexibility in response to new problems. Differences in generations, 
economic position, political ideology, a growing distinction between 
rural and urban Chinese and differences of opinion over the direction 
the community should take,led to factions. Arguments emerged as to 
viability of continued support for the Republic of China or the 
possibility of recognising the PRC. Similarly there were disagreements 
over who controlled the community and who had the right to exercise power 
or negotiate with the host society. The national Association and Chinese 
leaders came under criticism despite their long period of activity on 
behalf of the community during the war years. There was also uncertainty 
about the role of sport versus culture as a means of both holding 
the young people together and maintaining the general integrity 
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of the community. Language retention increasingly became a concern 
as younger Chinese involved in the European school system and drawn 
out of their own communities lost their language skills. 
Given the mounting problems a number of changes appeared in the 
community which attempted to resolve some of the problems and dis-
agreements. Sports clubs, active during the war in each centre put 
pressure on the national Association in 1948 to change Double Tenth 
from a cultural/political event to a national sports tournament. The 
move was supported by strong feelings that s would integrate a 
community spread allover New Zealand including most importantly 
a growing number of young people. The Chinese Anglican and Baptist 
Churches both, after 1945, developed active campaigns to rejuvenate 
their churches and provide facilities for their younger parishoners. 
The emphasis here, while acknowledging sport, was on Chinese culture 
albeit under the s of Christianity. The Consulate of the 
Republic of China, especially in the early 1950s began a conscious 
attempt to maintain support for the Republ ,reinforced by the 
Anti-Communist activity. This group however,was matched by the 
Chinese Cultural Society whose legitimacy in the community was 
questionable yet tacitly accepted by those who still maintained at 
least an interest in China. 
In'1949 a Chinese growers I \ Journal was published which had 
a national circulation and produced news not only for growers but the 
whole Chinese community. 
This situation where a number of groups represent various 
responses to the lemmas confronting the community allowed the 
emergence of a new leadership in the community and another set of problems. 
The issue of emphasis on either sport or culture as appropriate 
means to maintain a sense of community led to competing solutions 
in terms of the types of community halls that were to characterise 
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the developing communities. The unresolved political situation led to 
accusation and counter accusation as ideology became a vehicle for 
criticism. Older leaders felt threatened as there were calls for 
communities to move faster in providing faci and yet there was 
also scepticism of those who chose to be leaders, which became a 
topic of much discussion. Despite the situation, by the 1960s a number 
of events stimulated innovation in the community. 
In 1965 conflict that had plagued the role of leadership 
in the national Association emerged into the open through the growers' 
Journal and a major argument that had been brewing since the war was 
resolved leaving the Association intact. In the following years 
three major hall projects appeared in the largest urban Chinese 
communities. These emerged as community projects under community 
organisations but attempted to avoid the hegemony of any other 
associations, or implication in politics while attempting to resolve the 
dilemma of how best to articulate Chinese culture in New Zealand. All 
three projects also provided a medium whereby a young leadership now 
economically well off exerted its power over the community. While the 
projects did not resolve the former problems (excluding the external 
political one resolved by New Zealand recognition of the PRC) , they did 
provide a means whereby the politics of the local community, that is 
the power and authority assumed by the new leaders, could have a clear 
focus which involved all members of the communityjcutting across 
existing associations. Whatever the ideals that each project subscribed 
to and no matter how much these were violated all the projects were 
completed; furthermore they provided an example which was followed 
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by other small communities who, in turn sometimes with as many 
difficulties but without the extent of expense, provided their own 
facilities. The significance of the changes were that they produced 
a new set of structures with a new leadership but without the demise 
of the existing structures in the community. The new community 
associations parallelled existing locality associations and 
branches of the national association~ The situation, while not 
solving the problems concerned with the maintenance of Chinese culture 
within the community, provided structures whereby power and authority 
in the community could and can be articulated through a number of 
structures each with a degree of financial and political autonomy. 
Regardless of age, economic position or profession the existing 
situation provided a medium for both conflict and cooperation within 
the community at large, while at the same time providing the means 
of a united front for external relations. Notably only a minimal 
number of organisations have discontinued, including the CKT, the Anti-
Communist League, the Chinese Cultural Society and the smaller groups 
that have been amalgamated into the hall projects. The KMT has also 
totally declined as a viable organisation although individuals remain 
supporters of the Republic of China in the midst of those who would 
rather acknowledge their cultural links to their homeland. 
The results therefore of nearly 118 years residence in New 
Zealand is more than survival. The Chinese community, through its 
ability to manipulate organisations has successfully provided the 
basis for the maintenance of ethnicity and the transmission of power 
and authority in the community in a context which at times presented 
formidable opposition to their presence. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10 
1 It is not clear what effects the loss of contact with China had, 
although older informants have talked about a CCP-influenced group 
within the community as early as the 19505. This group is also 
described as 'left-leaning', but it is never clear what this 
meant, and in the late 1950s it might merely have meant a concern 
with continued interest in China or a return to the support of 
Sun Yat-sen as the founder of modern China, which would have 
conflicted with the then current KMT allegiance to Taiwan and 
Chiang Kai-shek. 
2 The Auckland Chinese Hall was the first edition of what was to 
become the Auckland Chinese Journal, a monthly publication. The 
first issue commemorated the first anniversary of the founding 
and opening of the hui sor. The sources will be abbreviated to 
ACH and ACJ respectively hereafter. Both publications are written 
in Chinese so all quotations and references have been translated. 
3 The "Auckland Chinese Hall" is translated into Chinese as hui sor, 
which makes its position in the community clear. It is, at least 
nominally, an organisation which stands between hui guan 
(community association) and gong sor (clan association-or public 
hall). It is a community hall. 
4 The organisation also had a badge or emblem which symbolised the 
structural position occupied by the group and was described by 
the gner as follows: 
The badge is composed of two bunches of rice paddy. These 
two bunches of rice make a circle and are tied together 
with a red rope. 
My purpose in using bunches of was to highlight the 
main theme of the organisation. Although we are far away 
from our motherland, we still take rice as our source of 
life. Thus, we should always remember this place which grows 
rice. What I s more, we should have the strength to acknowledge 
that we are a nation and that is our staple food. 
The two branches of rice go in different directions, though. 
This means that though we may have different directions in 
terms of ideas, beliefs, religion, occupation, we all 
stand together with overseas Chinese. We hope all of us 
could be tied together with 'sincere' hearts. That's why 
there is a red rope at the bottom of the two bunches of 
rice. 
The emblem is not a closed circle but rather a half circle. 
This implies that our association is not closed but always 
open for any Chinese to participate. Every member has the 
right to express his viewpoint. 
(ACH, 1961: 7 -8) 
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5 The initial estimates for renovation had by this time increased 
from the €7,000-€8,000 initially suggested. 
6 The hall project was not without its opponents. The New Zealand 
Chinese Growers' Journal published a brief exchange in 1959 
between two opponents then accused of being part of the 'left' 
and the Hall committee responded. The major part of the 
critique was levelled against the economic commitment made to 
the project and to the Chinese Association branch in Auckland. 
After two exchanges, the committee responded with the following: 
The two gentlemen criticizing the financial set-up of 
the hall should make helpful suggestions for raising 
funds rather than saying how funds cannot be 
raised. The committee knows that you gentlemen have 
not contributed a cent, so presumably neither of you 
will be using the facilities. 
(NZCGMJ, 31 September 1959) 
7 Two men were assigned this responsibility, one from the Mosgiel-
Outram growing area outside Dunedin and the other from Pukekohe. 
These two areas constituted the largest areas for Chinese 
growers in the South and North Island respectively. Both men 
were leaders in their local communities and the one from Pukekohe 
recieved the nomination as the Labour candidate . for Franklin in 
1963. 
8 The levy had been 2/6 per acre per year to be collected in each 
growing area and sent to the head office, but there were 
provisions in the rules to raise it to 5/-. Because all areas 
contributed sporadically and the collection was not routinised 
in any way, however, there were always areas which elected to 
pay under the old rate. In February 1960, for instance, the rate 
was returned to the 2/6 per acre (NZCGMJ, 29 February 1960), but 
in June 1965 increased to 3/- per acre (NZCGMJ, 1 June 1965). 
There were other problems attached to the levy and its collection, 
and often differences in locality hindered collection. Seyip 
collectors had a hard time collecting from Jung Sing and vice 
versa, for instance, which led to a radical suggestion at one 
time that a Jung Sing person from one growing area should be 
sent to another to collect the levy and the same for other 
locality representatives (see NZCGMJ, 1 June 1964). Areas also 
varied in their degree of cooperativeness. Otaki and Levin with 
small farms and small crops were least helpful to the 
organisation, as was the case with Hawkes Bay. Gisborne was 
the best organised, and Otago, Manawatu, Pukekohe and Auckland 
were all good. Christchurch supported the organisation but never 
contributed, since there were only three growers in the district, 
while Oamaru organised themselves into a local group. 
9 Two issues were at stake here, one concerning the supply of 
fertilizer after the war and the other concerning the price 
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of sacks and cases prior to the war. In the first case, joint 
representation was made to government over the supply of 
fertilizer, but the Chinese contended that the European growers 
were in collusion with the fertilizer manufacturers and were 
cting access to fertilizer by the Chinese. The latter 
situation involved a joint committee of both Chinese and 
European growers that got a ceiling put on the price of sacks 
and cases. One other issue that was still unresolved at the 
time was the charge levied by the Auction on new growers 
bringing their produce to the auction. This was also opposed, 
but the outcome is unknown. 
10 news he was referring to was usually included in the 
beginning of the Journal and covered events in Russia, China, 
Taiwan, and the United States which were of interest to the 
Chinese. Once the ~1inister had made this statement, all 
news stopped, and the new editor who took over in April 
1960, changed the editorial policy accordingly. 
11 Tien Fang Chen departed in December 1958, stating in his farewell 
speech that, ' ... I can honestly say that New Zealand is one of 
the best places in terms of the treatment of the Chinese', and 
that he 'praised the behaviour and standards set by the New 
Zealand Chinese' and the 'way Chinese built up their community 
and their support for the Chinese government' (NZCGMJ, 31 December 
1958). He was followed by Daniel Yu Tang Liu, described in the 
grower's Journal as a Cantonese Christian. At the meetings held 
to welcome him, particularly in Wellington and Auckland, the 
Chinese churches were in attendance as well as representatives 
of all the other associations including the Chinese Anti-
Communist League (see NZCGMJ, 31 March 1959 and 30 May 1959). 
12 Information from informants suggests that the Security Intelligence 
ce watched this group very carefully. Evidence for this was 
the fact that at least one member was refused naturalisation because 
of his affiliation with the group. He was, according to the same 
informants, told why his naturalisation was refused and was even 
asked for a membership list of the organisation. 
13 In 1966, according to one informant, the Chinese Cultural Society 
and the New Zealand China Friendship Society celebrated October 
1st together. At this time a considerable portion of the latter's 
membership was Chinese, estimated to be 400 or 500 in the early 
1960s. 
14 T.A.B. is the abbreviation for Totalisator Agency Board established 
by the Gaming Amendment Act 1949, which, by 1950 had devised a 
government approved Off Course Betting Scheme for horse racing 
and trotting (see Totalisator Agency Board, 1958). 
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15 In the Double Tenth Sports Tournament programme for 1963, the 
Dunedin editor also drew the attention of the readers to the 
problems he saw the community facing, which complemented those 
expressed in the grower's Journal. A part not translated into 
Chinese stated that: 
The Chinese people in New Zealand must inevitably be 
undergoing some process of assimilation into the 
occidental way of life. In most instances assimilation 
is good. However, if assimilation means the complete 
obliteration of the remaining amount of Chinese 
philosophy that is in us then drastic action must be 
taken to safeguard the preservation of our philosophical 
ideals. Should the future generations of Chinese lose 
our valued philosophical identity it will be no fault 
of the younger Chinese, but the incompetence and the 
negligence of the past and present generations. 
(Annual Chinese Sports Tournament 
Programme, October 1963:7) 
To facilitate a discussion of'these problems, the organisers of 
the programme set aside time for a small conference (ibid.). 
16 Two Chinese scientists invited by the New Zealand-China Society, 
whose aim was to 'encourage cultural and trade relations with 
China', were refused visas by the New Zealand government in 
1964 (EP, 13 June 1964). Nearly three years later the same 
organisation called upon the New Zealand government to recognise 
and support the recognition by the United Nations (EP, 13 May 
1967). In 1966 New Zealand had bought overi:l,OOO,OOO worth of 
goods from China, and China had bought~,OOO,OOO worth from 
New Zealand (ibid.). 
17 Criticism had ben levelled at both the Journal and the Association, 
the former for not including political news and for writing 
articles that were hard to understand, and the latter for doing 
so little. The editor's response was that a little difficult 
reading was a good thing and that if the Association went then 
who would oppose the European growers and the Federation. 
18 The Journal also noted that the Tung Jung Association would be 
celebrating Ch'ing Ming by visiting the graves at the Karori 
Cemetery in Wellington. About thirty or forty visited the 
graves, and 160 attended a banquet at their hall in the evening. 
This was curious in that it had never published this information 
before, although it has been verified by informants that 
particularly this association had celebrated this occasion since 
its founding. One interpretation is that the locality 
associations were responding to the conflict evident in the 
community, offering traditional solidarity as they had done in 
the past. 
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19 The amount was initially set att:5o for the student ing the 
highest marks in four subjects. This represents the first 
occasion of an Association rewarding, particularly young people, 
for activity within European society. Formerly the only way of 
acknowledging their success was to send them to Taiwan for 
university education. 
20 The concern for youth was not an exaggerated need. In 1966, 
44% of Chinese males and 48% of Chinese females in New Zealand 
were under twenty years (see Appendix XXXV) . 
21 The initial estimate for the proj ect required £7,500, and by 1961 
£ADD had already been raised through bazaars (usually made up of 
donated goods, food, and merchandise from Chinese shops and 
fami ), 1m shows and dispensing with wreaths at funerals 
EP, 12 August 1961). At the time it was estimated that 
were about 300 Chinese Anglicans in New Zealand, of whom 
thirty-five families lived in Wellington-Hutt areas. 
22 New Zealand changed its currency from Pounds to Dollars on 
27 July 1967. 
23 weddings in a small country like New Zealand also serve as 
indicators of wealth by conspicious consumption, and some 
younger informants have jokingly described them as very competitive 
24 This was, however, not the only reason rural students were shunned. 
Some have maintained that it had more to do with the fact that 
rural Chinese were seen somehow as backward and lacking 'culture'. 
They were also not part of the fairly close social networks that 
had built up amongst young people in the urban centres who had 
the benefit of youth groups and sports in their leisure time, 
which were far less frequent opportunities for rural children, 
ly in market-garden families. 
25 In June 1967 it was decided that the New Zealand Chinese Growers' 
Journal would change from a monthly to a bi-monthly journal due 
to the increasing costs faced by the publication (see NZCGMJ, 
August/July 1967). 
26 The organisation had originally planned to open a school at the 
time of buying the hall, but it had been postponed due to 
financial problems. When it did open, it was a free school which 
cost $2,000 to start with volunteer teachers. Its main objective 
was: 
... to let every overseas Chinese child understand the 
importance of being a Chinese and also understand our 
national pride, our history and our culture. 
and Chinese Journal November, 
In 1968 there were 180 students, which increased to 210 in 1969. 
They were divided into four groups equivalent to divisions within 
Chinese schools on the basis of their language capability. 
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27 This Ambassador, Konsin Shah, has been described by informants 
as a capable man who, unlike his predecessors, had only a high-
school education. Before appointment to New Zealand, he had 
been an Attache to Chiang Kai-shek, and his father-in-law was 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. His main contribution was to help 
New Zealand break into the Taiwan market, which from all accounts 
he accomplished with some success. His involvement in local 
community affairs, however, has been, since his departure in 1972, 
the cause of much debate. 
28 Following these promises, which were partially honoured, there was 
a political revival in Wellington. In March 1969 the New Zealand 
Anti-Communist Union, the KMT and the two local branches of the 
New Zealand Chinese Association put on a special film show to 
celebrate the 29 March, 1910 Revolutionary Memorial and "The Youth 
Day" of the Republic of China. The following month the Republic 
of China sent a number of their naval ships to New Zealand to 
reciprocate a visit by a New Zealand frigate in 1968. The same 
groups as above organised a large reception for the visiting 
boats and called on all local Chinese to donate money to defray 
the costs. 
29 The Auckland Chinese Journal was organised, according to its 
first issue, to help the Chinese school and to provide a medium 
for essays, reports and compositions (Auckland Chinese Journal, 
November 1969). The journal was to be free as an organ of the 
association, but was specifically not to publish politically 
factional articles or character assasinations (ibid.). 
30 References to the Auckland Chinese Journal will be hereafter 
abbreviated to (ACJ). All passages quoted have been translated 
from the Chinese. 
31 An article in the same issue relating the history of the Tai 
Tung group also mentioned a similar group that was attached to 
the Chinese Anglican Church in Wellington stimulated by the 
arrival of a new minister and his wife who came from Hong Kong 
in 1969. The article stated that, unlike the Tai Tung, most of 
the Wellington group had been born in New Zealand, and while 
some were from China they had come when very young (ACJ, No.3, 
May 1970). This led to a differing quality of performance, but 
their aims could be seen to be essentially the same. 
32 Using available Census statistics on income, this amount represents 
9% of the average yearly Chinese male income and 14% of the 
average yearly Chinese female income (see Appendix XXXVI). 
33 This is just one version of the sequence of events that surrounded 
the hall projects. Largely it is made up of explanations from a 
number of informants involved in both proj ects. However, it is 
not the only version, as Appendix XXXVII) indicates. This will be 
discussed later (see page 548). 
34 The ACMC is the abbreviated form of the Anglican Chinese Mission 
Church. 
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35 The Seyip Association was already making plans in 1970 for a 
gymnasium and clubrooms to be built on land they had already 
acquired. In the same year they also arranged for a cooking 
expert from Hong Kong to tour New Zealand giving seventy-five 
demonstrations aimed at encouraging people to use New Zealand 
foods for Chinese cooking when fresh Chinese ingredients were 
not available. The money received from this enterprise was to 
go towards the new facilities (see Eastern Suburbs Sentinel 
10 June 1970, and Dominion, 29 
36 the statement in their December 
issue 
37 In October 1971, a month before the Baptist Church liated 
with the WCS & CC they had held a Chinese fair to raise money 
for the extension of their building to provide room for a Sunday 
School. They had collected over $3,000 (EP, 18 October 1971). 
38 According to the current owners of the company, which was started 
to develop trade with Taiwan, the company had two very bad years 
but in 1974 turned over $4 million trade. At that time it 
exported sheepmeat, live heifers and processed meat to Taiwan 
(see National Business Review, 18 uune 1979). The Span 
Trust gave a grant of $15,000 to the project (Wellington 
Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre, Progress Report, April 1976). 
39 According to informants, a considerable amount of bad feeling 
was added to the already tense situation when the WCS & CC issued 
their proposal before the ACC. The ACC accused the WCS & CC 
of claiming to be a Chinese cultural centre but failing to print 
their brochure in Chinese. Although it was suggested that the 
bilingual ACC brochure tried to Gover all the omissions of the 
WCS & CC brochure, it was denied. 
40 This had also been the case, according to some informants, as 
regards the Northern Football Club Wellington, which had 
been started by the Chinese Community with their own funds but 
by the 1970s was almost entirely European. 
41 The Free China Society was an organisation operating in 
Wellington in 1970. It was essentially started to maintain ties 
between Taiwan and New Zealand, particularly in the area of trade. 
The Mayor of Wellington was a member and so was Sir Clifford 
Plimmer, who later became president of Trade Span; Sir Arnold 
Nordemeyer was a patron, and the president was E. Hill, a former 
mayor of New Plymouth (see NZL, Vol. 85, 27 November 1976:14). 
42 The man who initiated the whole confrontation achieved a high 
public profile because of his action which, although supported by 
the New Zealand Chinese Association, was criticised in private 
as extroverted behaviour unacceptable to the Chinese community. 
It was agreed that he achieved a very notable change, but that 
the way he did was improper. 
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43 Greif had done his study for a Ph.D. at the University of 
California, Berkeley, but the results of the survey had already 
been presented in Taiwan, Australia and at the University of 
Waikato in New Zealand. Greif had also, according to the 
Otago Daily Times, contacted the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation and offered to be interviewed after his return 
from Taiwan and later to present the results of his survey, but 
neither offer had been accepted, which led Greif to suggest 
that the Corporation had 'black-listed' him (see ODT, 15 July, 
1972) . 
44 Several articles and letters appeared in the press after the 
table-tennis team departed. There were letters exchanged 
between Wellington and the Otago Daily Times over various 
aspects of their article and also a lengthy discussion in the 
New Zealand Tablet, which went over much the same material 
(see ODT, 20 July 1973 and the New Zealand Tablet, 26 July,1972). 
45 Informants have claimed that this statement was nonsense, since 
few local Chinese were interested in the game. Most Chinese 
who attended, both in Auckland and Wellington, were there out 
of curiosity. 
46 The Prime Minister, however, did not welcome the players at the 
official reception and instead allowed the Minister of Internal 
Affairs to perform the duty (EP, 17 July 1972). 
47 There was also an Auckland Chinese businessman, Ian Bing, who 
supported the contention of the New Zealand Chinese Association 
and stood in opposition to the submissions made by his fellow 
countrymen from Auckland (see pp. 552 - 3) . His particular reasons 
for opposition to any change included the following points: 
Without a doubt, we Chinese have developed a good reputation 
as law-abiding, conscientious, and industrious zens in this 
country but this does not alter the underlying fact that, 
despite these qualities, we are not the ideal type of immigrants 
that this country needs. 
We are aware, very deeply, that in saying this we make an 
extremely unpopular observation, but nonetheless a very 
truthful one - and \ve feel you \vill not deny our honesty in 
upholding principle in this respect. 
They [the Chinese] do not condone the idea of integration and 
assimilation. Deep down in every Chinese heart, it is his or 
her desire that their children marry one of their own kind -
that they retain certain basic features of our own culture 
and tradition. 
We uphold the principle that Chinese children should be 
permitted to j parents, wives their husbands, or husbands 
their wives; and that immediate relatives should join their 
folk subject to the usual procedures and approval - bearing 
in mind that such should not be a lever, the thin end of the 
wedge, for the mass movement of Chinese to this country. 
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The past immigration policy has been a satisfactory one 
and, due to the restriction of numbers [with respect to the 
Chinese], the same policy has been to the benefit of both 
Chinese and European communities. Indeed it has helped 
create and cement harmonious friendship between the two. 
(Abridged version from New Zealand 
Truth, 2 October 1973) 
48 In 1977 the WCS & CC, the ACC, the Chinese Baptist Church, and 
the three locality associations in Wellington received a 
portion of the $81,000 remaining as assets of the defunct CKT. 
The formula for the division of the amount gave almost half of 
it to the two hall projects, dividing the rest between the other 
organisations excluding the New Zealand Chinese Association. 
49 For the complete text of the letter see Appendix XXXVIII. 
50 The Auckland Chinese Journal discontinued publication in 1973. 
At that time, the land for the new hall had already been 
purchased from a member who owned it as a market garden. This 
was in 1971. 
51 This article acknowledged that there were groups in New Zealand 
that maintained allegiance or at least interest in both China 
and Taiwan and interpreted the two hall projects as a reflection 
of this division. Particularly, it traced the development of 
the WCS & CC, linking it to the former Ambassador from Taiwan 
and then seeing it change its all egiance with the arrival of 
the new Embassy. Unfortunately, there is a confusion in the 
article between the interests of individuals and the role of 
organisations as well as a paucity of information on the 
development of either the WCS & CC or the ACC project. 
52 In Dunedin the issue of conflict had to do with the purchase of 
the facilities. At the time the project was started, the old 
but sound Chinese Presbyterian Church was'offered to the 
Chinese Association branch for $36,000, but the Association 
committee turned it down, resulting in the resignation of two 
members who thought the building, being centrally located and 
of historic interest to the Chinese, adequate. The committee 
instead bought a house outside Dunedin for $25,000 and spent 
$15,000 fixing it up. The building is adequate but small and 
of limited use. 
53 Using available Census statistics on income, this amount would 
represent 13% of the average yearly income for a Chinese male 
and 24% of the average yearly income for a Chinese female in 
1976 (see Appendix XXXVI) . 
54 The increased population and the presence of professionals in 
the community were important contributions to both the changing 
leadership and ideas in the community. This point can be 
generalised to other centres, where one also finds young 
professionals taking an active part in their community for the 
first time. In the period between 1971 and 1976, Chinese 
classified as Professional/Technical in the Census returns 
increased from 368 males and 138 females in 1971 to 868 males 
and 303 females in 1976 (see Appendi~ XXXIX) . 
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55 Although it is seldom discussed or admitted openly, there 
56 
some feeling of locality enmity in Christchurch. The community 
in the 1970s and 1980s is predominantly Seyip, but formerly, 
according to some informants, it was divided equally between 
Seyip and Jung Sing, which was also used as an excuse 
inactivity in the past. 
First prize 
for fourth. 
$100 with $70 for second, $60 for third and $50 
There are also ten other prizes of $10 each. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the previous chapters the Chinese community in New Zealand 
has been discussed not only in terms of an historical account but also 
as a developing community, or more accurately an ethnic group that 
has articulated its own needs in order to survive in a sometimes 
extremely antagonistic milieux. The term which best describes 
mechanisms used in this process of survival for the Chinese community 
is political ethnicity. 
In this conclusion I want to draw attention to the two major 
points that this study commenced with. The first is the notion of 
context, or the actual history of events which circumscribe the 
history of the community itself and the three inter-related spheres 
of activity. These, as noted in the first chapter, have been traced 
out chronologically to provide a basis for the discussion of the 
analytical points. The second point relates specifically, therefore, 
to the analytical points which have to do with the cyclical developments 
in the segmentary system of the New Zealand Chinese community and 
the use of political ethnicity as a means of describing what occurs 
in this cyclical process. 
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The Making of a Chinese Community 
Chinese migrants New Zealand appeared at a crucial time in 
the development of the young colony as it experienced a gold rush and 
the change from provincial to central government which attempted to 
grapple with the problems of an ailing economy. The Chinese initially 
arrived in small numbers, invited by businessmen and protected by the 
law to be involved in declining gold-mining enterprise, then in 
numbers uninvited, opposed and increasingly without protection 
to mine for gold and take up other occupations. While the opposition 
was vociferous and seemingly capable of er'adicating a Chinese 
I 
minority, it never was ciently organised or institutionalised 
to effect total exclusion. 
The Chinese in the gold fields for part quickly organised, 
not only to mine claims efficiently, but also to provide a network of 
communities complete with businesses to supply the needs of miners, 
a move not anticipated by European businessmen, who saw their 
involvement in this role as justification for the invitation extended 
to the Chinese in the first place. 
Within two years of their arrival, the Chinese had issued a 
petition to help expedite the apprehension of a European who had 
murdered a Chinese and within years Chinese merchants had 
opposed criticism of their role by drawing European attention to their 
contributions to customs duty and the general business of the community. 
Simultaneously in the 1870-71 period, two opposing strains of 
thought appeared concerning the presence of Chinese in New Zealand. 
One was expressed in the guise of a government committee set up to 
the growing opposition to their presence and the other in 
negotiations by representatives of the same government to hire Chinese 
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labour for works, specifically railroad construction, despite 
opposition by a majority of provinces consulted. The government 
committee for part recommended that there was no urgency for the 
exclusion of Chinese, but the railroad employment scheme became the 
source of a court case involving not only the European contractors but 
also the Chinese labour contractor and his disgruntled employees. 
At the time, there was obviOUSly sufficient support amongst 
some government members as representatives of the wealthy to tolerate a 
Chinese either for labour or as a small minority who would 
eventually return to China. However, neither the positive committee 
report nor the court case over the employment of Chinese labour helped 
the position of the Chinese. The report was only thinly sprinkled with 
facts about the New Zealand Chinese community, so decisions after 1871 
were made on the basis of generalities, and the event of the court case 
deterred any further major attempts to employ Chinese labour. More 
importantly, both situations provided an occasion to gain an understanding 
of the Chinese community which could have been modified through time, but 
in fact no such task was seriously undertaken nor would be in the future, 
which meant that knowledge of the Chinese community, henceforth, was 
largely a product of hearsay and generalisations based on feelings and 
cursory observation. Ten years later the Chinese population in the 
gold fields of Otago had doubled, and it was clear that the positive 
comments 1871 report were less capable of being supported in the 
face of an economic depression, unemployment and the emergence of 
organised labour and trade unions opposed to any person perceived as 
competition. The increased Chinese population, however, while having 
the detrimental effect of alarming Europeans, had the positive effect 
of allowing a matrix of social relationships to be established in the 
gold fields between groups of Chinese miners and their local centres 
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attached to goldfield towns. It took only ten years after their 
arrival for the locality association to organise (1869), and 
thirteen years later this association organised the Ch'eung Shin Tong 
to send the disinterred remains of deceased back to their 
villages in China. The Chinese were sufficiently organised in various 
areas to not only maintain their contact with home but also sustain some 
cultural and recreational activity that punctuated the monotony and 
hardship of mining. Such activities included the various celebrations 
of Chinese festival days, gambling and to some extent the smoking of 
opium, the last of which became the cause of a merchant association 
which aimed to 
importation. 
the community of the habit by restricting 
l~ile the majority of Chinese had organised themselves in the 
goldfields there had also been a gradual move by some into other areas 
of New Zealand, and although they faced little opposition, a 
growing anti-Chinese argument developed in the European-dominant 
society. The argument essentially took all the previous positive 
characteristics listed in the 1871 report, including industriousness, 
frugality, morality, ability to adapt and their inevitable repatriation, 
and turned them on their head. The Chinese were undesirable because 
they were industrious, unfairly competitive because they were adaptable, 
of questionable morality with too much ability, and now apparently were 
not going back to China as formerly anticipated. 
Since the validity of either set of arguments was never proved 
in any substantive sense, considerable power could be achieved by their 
use, as evidenced by the activity of government and segments of the 
dominant society inthepursuit of exclusion. 
584. 
The Chinese, for their part, faced a growing hostility to their 
presence at a time when their socio-economic base in New Zealand was 
in transition after the gold-mining era, and in a context lacking 
diplomatic representation. 
Simultaneously, the situation in China deteriorated with the 
Sino-Japanese war and later the Boxer Rebellion. 
From the latter l870s till 1908 the New Zealand government and 
the Chinese community engaged in an exchange of petitions and 
legislation. The endless stream of legislation restricting the numbers 
who arrived on each boat, imposed a poll tax, eventually withdrew the 
right to naturalisation, demanded fingerprinting as a means of 
identification and eventually under duress subjected the Chinese to a 
dictation test in English by 1907, is matched by attempts by the 
Chinese community, through its merchant leadership and by means of 
petition, to stop or at least modify these restrictions. Basically the 
New Zealand government justified and implemented an unequal status for 
the Chinese, and the Chinese for their part refused to accept this 
status. 
TIle government's efforts drew on and stimulated support for 
their position from vehemently anti-Chinese organisations and the 
labour movement, both of which manifested their strongest opposition 
in periods preceding crucial legislation and/or economic crisis. 
The former was most evident in 1895 just prior to the poll tax being 
raised from flO to lloo and in 1907 just prior to the imposition of 
the reading test in addition to the above, and the ~tter in 1926 just 
prior to the depression. 
The Chinese community, with a centre in Wellington, drew on its 
leaders and others in the community and in some cases sympathetic 
Europeans to oppose the government's relentless efforts. Their 
petitions tried at least to modify and in some cases stop further 
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legislation. They also attempted to present a constructive profile 
of a responsible Chinese community that was concerned with their 
continued existence in New Zealand, and drew New Zealand's attention 
to its international responsibilities as a colony of Britain. 
Unfortunately, the constructive points which the Chinese community 
could use to justify consideration were exactly those points which by 
the late 1800s had been turned against the Chinese. They were accused 
of being a group who took everything out of the country, since they 
would eventually go home, but on the other hand, any desire shown by 
the Chinese to stay New Zealand and settle was met with equal 
accusation and hostility. The government had ensured, therefore, that 
it was both hard and expensive to come and settle in New Zealand, which 
of course provided the impetus for the Chinese to ensure their socio-
economic security even more. Restrictions slowed immigration, but 
neither the legislation or the restrictions stopped the process. 
While the internal relations were played out in New Zealand, two 
spheres of external relations interceded to make the situation even more 
complex. New Zealand's dependent relationship with Britain was at best 
uneasy, with the lower House in Parliament adamant under Seddon that New 
Zealand must have autonomy to determine her destiny and the upper house 
more reticent and compliant to the requirements of New Zealand colonial 
status. In the instance, New Zealand was seen to have every right 
to control its population and immigrants, while the latter maintained 
that any such policy should not endanger Imperial diplomatic relations. 
The Liberal Party in power overcame the veto exercised by both the 
upper House and the Governor as the representative of the Crown by 
replacing members in the first body (not without opposition, however), 
and in the second instance eventually devising legislation that was 
outside the Governor's jurisdiction and made any exemptions the 
responsibility of the Governor. 
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This uneasy relationship between Britain and her New Zealand 
colony was not unknown to the New Zealand Chinese and to Chinese 
government officials in both Peking and London. In 1887 and again in 
1907 the Chinese government had dispatched Commissions of Inquiry to 
investigate the position of their overseas population, who, it was clear, 
faced increasing pressures from their dominant hosts which offended 
Peking. Local petitions from the Chinese community, aware of the fact 
that the external relations between New Zealand and Britain were the 
only vulnerable area which might cause modification of the restrictions, 
invoked on more than one occasion the existing diplomatic ties 
between Britain and China. Both the Chinese government and the local 
community pushed for diplomatic representation for the Chinese in New 
Zealand. One request was turned down in 1891 with little explanation 
other than the suggestion that New. Zealand people had strong feelings 
against the Chinese, but by 1907 there was no opposition, and a 
Chinese Consul was appointed the following year. By 1907 Britain 
had already brought her colonies into line over the matter of 
immigration restrictions by forcefully suggesting they comply with the 
example of the Natal legislation which imposed a language test for 
admission. Britain had also, much to the annoyance of New Zealand, 
exerted her rights in allowing mining companies in the Transvaal to 
import Chinese labour without regard to the national interests of the 
country. 
By 1907 the New Zealand government had imposed the reading test 
on the Chinese corning to New Zealand in addition to the poll tax, 
discontinued natura1isation, excluded Chinese from the old age pension 
provision, secured a right of entry to all Chinese homes and businesses 
on suspicion of opium use and achieved a modicum of autonomy with its 
new Dominion status. 
The Chinese community received stronger restrictions, 
diminished rights as residents in New Zealand and diplomatic 
representation, while China had direct contact with approximately 
2,600 more of overseas population, and a diplomatic presence 
acknowledged by the New Zealand government. 
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Peking's influence was soon felt by New Zealand as they objected 
in 1909 to the 1907 Act,requiring five modifications. Two were acceded 
to by the New Zealand government in 1910 when provisions for 
merchants, students and tourists, who both the Consul and Chinese 
government thought worthy of special attention, were made. The Consul 
arrived in 1909 and in the same year attempted to pull the factions of 
the community, created over political developments in China, together 
under one organisation. The first Chong Wah Wui Koon was intended to 
defuse the ct growing between supporters of the Chee Kung ~(]),ng 
and the T'ung Meng Hui, but the task was interrupted by the 1911 
Revolution China and consistently by its inability to handle the 
opposition to the Chinese in New Zealand. This opposition surfaced 
again before and after the First World War, demanding the attention of 
the Consul, who did not hesitate to support his countrymen much to the 
surprise of some Europeans. The war had generated an anti-Chinese 
alliance between the Returned Servicemen's Association (RSA) and the 
Anti-Chinese League, which caused sufficient concern over Chinese 
immigration and economic activity to push the government to an 
Act in 1920 requiring all immigrants not of British parentage or birth 
to obtain a permit from the Minister of Customs before entering the 
country. The Act was formulated by a civil servant and complied with 
the provisions settled upon at the 1917 Imperial War Conference, which 
allowed all communities of the Commonwealth complete control of their 
own populations. The Act was administered by one person - the Minister 
588. 
of Customs - and this effectively removed for all time the issue of 
immigration from parliamentary debate, since all future change could be 
accomplished by Cabinet decision. ~Vhile the permit system was equally 
applicable to all intending immigrants, the Chinese still had the added 
burden of the poll tax, which by this time was sharply opposed by 
Peking and by the Consul, who had been denied access to the lation 
before it entered the House as previously promised. The Chinese saw 
the arbitrary nature of the Act, and so did the Consul, who made moves 
to apply for a quota system for the Chinese, which was granted in 1921. 
The Governor and the Colonial Office disliked the Act, but upon advice 
from the Governor approved of it, since New Zealand had now the right 
to control its own immigration policy. The Colonial Office knew that the 
precedent had already been set in 1917, when the Attorney General had 
been given complete control over aliens in or entering New Zealand, 
and they further knew that New Zealand could legitimately make changes 
to this provision at will without informing them. 
In the interim, the Revolution in China had already given rise 
to a third political faction in the Chinese community with the KMT, 
leaving the Chong Wah Wui Koon unable to perform its intended role. 
The uneasy relationship between factions in the Chinese community, the 
deteriorating situation in their home districts, the increased 
immigration restrictions and the continued pressure from anti-Chinese 
activity forced segments within the community to seek unity in locality 
associations. The first was the Poon Fa (1961) Association, historically 
part of the Chinese social structures in the goldfields but now moved 
to an urban setting with a large number of the former Coo.ng Wah Wui Koon 
forming its membership. In 1920 the Kwong Chew Club (Sun Wui) started 
in Auckland, in 1924 the Tung Jung Association started in Wellington, 
and much later the Seyip Association (1936) in the same city. 
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Traditional sOlidarity allowed unity which represented the majority 
of districts~iv~from which the New Zealand Chinese had come and cut 
across political factions to take care of more fundamental needs of 
individuals. The associations provided reading rooms, celebrated 
some Chinese festivals, arranged passages home and temporary residence 
for new arrivals, plus in some instances founding an import/hostel 
facility in Hong Kong. Despite the existence of locality associations, 
however, factions in the community persisted unresolved till 1928, 
when the Northern Expedition established Chiang in control, but even in 
1927 the tension had led to open conflict in Wellington over the 
celebration of the Double Tenth in the absence of any community 
organisation or strong consular hand. The conflict was resolved, however, 
with the Chee Kung Tang's supporters admitting defeat and the KMT taking 
over leadership in the community. 
The KMT's one public occasion was the Double Tenth celebration 
held each year by local Chinese communities, and although these were 
evident in 1912, it was not until the late 1920s that they were noticed 
by the dominant society in New Zealand. The Double Tenth gathering, 
steeped in nationalist fervour and organised to develop high morale 
and morality in the community through sport, was seen by the dominant 
host society as acceptable, and the fact that money collected on such 
occasions by the Chinese community was donated to local hospitals or 
other charities elevated the status of the Chinese community 
considerably. 
Chinese living in small towns and urban areas weathered the 
depression within their own communities. Being wary of the bureaucracy's 
questions, they never tested its benevolence, but rural Chinese who had 
entered new market gardening areas suffered the brunt of another 'race 
purity' campaign. The real issue was blatant racism, but the excuse 
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for action was found in the supposed Chinese exploitation of an inter-
marriage with female Maori labour on the market gardens. Such inter-
marriage was seen as an insult to the Maoris, but equally there was 
alarm over the increased number of Chinese women in the community. 
The issue lasted from 1925 till 1929, creating an alliance between 
the Anti-Chinese the National Women I s Council and four Maori 
organisations, resulting finally in a Commission of Inquiry and a later 
publicised argument between a doctor and the Chinese Consul. The Consul 
mounted a defence of the Chinese in general, but his arguments did little 
to ease the local tension from which Chinese associations noticeably 
stayed absent. results of the inquiry were slightly more 
sophisticated than the 1871 report and gathered cient data, 
'although in the wrong season, to point constructively to some 
improvements which could be made in the market garden but discovered 
nothing to confirm the contentions of the opposition. 
The area from which the opposition had arisen was clearly 
dissatisfied with results but waited three years to launch another 
campaign. In the meantime, the Chinese had been alerted to their 
vulnerability, especially with increasing numbers of families and young 
students in the community and a depression depleting their resources at 
home and in New Zealand. Their response was a second Cho,ng Wah Wui 
Koon, this time representing all existing factions, unlike its 
predecessor, which chose to organise by region. The organisation, with 
its headquarters in Wellington, was a clear reaction to the single 
government in China and the conditions in New Zealand. Simultaneously 
branches formed in communities where united action was possible, and 
the organisation proceeded to actively represent the community. Its 
efforts in re-activating the temporary permit system for Chinese 
immigrants, acting as the official welcoming committee for government 
officials from China and the organisation through which money was 
collected to help build government buildings in Nanking indicate 
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aspects of its role, but the united public opposition to the Franklin 
County petition for repatriation of all Chinese in New Zealand confirmed 
it as a representative body. 
During the early thirties the association and its few branches 
stayed intact and became, with KMT leadership, an organising nexus of 
the various local Chinese communities, but with the Japanese invasion 
in 1937 the organisation on its own initiative became the foundation 
of the Go Koh Kong Yut. TIle organisation of this donation programme 
was a massive collective effort which demanded national coordination 
and considerable leadership. This activity was acceptable to the New 
Zealand government as a legitimate enterprise, since China was an ally 
at the time. This in turn facilitated the remittance of considerable 
funds to China and the initiation of a refugee programme to bring women 
and children to New Zealand, although this arrangement was discontinued 
after a year due to accusations about the supposed abuse of the 
provisions by the Chinese community. 
The collective effort and the money sent to China attested to 
the concern of the New Zealand Chinese over the plight of their 
homeland, but the intensity of this concern waned, with individual 
communities feeling less inclined to continue sending money home 
when they were more concerned with getting their families to New Zealand. 
The united effort of the initial years therefore gave way to a divided 
community with some local communities withdrawing from the collection 
and the hegemony of the national association. There was also sone 
scepticism over Chiang's future in China. Japan was defeated in 1945, 
China returned to a state of civil war as Chiang turned for the second 
time against his former allies and the CCP. The effect on the New 
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Zealand Chinese was uncertainty about their return home or the possible 
repatriation of their wives and children brought to New Zealand during 
the war on condition that they would return to China once it was over. 
China's diplomatic front became increasingly vehement about 
maintain~ng the fire of nationalism amongst its overseas Chinese in New 
Zealand, but the New Zealand Chinese in turn had divided loyalties torn 
between support for their homeland and the more immediate needs of their 
family or local overseas community. New Zealand also had its problem, 
for it was forced to decide on whether it would accept a permanent 
Chinese minority complete with wives and families in the humanitarian 
tradition under which they had originally been permitted to come or 
repatriate them as the agreement specified, maintaining that it did not 
want a Chinese minority in New Zealand. 1be government, however, was 
not alone in making its decision. The Chinese Consul, the New Zealand 
Chinese Association and two Chinese churches together with the New 
Zealand Presbyterian Church joined as an effective lobby and prevailed 
on the government to decide in favour of continued residence for the 
refugee ::ami lies. In 1947 the government approved their permanent 
residence, and in addition, under pressure from increasing applications 
by local Chinese, it also approved a quota system whereby residents 
could continue to bring in wives and children, but to a limit of fifty 
permits per year. The plan had to be reviewed each year, so that 
while one could argue that New Zeal and had finally accepted it's 
Chinese minority, it was only with considerable hesitation, and 
with a catch. The quota system was contingent upon the Chinese who 
applied ::01' his family to come to New Zealand also applying for 
naturalisation, a right which was still prohibited to the Chinese until 
1952. This problem was further compounded by the requirement of the 
Chin~~se l~overnment in 1948 that all Chinese desiring to change nationality 
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should get a release from their Chinese nationality first. This 
required the Chinese Consul to handle the application, but it was not 
clear that the Consul would approve such applications and send them 
on, since he had recommended to the New Zealand government that high 
standards be used by New Zealand in itlg naturalisation requirements 
should they be re-implemented. The government, realising the empty 
content of it's quota system, dropped the naturalisation 
requirement and in 1948 began the process of re-instituting the right 
to naturalisation for the Chinese, which would take four more years 
before it came into effect. 
By 1948 the Chinese minority in New Zealand was almost twice 
the number it had been in 1936, but more importantly it was now a 
settled community, not so much out of choice as out of necessity, since 
return to China became increasingly difficult with civil 
ation and later the constraints imposed by the ideological outcomes 
of the CCP victory in China and the Korean conflict, namely, the cold 
war. The absence of even the traditional trip home or the temporary 
repatriation of mothers and children while the latter were educated 
meant a substantial young population in the Chinese community who 
would of necessity have to be part of the local education system and 
lose what Chinese language skills they had. Attention to these 
youth led initially to the establishment of a number of Chinese 
schools, which ran during the war years. Due to the fact that teachers 
could come only on temporary permits and to the fluctuating interest 
of the local communities, they seldom became permanent fixtures. 
During the war, sports clubs were also started in various centres to 
the young in the community a sense of identity and in 1947 these 
various groups managed to change the Double Tenth celebration from a 
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local community event into a national event which would be held at a 
centre each year. While there was unity in this event, the 
war years had also left a legacy of division. The remaining funds from 
the war collection were the source of argument between Wellington and 
other centres. The decision by the national Association to buy a hall 
in 1951 led to feelings of distrust, and the presence of two Chinese 
governments led to even more complex divided loyalties in the community. 
The community had a national organisation, but its executive was neither 
capable of representing the whole community nor did they have the benefit 
of the Chinese newspapers used during the war years to reinforce their 
community role. Although the KMT and the locality associations persisted 
later joined by the Anti-Communist League, their action did little to ease 
tension within the community, as their attentions were directed largely 
towards developments in China and Taiwan. 
Young and old were also divided. The old wanted to reinforce 
their Chinese heritage overseas now that it was under threat and also 
ensure that their young were properly soci sed to enable participation 
in the community when they were older. On the other hand, the young, 
now free from the familial work obligations to which their predecessors 
had been subjected and living in the midst of a more affluent Chinese 
community, wanted their autonomy, or at least freedom to live in both 
the European and Chinese worlds. 
New Zealand, and specifically the government, moved more and more 
in the post-war years to accept a policy of assimilation, which meant a 
disapproval of any Chinese moves to reinforce their culture through the 
provision of schools and the continued migration of Chinese women, 
especially those who would become the of local Chinese. There 
was even reluctance to continue the acknowledgement of the Chinese 
growers' organisation, started on the ative of the New Zealand 
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government during the war but seen as an anachronism in the post-war 
era. The role of this organisation was crucial, however, for it had a 
national journal (in Chinese), and despite its focus on rural 
also became the medium for communication with all Chinese, 
statements from the Consul and overseas news. While the 
government reluctantly acknowledged its role, it also gradually withdrew 
support, allowing the dominant European growers'organisation and the 
minority of Chinese growers to work out their o~~ relationship, stopping 
the publication of overseas news and refusing to allow agricultural 
information to be provided in Chinese for the benefit of middle-aged 
and older growers. These moves, especially those directly 
al viability of the Journal, eventually brought about 
but not before it had served the community during the 1950s and 
1960s, which would best be described as a transitional period and at 
worst a period thwarted by division and an uneasy relationship with 
New Zealand government. 
In the 1950s and '60s the Chinese communities, especially those 
in larger urban centres, began a search for a new way to articulate 
their specific needs. Unwilling to accept control by any central 
sation and guarded about their public profile, individual 
communities sought to remedy their own problems This gave rise to a 
number of activities by cross-cutting groups brought together to provide 
1 for the growing communities. They drew on existing 
organisations for support but attempted to avoid political or locality 
divisions and the various conflicts inherited from previous years. In 
1959 Auckland Chinese had started a alii Sor largely aimed at 
maintaining the cultural integrity of the older members of the Chinese 
community. In 1965 the New Zealand Chinese Association resolved its 
internal disputes and emerged ready to acknowledge need for community 
facilities, a history of the New Zealand Chinese and a monetary 
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recognition for its young who succeeded in the European education 
system. At the same time, however, the locality associations in 
Wellington and Auckland were stirred into action, and their activity 
predictably drew support away from the national organisation. 
By the mid-1960s three organisations in Wellington stated their 
intention to build or provide facilities for community use, and the 
Auckland Hui Sor gave notice of its intent to provide a community 
centre which would cater for both young and old. 
Three projects emerged in the late 1960s, two in Wellington and 
one ln Auckland, each depending on the benevolence of the community for 
collective support and arguing vehemently that they intended to 
represent the interests of all Chinese, to be non-political and non-
factional. While the intent was clear, this ideal could not eventuate 
without the historical reality of divisions re-appearing in the 
communities. In the midst of intense collective activity aimed at 
providing a base for future cohesion in the community the projects also 
highlighted differences,some unresolved from former times and others 
created by the contemporary relationships in the community. Accusations 
and counter-accusations filtered through the collection activity, and 
the involvement of the Chinese Embassy, local bodies and the national 
government also created their own consequences. Again, questions about 
the respective roles of cultural activities and sport as idioms through 
which to articulate the unity and needs of the community were discussed 
but unresolved. All projects tried to cover both areas, but their success 
could be evaluated only in future activities rather than the expressed 
aims. 
The fund-raising that occurred was as intense as that during the 
war, but the projects were appealing to a more affluent community and 
the expectations were higher. Between 1977 and 1979 all three projects 
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completed their facilities, proving that co-operation was still 
possible, but it left a wake of division in the community, except for 
the New Zealand Chinese Association, which had remained aloof and 
unscathed. 
While the projects were in progress, the political party in 
power had changed twice in the New Zealand government, and the Chinese 
made use of an interim period of a Labour government to push for 
increased immigration of their relations. The community was divided, 
however, as appeals came from two different groups, resulting eventually 
in the New Zealand Chinese Association exerting its presence as the 
legitimate represent of all Chinese in New Zealand. 
Labour's time in power also meant recognition of the People's 
Republic of China and the departure of the Republic of China's 
ambassador. Although this caused uneasy both within the 
Chinese community and in New Zealand generally, curiosity was 
sufficient to equal opposition and dissent that might have emerged from 
the PRC's presence. There were only faint rumblings from the 
government that the 'left' might be part of the Chinese community 
after 1972, and while the community itself talked of a 'left' and 'right', 
its actual profile was remote from such party politics, although the 
labels were a viable tool in the politics of the Chinese community. 
With the recognition of the People's Republic, the Double Tenth 
celebration became an anachronism, and after one year's postponement 
and intense deliberation, the annual event re-appeared as an Easter 
Tournament in 1974, equally as vigorous, but devoid of nationalist 
fervour. The KMT, although still active in some communities and still 
celebrating the Double Tenth, largely declined as Taiwan's future less 
and less concerned the imminent conquest of the mainland and as its 
members got older. Anti-Communist League disbanded and the Eastern 
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Sports Club merged with the Wellington Sports and Cultural Centre. 
The locality associations remained intact, although future 
membership was to be based on inherited (still ascribed) locality 
affiliation rather than on place of birth in China. While there are 
arguments about the dwindling influence of locality, 
used as a means of identification. 
is stently 
The New Zealand Chinese Association as the national body also 
remains intact but largely by virtue of its Annual General Meeting, 
which still brings delegates from allover New Zealand. It has 
become, as one informant described it, 'the watchdog of the community' , 
where maturing young leaders can watch the next generation as they 
11 vacated positions in the community organisation. 
The contemporary situation of the Association best 
exemplified by the last community project discussed (see Chapter 10, 
pages 558-563). In a sense, the project began, persisted and was 
completed because of the Association, for without it would 
not have been suggested in the first place, nor would the conflict 
have eventuated that spurred the centre committee on to be successful. 
The Association helped voluntarily; it expected to be consulted but not 
make commitments; it expected both to lead and to follow and decided 
to send a wreath to commemorate the death of Mao Tse Tung but wished 
to be consulted if a branch organised a trip to China or showed films 
from the People's Republic. In each instance, it might express its 
disapproval but it had and has no authority over the local branches, nor 
does it have any financial hegemony, for each branch guards its 
financial autonomy with caution. 
Other local communities have also organised to provide facilities 
but with varying success, often plagued by old divisions in the 
community or the power of individual families or groups. They may even 
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di over the kind of facility needed. The debate about the 
appropriate idiom for the articulation of Chinese identity is ongoing, 
but as long as it is, the vitality of local communities is ensured. 
As for relationships between the Chinese community and New 
Zealand society or the government, they remain for the most part 
mutually tolerant, with the latter still expecting eventual assimilation 
of its once undesirable minority and the former moving through cycles. 
As one informant described it, 'You lose a little then you gain a little, 
and maybe then you will lose some more'. Whatever the situation, 
social relations and social organisation persist. 
If this overview can indicate anything it is the simple point, 
which cannot beoV<eTemphasised, that the history of the Chinese 
community is far more complex than the literature would portray or 
than one could imagine. The Chinese population in the goldfields 
cannot be dismissed as an occupational episode in the history of the 
local Chinese, for it was there that a whole set of relationships 
developed which can be traced through successive years. 
Similarly, immigration restriction cannot be viewed totally as 
the product of personal or national racism, for this denies the utility 
of examining New Zealand's relationship with Britain and China's 
relationship with Britain, New Zealand and her overseas community. 
More importantly, without this history in all its complexity, 
it is impossible to verify an active and organised community that 
often finds itself responding to pressures that are aspects of its 
o\m social relations as well as those resulting from other spheres 
of activity. These account for the survival of the community. 
Chinese Social sations and Political Ethni 
Several studies on overseas Chinese communities, including 
those mentioned in Chapter 1 have paid special attention to the 
associational framework which has developed in many overseas 
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Chinese communities. This was important, for as Willmott noted in 
1969, it was the beginning of attempts through sociological analysis 
to come up with some generalisations about overseas Chinese communities 
which could form the basis of comparative work (Willmott, 1969:282). 
This present study is, hopefully, a useful extension of that previous 
literature, since it attempts to put together, with modifications, the 
key ideas of Freedman (1967), Crissman (1967), Willmott (1969) and 
Wickberg (1979), in order to trace the changes and persistence in the 
associational structure of the New Zealand Chinese community. 
Essentially, through the provision of a social history of the Chinese 
community, which places it in a constantly changing historic context, 
it is possible to show how the organisational structure of the community 
is capable of ation through fragmentation, cohesion or the 
development of new organisations. This takes Crissman's model of the 
segmentary structure, the product of synchronic analysis, and applies 
it in a diachronic fashion. This assumes that, while the derivation of 
the segmentary system may be traced to urban adaptation in China, its 
development through time in the overseas community is a reflection of 
changing contexts. It is argued here, not only that interaction 
within and external to the Chinese community create the necessity for 
persistence and change in the segmentary system, but that the 
segmentary system itself provides an efficacious means through which 
the entire Chinese community or segments within it can articulate their 
needs. Consequently, as part of the culture of an overseas Chinese 
community, segmentation constitutes what Cohen (1974) refers to as 
a universe of ' ... formally non-political formations and activities that 
are politicised in the course of social action' (Cohen, 1974:xvi), 
in brief, political ethnicity, 
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The brief historic overview of the Chinese community (pages 580-599) 
indicated that a viable Chinese community has survived within a complex 
set of relationships. The relationships, although overlapping have 
been described as three spheres of activity, two of which link the 
Chinese community historically to the dominant society in New Zealand 
and to China. The third sphere is the complex set of social relations 
within the Chinese community. This study has focused on one aspect 
of these relationships, namely, the segmentary system. This system 
is made up of a number of organisations which utilise a recognised 
criterion as the basis for this formation. In the New Zealand context, 
it is primarily being Chinese that qualifies one for membership in any 
one of the organisations that make up the segmentary system. Within 
the general category, however, there are other characteristics 
including speech group, surname and locality, the latter of which is 
relevant to this study. 
The importance of these organisations collectively, a 
segmentary system is that they represent a set of interests and 
concerns in the community through time and because, as these interests 
and concerns change, so does the configuration of the segmentary system. 
Various organisations may cooperate over some issues and divide over 
others, and still others may be introduced alongside existing ones to 
defuse a situation or provide for other specific needs. In a sense, 
they become a map to the community's history which can precisely 
reflect the kinds of tensions within the community and the nature of 
its external relations. However, it is not enough to suggest they 
only reflect these aspects of the community and take action specifically 
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orientated to one or other of the external relations mentioned 
previously. Individually or collectively, they provide for their 
membership a means of articulating needs, making decisions and taking 
action. As Crissman noted, they are the government and administration 
of the Chinese community. In this sense, the leaders of these 
organisations are using ethnicity - that is, being Chinese and other 
specified characteristics which are commonly shared 
and authority in their own community. 
to seek power 
The organisational structure of the New Zealand Chinese 
community can be described historically as having both locality and 
community organisations as part of the segmentary system. In the 
goldfields the earliest association was the Poon Fa association, 
representing two localities and organised by merchants from these 
localities. However, the association was restricted to specified 
localities in the goldfields where people from these areas were 
working, and it was not until the Ch'eung Shin Tong was organised by 
Poon Yu people that this association asserted its power over all Poon 
Yu people in New Zealand. This activity links the Poon Fa association 
to its appearance in 1917, when it was reconstituted in the absence of 
any community organisation that could resolve the internal conflict 
of the community and constitute a united front. Aside from this, 
however, the association provided a medium through which merchants 
could articulate their specific needs, that is, for power and status 
within their own community. According to some informants, even from 
this early date, merchants from Po on Yu essentially controlled the 
Chinese community with the cooperation of Fa Yuen and Jung Sing people, 
initially in the goldfields and in later years throughout New Zealand. 
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The power they had allowed them to incorporate sanctions into the 
provisions of, for instance, the Ch'eung Shin Tong, which in Clauses 1 
and 8 specified a minimum donation and a fine should the donation not 
be made prior to departure for China (see Appendix V). Later, when a 
group of merchants formed the Cherishing Virtue Union (1888) to 
discourage the importation of opium, they prescribed fines for 
non-compliance. 
Both of these organisations were active after the founding 
of the Poon Fa Association and responded to the needs of the community, 
in the first instance repatriation for the deceased and in the second 
the concerted effort to present a constructive profile to New 
Zealanders, who had and would continue to use the opium habit as part 
of the invective levelled against the Chinese. 
However, while these organisations provided a means of 
articulating and providing for certain needs they also had the 
potential to generate dissent. The act of wielding power within the 
community, which necessitated the appropriation of money from other 
individuals legitimised by the authority that power brings, often 
caused distrust and then accusation. In both the Ch'eung Shin Tong 
and the Cherishing Virtue Union, merchant leaders had collected money 
which would be put to a specified use without remuneration to those 
acting in an organisational capacity. However, because both efforts 
met with difficulties - in the former the sinking of the Ventnor, and 
in the latter argument over cooperation - the full purpose of the 
respective organisations was never realised. In both cases, public 
money was at stake, and in both cases there were questions about 
remaining funds and later accusations about its use. Even when 
remaining funds were declared and then used for another purpose, the 
executive of these organisations always left themselves vulnerable to 
the accusations that they appropriated and used funds without authority. 
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Provided the accusations were strong enough, they could undermine the 
authority of those in power. It was a slow form of democracy within 
the Chinese community but nevertheless effective, and it usually 
preceded drastic reorganisation of associations. 
These organisations for the most part, however, represented an 
internal aspect of the community which linked it directly with its 
homeland. If they contributed any response to the pressures faced 
by the Chinese in the New Zealand context, was to provide a 
solidarity which circumvented factions in their own community and 
insulated the members from European hostility. \Vhile they may have 
formally specified in their constitution that they would support 
members in situations of conflict with European society, this appears to 
have been more of a gesture to their milieux than a task they could 
undertake, for they had little community-wide power as locality 
associations. 
In the early years of Chinese settlement, therefore, it appears 
that there was a lacuna in the organisational hierarchy with the 
absence of a community or voluntary organisation which could represent 
all Chinese in New Zealand. Furthermore, the community was also devoid 
of formal representation by a Consulate which would be recognised by 
the New Zealand government, by the Chinese government and, with some 
reservation, by the overseas community. This gap, while apparent if 
one seeks an organisational response, is not so apparent if one accepts 
other idioms by which the Chinese have articulated their needs. 
Contemporary with the locality association but almost entirely 
orientated towards the dominant European society, were a number of 
Chinese petitions. 
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In the early years these petitions were less formal and more 
localised, expressing concern in 1867, for instance, over the murder 
of a fellow countryman in the goldfields and in 1872 questioning the 
judicial impartiality of a judge deemed to be unnecessarily hard on 
Chinese offenders. In both cases, however, Chinese merchants and 
shopkeepers were the initiators, as they would be in the nineteen 
petitions sent to the government between 1883 and 1907. These later 
examples of the strategy became more sophisticated of necessity as 
the New Zealand social and political environment paid increasing 
attention to the restriction of Chinese immigration. 
This use of the petition by Chinese leaders occurred at a time 
when their community was economically and residentially in transition, 
in the first instance from goldmining to other activities and in the 
second from the goldfields to more exposed positions in urban centres 
and small communities allover New Zealand. Social relations 
built up in the goldfields changed, and many Chinese traded their 
partial seclusion in mining groups for more conspicious occupations 
dependent on European clientele. The petition, using the only power 
the Chinese had, that is, their ethnic unanimity, attempted to ease 
the transition. Unfortunately, the characteristics which they 
perceived as peculiarly Chinese and at the same time argued were 
useful to European New Zealand were exactly those which the anti-
Chinese Europeans found abhorrent. This would lead one, then, to 
suppose that the petition was an empty political strategy, since it 
did little to alter the impositions placed on the Chinese community, 
but in fact it was not. Like the locality association, it provided 
a means through which a new group of leaders could articulate the 
needs of their fellow countrymen and achieve power and status in their 
~~ 
own community. While it may not have eased the position of the Chinese 
in New Zealand it did maintain an active profile for the community 
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and one which, operating within the norms of European politics, could 
not be used against them.lt~sed ethnicity of the Chinese, since 
it allowed group participation, but in the end 
European idiom. 
was articulated in a 
The use of the petition ended abruptly in 1907 with the 
appointment of the Chinese Consul, in itself an indirect outcome of 
opposition to discrimination on the part of local Chinese. The Chinese 
government, increasingly concerned with its diaspora and particularly 
the ca~es where restrictions were limiting immigration and business 
developments, Was alerted to the situation in New Zealand by the actions 
of local Chinese. It dispatched it's own Commissions of Inquiry, 
whose findings and requests mirrored those expressed in the petitions, 
including a request for diplomatic representation. However, the Chinese 
government was not totally concerned with the restrictions faced by 
its overseas population, for it must also have been clear to them that 
political factions in China were now being duplicated overseas where, 
particularly, monetary support was readily available. 
The arrival of the Consul in New Zealand coincided with the 
emergence of these factions represented through two associations, the 
T'ung Meng Hui started in 1905 and the Chee Kung Tong two years later. 
These were voluntary associations whose expressed purpose was to 
solicit support for political change in China, but while their aims 
were externally orientated, their effect was to split the local 
community. The Consul, as a representative of the Chinese government, 
naturally opposed the political activity overseas and used two 
strategies to thwart its development. The first was to discourage 
overseas residence by making continued reference to the discriminatory 
practices the Chinese faced. It was clear to him that opposition to 
the Chinese was based on groundless assertions that were demeaning and 
resulted in treating them like criminals by, for example, using 
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fingerprinting as a means of identification. Discrimination, 
according to the Consul, created an undesirable community, and if New 
Zealand was going to continue to do this, then the Chinese should 
return home. The Consul in fact had reversed the logic of anti-
Chinese arguments which maintained that Chinese were undesirable 
and therefore should be discriminated against. 
The second strategy, hardly consistent with repatriation but 
nevertheless a much more accurate reflection of the continued 
immigration statistics, was to strongly suggest the founding of a 
community organisation which would cross-cut the divided alliances 
manifest in existing factions. 
Subsequently, the power and authority of local leaders and 
the Consul was sufficient in 1909 to start the Chong Wah Wui Koon. 
Its explicit aim was to bring together all Chinese in New Zealand 
and to avoid factionalism. In line with this, neither of the existing 
factions achieved formal representation, but instead the association 
was open to all Chinese regardless of political liation or locality. 
This aspect was formalised by having representatives from sixteen 
centres around New Zealand. 
The interests of the Chinese community, therefore,by 1909 had 
been consolidated into one community organisation which could 
represent all Chinese in New Zealand. Fragmentation in the 
organisational structure resulting from external political influence 
had led directly to the creation of a Chong Wah Wui Koon and the 
setting in motion of an organisational cycle. The cycle itself is a 
process derived from the very nature of a segmentary system, which 
contains within it both the ability to consolidate or fragment 
depending on the influences which realign segments within it. In 
this period it would be hard to argue that population was sufficient 
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to have an influence on these developments, since the total Chinese 
population actually continued to decline until after 1916 (see 
Appendix I), so the segmentary system and the cycle must be. variables 
which respond to spheres of social relations in which the Chinese 
community are enmeshed. 
1be further development of this cycle occurred seven years after 
the founding of the Chong Wah Wui Koon, at a time when New Zealand 
was involved in World War I and the legislative activity against 
Chinese immigration had abated temporarily. In China the 1911 
Revolution had established the Republic and its political party the KMT. 
However, these changes had not resolved the factions in the overseas 
community. In the years after 1911 the Chong Wah Wui Koon in New 
Zealand faced dissent in the community and, as a result, its own demise. 
In its place emerged associations which chose to avoid influences of 
existing factions by building solidarity around locality. These 
traditional forms of solidarity emerged in response to continued 
hostility from the anti-Chinese League, later the RSA, and to the 
political factions in their own community - resulting from changes in 
China and their need to provide for more immediate concerns. The 
Poon Fa, Kwong Chew, and Tung Jung Associations represented the 
majority localities of the New Zealand Chinese. Their role was to 
represent the membership largely' reinforcing the solidarity of the 
group. Like the Po on ,Fa Association in the goldfields, the later 
urban counterpart celebrated festivals, took care of funerals and 
arranged passage back and forth to China, a role previously performed by 
the Chong Wah Wui Koon. The other locality associations performed 
similar functions. 
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The segmentary system was now fragmented into political 
factions reflecting the homeland situation and locality associations 
providing for more localised needs. The Consul, as nominal head of 
the overseas community, remained uninvolved in associational activity 
until 1928. 
This fragmented system characterised the community from 1916 
until 1928, a period in which government moved even further to 
restrict Chinese immigration and local hostility to Chinese became 
critical on several occasions. The Consul, while silent about 
associational activity, was active in the sphere of Chinese/New Zealand 
relations. He monitored legislation, spoke on behalf of local Chinese 
who were unjustly treated and protected the interests of Chinese 
merchants. The latter group of Chinese had in fact always received 
preferential treatment, as evidenced by the special permits made 
available for them in the 1910 legislation and the support for their 
importing enterprise evidenced by later negotiations with the Customs 
Department. The Consulate was generally sympathetic to the merchants, 
who were considered a better class, a point various Consuls made 
clear to the New Zealand government on more than one occasion and 
which further legitimated the class to the New Zealand government. 
The Consul, unlike the Chinese community, had direct informal access to 
government by virtue of his diplomatic status, so negotiations were 
carried on directly with ministers and departments, which circumvented 
the bureaucratic process to which petitions had to be subjected. While 
the Consuls acted competently in these various capacities, they seldom 
spoke publicly in support of the New Zealand Chinese. 
In 1927 the argument between opposing political factions in 
the fragmented community, despite the counter-influence of locality 
associations, came out in the open during the meetings held to organise 
the Double Tenth celebration. The CKT and the K~IT argued over which 
should be flown, and the feud became public knowledge. 
Although at the time it led to two celebrations, the victory of 
Chiang the following year left no uncertainty as to who 
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controlled China. The CKT, with older members, gradually lost its 
institutional status as an active organisation, but members who were 
11 alive kept it going for some years. 
With the conflict resolved and the KMT firmly established in 
its political role amongst New Zealand Chinese, there was again a move 
to bring together the various associations under a community-wide 
organisation. Partially spurred on byunity in China and the fact 
that the KMT could play an important role in its development, it 
also coincided with anti-Chinese hostility, the depression and the 
virtual exclusion brought about by the 1920 Immigration Act in New 
Zealand. A meeting was held with representatives from each of the 
existing associations including the CKT, and another Chong Wah Wui Koon 
was formed with headquarters in Wellington. Branches also formed 
voluntarily in four other centres and the organisation became the 
active representative of all Chinese, both in the New Zealand context 
and in regard to China. 
As noted in the previous section, the organisation persisted 
through the depression, when for the first time the Chinese community 
in New Zealand and China itself gained an acceptable status as far as 
New Zealand was concerned. The immigration system had been eased by a 
temporary permit system for a few wives and their children as well as 
students. If things had improved in New Zealand, however, they were 
steadily deteriorating in China. The civil war with the CCP, and the 
activities of Russia and Japan towards China alarmed the local Chinese 
and paralleled the fervent nationalism that had swept over the 
community after 1928. In 1935, under the influence of a newly arrived 
Consul, the Chong Wah Wui Koon was re-organised along similar 
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to its 1909 predecessor with regional representation consisting of 
twenty-six branches including those formed during the 1928 effort. 
The New Zealand Chinese Association, as it was known, recognised 
other associations but had no delegates from these associations, only 
representatives of communities. Even though the leadership came from 
other existing associations, they were expected to act on behalf of 
the whole community and not on behalf of their sectional interests. 
lfuile the ideal of representativeness was apparent, the actual 
organisation was dominated by the same locality groups which already 
existed. Furthermore, these new leaders had by now established 
themselves as wealthy members of the community. 1~ese people 
constituted a stable population, mostly with families and with 
interests both overseas and in China. ~e extent of their stabi is 
apparent in the fact that they were able to maintain control of this 
community organisation until 1965. 
Within a year of organising, the new community association had 
the chance it needed to weld the New Zealand Chinese together. With 
pressure from one of its branches, it organised a collection to support 
China in their war with Japan. The Wellington executive responded 
despite the Consul's reticence about forcing local Chinese to donate 
for such a collection, and by the end of 1937 the national executive 
had achieved the goal of organising a national collection which was to 
include all New Zealand Chinese. While there was no doubt about the 
sentiments of nationalism in the local Chinese community, there was no 
unanimity about organisational procedure and leadership, and the Consul's 
feeling about the kinds of impositions the community would tolerate for 
such a collection were accurate. The organisation of the collection, 
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including the fact that it had to be centralised and would in the end 
be controlled by a few, was sufficient to cause doubts about the 
reliability of those who so fervently encouraged it at every 
opportunity. The mandatory financial obligation week after week and 
the hegemony of the Association which appropriated the right to impose 
sanctions on defaulters also did little to help. In fact the only 
restraint that could be imposed on such an organisation was achieved 
by representatives from local areas absenting themselves from 
representative congresses, which were held whenever needed to coordinate 
further plans. However, there was no other body that could sanction 
inappropriate activity on the part of leaders, and the Consul was 
virtually powerless to intercede, as a person whose role was to 
encourage such efforts. 
The dissent predictably was directed against both the national 
Association and individual leaders, and it came from Chinese centres 
in other areas of New Zealand who felt antagonistic to what they 
considered the arbitrary exercise of power by Wellington. The dissent 
was articulated through and focused on the issue of authority to 
appropriate the funds collected. The large amount of monies were 
centrally remitted to China, but as the realities of the KMT activity 
in China emerged and the war extended, enthusiasm had waned and 
autonomous community control of the collection or even termination had 
been seen as an alternative. 
However, it was not entirely these concerns that caused the 
tension. The temporary immigration provisions both prior to and during 
the war which had allowed a number of famil to be brought together 
in New Zealand had given rise to an increasingly large number of younger 
Chinese in the community. While the economic activity of these young 
people was determined by their kin, their education was under the 
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control of New Zealand society, a situation which had previously 
been mitigated by a mandatory educational sojourn in China for 
children who had been in New Zealand for some years. Now, with their 
home localities embroiled in war, repatriation for education was both 
risky and expensive. 
The apparent need, therefore, to contain the youth within the 
community and develop a nationalist sentiment amongst them led to 
concerted efforts to organise them. Through the medium of Double 
Tenth, local schools and sports groups, each community was encouraged 
by the Consulate and the national Association to organise its young 
popUlation. Language and sport became, during the war years, the two 
idioms through which Chinese ethnicity and nationalism could be 
articulated indirectly, providing the impetus for local communities 
to be concerned about their local needs. The tension resulting from the 
feelings of allegiance to China's needs while at the same time feeling 
concerned for their future in New Zealand,together with any 
misgivings people might have about the collection campaign, had the 
effect of providing a basis for fragmentation. However, the context 
in which it was occurring made the former bases for al ternati ve 
solidarity inappropriate, for none was capable of providing for the 
needs of younger community members. The national A.ssociation, while 
concerned about youth to the extent that it encouraged the Double Tenth 
celebration, was too preoccupied with the post-war immigration 
situation to start any active programmes. 
From 1945 till 1947 the issues of continued immigration of 
Chinese to New Zealand and the pending provisions for repatriation of 
war refugees and those in New Zealand on temporary permits were unresolved, 
but once New Zealand had decided to accept the possibility of a Chinese 
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minority, then the future activities of the Chinese in New Zealand 
became a topical issue. For the Chinese, it intensified the concerns 
of the war years as regards youth, but after 1947 and particularly 
1949 the concerns had to do with their position in New Zealand. Two 
responses emerged initially. First, the Chinese Anglican Church in 
Wellington, run by Chinese but marginal to the segmentary system 
although supported by the Chinese community, proposed concrete plans 
to provide for youth in 1945. Secondly, three years later various 
Chinese sports organisations from local communities suggested to the 
national Association that an annual sports tournament be held involving 
representatives from all Chinese communities where Association branches 
were supposedly in existence. The first such meeting was a success 
but required considerable organisation, since leisure time was a 
relatively rare commodity before the 1960s, and days when businesses 
closed, while demanded by the national Association,met with opposition 
on more than one occasion. 
In the annual sports tournament the New Zealand Chinese had at 
least one event which demonstrated their unity and preserved the 
integrity of their ethnicity amongst the younger community members, 
but other tensions had not been resolved. The remaining collection 
funds and their use after the war divided the two major urban Chinese 
communities, and the 1949 victory of the CCP and the Korean War in the 
1950s placed additional sure on the local community. The notions 
of 'left' and 'right' entered community politics, exacerbated by 
'cold war' polemics but also by the conservative KMT, whose government 
affiliation had been moved to Taiwan. The KMT, where it was strong in 
New Zealand, claimed the right to remaining funds, but the national 
Association maintained its use was their prerogative, and local 
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communities asserted that it belonged to the individual Chinese 
communities. The solidarity and cohesion of the war years dissipated, 
and fragmentation of the Chinese community was inevitable. There were 
no publications which could reach local Chinese as there had been during 
the war, the Consulate was of an exiled government whose recognition 
by the rest of the world as the legitimate government of China was 
debatable and the PRC was considered part of the communist threat, 
making Chinese residents in New Zealand uneasy. In addition, New 
Zealand policy was keen to discourage any signs of manifest ethnicity in 
the Chinese community, either as a result of continued immigration or 
exclusive organisation, so active steps were taken to make such 
developments difficult if not impossible. 
The complexity of the situation required careful articulation, 
and the organisations that eventuated in this period were understandably 
unique, straddling all three spheres of social relations, that is with 
the PRC and the Republic of China, with New Zealand and with their own 
community. 
In the post-war years, a whole new segmentary structure appeared 
in the Chinese community parallel to that which already existed. A 
number of organisations emphasised sport as a focus and as the particular 
medium through which the young Chinese would express their ethnicity. 
The Progressive Club, the Eastern Club and the Northern Soccer Club, as 
well as numerous other sports clubs around the country, were organised by 
young people supported by elders who approved of their intra-ethnic 
activity and often met annually at the Double Tenth annual sports 
tournament. While the use of sports was hardly unique as a medium of 
association, this development was partially free from the hegemony of 
other associations and ostensibly provided for the young, which was a 
new development. Furthermore, it was seen to be preserving the 
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integrity of the Chinese community by bringing Chinese together in the 
absence of European influence, which otherwise was of considerably more 
significance in their lives than it had been in their parents' 
generation. Of importance, however, was the fact that sport Was an 
acceptable idiom not only within the community but in Taiwan and later 
the PRC and in New Zealand. 
Another counter-emphasis expressed in the post-war community was 
Chinese culture, which was acclaimed as having primary importance by 
the Chinese Anglican and Baptist Churches as well as the Auckland Hui Sor. 
These organisations and the New Zealand Chinese Association, aside from 
the traditional locality associations, were the only groups interested 
in providing something in the nature of community facilities. The 
churches, like the sports organisations, were not new, but now under 
almost complete Chinese control they saw Chinese culture - the 
maintenance of ethnicity - and Christianity as complementary. Both the 
churches provided community facilities very quickly after the war and 
accomplished it through community fund-raising in which at least a 
token exchange was seen to be transacted: the bazaar dinner or cultural 
performance gave the community something in return for its donation. 
The Auckland Hui Sor similarly emphasised Chinese culture as a 
means to maintain Chinese ethnicity, and it brought together opera, 
Chinese films, and later Chinese school and sports under the roof of two 
community centres, initially a theatre and later a new hall for which 
money was raised in the community. The former building was refurnished 
elaborately but notably lacked facilities for a school and sports, which 
meant that culture for a period of years was the prerogative and foremost 
concern of older members in the community. It was not until a counter-
organisation, a hybrid development partially related to a traditional 
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locality association and partially made up of concerned parents, brought 
pressure to bear on the Hui Sor, threatening to take its young 
population or potential members away, that the latter relented and 
quickly provided facilities for a school and later a new complex 
almost entirely for sports. 
Two other types of organisation also became prominent along with 
the above; two reflected specific views of the external relations of the 
Chinese community and one other organisation came close to being a 
community association. 
In the former category was the Anti-Communist League and the 
Chinese Cultural Society, The Anti-Communist League was the inspiration 
of the Republic of China and created in New Zealand as elsewhere to 
capitalise on the anti-PRC rumours moving amongst the overseas Chinese 
communities. These rumours were about the persecution of relatives in 
China who were being ransomed to draw overseas funds into the mainland 
instead of Taiwan. The organisation in New Zealand was closely aligned 
with the KMT, where it still existed, and .the New Zealand Chinese 
Association and the Embassy until 1972. It was vocal about itsanti-PRC 
feelings and created an image of a very pro-Republic of China Chinese 
community. It was later matched with a European version in the Free 
China Society. The external relations of the New Zealand Chinese in 
regards to politics and commerce were linked to Taiwan, and the 
Embassy's role reinforced this. 
The counter to this organisation was the Chinese Cultural Society 
formed by younger members of the community who had experienced China 
after liberation and were keen to promote knowledge of developments. 
The organisation itself was small, but there was sufficient interest 
quietly expressed amongst local Chinese through willingness to receive 
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material and see films to make it viable. Although of concern to the 
New Zealand government and to some in their own community, they were 
allowed to persist but not without having theideological label of 'left' 
attached to them. Like the Anti-Communist League, this organisation 
also had its European version, the New Zealand-China Friendship Society 
which was started at about the same time and was considered by many 
Chinese to be safer politically than being associated with their own 
organisation. 
Both of these groups had a commitment to seeing China recognised 
by the New Zealand government, which finally occurred in 1972, but 
only the European version continued, with,an extensive membership in 
some centres. External links to both Taiwan and China were maintained 
after 1972 by individuals making their own choice. Diplomatic 
representation, however, was from the PRC, and while there are still 
links with the Republic of China government, they are adjunct to trade 
relationships and not purely diplomatic nor acknowledged formally 
by the New Zealand government. 
The organisation in this period that came closest to the role of 
the New Zealand Chinese Association as a community-wide group was the 
Chinese Growers' Association formally known as the Chinese Commercial 
Growers' Federation. This organisation, started during the war was, 
by 1949, publishing its own journal, which was distributed allover New 
Zealand. The significance of the organisation and the Journal was the 
fact that, aside from providing for the sectional interest of Chinese 
growers, it also became,the voice of the Chinese community. It 
carried overseas news, published announcements by the Chinese Embassy, 
commented on Chinese associations and community affairs. Because market-
gardening was both rural and urban and an occupation filled by young 
and old from all localities, cut across locality, political and 
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community factions and remained purposefully apart from intra-
community conflict. What was particularly unique about the organisation 
and its journal, however, was the that the growers' organisation 
had been initiated on the suggestion of the Prime Minister during the 
war and, together with the Journal was subsidised by the European 
growers' organisation which by definition formally represented all 
growers no matter what ethnic group they belonged to. The subsidy, of 
course, was a proportion of the levy collected from all growers 
including the Chinese, but the fact that some was returned acknowledged 
the autonomy, if not the ethnicity of the Chinese growers. Increasingly 
this very fact became anathema to both the European growers and the New 
Zealand government. The former reacted by insisting on amalgamation. 
When that led, they dropped their subsidy and gave the Chinese 
growers formal representation at annual meetings, with the government's 
approval. The government, aside from condoning the action of the 
European growers, also suggested forcefully that all foreign news be 
dropped from the Journal and that it print only material relevant to 
its membership. 
Neither move destroyed the growers' organisation, but the removal 
of the subsidy meant the Journal could no longer be published after 
1972, and at least three growing areas opted for joining the European 
organisation or organis their own cooperative. vfuen foreign news 
was purged from the Journal, it was replaced by a poignant analysis of 
Chinese associations and the conflict between them and particularly how 
certain people used associations for private gain rather than public 
good. This was particularly germaine at the time, for it was the 
conflict between associations and the suspicions held by some against 
former leaders in the community that gave rise to the newer segmentary 
structure outlined above. The realisation that the needs in the 
Chinese community had changed dramatically, that their relationship 
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wi th the New Zealand government and society was quali tati vely 
different after the war than it had been before, and that their 
--, ~ I 
relationship with their homeland was again a s'ltuation of two 
governments, as it had been in 1927, demanded new ways of articulation. 
The articulation, however, was one that needed to bridge the gaps 
between factions, localities, young and old and, most importantly, to 
stem the dominant threat of assimilation and loss of ethnicity, 
However, the parallel segmentary system seemed to be duplicating 
the conflict, since the mere fact of a new set of competing idioms and 
the political implications of any allegiance made new splits inevitable. 
By the end of the 1960s, therefore, two segmentary systems were 
operating in the Chinese community, one the legacy of the pre-war and 
war periods and the other resulting from post-war developments, 
The post-war developments therefore, left their own legacy of a 
fragmented community, not in a situation of conflict but neither with 
any indication of cohesion. There was also some uncertainty as to who 
had the authority to speak for the Chinese community, for although 
the New Zealand Chinese Association was still nominally in charge of 
Double Tenth and still had its branches throughout New Zealand, it 
had responded only minimally to its changing constituency, 
After 1965, there were attempts to resolve some of the sources 
of past conflict, and this initiated a series of organisational changes 
which re-asserted the position of some traditional associations within 
the milieu of what had already transpired. 
In 1965 the New Zealand Chinese Association had come under 
scrutiny by the Chinese community in Wellington, partly due to an 
argument over regional representation to the national body and partly 
over alleged misuse of the deed of the Association headquarters. Some 
maintained that an organisation which had been started to bring unity 
to the community had brought only disunity and given rise to 
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autocratic control by the central executive. The resolution of this 
situation was to provide mechanisms for preventing the misuse of both 
the Association's assets and the power that derived from its position 
in the community. In an attempt to change its image, the Association 
announced its recognition of young Chinese scholars in the community 
with awards for outstanding performance in examinations, talked about 
building or extending the hall for recreational purposes, and proposed 
to write a history of the New Zealand Chinese. 
Only the first of these proposals was carried out, but the idea 
of providing facilities for the community had become the concern of a 
larger forum in the community. At the time the Seyip, Tung Jung and 
Poon Fa Associations had facilities, but they were limited in size and 
adequate only for banquets or for school classes. In 1966, however, 
the Seyip Association announced plans to build a hall, the Chinese 
Anglican Church started a collection for a new building programme and 
the Eastern Sports Club decided it was going to build a hall. All 
three were trying to cater for an increasing young popUlation, but the 
emphasis was different. The church, as had done in the past, 
wanted to provide the most comprehensive facilities including a youth 
hostel, chapel, missioner's house and additional activities, while both 
the Eastern Club and the Seyip Association appeared more concerned with 
a sports facility. The following year the Christchurch Chinese community 
also planned to provide a cultural centre for the community, and in 1968 
the Auckland Chinese Hui Sor, as noted previously, expanded its 
functions to include a school. Both of these groups placed their 
emphasis on culture, as did the Chinese Anglican Church, although the 
Auckland Hui Sor, already established and having a larger popUlation to 
draw on, was able to move considerably farther to consider a sports 
lity, and in 1969 they started their own journal to plot their 
progress. In 1970 the Auckland Hui Sor and the Chinese can Church 
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both started to collect for their respective projects. The Auckland 
group set out purposefully to steer a course between existing groups 
in the community and found itself having to justify this position in 
the face of criticism from those who thought the project ought to come 
under the New Zealand Chinese Association branch and from others who 
thought that a locality association was sufficient. Both the Chinese 
Anglican Church and the Auckland Hui Sor organised public meetings to 
state their position, but the latter group met with more support from 
the community than did the Chinese Anglican Church. 
The issues that were part of the argument in the two cases were 
essentially the same, having to do with distribution and use of power 
in the community. The Chinese community had a history, confirmed in 
both the Chinese Growers' Journal and the Auckl and Chinese 
Hall Journal, of community leaders using the status of associations 
to place personal gain above community needs. The presence of this 
in the past had left doubt in the minds of many, especially when 
community projects were undertaken on behalf of all in the community. 
The doubt turned into distrust, antagonism or apathy and a refusal to 
cooperate. 
In 1970, both the Chinese Anglican Church in Wellington and 
the Hui Sor in Auckland were established groups and were well aware 
of the kinds of factions that operated in the community, but whereas 
the Hui Sor group was able to pull the Auckland community behind them, 
the Chinese Anglican Church found themselves in a competitive 
situation. The other associations did not give them the mandate to 
act on behalf of the community, but nevertheless they persisted. 
The outcome of the Wellington situation was two major Hall 
projects, the second generated by an alternative alliance between the 
Chinese Ambassador prior to recognition of the PRC in 1972, the 
Eastern Sports Club and the Wellington City Council. The result 
was ideally to be a community Hall with all existing associations 
affiliated, but even in this case there was reticence, and any 
assumed affiliation on the part of what became the Wellington 
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Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre was met with denial or criticism. 
The Chinese Anglican Church for their part had to rely on individual 
support, massive, well publicised fund-raising, and the argument that 
they included sports and culture as part of their plan, whereas the 
other project was equipped largely to be a sports centre. 
It took nearly seven years for the projects to be completed, 
and the Chinese Anglican Church was able to complete only the first 
stage of their plan. Inflation over the fund-raising period increased 
the costs in all the projects, placing greater dependence on the local 
community's generosity. In Wellington the situation was worse, for 
in the end the Chinese community made the compromise of supporting 
both projects. The segmentary system in both Auckland and Wellington 
had survived, however, with individual units maintaining their 
autonomy yet supporting projects for community facilities. Curiously, 
the two projects in Wellington and the one in Auckland were all 
recipients of government money, and the Chinese Anglican Church is 
still nominally under the control of the New Zealand Anglican Church, 
so there is a sense in which they are a compromise in the area of 
ethnicity at the same time. In each centre there had also been a 
noticeable change in leadership in the early 1970s, which some argue 
accounts for the push to complete the projects, for these were young 
professionals who were at last taking their position as leaders in the 
community. 
624. 
The situation outlined was not unique to the two major Chinese 
centres in New Zealand. Other small communities with increasing 
populations, young people and an energetic professional group, have 
attempted to pull local people together, often with the focus of a 
community project. In each case the problems have been similar, 
albeit on a smaller scale, forcing any new community effort to 
articulate its needs usually within a set of historic factions or 
divisions that already exist in the community. In most cases, 
they have chosen to try to avoid conflict. 
The general means of doing this was similar to the Auckland 
Hui Sor, that is, to establish a community-wide organisation autonomous 
from but at the same time linked to, the existing institutional framework. 
In this way, power, status, authority and most importantly money could 
not be appropriated illegitimately by local members of the national 
organisation, the New Zealand Chinese Association. Nor was blame to be 
easily laid at the feet of those involved by others unwilling to accept 
the community organisation, for time commitment was voluntary and 
financial commitment was arranged in such a way that it could be seen 
as investment and not an outright expenditure. 
The innovation derived from the experience of the post-war 
years had, therefore, not destroyed the segmentary system in the 
Chinese community but rather built on it appropriately to reflect 
the new context the community exists within and the kinds of needs 
this situation generates. However, there is a tension in the way 
this is articulated. The debate is still going on as to whether the 
Chinese community's needs are best articulated through sport or 
through culture, and whether the latter should be represented by 
language classes or some other means. There is also some tension 
over who actually represents the Chinese community, and despite the 
continual fluctuations that go on within the New Zealand Chinese 
Association, it has maintained its integrity, still holding its 
",d. 
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annual meetings which are still sufficiently(attended to decide on 
policy, albeit heavily dominated by representation from the two 
large urban communities. The right to actually implement policy, 
however, is the prerogative of local branches, who guard their 
autonomy, for the hegemony of the centre is no longer accepted. 
However, the national Association is still accepted both locally and 
nationally as the watch dog of the community, which demands to be. 
consulted but may not have sufficient power to impose any sanctions 
on non-compliance with policy. 
Other associations also persist as part of the segmentary 
system including both the Hall projects (and the Chinese Anglican 
Centre) the locality associations and the Chinese growers' 
association. The Chinese Anglican Church, while part of the European 
dominant society, is still largely operating within the Chinese 
milieu, so its inclusion as an essentially Chinese organisation is 
considered legitimate. The sports organisations for the most part 
have been re-incorporated into existing organisations ,so whereas 
the autonomous unit may no longer persist its membership is still 
part of the organisational life in the community. 
If one attempts to characterise the segmentary system now in 
terms of the cyclical process of cohesion and fragmentation, it would 
seem to fit the position of a compromise, for there are aspects of 
both cohesion and fragmentation evident. Christchurch epitomises this 
situation: a united community but with two legitimate groups having 
authority and wielding power within the community. The position of the 
New Zealand Chinese Association branches is also a case in point, 
affiliated to and part of a national organisation but autonomous 
within their local communities. 
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The dynamic process within the segmentary system is therefore 
still in existence, but rather than having to articulate interests 
in diverse spheres, it can restrict its activity to those which 
seem most important. The relative decline in the influence of events 
in China and New Zealand government policy on the Chinese community 
leaves them free to articulate interests and needs within their 
local populations. 
Liberation from having to negotiate relationships in all 
three spheres of activity has allowed the Chinese to concentrate on 
the cultural ethnicity of their own community but even the 
articulation of this becomes a political act, concerning the use of 
power in the community to muster support for particular policies, a 
task often influenced by traditional allegiances. 
As noted before, the segmentary structure in its contemporary 
state has two parallel forms of organisation which combine the function 
of being both traditionist and modernist at the same time. It is clear 
that in fact the modernist Hall projects, for instance, operating in a 
New Zealand Chinese milieu, are at heart traditionist in their 
sometime orientation to exclusiveness. Likewise the dichotomy between 
formal and informal has been bridged gradually as the cyclical process 
has unfolded. Aside from the formal requirement that all incorporated 
societies be registered, the major community associations have moved 
more and more towards operating at both an informal and formal level, 
articulating their interests both in the European and Chinese idiom. 
The formality necessary for accomplishing tasks within the context of 
the dominant society is undertaken by those who have the requisite 
skills, but the basis of any collective action must still rely on the 
informal relations that are an integral aspect of the Chinese 
community, very often only with the good will of elders. The 
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distinction between the contemporary situation and other periods 
as far as this is concerned has to do with the nature of the 
articulation. In the past,the English secretaries or other 
individuals who were bilingual not only wielded considerable power, 
as part of the executives of the associations but were seen to exist 
,~ in a situation of confrontation. They confronted the hostile dominant 
society, its tax department or customs department, on behalf of the 
community and were trusted to do so. Now such skills are much more 
the norm within the Chinese community, and they attract less status 
and accordingly less power. Similarly those who achieved power and 
status ,by virtue of!heir'positions within the Chinese community alone 
now face considerably more scrutiny than they did in the past; The 
likelihood of fragmentation occurring-again like it did after 1909 and 
again after World War II seem less probable now, with the possibility 
of individuals using associations for their own personal political 
ambitions within the community diminished. In 1909, 1928 and 1937, 
not only the detrimental 'effect of internal community factions had 
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brought about cohesion butipredominantly external influences, largely 
to do with events in China. In each case, these external influences 
generated a means of achieving status and power in the community which 
was far less vulnerable than that achieved by action whose means 
and ends are immediate, circumscribed by the local situation. There 
has been a qualitative difference in the way various communities have 
become mobilised and politicised over the various hall projects from 
the situation of the collection during the 1937-1944 period, when the 
conflict was left to emerge after the event. 
The type of political ethnicity which emerges and consequent 
changes in the articulation of the organisational structure are, 
therefore, variables influenced as much by the internal dynamics of 
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social relations within the Chinese community as by those external 
influences with which it must interact. 
Like Cohen's example of the Hausa, the New Zealand Chinese as 
an ethnic group are the product of a set of relationships which have 
prompted the Chinese to use whatever cultural means they have 
available (the segmentary system) to articulate their ethnicity in a 
political way to ensure survival. Since the influences that affect 
the relationships are in themselves variable, the community follows 
no evolutionary pattern but has, on the basis of its segmentary 
system, alternative ways of articulating its interests depending on 
the pressures facing the community. Politically, ethnicity is, 
therefore, a product of interaction not of impositions. 
This represents, as noted in Chapter 1, a departure from the 
work of Yancey et al., who tended to view emergent ethnicity as a 
result of structural constraint (see Chapter 1, page 25) and brings 
it closer to Barth's (1969) contention that social interaction may 
form the basis of ethnic distinctions (Barth, 1969:10). In the case 
of New Zealand the major constraint was the attempt to restrict the 
immigration of Chinese into New Zealand, which was largely achieved 
and justified by the erection of a boundary by the dominant host 
society protecting them from knowledge of and contact with the 
Chinese community. The failure to gather information about the 
community, to understand its organisational structure or anticipate 
its needs (with the exception of some situations after 1966), reinforced 
this boundary. In addition, the absence from New Zealand of any notion 
of a plural society, unlike the .situation in Nigeria with the Hausa, 
further confirmed its existence. There was always a real concern to 
maintain separation between the Chinese and the dominant host society, 
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as evidenced by attempts, for instance, to prevent European women from 
trading with Chinese fruit and vegetable merchants or, particularly 
Maoris from inter-marrying with the Chinese. The only exception to 
this was in 1948, when the government (see Chapter 9, page 440) 
speculated that encouraging inter-marriage might represent a strategy 
for diminishing Chinese ethnicity. In other words, the dominant host 
society would modify its boundary but only with the intent of 
recruiting assimilated Chinese to European society. By 1954 this 
policy had been modified with the permission given to bring wives to 
New Zealand, but assimilation was still the desired outcome. 
Given the lack of any desire on the part of the dominant host 
society either to interact with the Chinese or even to accept the 
idea of a plural society, it became incumbent upon the Chinese to 
articulate their needs by forcing interaction. The petitions and the 
request for diplomatic representation, the development of the Chong 
Wah Wui Koon (1927) and later the New Zealand Chinese Association were 
the results, in part, of attempts to mediate or negotiate the 
interaction with the dominant society. It was only in 1942 that the 
Chinese growers were acknowledged formally by the government and in 
1947 that the Chinese minority was considered as a permanent part of 
New Zealand society. This contrasts markedly with, for instance, the 
situation Willmott drew attention to in his 1969 article, where he 
took issue with Freedman's generalisation that Chinese communities could 
be placed on a continuum from simple to complex in terms of 
organisational make-up. Willmott maintained that, while a synchronic 
view might confirm this contention, a diachronic view would not in 
some instances support the model. In Cambodia, Singapore, Java and 
Thailand, for instance, the presence of indirect rule had imposed a 
simple organisational structure on the respective Chinese communities, 
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which limited the extent of segmentation. This arrangement also 
specified the kind of interaction which could take place between the 
Chinese community and the government of the host society. Segmentation 
occurred in the above situations when the removal of indirect rule 
and the influence of events in China coincided. The consequence of 
this was the kind of community Freedman described in Singapore which 
he explained in terms of population ze and heterogeneity. 
In the New Zealand context, however, neither population size 
nor indirect rule can be used as explanations for the persistence and 
change within the organisational structure. The explanation which 
fits the New Zealand case is one that combines aspects from the 
analyses of Freedman, Willmott and Wickberg. This work therefore 
suggests that change in and survival of the Chinese community can be 
a?certained from an examination of the segmentary structure of the 
community through time. It suggests, furthermore, that this segmentary 
structure emerges and develops because of the influence of events in 
China and events in the dominant host society, which may include, in 
addition to those specifically directed at the community, others which 
are external to the community. 
There is an additional variable which is equally important: 
the segmentary structure must also be seen as a response to the nature 
of the internal dynamics within the community. Since it provides 
a legitimate means to achieve power and authority in the community for 
both groups and individuals, it also produces the basis for conflicts 
of interest. The emergence of the locality associations after 1915, the 
1927 Chong Wah Wui Koon, the various sports clubs after the war, the 
community projects and the movement for local community autonomy in 
the post-war years - all have aspects of their developments that 
relate to conflict internal to the community. From this perspective, 
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therefore, it is important to locate the associational and political 
development of the community within a context which encompasses 
relationships both external and internal to its existence. 
Two points can be made from the preceeding. First, political 
ethnicity, while culturally derived from urbanisation in China, is 
nevertheless uniquely manifested in the overseas context through 
changes in the segmentary structure which ensure the survival and 
integrity of the Chinese community. Second, that the changes in the 
segmentary structure described variously by the term fragmentation 
or cooperation are as much the product of the external relations of 
the community as they are of the internal dynamics of the community. 
Internal conflict ot dissension may affect the relationship and 
existence of associations and in turn the external relations of the 
community or vice-versa. As Crissman noted without elaboration: 
Various segments, or sub-communities, combine and 
divide in different circumstances. In some contexts 
the whole Chinese community is united and acts 
together, while in different situations small 
segments act independently against each other. 
(Crissman, 1967:193) 
While Crissman does not intend his model to be anymore than 
synchronic and therefore omits discussion of the variables that might 
initiate change or reinforce persistence his suggestion of process 
coincides with the findings of this study. In addition, although 
beyond the scope of this work, there is an apparent but perhaps 
unintended affinity between Crissman's analysis and the extensive work 
done on segmentary lineage systems (see Smith, 1956). The very 
term segmentary or segmentation, other than having obvious links to 
biology, has had extensive coverage in the anthropological literature 
especially in regard to African kinship systems. Crissman, however, 
makes no connection even though he uses the terminology and refers to 
both explicit administrative and political roles of associations amongst 
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overseas Chinese in the absence of formal government (see Chapter 1, 
page 34~. He also describes the possibility of what could be 
termed 'fission and fusion', both of which are used to describe 
change wi thin segmentary linea.se systems. A more substantial link 
however comes from the work of Smith who, in the course of a lengthy 
discussion of the problems posl~d by differing contexts and interpretation 
of the theoretical assumptions about segmentary systems states the 
followir.g: 
Since all political .:nganisation involves segmentation, 
and since political organisation is only one aspect of 
the process of government a distinction cannot be drawn 
between societies which are organized on segmentary 
principles, that is, lineage societies, and those which 
are not. What is crJcial in any particular case is the 
nature of the segments. In some societies these may be 
lineages, in others localities, in others age-sets or 
regiments, in others cult-groups or associations ... 
(Smith, 1956:35) 
TIle linkage here between political organisation, segmentation 
and associations as legitimate segments is clearly consistent with 
the discussion of Cohen and Crissman as well as the direction taken 
in this study. However, the major problem that emerges relates to the 
notion of change within the system. In the other work quoted on 
overseas Chinese - especially Willmott and Wickberg - there is a clear 
emphasis on external influences but little on the internal dynamics 
of the community and their relationship to change. From Smith's 
discussion however, it is clear that the influences which initiate 
change are largely internal to the segmentary lineage systems. Whi Ie 
theTe is considerable attention to the internal dynamics of the New 
Zealand Chinese community the shortcoming of this study is its inability 
to predict concisely the extent to which either internal or external 
variables bring about a change in the segmentary system. In other 
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words it is hard to say with any certainty that internal causes will 
produce one form of segmentary response and external will produce 
another. Hopefully with more research and a greater understanding of 
the impact of particular influences on the Chinese community this kind 
of result may be forthcoming. 
In conclusion it would seem necessary now to bring together 
the two discussions that have ended this study. Aside from the 
analytical points which have been emphasised concerning the 
organisation of an overseas Chinese community I think there are some 
equally important observations one must make about the notions of 
ethnicity and multi-culturalism. New Zealand government policy as 
regards ethnic minorities has changed markedly from one that 
init ly gave total support to assimilation, later integration and 
now multi-culturalism. The New Zealand Chinese have lived through all 
three and their community has persisted and changed. What is alarming 
about both the change in policy and the change in the Chinese community 
is that the former existed in a total vacuum from the latter. The 
development of the Chinese community has taken place, by and large, 
in a context which has desired to comprehend neither the process nor 
the necessity of its existence. This in itself has ensured the 
maintenance of inaccurate stereotypes and aided in persistent attempts 
to discuss and legislate against Chinese residence in the absence of 
meaningful communication with the community. It furthermore has 
perpetuated a level of ignorance within the larger community which if 
not entirely manifest in action against the Chinese has not helped 
their position, nor provided the basis for understanding that is 
necessitated by a multi-cultural nation. The Chinese community for its 
part has survived articulating its political ethnicity through a 
segmentary system which reflected the kinds of influence the cbmmunity 
faced. The fundamental point here is that ethnicity or political 
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ethnicity in this context is a constructive and necessary aspect not 
only for the existence of the New Zealand Chinese but for any ethnic 
minority. The understanding of this phenomenon therefore is crucial 
for policy makers and for the public at large for without this 
understanding is impossible to comprehend the kinds of constraints 
an ethnic minority faces and the kinds of responses they may make. 
The alternative to this view is to operate under the assumption that 
an ethnic minority's social life, in its entirety, can be explained 
by innate ethnic or racial propensities or as cultural traits brought 
from their homeland. These explanations, intentionally and 
unintentionally used can too easily lead to the failure on the part 
of a dominant society to either accept or understand the position 
of minorities. In the end this attitude may be used to absolve a 
potentially multi cultural nation from taking any responsibility 
for those that do not fit its dominant cultural pattern and worse 
may completely eradicate the notion of ethnicity as a viable and 
constructive means of survival. 
In the years that this study covers,New Zealand policy has 
changed and its effect on the Chinese community is noted, however, 
we have far to go before we can consider ourselves a genuine 
multi-cultural nation. It is hoped that policy decisions that are 
made in future concerning minorities and attitudes towards manifest 
ethnicity are informed by knowledge and not judgements and that the 
histories of ethnic groups in future will not be a matter of shame 
or indifference but produced with the dignity they deserve. 
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APPENDIX I 
THE CHINESE POPULATION IN NEW ZEALAND: 1867 TO 1976 
Year Male Female Total 
1867 1213 6 1219 
1871 2637 4 2641 
1874 4814 2 4816 
1878 4424 9 4433 
1881 4995 9 5004 
1886 4527 15 4542 
1891 4426 18 4444 
1896 3773 86 3859 
1901 2885 78 2963 
1906 2515 55 2570 
1911 2542 88 2630 
1916 2017 130 2147 
1921 2993 273 3266 
1926 2927 447 3374 
1936 2432 511 2943 
1945 3414 1526 4940 
1951 3633 2090 5723 
1956 4026 2705 6731 
1961 4913 3611 8524 
1966 5700 4583 10263 
1971 7025 5793 12818 
1976 8081 6779 14860 
Source: New Zealand Census, 1871 to 1976. 
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APPENDIX II 
ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND 
1871 TO 1941 a 
Permanent 
Arriva1s c 
1871 1596 
1872 475 190 285 
1873 183 278 95 
1874 1123 355 768 
1875 776 384 392 
1876 112 453 341 
1877 162 443 281 
1878 1025 255 770 
1879 329 356 27 
1880 296 386 90 
1881 1029 371 658 
1882 23(15)b 168 145 
1883 44 (37) 257 213 
1884 84(79) 306 222 
1885 94 (71) 164 130 
1886 239 (48) 181 58 31 
1887 354 (100) 246 108 25 
1888 308 (281) 211 97 33 
1889 16 (13) 104 88 34 
1890 18(12) 169 151 27 
1891 5 (6) 160 155 30 
1892 58(45) 197 139 43 
1893 116 (107) 134 18 25 
1894 278 (228) 143 135 3 
1895 214 (158) 170 44 
1896 173 (127) 122 51 
1897 13 (6) 123 110 
1898 20 (4) 93 73 
1899 26 (3) 184 158 
1900 27(15) 181 154 
1901 75 (29) 145 70 
1902 69(44) 87 18 
1903 132(90) 124 8 
1904 235 (153) 128 107 
1905 239 (145) 187 52 
1906 260 (139) 133 127 
1907 255 (148) 182 73 
1908 538 (320) 248 290 
1909 171(3) 335 164 
1910 209(2) 298 89 
1911 546(1) 579 33 
1912 348(2) 412 64 
1913 325 (1) 323 2 
1914 511 (1) 537 26 
638. 
Appendix II (Continued) 
Permanent 
Year Arrivals DeEartures Gain Loss Deaths arrivals 
1915 265(2) 237 32 
1916 327 (9) 216 III 
1917 272 (12) 312 40 
1918 256(29) 214 42 
1919 418(289) 238 180 
1920 1477(1029) 380 1097 
1921 255[39]d 368 113 
1922 345[157] 362 17 
1923 365 [99] 378 13 146 
1924 548 [88] 451 97 157 
1925 531 [53] 473 58 58 
1926 600[40J 560 40 50 
1927 527[8] 532 5 11 
1928 545 656 111 6 
1929 531 473 58 5 
1930 458 521 63 7 
1931 375 542 167 3 
1932 327 461 134 (1932-1933) 0 
1933 240 340 100 (1933-1934) 7 
1934 222 349 127 (1934-1935) 10 
1935 273 228 45 (1935 1936) 21 
1936 309 218 91 (1936-1937) 73 
1937 343 218 125 (1937-1938) 112 
1938 473 265 208 (1938-1939) 130 
1939 311 160 151 (1939-1940) 684 
1940 780 127 653 (1940 1941) 197 
1941 271 141 130 
1945-46e 7 6 
1946-47 33 84 
1947-48 79 85 
1948-49 169 244 
1949-50 474 36 
1950-51 176 99 
1951-52 263 20 
1952-53 244 9 
aThese statistics are compiled from the New Zealand Statistics, 1891:24, 
1910:273, 1920:25 and the New Zealand Official Year Book for each year. 
Deaths were available only for the years listed in the AJHR, 1894, 
Vol. 3, H-21. Arrivals and departures ceased being listed in 1941. 
bThese statistics ( ) are from (NA, L22/l/81). They represent new 
arrivals for the years who would have paid poll tax. This would have 
included the 10 poll tax from 1882 till 1896 and 100 poll tax from 
1897 till 1944 when the tax was repealed. The Department however has 
only recorded those paid until 1920. 
cpermanent Arrivals were only listed in the New Zealand Offica1 Year Book 
between 1923 and 1941, as a separate category. 
d These statistics [ ] are. from Appendix XI 
eStatistics for 1945 to 1953 (Census, 1951, Vol. 8:119). 
APPENDIX III 
STATISTICS COMPILED FOR THE INTERIM REPORT NO. 1 AND NO. 2 OF THE CHINESE 
IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE, 1871 
Return of the Estimated Number of Chinese in the Province of Otago on the 15th September, 1871 
How Employed Offences commited during the past Twelve Months 
(1) b.O 
0"0 r.:: 
VI VI H +-i.""; '''''; 
H H (1) U "0 Districts VI (1) (1) +-i >, b.O .,...; .,...; b.O H 0.. 0.. VI VI ...r.:: ...-! r.:: ;::j VI H r.:: VI (1) (1) (1) H H b.O VI >, H .,...; t/) +-i (1) '''''; (1) 
Where +-i (1) (1) (1) (1) VI ;::j >, +-i U (1)+-i +-i r.:: H H >'VI r.:: VI ..><: ..><: r.:: VI H H (lj r.:: ...-! r.:: "0 U o..+-i (1) ;::j ;::j (1) r.:: (1) H (1) ...-! (1) +-i VI ;::j (1) ...:I ...-! (1) ;::j (lj H ;::j Ei U VI 0 ..0 0 
0.. (1) H (1) "0 r.:: ..><: 0 ..><: ~ VI U (lj H 0"0 (1) (1) 0 '''''; ~ ~ Located H r.:: 0 +-i H (1) 0 ..0 :il: r.:: H VI b.O VI r.:: +-i "0 0.. H (lj .,...; +-i 0 (lj b.O 0 (lj (lj a ~ (lj VI (lj .,...; 0 ~ r.:: >< ;::j .,...; ;::j u :E t/) ::c: t.? -< U ...:I ::c: E- ...:I -< > OU I-lp::) u.. Ot/) 
Dunedin 4 8 10 3 10 12 47 1 
Dunstan 1910 77 12 1 2,000 1 3 1 1 
Mount Ida 218 5 5 228 6 1 
Tuapeka 1083 6 1 1,000 3 6 1 1 4 
Southland 350 350 
TOTAL 4 3561 96 1 27 3 1 10 12 3,715 1 12 6 2 1 1 1 1 4 
VI 
,.;.: 
H (lj 
Ei (1) 
ex: 
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Return of the Estimated Number of Chinese in New Zealand, 19 October 1871 
How Employed 
"--"--
til 
til til H 
H H (l) 
til (l) (l) ~ 
H P< P< til til ell ~ (l) (l) (l) iii H S H +-J (l) (l) (l) til +-J :::l 
~ til ~ ~ ~ til H H (l) +-J (l) H (l) r-I (l) +-J til :::l (l) ~ (l) ....:1 
P< (l) H (l) 'U ~ ~ 0 ~ .,.., t:t:: <G 
H ~ 0 +-J H (l) 0 ..0 ;;: ..0 E-< 
ell .,.., +-J 0 ell bJ) 0 ell ell ell 0 0 
u :2: U) ::c: C.::l <G u ....:1 ::c: u Z E-< 
Canterbury 2 2 5 9 
Wellington 1 2 6 1 1 6 17 
Hawkes Bay* 
Nelson 2 1 3 
Marlborough 1 1 
Auckland 2 2 
Westland 9 14 1 24 
Otago (15th Sept. , 4 3561 96 1 27 3 1 10 12 ) 
see Return Interim ) 
Report, No. 1, ) 
Appendix III) j4159 
Since arrrived by sea 444) 
(less ten died in 
harbour) ) 
5 3570 103 1 49 3 3 12 12 6 451 4215 
*None in the Province 
Source: AJHR, 1871 H-5:23 and H-5a: 13 
APPENDIX IV 
REVENUE FROM THE DUTY ON THE IMPORTATION 
OF OPIUM INTO NEW ZEALAND 1867 TO 1901 
1867 
1868 
1869 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1883 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
Source: 
(in pounds sterling) 
£488 
691 
1348.10.0 
1570.5.0 
2028.0.7 
2217.5.0 
2414.1.10 
2369.7.4 
2697.17.6 
2809.1.6 
2688.18.9 
2578.0.0 
3289.10.0 
2544.9.2 
4102.4.5 
4019.4.5 
4183.7.6 
4340.10.6 
4603.7.0 
4367.16.6 
4424.10.0 
3790.5.0 
7576.15.9 
7553.18.3 
8159.5.0 
8045.16.6 
8041.19.6 
5968.18.6 
5408.15.0 
5625.7.6 
5501.9.0 
6139.4.4 
6425.12.6 
6617.10.8 
Statistics of New Zealand 1867-1901 
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APPENDIX V 
RULES OF THE CH'EUNG SHIN TONG 
New Zealand Gold Hill, Panyu District (1) 
Goodness Board Rules 
We hear that, generally speaking, through the great virtue of 
the Sages (2), beneficial influences extend to the shades; and through 
the deep benevolence of the Superior Men (3), favours flow to the most 
distant tombs; but the breast of the benevolent man is moved with 
compassion for fear that the wandering souls of the dead (4) should 
famish. 
We, the publishers, village-gentry of the district of Panyu, 
pity those sojourning coffins not returned home, and regret the 
uneasiness of those scattered souls. 
And there rests on us a duty imperative, on:u~ fellow-villagers 
and fellow-sojourners; then how can we endure to sit on one side and 
look on? 
But it is difficult for one man to bear such a heavy burden; 
the strength of many people is able to accomplish the good work. 
Therefore together we have deliberated over the public-spirited 
proposal to transport these sojourning coffins back to Kwangtung; so 
let all open their purses of gold to aid the compassionate vessel to 
cross over (5). 
It will perhaps be found that some graves are in the corners of 
the earth and in the remotest parts, so that "the lash though long will 
not reach;" but concerning the others, though rivers are vast and 
oceans broad, they can be crossed with one reed (6). 
But having an initiator, it is desirable that we have responders; 
the skilful inventor still requires skilful successors. 
Those who lay up virtue have a foundation, so let all proceed and 
bear the good fruits of the 1000 families (7); in doing good lies the 
greatest happiness, so let all bestow one drop from the willow branch (8). 
Each man should regard virtue as devolving on himself, the 
performance of which he may not yield to another (9). Strive to be 
first with your subscriptions in aid; we are waiting for you to see 
what is right and do it; in paying taxes men fear to be last. 
Those whom we look after, having relatives, will each on return to 
his native village (10) receive the sacrifice of posterity; those without 
such relatives, will be again buried in a public grave, there to enjoy the 
fragrant odours of the summer sacrifices. 
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Alasl in past years their bodies fell in different places; we 
should deplore their separation from us by death, and rejoice that now 
their bones are to return to their native land; for what difference is 
there between the return of these dead and the return of the living? 
For, see the moon in the heavens! is it always round? And on 
earth is there a flower that does not wither (ll)? 
The head of the corpse being adjusted in the grave (12) the souls 
of our former friends will be put at ease; and Hades will produce ght 
gratefully favoured by your goodness. 
All resting peacefully in the tombs, the deceased will surely 
bear grass (13) and bring golden rings (14) to requite your kindness. 
Moreover those who do good will have felicity descend upon them. The 
living may expect the advantages of a good name to follow. 
1. It has been decided that each man shall contribute £l.lOs. 
If some be rich, they must exceed this fixed sum; they may not 
contribute the mentioned minimum amount. 
2. The committee of management are to receive no salary; but 
their expenses to and fro will be borne by the Board. 
3. Those who subscribe shall receive a receipt setting forth the 
name, year, month, and day; distinguishing mark, number, and the name 
of the collector. 
4. Each time a journey is made to the various gold-diggings to 
receive subscriptions, on return to Dunedin, the money shall be delivered 
to the manager at Sew Hoy's store when after deducting the collector's 
expenses, it shall be deposited in a bank to receive interest to make up 
any deficiency. 
5. The money collected shall be used only for the "former friends; II 
it may not be applied to other purposes 
6. Friends of the dead should, at an early date, write clearly 
about the deceased, giving village, surname and name, with the name of the 
burial place, sending the letter to the "Effulgent Goodness Board", that 
the name may be enrolled and the numbers ascertained. 
7. Those who do business for the Board are reckoned as associates 
thereof; when they have set about their work, they shall not engage in 
any other business to the damage of their work. 
8. Persons intending to return to China, must first go to the 
office of the Board, stating their intention, when they will get a 
receipt; they already possess a receipt, they must so report when 
their numbers will be cancelled and they may proceed; those not possessing 
a receipt are absconders,whom it has been decided to fine in the sum of 
es, no quarter to be given. 
9. Those who arrange matters on the goldfields, shall send all 
moneys collected to the manager, who will issue receipts to the sender for 
delivery to the subscribers in proof of receipt. 
10. It is required of the relatives, of fellow-villagers, who have 
died in hospitals, that they attend to the graves, to avoid there being in 
course of time levelled and lost; so that no mistake may be made by the 
openers. If any such mistake occur, no blame shall attach to the Board. 
Let this rule everywhere be observed. 
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11. As the expense of transporting the "former friends" is 
immense, it has been decided that if any man return to China now, and 
afterwards come again to New Zealand, he must again subscribe in accord-
ance with the above minimum amount - much talk not allowed. 
12. Whatever the collectors collect must be forwarded every 
quarter, during the 3rd, 6th, 9th, and 12th months - these times must 
not be exceeded and people kept waiting. 
13. The "former friends" having been raised and arranged shall be 
sent to Dunedin, where the directors shall, in the presence of the 
"former friends," reckon clearly all accounts, and burn a written oath to 
show plainly that all is fair without secrecy; they shall afterwards 
engage a vessel to convey the "former friends" back to Kwang Tung, so that 
in the end all shall be well. Any money remaining shall, as before, be 
lodged in the bank to receive interest for the purpose of carrying out any 
good work which hereafter may be determined. 
Notes. 
(1) P'anyu or P'oonyu - the district in Kwangtung province which 
shared in the exhumation. 
(2) Literally, "Holy men," Vas, Shun, Show, King, Confucius, etc. 
(3) Next in rank to the "Holy men". 
(4) Thvse buried in far away lands. 
(5) The original "compassionate vessel" is that in which the 
Buddhist goddess of mercy carries souls to heaven. The owners of the 
s.s. Hoihow (which carried the former men) will doubtless be overjoyed 
at the comparison. 
(6) This sentence is obscure; it may be paraphrased, "It may be 
found impossible to reach some graves; but if rivers and oceans are the 
only obstacle, they will be easily crossed". One reed may mean a 
bundle of reeds~ the expression comes from the classic Book of Poetry. 
(7) The clan interested - the P'oonyuites. 
(8) The goddess of mercy dipped a willow branch in a vessel of 
sweet dew and scattered it to cure disease. 
(9) This sentence in the original consists of six words - "Each 
should regard virtue, not yield". It is from Confucius. 
(10) Literally, "family garden". 
(11) Implying that man also must change. 
(12) The Chinese believe the fox to be capable of assuming at will 
the human form. It is said that when an old fox is about to die, the 
younger faxes are careful to arrange the body and head in a line pointing 
directly towards the opening of the den. 
(13) Referring to a legend supplied by my Chinese tutor. The father 
of one Ngai-kit, a commander-in-chief, being about to die, charged his 
son to take care of an old friend while living and bury him when dead. 
Ngai-kit discharged his trust faithfully. Some time after the death of 
the old man, ~gai-kit met in battle with one To-Ui, a famous warrior who, 
all things being equal, would surely be victorious. They met near the 
grave of the old man with spears, face to face on horse.· To-Ui had to 
pass the grave to meet Ngai-kit, but meanwhile the spirit of the old man 
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was busy making a rope of long grass growing on the grave. As Toi-Ui 
passed rapidly on his horse to meet Nga-kit, the spirit pulled the rope 
tight, the horse and rider were overthrown., Ngai-kit was able to 
despatch his enemy and was thus requited for his kindness to his 
father's old friend. 
(14) Referring to another legend. One Young Po seeing a bird in 
peril, rescued it and then set it at liberty .. Some time afterwards 
the same bird returned with a golden ring in its mouth and said: "For 
three generations your posterity will attain to the title of duke or 
marquis," This proved true, and thus Yeung Po·was rewarded. 
Source: New Zealand Presbyterian,lDecember 1883:103-105 
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CHINESE DWELLINGS IN NEW ZEALAND BY TYPE FOR 18781 
Houses Huts Tents 
North Island 78 4 1 
Middle Island 1298 2100 888 
TOTAL 1376 2104 889 
1The Middle Island is referred to as the South Island 
after 1891 
Source: Census, 1878:9 
Sleeping 
Out 
13 
13 
APPENDIX VII 
NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION PERTAINI 
TO CHINESE IMMIGRATION, 1879~1944 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1887 
Chinese 
Chinese 
Chinese 
Chinese 
Chinese 
Immigrants Bill 
Immigrants Prohibition Bill 
Immigrants Act 
Mining Exclusion Act 
Influx Prevention Bill 
1888 The Act to Amend the Chinese Immigrants Act of 1881 
1889 Chinese Immigrants Act Continuance Bill 
1893 Aliens Act Amendment 
1894 The Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act 
1895 Asiatic and Other Immigration Restriction Bill 
Chinese Immigrants Bill 
1896 Asiatic Restriction Bill (1) 
Asiatic Restriction Bill (2) 
1897 Aliens Immigration Restriction Bill 
1898 Immigration Restriction Bill 
1899 Immigration Restriction Bill 
1901 Chinese Immigrants Amendment Act 
1907 Chinese Immigrants Amendment Bill 
1908 Immigration Restriction Act 
1908 Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill 
1911 Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill 
1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Bill 
1944 Finance Act (No.3) 
Note: This list incorporates legislation both enacted 
and failed. 
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OCCUPATIONS OF THE CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND 1871 1901 
1871 1874 1878 1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 
l. Merchants . 10 7 7 20 16 12 23 
2. Storekeepers 103 87 105 116 140 137 217 209 
3. Store Assistant 16 20 17 38 43 94 70 
4. Servants 37 78 66 75 92 31 1 
5. Hotel/Boarding 1 8 12 19 30 32 32 27 
House keeper 
6. Restaurant 1 1 3 7 7 19 7 
7. Service (General) 17 48 92 165 119 151 128 126 
8. Laundry 4 31 86 
9. Hawker 12 12 36 33 57 112 83 81 
10. Market Gardener 49 102 255 393 631 566 530 591 
II. Market Gardener 24 7 16 43 i27 94 
Labourer/Assistant 
12. Farm 47 129 132 80 61 45 68 Labourer/Servant 
13. General Labourer 12 337 199 133 91 79 59 50 
14. Miner 3570 4022 3398 3860 3134 3025 2170 1313 
15. Professional 8 13 6 16 13 13 11 
16. Wives 2 6 4 4 11 15 
17. Students 2 2 12 2 8 15 
18. Children 8 9 6 14 17 16 
19. Charitable 12 9 18 20 35 28 38 
Institutions 
20. Prison 2 3 1 5 3 2 1 
2I. No Information 451 65 36 13 41 9 54 15 
TOTAL 4215 4816 4433 5004 4542 4444 3711 2857 
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l. Merchants 
2. Storekeeper 
3. Store Assistant 
4. Servants 
7. Service (General) 
9. Hawker 
14. Miner 
15. Professional 
17 & 18 
19. Charitable 
Institutions 
opium, general, agent, money lender. 
grocer, fruit and vegetables, confections, 
fancy goods, rag, bone, waste paper dealer. 
shopman, storeman, clerk, packer, traveller. 
domestic, club, ship 
baker, butcher, bootmaker, tailor, cabinet 
maker, carpenter, cook,painter, wood carver, 
brick maker. 
tea, vegetables, fish, fancy goods, drapery. 
coal and gold 
Herbalist, chemist, dentist, interpreter 
law clerk, accountant, school teacher, music 
teacher. 
includes both male and female. 
hospital, benevolent asylum, lunatic asylum. 
Source: New Zealand Census 1874-1901 and AJHR, 1871, H-5a:13. 
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P LL TAX DEPOSITS D BONDS PAID BY 
CHINESE IMMIGRANTS 1882-1944 
Year Amount in Year Amount in 
1882a 150.0.0 1914 200.0.0 
1883 270.0.0 1915 330.0.0 
1884 770. O. 0 1916 980.0.0 
1885 510.0.0 1917 1,210.0.0 
1886 530.0.0 1918 8,190.0.0 
1887 990.0.0 1919 45,700.0.0 
1888b 2,780.0.0 1920 83,500.0.0 
1889 70.0.0 1921 5,020.0.0 
1890 90.0.0 1922 15,530.0.0 
1891 50.0.0 1923 10,270.0.0 
1892 440.0.0 1924 10,490.0.0 
1893 1,050.0.0 1925 10,660.0.0 
1894 2,200.0.0 1926 9,840.0.0 
1895 1,460.0.0 1927 5,070.0.0 
1896c 1,100.0.0 1928 3,590.0.0 
1897 430.0.0 1929 3,970.0.0 
1898 100.0.0 1930 3,140.0.0 
1899 1,200.0.0 1931 1,760.0.0 
1900 800.0.0 1932 1,490.0.0 
1901 2,300.0.0 1933 1,480.0.0 
1902 4,400.0.0 1934 1,824.0.0 
1903 10,030.0.0 1935 1,882.0.0 
1904 14,800.0.0 1936 4,780.0.0 
1905 15,500.0.0 1937 5,480.0.0 
1906 13,000.0.0 1938 4,232.0.0 
1907 21,800.0.0 1939 3,790.0.0 
1908d 23,600.0.0 1940 1,970.0.0 
1909 300.0.0 1941 988.0.0 
1910 100.0.0 1942 65,101. 0.0 
1911 1943 2,040.0.0 
1912 300.0.0 1944 1,570.0.0 
1913 
Source: Statistics of New Zealand: Finance Section 1882-1944. 
APPENDIX X 
MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHINESE MINISTER TO THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE CONCERNING IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON THE 
CHINESE, 1910 
651. 
Chinese Legation, 14 August, 1909 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received 
telegraphic instructions from the Wai-wu Pu in Peking, directing me to 
approach Your Excellency on the subject ot the present position of 
Chinese subjects in the Dominion of New Zealand. 
In the year 1908 the New Zealand lature passed an Act entitled 
the Immigration Restriction Act, with an addition in the same year called 
Immigration Restriction Amendment Act. On reading the provisions contained 
in the Acts, I cannot refrain from remarking that the restrictions 
they impose upon Chinese subjects appear very oppressive and undiscriminating. 
With the exception of officers or crews of Chinese vessels of war, as 
provided for in clause 41 of Part III of the principal Act, all other 
classes of Chinese subjects are precluded from visiting that prosperous 
colony of the British Empire unless they are willing to submit themselves to 
certain proceedings derogatory to their dignity and self-respect. 
As New Zealand is within easy distance of China, and has made great 
progress within the last generation in the development of various 
industries, and also in her economical conditions, it would be to the 
advantage of both countries if facilities were afforded to Chinese subjects 
to visit that Dominion not only for the purpose of encouraging trade, but 
also for intellectual studies. 
, 
With this object in view the Chinese Government have had this matter 
under consideration for some time, and have now arrived at the conclusion 
that the present might be considered an opportune time to approach the 
Government of New Zealand for the negotiation of some change in their laws 
regulating the immigration of Chinese subjects into their Dominion. 
I am now instructed, therefore, by my Government to enclose herewith, 
for Your Excellency's information, a memorandum of the proposed 
modifications on the existing immigration rules of New Zealand, and my 
Government would feel deeply gratified if Your Excellency could see your 
way to exercise such a favourable influence in the matter as would 
contribute to the settlement of this important question in the sense 
desired. 
I have, etc. 
Sir Edward Grey, Bart., MP., etc. Li Ching-Fong 
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Memorandum of Proposed Modifications in the New Zealand Regulations for 
the Immigration of Chinese 
1. Chinese officials, students, and merchants with capital shall 
be granted the same privileges and facilities in landing at any 
port of New Zealand as are granted to the subjects of other 
Powers who have treaty relations with England: Provided they 
can produce passports issued by competent Chinese authorities 
certifying as to his status and condition, such passports to be 
issued by English Consuls or otherwise duly authorised sh 
officials. 
2. Any Chinese subject who has been resident in New Zealand for 
over three years, and who is well known to have been engaged 
bona fide in any respectable business, can have his wife and 
family brought from China to New Zealand to reside with him, 
,and his wife and family may be allowed to land without paying 
any tax or submitting themselves to the language test, if they 
can produce a passport or passports issued by a competent 
Chinese authority certifying that they are in fact the wife and 
family of the aforesaid Chinese subject. 
3. No Chinese subject who has been resident in any part of New 
Zealand for a number of years and is well known to his 
neighbours shall, he desires to leave New Zealand temporarily 
with the intention of returning within four years, be required 
to leave his thumb-impressions for identification. 
4. Any Chinese subject who is able to pass the language test on 
entering New Zealand shall be allowed to land, like the 
subjects of other Powers, without paying any tax. 
5, Any Chinese subject who is passing through New Zealand on his 
way to other countries shall be exempted from paying any tax if 
he can find sureties to guarantee that he is a bona fide through 
traveller. If such traveller is afterwards found to remain in 
any part of New Zealand he will be dealt with in accordance with 
clause 34 of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1908. 
Source: AJHR, 1910, A-l:45 
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ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES OF CHINESE CHINESE NATIONALITY 
IN NEW ZEALAND 1921-1936 
Period Arrivals Departures M F T M F 
9 mos. 1921 32x 7x 39x 19¢ -¢ 
Year 1922 144x 13x 157x 12¢ -¢ 
1923 91x 8x 99x 15¢ 1¢ 
1924 81x 7x 88x 17¢ 
-¢ 
1925 51x 2x 53x 23¢ 
-¢ 
1926 34x 6x 40x 25¢ 1¢ 
1927 6x 2x 8x 35¢ -¢ 
1928 391 13 404 618 38 
1929 453 25 478 492 36 
1930 325 18 343 492 34 
1931 331 14 345 406 32 
1932 230 11 241 345 34 
15 mos. 1933-34 227 21 248 335 15 
Year 1934-35 246 12 258 207 14 
II 1935-36 274 19 293 194 13 
xFor period 1921-1927, figures are for new immigrants intending 
permanent residence only; the remaining years cover all arrivals. 
T 
19¢ 
12¢ 
16¢ 
17¢ 
23¢ 
26¢ 
35¢ 
656 
528 
526 
438 
379 
350 
221 
207 
¢For period 1921-1927, figures are for New Z~a1and residents 
departing permanently only; the remaining years cover all departures. 
Note: Table reproduced as in source 
Source: NA, IA 1935, 155/39, a reply to an Internal Affairs Department 
request (NA, IA 1935/155/38) by the Census and Statistics 
Office, 8 April 1937. 
654. 
APPENDIX XII 
MIGRATION - PERSONS OF CHINESE RACE 
ARRIVALS DEPARTURES 
Period Full-Blood Mixed Blood Full-Blood 
9 mos. 1921 182x 24x 206x x x x 253x 14x 267x 
Year 1922 324x 21x 345x x x x 345x 17x 362x 
1923 348x 17x 365x x x x 359x 19x 378x 
1924 526x 22¢ 54816 5 43016 2116 45116 
1925 490¢ 2716 51716 5 49516 2916 52416 
1926 59016 23¢ 613¢ 6 51716 2416 541¢ 
1927 52816 1416 54216 3 547¢ 4016 587¢ 
1928 397 17 414 4 1 5 634 45 679 
1929 467 30 497 2 5 7 494 35 529 
1930 331 20 351 2 2 503 43 546 
1931 332 17 349 3 3 416 43 459 
1932 231 12 243 2 2 352 41 393 
15 mos.1933-34 230 22 252 1 1 353 26 379 
Year 1934-35 254 17 271 2 2 209 17 226 
1935-36 279 27 306 1 2 3 202 15 217 
11 mos. to 321 12 333 1 2 3 160 7 167 
28/2/37 
x For the period 1921-1923, the numbers of mixed-blood Chinese (if any) 
are included in the figures given for full-blood Chinese 
¢For the period 1924-1927, the figures given for full-blood Chinese 
include mixed-blood Chinese. Sexes of mixed-bloods not available 
for these years. 
Note: Table reproduced as in source 
Source: NA, IA 1935/155/38 - a reply to an Internal Affairs Department 
request by the Census and Statistics Office. 
Mixed 
x 
x 
x 
1 
4 
3 
2 
1 
Blood 
x x 
x x 
x x 
3 
4 
2 
2 
1 1 
1 2 
2 6 
1 4 
2 4 
1 
2 2 
1 1 
1 1 
655. 
APPENDIX XIII 
PERSONS BORN IN CHINA 
(Figures not available prior to 1928) 
Arrivals (other than Persons of Chinese 
N.Z. residents re- race who were per- All 
Period turning) manent residents Departures 
to N.Z.x 
M F T M F T M 
Year 1928 119 15 134 288 11 299 606 
1929 148 26 174 321 20 341 486 
1930 76 18 94 262 15 277 488 
1931 45 9 54 295 14 309 404 
1932 52 14 66 188 7 195 337 
15 mos. 1933-34 44 15 59 193 15 208 355 
Year 1934-35 40 17 57 226 13 239 216 
1935 36 104 19 123 188 16 204 198 
xlnc1uding mixed-blood. Birthplaces of N.Z. residents returning are 
not known, but the great majority of Chinese returning would 
probably be born in China. 
Note: Table reproduced as in source. 
F 
30 
21 
35 
25 
23 
34 
23 
20 
Source: NA, IA,1935/155/38 - a reply to an Internal Affairs Department 
request by the Census and Statistics Office, 8 April 1937. 
T 
636 
507 
523 
429 
360 
389 
239 
218 
656. 
APPENDIX XIV 
PETITIONS SENT BY CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND TO THE NEW ZEALAND 
GOVERNMENT OR THE GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND 1883-1912 
1883, 
1888, 
1891, 
1895, 
1896, 
AJHR, Vol. 3, I-I, p.4 
Petition of John Ah Tong and other Chinese: 
"The petitioners pray that Chinese immigration may be freed 
from the poll tax until the number of Chinese in the Colony 
reaches seven thousand". 
AJHR, Vol. 3 I-I, p.3 
Petition of Chinese residents (21) of Auckland: 
"The petitioners protest against any legislation that imposes, 
or may hereafter impose restrictions on the immigration and 
residence of Chinese in this Colony, pleading that such 
legislation is not only unjust and impolitic in itself, but 
that it constitutes a violation of treaties now in force 
between the British and Chinese Empires". 
AJHR, Vol. 4, 1-2, p.4 
Petitions of Gee, Sew and Others, and Ah Kew and Others 
of Auckland: "Petitioners pray for an amendment of 
"The Chinese Immigration Act 1881". 
AJHR, Vol. 4 I-I, p. 8 
Petitions of Wong Choi Fong and Others (Fong Wong Choi): 
"Petitioners pray for the Amendment of liThe Chinese 
Immigration Act 1881". 
AJHR, Vo 1. 4, I-I, P . 8 
Petition of Sun Kwong Lee and Others of Wellington: 
"Petitioners pray that the House will not pass any further 
laws of an oppressive nature against the Chinese". 
C.O. 209/256 Despatch 48. 
Petition of Thot Chang Luke, Chow Fong, Sing Kee and Co., 
William Ah Tong - Interpreter. 
"Your Petitioners humbly pray that your Excellency will take 
this petition into your favourable consideration and that your 
Excellency will be pleased to refuse your assent to the 
measure now before Parliament. 
C.O. 209/256 Despatch 48. 
Petit ion of W. Hong Kew & Co., Wong Hong Cheok. 
"Your petitioners respectfully ask that no further disabilities 
should be cast upon their countrymen ... That all measures which 
place impediments in the way of your petitioners' countrymen 
bringing their wives and children to the Colony should be 
disallowed. 
1897, 
1900, 
1901, 
1903, 
1904, 
AJHR, Vol. 3, I-I, p.4 
Petition of Fook On, of Wellington: "Petitioner prays for 
relief from poll tax imposed upon his wife". 
657. 
Reply: "I am directed to report that the Committee is of the 
opinion that, upon proof of the marriage ceremony in this 
Colony, the Governor be advised to remit the fine of 100, 
as provided by Section 10 of "The Chinese Immigration Act 1881". 
Also see in connection with above: Letter in (NZPD, Vol. 100, 
1897, pp. 873-875) from one Chin Tong, a merchant from 
Pahiatua, who makes reference to the situation of Hook On of 
Yee Chong Wing and Co. (Manners St., Wellington) who is 
believed to be the same person as the gentleman, Fook On. 
AJHR, Vol. 3, I-I, p.6 
Peti tion of Ah Foot of Riverton: "Peti tioner prays for a . 
refund of expenses incurred by him in an action in the 
Magistrate I s Court, Ri verton
'
!. 
AJHR, Vo 1. 3, I-I, p'. 8 
Petition of Young Hee and 541 Others: "Petitioners pray that 
an act be passed prohibiting or limiting the importation of 
opium, and controlling the use and sale thereof". 
Petition of 172 Chinese to Hon. J.G. Ward, Acting Premier. 
"We ... pray that for the reasons set forth, you will advise 
the Chinese Government to authorise the appointment in this 
city of a Chinese Consul or Protector. 
Source: Turnbull Library MS Paper H-19. 
AJHR, Vol. 4, 1-2, p. 7 
Daniel Wong and 100 Others; J. T. Pinfold and Another; Wee Wah 
and 32 Others, G.W. Moy and 34 Others; Rev. C.H. Garland and 
4 Others; and Rev. H. Kelly and 3 Others: "Petitioners pray for-
the prohibition of limitation of the importation of opium into 
the Co lony" . 
Reply: "I am directed to report that, as the subject matter 
of the petition has'been dealt with by the passing of the 
Opium Prohibition Bill, the Committee has no recommendation 
to make". 
AJHR, Vo 1. 3, I-I, p. 3 
Petition of Louis Kitt and 322 Others of Wellington: 
"Peti tioners pray that the Government will appoint some 
official representative of the Chinese in the Colony". 
See also, NZPD, 1903, Vol. 125, p. 563. 
AJHR, Vol. 3, I-I, p.4 
Petition of Louis Kitt, of Wellington, and 4 Others: 
"Petitioners pray that more drastic measures be taken for 
the suppression of opium smoking". 
Reply: !II am directed to report that, in the opinion of the 
Committees, this petition, together with the evidence of 
Inspector Ellison, should be referred to the Government, and 
that the Government be recommended to give effect to the 
prayer of the petition". 
1904, 
1907, 
1908, 
1912, 
AJHR, Vol. 3, I-I, p.4 
Petition of Louis Kitt, of Wellington, and 4 Others: 
"Peti tioners pray that more drastic measures be taken for 
the suppression of gambling among Chinese". 
AJHR, Vol. 3, I-I, p.9 
Petition of Wah Lee of Wanganui, and Another: 
"Petitioners pray for the return of the fines inflicted 
on them (a portion of them)". 
AJHR, Vol. 5, I-I, p.4 
Petition of Kwok Wah Sui of Alexandra South: 
658. 
"Peti tioner prays for a refund of the poll tax paid on account 
of his wife". 
AJHR, Vol. 5, ,I-I, p. 7 
Petition of Ah Ming of Cambridge: "Petitioner prays for 
the return of poll tax paid for the second time". 
AJHR, Vol. I, A-I, ,p. 15 and pp. 19-22 
Petition of the Chinese residents ( ) of the Dominion of 
New Zealand: "Petitioners ... pray that Your Excellency may be 
pleased to place this their petition before His Most Gracious 
Majesty King Edward the Seventh. They pray that Your 
Excellency may be pleased to recommend His Majesty to withhold 
his assent from the Bill (The Chinese Immigrants Amendment 
Act, 1907) which Your Excellency has been pleased to reserve 
for the signification of His Majesty's, and that your 
petitioners may be granted such further or other relief as 
to His Majesty may seem meet. 
AJHR, Vol. 5 (Session 2), I-I, p. 9 
Petition of William Pettie and 98 Others of Gisborne: 
"Praying for an Amendment to the Immigration Act 1908, in 
order that one Ching Foo be permitted to reside in New Zealand, 
the said Ching Foo having prior to visiting his native country 
in 1910 resided twenty years in this Dominion". 
Year 
1852 1 
1856 
1866 1 
1869 
1870 1 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1879 
1880 
1881 
mm 
1 
1883 2 
1884 
1885 J 1 
1886 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
lliti=t 1892 1893 . 
APPENDIX XV 
CHINESE NATURALIZED IN NEW ZEALAND FROM 1852 TO 1907 
BY OCCUPATION1 
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1 In 1907 the "Chinese Inunigrants Amendment Act" was passed, in order to restrict the inunigration 
of Chinese into New Zealand. In view of this legislation (which was embodied in the 
Immigration Restriction Act, 1908), the Minister of Internal Affairs decided not to naturalize 
Chinese and placed the matter before Cabinet for a decision. Cabinet direction on the 
4th February, 1908 was "decline naturalization." 
(I.A. 116/7, 24 June 1946). 
From 1910 to 1947 the following exceptional cases were allowed to take out naturalization, 
1 Commercial Traveller. 1 Domestic, 1 Clerk, 1 Child, 1 Merchant. 1 Housewife. 
1 Medical Student, 1 Baker, 1 Medical Practitioner. 1 Radio Mechanic. 
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APPENDIX XVI 
PETITION FROM LLINGTON CHINESE CONCERNING POLL 
TAX PROVISIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF NATURALISATION 
RIGHTS 1897 
To His Excellency the Governor of New Zealand 
The Humble Petition of the Undersigned Chinese residents of 
Wellington, on behalf of themselves and their fellow countrymen in 
New Zealand. 
Sheweth 
660. 
1. That the Chinese residents in New Zealand are as a rule, 
peaceful, orderly, industrious, and law abiding Colonists, 
and compare favourably with the subjects of any other Nation 
who become residents of New Zealand. 
2. That exceptional laws have already been passed in New Zealand 
in respect of the Chinese. 
3. That for years past the number of Chinese residents in New 
Zealand is decreasing. 
4. That in order to obtain Letters of Naturalization the Chinese 
have to pay a fee of tl.O.O, whereas Letters of Naturalization 
are granted to other aliens free. 
5. That it is now proposed to make it unlawful in future to grant 
Letters of Naturalization to Chinese. 
6. That your Petitioners respectfully submit that the proposed 
alteration in the law relating to the Chinese is exceptional, 
cruel, and unjust, and is such that one friendly Nation should 
not pass with respect to the subjects of another friendly nation. 
Your Petitioners Humbly Pray that your Excellency will take this 
petition into your favourable consideration and that your Excellency 
will be pleased to refuse your assent to the measure now before 
Parliament. And your Petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray etc. 
Thot Chang Luke 
Chow Fong 
Source: C.O. 209/256/17/755/767 
Sing Kee & Co. 
W. Hong Kew and Co. 
Wong She 
Yee Chong Wing 
William Ah Tong, Interpreter 
Despatch 48 
APPENDIX XVII 
PETITION FROM NATURALISED CHINESE 
DESIRING TO SETTLE PERMANENTLY, 
1897 
To His Excellency. 
The Right Honourable David, Earl of Glasgow 
Knights Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished 
Order of Saint Michael and Saint George; 
Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over 
Her Majesty's Colony of New Zealand and its 
Dependencies. 
661. 
The Humble Petition of the undersigned 
British Subjects, natives of China but 
duly naturalised by virtue of the 
provisions of the laws from time to 
time in force in the Colony of New 
Zealand 
Humbly and Respectfully Showeth 
1. That your petitioners represent besides themselves a great number 
of their countrymen who have resided in Wellington and other places 
in New Zealand for various periods up to over twenty five years. 
2. That the majority of the persons aforesaid including your petitioners 
have become naturalised subjects of Her Majesty the Queen 
3. That your petitioners and those they represent have complied with the 
laws of the Colony during the time they have resided in the Colony 
and have, they believe, conducted themselves soberly, industriously, 
and with respect to the feelings of other law abiding residents of 
the Colony. 
4. That some of your petitioners and their friends have relatives and some 
have wives and famil resident in Asia. 
5. That it has often been urged against Chinese residents in the Colony 
that they have neglected domestic relations by not bringing their 
wives to settle with them in the Colony. 
662. 
Appendix XVII (Continued) 
6. That when your petitioners and their friends came to the Colony 
they did so with a view to a temporary residence only but almost 
the whole of them have become accustomed to the habits and rule of 
the Colony and so appreciate them that they have determined to 
make it their permanent home. 
7. Some of them have in consequence of their premises brought their 
wives to the Colony and others desire to do so. 
8. A strong prejudice on the part of some members of the community has 
caused legislation to be passed which presses heavily upon our 
petitioners and their fellow countrymen who are desirous of joining 
your petitioners in sharing the advantage of settling in this 
Colony. 
9. Further legislation has been sought to be passed during the present 
Session of Parliament and the same has been passed by both Houses of 
Parliament. 
10. Your petitioners humblY submit that this legislation now sought to 
be passed is unfair to your petitioners and their kinsmen who belong 
to the Nation' at peace with Great Britain and bound by Treaty to 
permit intercourse between such nations. 
11. If such legislation is passed your petitioners will be deprived 
except under heavy penalty of the right to bring to the Colony their 
wives and children at present resident in other parts of the world. 
12. A slight is placed upon your petitioners by a public enactment which 
virtually declares that your petitioners and their countrymen are 
bad Colonists. 
13. Your petitioners submit that they and their countrymen within the 
Colony have maintained as pure and unblemished a record as any 
similar number of Colonists of any other race. 
Your Petitioners Therefore Humbly Pray 
1. That Your Excellency will be pleased to transmit to Her 
Majesty the Queen whose subjects they pride themselves 
upon being, their assurances of respectful obedience 
and their above humble expression of their opinion. 
2. Your petitioners respectfully ask that no further 
disabilities should be cast upon their countrymen but 
that if it is seriously alleged that they are guilty of 
any conduct not conducive to the well being of the State 
that due inquiry should be made before measures 
condemnatory of a large body of citizens are passed. 
3. That all measures which place impediments in the way of 
your petitioner's countrymen bringing their wives and 
children to the Colony should be disallowed and your 
petitioners as in duty bound will ever pray etc. 
Source: C.O. 209/256 17/755/767 
Despatch 48 
W. Hong Kew & Co. 
Wong Hong Cheok 
APPENDIX XVIII 
Age Distribution for the New Zealand Chinese Population, 1891-1921 
1891 1906 1916 1921 
M F M F M F M F 
15 and under 11 8 25 10 39 33 160 80 
15 and under 20 30 1 32 9 1 9 240 9 
20 and under 25 161 3 125 13 32 8 428 23 
25 and under 45 3000 6 939 22 672 22 1050 84 
45 and under 65 1155 0 1146 1 850 1 753 9 
65 and upwards 24 0 219 0 308 0 263 0 
unknown 45 0 29 21 11 
TOTAL 4426 19 2515 55 1923 73 2905 205 
Source; Census 1891:142, Census 1906:202-203, Census, Part X 1916:16, Census, Part VI 1921:30. 
APPENDIX XIX 
PETITION OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE COMMUNITY 
OPPOSING THE CHINESE IMMIGRANTS ACT AMENDMENT 
ACT 1907 
To His Excellency the Right Honourable William Lee, 
Baron Plunket, K.C.M.G., Governor of the Dominion 
of New Zealand. 
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,-
664. 
This humble petition of the undersigned Chinese residents of the 
Dominion of New Zealand showeth:-
1. That your petitioners comprise the great majority of the 
Chinese residents of the Dominion aforesaid, and some of them are 
naturalised subjects of His Majesty and Christians. 
2. That the Chinese residents of the Dominion are peaceful, 
hardworking, and law-abiding. The proportion of law-breakers among 
them is considerably smaller than among European residents, and 
practically all offences committed by them are of a minor character. 
3. That before being admitted to the Dominion each of your 
petitioners paid the poll-tax, as required by law. 
4. That your petitioners earn their living honestly as miners, 
market-gardeners, laundrymen, and shopkeepers, and more than two 
hundred have become naturalised. 
5. That during the session of the General Assembly of New 
Zealand held in 1907, a Bill intituled "An Act to amend 'The Chinese 
Immigrants Act, 1881,' " was passed, but reserved by Your Excellency 
for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon. 
6. That your petitioners respectfully submit that the said Bill, 
having been introduced and passed at the close of an unusually long 
session of the General Assembly of New Zealand, was not fully and 
adequately considered and discussed; that your petitioners had no 
knowledge of the introduction of the said Bill until considerable 
progress had been made with it, and were afforded neither time nor 
opportunity for placing their protest fairly before Parliament. 
665. 
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7. That such Bill proposes to enact as follows:-
(a. ) "It shall not be lawful for any Chinese to land in New 
Zealand until it has been proved to the satisfaction 
of the Collector or other principal officer of Customs 
at some port in New Zealand that such Chinese is able 
to read a printed passage of not less than one hundred 
words of the English language, selected at the 
discretion of such Collector or principal officer: 
Provided that any Chinese who is dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Collector or principal officer shall 
have the right to appeal to a Magistrate, who shall 
administer such fUrther test in reading the English 
language as he thinks fit, and the decision of the 
Magistrate shall be final. 
(b.) "Any master of a ship who lands or permits to land in 
New Zealand any Chinese who has not fulfilled the 
requirements of this Act shall be liable to the same 
penalties, and may be dealt with in the same manner as 
if he had landed or attempted to land without payment 
having been made as provided by section five of the 
principal Act." 
8. That under "The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1881," every Chinese 
immigrant to New Zealand was subjected to a poll-tax of ~10, in 
addition to which the proportion of Chinese immigrants travelling on 
anyone ship was fixed at one for every 10 tons of registered tonnage. 
9. That by an amending Act of 1888 the proportion of Chinese 
immigrants per ship was further limited to one for every 100 tons of 
registered tonnage. As if all this was not sufficiently severe, the 
General Assembly of New Zealand in 1896 passed a Bill intituled "The 
Asiatic Restriction Act," the chief objects of which were to raise the 
poll-tax to €100, to limit the proportion of immigrants to one for 
every 200 tons of registered tonnage, and to prohibit the naturalisation 
of Chinese. The measure was reserved, however, by His Excellency Lord 
Glasgow for the signification of Her late Majesty's pleasure thereon, 
and it never became law. 
10. That when "The Asiatic Restriction Act, 1896," had been 
reserved as aforesaid, the General Assembly of New Zealand passed "The 
Chinese Immigrants Act, 1896," the object of which was to increase the 
pOll-tax to £100 and to limit the number of Chinese passengers by any 
one ship to one for every 200 tons of registered tonnage. That Act 
was intended as a temporary measure pending the assent of Her late 
Majesty to the Bill which had been reserved, but, as Her late Majesty 
withheld her assent from the latter, the said Act of 1896 is still in 
force. 
11. That when the Colonial Premiers met the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies in Conference on the occasion of Her late Majesty's 
Diamond Jubilee in 1897, the question of alien immigration into the 
British colonies was dealt with exhaustively. The Secretary of State for 
the Colonies submitted a draft measure to the Conference of Premiers for 
submission to their respective Parliaments, with a view, as far as 
possible, to the adoption of uniform legislation in this connection 
throughout the Empire. This measure, as adopted by the Premiers, omitted 
all reference to immigrants of any particular nationality; it contained 
no reference to the question of naturalisation, and proposed a 
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uniform writing test for immigrants "in some language of Europe". 
The evident policy of the measure was to deal with a subject 
admittedly difficult in the least offensive manner possible in the 
circumstances, and to avoid undue harshness towards the people of any 
particular nation. "The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899," 
represents the measure submitted to the Premiers by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, as the same was adopted by the Parliament of 
New Zealand. Section 21 of the Act reads as follows: "Nothing in this 
Act contained shall apply to Chinese within the meaning of 'The 
Chinese Immigrants Act, 1891,' but all such Chinese shall continue to 
be subject to the Act as if this Act had not been passed", This 
clause was in the Bill as was first submitted to the House of 
Representatives, and it clearly shows that the Conference of Premiers 
and the Parliament of New Zealand considered that, inasmuch as Chinese 
immigrants were already subject to a poll-tax of £100 and to drastic 
limitations on the number travelling by anyone ship, it was neither 
desirable nor equitable that they should also be made amenable to a 
wri ting test. 
12. That under the law as it exists at present alien immigrants 
other than Chinese are subject to the writing test aforesaid, which, 
generally speaking, in their own language. Chinese immigrants are 
exempt from the writing test but are subject to the poll-tax and the 
limitation on travel already mentioned. If, however, the proposed 
legislation is approved by His Majesty, Chinese immigrants will be 
subjected to peculiar hardships, inasmuch as they will be amGnable to 
the poll-tax, to the limitation of the number travelling by anyone 
vessel, and to a reading test in a language foreign to them, and of 
which they cannot be expected to have any knowledge. 
13. That the Bill recently reserved by Your Excellency is directed 
solely against persons of the Chinese race, and Your Excellency's 
Advisers expressly stated when the measure was before Parliament that 
its object was the complete exclusion of Chinese immigrants from New 
Zealand, and that its probable effect would be the prevention of any 
further accession to the Chinese population of this Dominion. 
14. That your petitioners firmly believe that the effect of the 
Bill, if it passes into law, will be, as stated by Your Excellency's 
Advisers, to prevent all Chinese immigration into the Dominion, since 
practically all the Chinese likely to emigrate to this country must be 
manual labourers, and, as they have no facilities for acquiring a 
knowledge of the English language in China, they will necessarily be 
unable to pass the reading test for which the Bill provides. 
15. That the said Bill makes no provision for the re-entry of 
Chinese residents who, though domiciled in New Zealand, are at present 
absent from the Dominion, and, though having their homes and property 
here, will precluded by the rigorous reading test imposed by the Bill 
from returning. Moreover, your petitioners would respectfully point out 
that it is impossible to inform such persons of the provisions of the 
Bill in time to enable them to return before the same becomes law, if it 
should in due course receive the assent of His Majesty. 
16. That the Bill provides for no exemption in favour of Chinese 
at present residing in New Zealand, but who may desire to visit China or 
any other part of the world. 
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17. 1bat, if the said Bill passes into law, it will necessarily 
cause great hardship to those Chinese who are now visiting their 
native land, all of whom have made their homes in New Zealand. 
18. That, if there were any influx of Chinese into this 
Dominion, your petitioners, though they would feel that they were 
being unjustly treated, nevertheless would not complain. The 
Chinese population of New Zealand, however, steadily diminishing, 
and there is every reason to believe that it will continue to 
diminish, in proof of which your petitioners would quote the following 
figures from the official census returns:-
Census Year 
1881 
1886 
1891 
1896 
1901 
1906 
Chinese in 
New Zealand 
5,004 
4,542 
4,444 
3,711 
2,857 
2,570 
Your petitioners are thus able to show incontestably that for the past 
twenty-six years there has been a steady diminution of Chinese in this 
Dominion. Hence, even from the standpoint of those opposed to Chinese 
immigration, the said Bill is uncalled-for and unnecessary, more 
especially as the measure adopted by the Premiers' Conference on the 
suggestion of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1897 was 
clearly intended both by the Conference and the Parliament of New 
Zealand to mark the point beyond which legislation should not advance 
unless special circumstances made such a course necessary. Your 
petitioners humbly submit to Your Excellency that, in fact of the 
official figures hereinbefore quoted, it cannot be seriously maintained 
that any such circumstances have arisen in this country. 
19. That your petitioners submit further that the provisions of 
the Bill are opposed to the well-recognised principles of international 
comity, and that they amount to an unfriendly act towards the Empire of 
China, between the Government of which and His Majesty's Imperial 
Government happily the most cordial relations obtain. Your petitioners 
would respectfully point out that, if such legislation were attempted 
in China against the subjects of any foreign State, pressure would at 
once be brought to secure its withdrawal or modification, and your 
petitioners humbly submit that other Governments should hesitate to 
impose on subjects of the Chinese Empire disabilities to which they 
themselves would strongly object. 
20. That your petitioners readily acknowledge and appreciate the 
many blessings afforded them by living under the British flag, and 
they particularly appreciate the even-handed justice invariably meted 
out to them in Majesty's Courts of law. They are not unmindful 
either of the kindness and forbearance observed towards them by the great 
majority of His Majesty's subjects, from whom they are necessarily 
separated by difference of customs, language, institutions, and national 
feeling. Your petitioners feel strongly, since they find no difficulty 
in pursuing their respective avocations this country, and that there 
is not the slightest objection to dealing with them in the ordinary 
course of business, that they are neither undesirable immigrants nor 
nearly such unwelcome residents as the provisions of the said Bill would 
indicate. 
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21. That, notwithstanding the far-reaching effects and the 
drastic provisions of "The Asiatir, Restriction Act, 1896, II there was 
not the slightest manifestation of popular dissatisfaction when Her 
Late Majesty withheld her assent therefrom, and your petitioners have 
no doubt whatever that the public opinion of New Zealand will dictate 
loyal acquiescence in His Majesty's will if His Majesty should see fit 
to save your petitioners and their countrymen from the hardships and 
indignities proposed by the said Bill. 
Your petitioners, therefore, humbly pray that Your Excellency may 
be pleased to place this their petition before His Most Gracious 
Majesty King Edward the Seventh. Your petitioners realise that His 
Majesty has during his reign gained a proud pre-eminence for his noble 
efforts to promote peace and good will not only throughout his vast 
Empire, but among all nations. 
They pray that Your Excellency may be pleased to recommend His 
Majesty to withhold his assent from the Bill which Your Excellency 
has been pleased to reserve for the signification of His Majesty's 
pleasure, and that your petitioners may be granted such further or 
other relief as to His Majesty may seem meet. 
And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray. 
Source: C.O. 418/62 
APPENDIX XX 
A MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND 
TO THE GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND REGARDING THE CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS ACT AMENDMENT AND A CHINESE PETITION 
669. 
The Prime Minister presents his compliments to His Excellency, 
with the request that when forwarding to the Imperial authorities the 
petition of certain Chinese residents against "The Chinese Immigrants 
Act Amendment Act, 1907", he will also transmit the views of His 
Excellency's advisers on the subject matter of the petition. 
(1) The Immigration Restriction Act, 1899, which imposed a writing 
test on all persons coming to New Zealand (with exceptions which do 
not affect the present matter) expressly exempted Chinese from its 
operation. The purpose of the present Bill is to remove this 
exemption. The only difference is that under the Act of 1899 the 
immigrant might select any European language he chose, whereas in 
the Bill the language is specified to be English. The difference 
is immaterial, and the Chinese immigrant cannot reasonably complain 
of legislation which merely brings him into line with all other 
persons who wish to land in New Zealand. 
(2) This practically disposes of the petition, but it may not be 
out of place to offer a few observations on its various clauses. 
(3) They cover a good deal of ground but may be resolved into 
two main points:- 1st that the Bill is directed solely against 
Chinese by name, and 2nd thatit imposes hardships on Chinese residents 
by making no provision for re-entry to New Zealand, etc. 
(4) As to the first point,it is sufficient to say that the 
objection comes too late. For very many years past both Australia 
and New Zealand have legislated against Chinese by name. The first 
New Zealand Act - The Chinese Immigrants Act, 1881 - which imposed 
a poll tax and fixed the proportion of Chinese immigrants on any 
ship to one for every 10 tons of registered tonnage - was reserved 
for the Royal assent, and duly received it. Since then various 
amending Acts have been passed, the purpose of each being to further 
restrict Chinese immigration, and none of them have been objected to 
by the Imperial authorities. In these circumstances the 
constitutional right of New Zealand to legislate on these lines 
must be deemed to be fully established. 
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(5) The long and consistent course of legislation on the subject 
shews conclusively the fixed conviction of the people of New Zealand 
that the presence of Chinese is undesirable. It is not necessary to 
offer reasons for this, though reasons in abundance could easily be 
given. It is sufficient to state the fact; and Your Excellency's 
advisers are profoundly convinced that any action by the Home 
authorities tending to fetter the policy of the New Zealand 
Parliament on this matter would be regarded by the people with 
feelings of the liveliest dissatisfaction. 
(6) As regards the various hardships which the petitioners say 
the Bill will cause to Chinese residents, it is perhaps sufficient 
to observe that the Bill must be read with the sting Acts. It 
merely imposes one additional restriction. Hence whatever hardships 
can possibly arise in respect of this restriction under the Bill 
must also exist under the Acts in respect of their restrictions. 
Yet, so far as concerns the Acts, the Government is not aware of 
any case of hardship which has not been sufficiently met by the 
provision for remitting penalties. 
(7) In conclusion it is submitted, that, the right to legislate 
on the subject being conceded, the details are matters entirely for 
the New Zealand Parliament in the exercise of the power conferred 
by the Constitution Act to make laws for the peace,order and good 
government of New Zealand. 
(Sgd. ) J.G. WARD 
Source: C.O. 418/62, 21 April 1908. 
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THE RULES OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE ASSOCIATION 
History has borne out the fact that a wise emperor would always 
attach supreme importance to peace and the well-being of the nation, 
and to achieve this end, solidarity of the people and of different 
strata of the society must be realized. We have not seen a divided 
nation that survives. 
His Excellency Consul Wong Wing-lian has instructed us over and 
over again that to forge closer ties amongst the Chinese in New Zealand 
is now our over riding task. To facilitate this goal we should work 
all out to establish an association of New Zealand Chinese. 
The work of raising funds should be sped up. However the whole 
project has just taken shape. It has to be discussed by all concerned 
by convening meetings. It is hoped that all the Chinese in various 
places displaying their enthusiasm by giving generous financial 
support and publicizing the need for this body which is in the interest 
of all the Chinese in New Zealand. With this organisation behind us, no 
foreigners will dare to insult us. 
The rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association 
1. The name of the organization is the Chinese Association. 
2. A. Aim: The Chinese Association is an organization formed to unite 
all the Chinese in New Zealand. 
a) The Association will institute a consultant section to 
offer assistance to all overseas Chinese. 
b)A reading room will be set up for the convenience of 
our compatriots. 
B. The Association endeavours to forge better friendly ties amongst 
our compatriots, fosters the spirit of mutual help, and plays an 
intermediate role in the case where divergent or conflicting 
opinions arise among our people. 
C. A night school will be arranged teaching Chinese and English. 
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3. Nature of the Association: This organization promotes the progress 
of the society as a whole and is not involved in party 
politics nor religious affairs. 
4. The premises: The Association is set up in Wellington. All 
Chinese are eligible members. The premises are rented. It 
is hoped that we can purchase a suitable site when our 
financial position improves. 
5. The right of the executives and commentators: 
A. Cm~entators have the right to take part in the discussion of the 
general affairs of the Association. 
B. The Association undertakes to report in full details of its 
annual balance sheet and the good deeds performed by various 
individuals. , 
6. The duties of the executive and conunentators: 
A. The president manages the general business of the association. 
B. Three vice-presidents assist the president. They shall be acting 
on his behalf in his absence. 
C. The secretary will reside permanently in the living quarters of 
the Association building and temporarily take up the work of a 
caretaker. 
D. Th~ duties of the three treasurers are to record and manage the 
fi:1ancial matters of the association. 
E. The duties of the three iLspectors are to see all the work of the 
Association are correctly performed. 
F. The 15 conunentators must be present whenever a meeting is convened. 
7. Officers' designation: All officers are elected by all members of 
the Association anLual1y by voting. 
8. A. Every executive or commeLtator must be present at the semi-monthly 
me,=ting. 
B. Only when more than half of the officers are present may the 
meeting be started. 
Regulations to be Observed 
1. Subscription and Donation: Each New Zealand Chinese must pay a 
basic subscription of 5/-, for which a receipt from the 
Association will be issued. Any donation to the 
Association will be conunended by displaying the donor's 
name and the sum of money in the Association Hall. 
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Any person returning to China will pay a levy oftl and a 
commission of 10/- for purchasing his steamer's ticket. 
Those who are aged and sick are exempted from paying the 
levy. Those who try to evade paying the Association a 
levy will be dealt with severely. 
2. The duties of the Executives: Six persons are elected to handle 
affairs of travelling to and from China. They act as 
guarantors for the travellers. They have the right to 
refuse guaranty should they think their honour is at risk. 
The secretary is invested with the power to handle 
correspondence in general. Any correspondence of important 
nature must be. approved by executives or commentators 
before sending. 
Commentators are requested not to interrupt one another when 
discussion is held. 
The provisional chairman of each meeting announces the agenda and 
is made responsible for the proceeding of the meeting. 
3. Emergency meeting: Any emergency meeting must be approved by the 
president of the Association and the secretary must be 
informed five days prior to the convention so that sufficient 
time is given for circulars to reach all the members. 
4. Payments: All monetary matters are under the jurisdiction of the 
treasury. But all cheques must be signed by three persons. 
5. Property and expenditure: All materials, furniture pieces are 
registered in detail. Incidental expenses are borne by 
the Association. 
All executives and commentators are honorary members, the 
caretaker who resides permanently in the Association building 
is entitled to a salary. The amount of the salary is subject 
to the approval of executive committee. Teachers in Chinese 
and English are to be paid by the students taking the lessons. 
The tuition fee is€2 per year (one lesson weekly) ort4 per 
year (two lessons weekly). 
6. Guest speakers: Guest speakers are to be invited each month. 
All members are welcome. 
7. These regulations are subject to further revision in the future. 
---The third month of the first year 
of Emperor Xuan Tong (1909) by the 
New Zealand Chinese Association---
Note: Document translated from the Chinese 
Source: Turnbull Library MS 1923/264. 
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APPENDIX XXII 
OCCUPATIONS OF THE CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND 
1906-1916 
1906 1911 
Merchants 10 2 
Storekeepers 275 368 
Store Assistant 53 10 
Servants 11 14 
Hotel/Boarding House 19 21 
keeper 
Restaurant 4 3 
Service (General) 117 116 
Laundry 243 287 
Hawk~r 97 83 
Market Gardeners 737 886 
Market Gardener 57 62 
Labour/Assistant 
Farm Labourer/Assistant 45 63 
General Labourer 117 113 
Miner 612 420 
Professional 8 5 
Wives 40 37 
Students 18 24 
Children 18 53 
Chari table Institutions 47 14 
Prison 5 1 
No Information 13 27 
Rabbiter/Fisherman 26 15 
Pensioner 3 2 
Independent Means 1 4 
Clergyman/Missionary 3 
TOTAL 2570 2630 
Source: Census, 1906:457, 1911:507, 1961, Vol. 7:23. 
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1916 
1 
407 
290 
90 
39 
881 
34 
130 
16 
186 
38 
8 
14 
13 
2147 
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Notes on included within each 
1. Merchant 
2. Storekeeper 
3. Store Assistant 
4. Servants 
7. Service (General) 
10. Market Gardeners 
13. General Labourer 
15. Professional 
tea merchant, merchant, importer, agent. 
fancy goods dealer, fruiterer, greengrocer, 
grocer, storekeeper, dealer, tobacconist; 
(19l6)-dealing in: art and mechanic 
productions, textile fabrics, dress and fibrous 
materials, food, drink, narcotics and 
stimulants, animals, animalarrd vegetable 
substances, fuel and light, metals and other 
minerals. 
assistant, clerk, storeman, shopman, salesman, 
expressman, carter, general carrier. 
steward, housemaid, groom. 
basketmaker, cabinetmaker, tailor, dressmaker, 
shirtmaker, carpenter, cooks, billiard-marker 
barber, butcher, fish dealer (19l6)-engaged 
in: railway traffic, traffic on roads, on 
seas, and rivers, in forestry, water 
conservation and supply; working in: art and 
mechanic productions,textile fabrics, dress 
and fibrous materials, food, drinks, narcotics 
and stimulants, animal and vegetable 
substances, metals and other minerals, fuel, 
light and other forms of energy. 
farmer, dairy-farmer, fruit grower; (1916) 
engaged in: agricultural pursuits, pastoral 
pursuits. 
(19l6)-engaged in: construction of roads, 
buildings and railroads, disposal of refuse or 
the dead, undefined industrial pursuits. 
Chinese doctor, herbalist, chemist, 
interpreter, Consul and secretary, Secretary 
of Chinese Association; (19l6)-engaged in: 
government, defence and law; ministering of 
religion,charity, health and education. 
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Notes on Occupations, 1906-1916 
1. In the 1911 and 1916 Census categories that were separate in 1906 
have been collapsed. For instance, shopkeepers, merchants and 
fruiterers are separate categories to assistants for each in 1906 
while they are collapsed and included under the former categories 
in 1911 and 1916. 
2. In 1906 four new categories are added at the end to allow comparison 
with the previous Appendix on occupations. The new categories include 
Rabbiter/Fisherman, Pensioner, Independent Means and Clergyman/ 
Missionary. The category 'Pensioner" is problematic since Chinese 
were excluded from the Old Age Pension Act in 1898. 
3. In 1911 two new Professional categories are noted including the 
'Consul and secretary' and the 'Secretary to the Chinese Association'. 
These do not appear again in the Census. The fact that they are 
listed however does reflect the appointment of a Consul for the 
first time to New Zealand for the Chinese in 1908 and the founding 
of the Chong Wah Wui Koon in the same year. 
4. The merchant category is no longer clearly discernable in 1911 and 
appears to have been included under 'Storekeepers'. 
5. In 1916 'Laundrymen' and 'Hawker' are excluded but it is entirely 
unlikely that they were non-existent. It can be assumed that they 
have been included in possibly 'Engaged in domestic service and 
attendance' and 'Engaged in undefined industrial pursuits' 
respectively, since the numbers in categories match estimated 
numbers in these occupations based on previous years. 
6. In general the use of 'Engaged in ... ', 'Working in ... ', 
'Dealing in ... ' as general categories for 1916 makes clear analysis 
of occupation impossible. 
7. In 1916 'Engaged in disposal of dead or of refuse' is included under 
'General labourer' which is unsatisfactory. 
8. Since there is no separate category of 'students', 'children' or 
'wives' one can only assume that all three categories have been 
included under 'Dependent 011 natural guardians I since it is 
unlikely they disappeared after 1911. This category appears under 
(18) for 1916. 
Tmm 
Nelson 
Otaki 
Fielding 
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SAMPLE OF POPULATION RECORDED BY ALEXANDER DON BY 
TOWN, OCCUPATION AND COUNTY OF ORI_GIN, 1909-1913 
Occupation Name Partners 
Gardens: (1) 8 men 
(2) 5 men 
Fruit Shop 3 partners 
Laundry Wing Lee 1 man 
Tin Lee 3 men 
Gardens 7 men 
1 man 
Oh Loh! s 1 man 
Te Horo 2 men 
Bridge 2 men 
River Flat 4 men 
Fruit Shop On Tie 
Fancy Goods Shop 
Fruit shop Hop Lee family 
Gardens: (1) Wong You 
(2) Ah Chung 
(3) 
(4) 
Laundry 
County of Origin 
Poon Yu and Fa Yuen 
Poon Yu 
Onwer Jung Sing 
Partners - Poon Yu 
Toy San 
Toy San 
Poon Yu 
Poon Yu 
Poon Yu 
Po on Yu 
Poon Yu 
Poon Yu 
Jung Sing 
Poon Yu 
Jung Sing 
Jung Sing 0\ 
'-I 
Jung Sing '-I . 
Jung Sing 
Jung Sing 
Po on Yu 
Wanganui Gardens: (1) Long Acre 14 men Poon Yu ~ (2) 11 men Poon Yu 
'"d (3) 3 men Poon Yu 0 ;::l (4) 5 men Poon Yu p.. 1-'. 
Fruit shops (1) Po on >< Yu >< (2) Jung Sing >< H (3) Jung Sing H H 
Laundry (1) (plus co,okshop) 2 men Poon Yu ,..-, n (2) 1 man Poon Yu 0 ;::l (3) 1 man Poon Yu rt 1-'. 
(4) 1 man Sun Wui ;::l ~ (J) 
Hotel Cooks 2 men Sun On p.. 
"-' 
Palmers ton Northa Gardens: (1) 8 men Poon Yu 
(2) 6 men Poon Yu 
(3) 1 man Poon Yu 
Fruit Shops (1) Wong Hop 2 men Jung Sing 
(2) Kew Kong 1 man Jung Sing 
(3) 1 man Jung Sing 
(4) 1 man Jung Sing 
Laundry (1) Wing Lee 1 man Toy San 
(2) Sun Lee 2 men 
(3) 2 men Po on Yu 
(4) Chung Lee 1 man Poon Yu 
(5) Wah Lee 1 man Poon Yu 
(6) Joe Lee 1 man Poon Yu 
Foxton Gardens: (1) 6 men Jung Sing and 
Poon Yu 
Laundry 1 man Poon Yu 
Fruit Shop 4 brothers Jung Sing 
0\ 
" 00 
Auckland Gardens: (1) Poon Yu 
(2) Poon Yu 
(3) Jung Sing 
(4) Toy San 
(5) Jung Sing 
Fruit Shops (1) Jung Sing 
(2) Poon Yu 
(3) Jung Sing 
(4) Toy San 
a) Pa1merston North was unusual in that a large proportion of the population were of a single 
surname 'Joel and came from the same village in Po on Yu. In 1913 at least 23 of the 28 people 
recorded were in this category. 
Note: Spaces indicate missing data. 
Source: Alexander Don's Diary, 1909-1913:74-89. 
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NOTICE AGAINST THE KO TONG HOSPITAL ISSUED AND CIRCULATED 
BY THE PEOPLE OF PONG WU SHORTLY AFTER ITS OPENING IN 1909 
It has been generally recognised for a long time that foreigners 
should learn the customs and taboos of a new place to which they go. 
Recently, however, we discovered that a western doctor infringed 
local customs by establishing a special hospital in the public area of 
Ko Tong. The hospital caters only for women, excluding men, and young 
women rather than old. Moreover it employs young Chinese women who live 
at the hospital. The doctor seduced and incited women and such animal 
behaviour is not to be tolerated. 
We have already set a trap to catch the pig. With pseudo charity 
this doctor has reduced our women to ignorance. Consequently this has 
destroyed our family relationships as well as our customs and Chinese 
heritage. Didn't you see what the Russians have done to the Jews, 
European Americans to Red Indians, British upon Indians, Japanese upon 
Taiwanese? Such behaviour destroys our customs our race and brings 
disaster upon our innocent women. So long as we are still human beings 
we cannot but help feel anger and hate especially taking into consideration 
the emphasis our dynasty has placed on the 'five human relationships'. 
Now this doctor has broken the taboos. Moreover in the name of 
medicine he in fact preached religion clandestinely. By using honeyed 
words he induced young women to go astray and this has resulted in 
conflict and internal strife for the family concerned. 
Ko Tong is a strategic place. If we do not design a method to 
prevent such happenings as soon as possible, we will be trapped. In 
view of this we cannot tolerate this development. Hence we unite our 
people here to start a public committee in the hope that there will 
be no more shameful incidents which might lead to the destruction of 
our customs and the extinction of our race. 
After public cussion, all people in Ko Tong were informed that 
after the 15th day of August this year no people, young or old, men or 
women should enter the hospital for treatment or to buy medicine. No 
women will be allowed to go into the hospital, give the doctor money 
or work there. 
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This is a matter of public concern which was discussed publicly. 
A committee 'Pi Chien Yi Hui' will take charge of this matter. 
Anyone who breaks these rules will be fined $150 regardless of whether 
they be men or women. The case will also be referred to the Court. 
The penalty however, will be the matter for the local area (Ko Tong). 
Regarding the fine, one hundred dollars will go to the Pi Chien Yi flui 
for confiscation: the other fifty will go for those investigators who 
will distribute the money on an average basis. 
The regulation will certaintly be enforced and no excuse will be 
accepted. All our people should inform each other lest anyone should 
allege they have not been informed. 
Source: McNeur Collection, Hocken Library (translated from Chinese) 
APPENDIX XXV 
OBJECTS OF THE SEYIP ASSOCIATION OF NEW ZEALAND 
AS STATED IN THE 1947 CONSTITUTION 
OBJECTS: 
2. The objects of the Association are:-
a) To foster, promote and encourage friendship, cooperation 
and understanding between the Chinese people and the 
people of New Zealand. 
b) To alleviate the necessity of aged, infirm and indigent 
members of the Chinese community. 
c) To contribute as opportunity affords to all deserving 
charities, which in any way minister to the needs of 
the community as a whole, both Chinese and New Zealand. 
OBJECTS OF THE SEYIP ASSOCIATION OF NEW ZEALAND 
AS STATED IN THE 1949 CONSTITUTION 
2. OBJECTS: 
The objects of the Association are as follows: 
682. 
1. To provide for Chinese residents in New Zealand the means of 
mutual helpfulness, social intercourse, and rational 
recreation, and to promote the intellectual, moral and 
physical well-being of the Chinese in New Zealand and to 
unite and cooperate for patriotic cultural and educational 
progress and to deal with all matters concerning the 
welfare of Chinese. 
2. To establish schools and classes and to make provlslon for 
public lectures, addresses and debates for the education 
and entertainment of Chinese. 
3. To provide halls and meeting places, clubs, buildings and 
premises where members can meet for any of the purposes 
of the Association. 
4. To purchase take on lease exchange or hold any real or 
personal property whatsoever or any easements therein 
or thereon requisite for any of the objects of the 
Association or which may in any way be used conveniently 
in connexion with any such objects and to sell lease 
exchange or otherwise' dispose of any real or personal 
property and to grant any easements or rights therein or 
thereover. 
5. To provide funds for objects of the Association or any of 
them and for that purpose to borrow or raise money and to 
give security in any manner over the whole or any part of 
the real or personal property of the Association. 
6. To make application for leave to bring any Chinese student 
or other person into New Zealand and to go bond for any 
Chinese Student or person and to execute any bond or other 
deed or document required by His Majesty the King or the 
Government of New Zealand with respect to the entry of any 
Chinese Student or person into New Zealand and for such 
purpose to pledge the assets of the Association or any 
part or parts thereof unto His Majesty The King or the 
Government of the Dominion of New Zealand and to do all 
things which the Association may consider necessary or 
desirable in connexion therewith or in anywise relating 
thereto. 
7. To accept from any person or persons any bond mortgage 
or other security with respect to any Chinese Student 
or person whether by way of security for any bond given 
to His Maj esty the King or otherwise howsoever and to 
receive or recover from any person or persons any moneys 
owing or payable in respect of any bond mortgage or other 
security and to take such steps for the recovery of such 
moneys as the Association may in its discretion think fit. 
8. To do all such other acts and things as are incidental or 
conducive to the above objects or any of them. 
9. To form branches of the Association in such places in 
New Zealand as the Executive Committee shall from time 
to time determine. 
Source: Informant. 
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C TITUTION OF THE NEW Z 
JUNG ASSOCIATION, 1926 
PRINCIPLES 
1. The principles of the association are cooperation, goodwill: to 
help one another, to help in any difficult matters where there 
no harm for the good of the community. 
AIMS 
1. There is no annual subscription but members should pay~l or more. 
2. a) Any member who leaves for China must pay a commission to the 
Association for the booking of the passage. 
b) If the person fails to do this they will 
of the Association. 
the privileges 
c) If the Tung Jung Association however, is not guarantor for the 
passage booking then the above clauses do not apply. 
3. Any person going to China or returning can stay at the Association 
for up to two weeks. This may be extended on application to the 
committee. A committee member is exempt from the above clause. 
4. Any member may be expelled. 
5. Any elderly, disabled or crippled member who wishes to return to 
China, amy ask the association to raise funds for the purpose. 
a) Or, if any member dies and has no money for a funeral, the 
Association will raise funds. 
6. a) Monthly meetings of the committee may be called for any 
emergencies. 
b) Any member who either leaves or returns may be officially 
welcomed or sent off. 
7. Treasurers work: ordinary receipts and payments. 
a) Any special items will have to be passed by Committee. 
b) Accounts must be presented half-yearly. 
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8. a) Any member may be nominated for the committee. 
b) Annual elections will be held in May. 
c) Committee members will serve for one year. 
d) Every member must take an oath to be loyal to the Association. 
e) No committee member may resign. 
9. Committee should consist of: 1 president 
2 wardens 
1-4 secretaries 
1 2 treasurers 
Other members can be called to help the committee. 
10. Any member who returns to China and wishes to donate money to the 
Association will have his name entered in the Association. 
11. Any member of the committee serves on a voluntary basis. 
12. Any money remaining must be banked to receive interest for the 
benefit of the Association. 
13. The committee reserves the right to improve or change any of 
s aims. 
Note: Anyone who wishes to return to China may inquire from any committee 
member or write direct to the Association. 
APPENDIX XXVII 
OCCUPATIONS OF ALL CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND FOR 
1921, 1926 and 1936 
1921 1926 
Market gardening 1,252 1,144 
Other agricultural, etc. 82 50 
Gold mining 59 22 
Sale of groceries 21 24 
General storekeeping 57 26 
Sale of vegetables and fruit 621 627 
Sales, other goods 49 80 
Private domestic service 35 26 
Hotel and boardinghouse staff 101 56 
Restaurants etc. 17 11 
Laundries, dry cleaning 373 356 
Others 183 669 
Dependent on natural guardians 416 669 
TOTAL 3,266 3,374 
*Inc1udes temporary residents 
Source: Census, 1936, Vol. 9:p.v. 
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THE PETITION OF A CHINESE MERCHANT CONCERNING 
A DISPUTE WITH THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT, 1932 
TO THE HONOURABLE THE SPEAKER AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND IN 
PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED ... 
THE PETITION OF WAH LEE ... 
Of the City of Auckland, Chinese Merchants ... 
Humbly showeth:-
1. That your Petitioners are a firm of Chinese Merchants who 
687. 
have been established in Auckland for the past thirty years. 
2. That your Petitioners import into New Zealand from China each 
year a considerable amount of merchandise and other articles 
mostly food stuffs. 
3. That prior to July 1927 the Collector of Customs at Auckland 
before assessing the customs duty on your Petitioners' 
importations in every case demanded duty on double the cost 
of each article as disclosed in the invoices. 
4. That the duty so assessed was paid by your Petitioners in 
ignorance of their legal rights. 
5. That representations were made to the Customs Department in July 
1927 pointing out that the system adopted was. inequitable and 
wrong and that the practice was not adopted in the case of 
importations by other Chinese merchants in the City of 
Auckland, nor as your Petitioners believe in the case of any 
other Chinese merchant in New Zealand. 
6. That immediately your Petitioners made representations to the 
Collector of Customs, Auckland, in 1927 for refund of duty for 
three years, the Customs Department instructed one of their 
Officers to compare your Petitioners' goods with like goods 
of their competitors, and it was found in most instances that 
your Petitioners' invoice values exceeded those of their 
competitors \'1ho were paying duty on invoice values only. 
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7. That following on such representations to the Department 
instructions were immediately issued to discontinue the 
practice as the Department recognised the justification 
of your Petitioners' complaint. 
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8. That in consequence of the arbitrary assessments made by the 
Customs Officials your Petitioners have suffered very serious 
financial loss and have in fact paid double the correct amount 
of customs duty chargeable for the approximate period from 1912 
to 1927. 
9. That as a result of the arbitrary assessment of the Customs 
Department aforesaid your Petitioners have paid thousands 
of pounds in excess duty. 
10. That the Comptroller of Customs recognised that your Petitioners 
have been overcharged and authorised a refund to your 
Petitioners of the duty overpaid for the period commencing 
on the 26th July 1926 and ending on the 26th July 1927. 
11. That your Petitioners contend that they were entitled to a refund 
for duty overpaid for fifteen years but under the provisions 
of The Customs Act 1913 your Petitioners were debarred from 
making a claim for any period greater than three years. 
12. That from July 1927 to October 1929 continuous representations 
were made and negotiations entered into with a view to the 
recovery by your Petitioners of all duty overpaid by them 
for the two years immediately prior to 26th July 1926. 
13. That your Petitioners supplied to the Collector of Customs, 
Auckland, and Comptroller of Customs, Wellington, all 
relative information in their possession relating to the 
duties paid by them prior to July 1927. 
14. That the Honourable the Minister of Customs advised your 
Petitioners that in view of the limitations laid down by the 
Customs Act 1913, that he was not authorised to make to your 
Petitioners any refund for the period in question. 
15. That your Petitioners are of the opinion that their claim for a 
refund is just and equitable and is one that would be 
considered by the Department but for the statutory 
restrictions imposed by The Customs Act 1913. 
16. That your Petitioners presented a Petition to This Honourable 
House in November 1929 Praying for a refund of duty for the 
two years period mentioned herein. 
17. That your Petitioners are advised that on the hearing of such 
Petition the Comptroller of Customs informed this Honourable 
House that his Department considered that they were entitled 
to double the invoice value of your Petitioners' imports and 
assess duty accordingly. 
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18. That since 1929 your Petitioners have refrained from presenting 
their claim for a refund in the hope that some steps would 
be taken by the Customs Department to remedy what your 
Petitioners consider an obvious injustice. 
WHEREFORE your Petitioners humbly pray This Honourable House 
will recommend that the customs duty overpaid by them for the two years 
immediately prior to July 1926 be refunded to them. 
AND your Petitioners will ever humbly pray 
Dated this Fourth day of October 1932 
SIGNED by WAH LEE ... 
Per: Arthur Ming Watt 
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CHINESE RESPONSE TO THE PETITION OF C.R. LLOYD AND 1456 
OTHERS RE IRING THE REPATRIATION OF ALL ASIATICS 
The petition is calculated to inflame the minds of New Zealand 
nationals against the Chinese resident within its shores, and is 
calculated to insult not only the dignity of the Chinese nationals 
but the country from which they have sprung. It is a matter well 
recognised by the International Code that one nation bears an 
obligation to another to see that its nationals residing within its 
shores are not subjected to humiliation, and that indirectly the 
nation itself is not insulted. But it is in the opinion of the 
signatories to this memorandum that should any effect be given to the 
petition, which is not only based upon error but is couched in 
injudicious language, then both the Chinese residing in New Zealand 
and the great Republic of China itself will be insulted in 
contravention to the obligation that New Zealand owes toward China 
under the code subsisting between nations. Such violation of the 
common decencies which should subsist between nations will inevitably 
have a repercussion, and such repercussions will be visited necessarily 
upon British nationals residing within the shores of the Republic of 
China. 
TRADE RELATIONS 
It is axiomatic that trade relations should be cultivated between 
neighbouring nations, and it is to the advantage of New Zealand that 
trade relations with China should be cultivated and increased. Such 
a movement is recognised by the merchants and traders in New Zealand, 
and it ill becomes those thoughtless persons who have subscribed their 
names to the petition to so antagonise the Chinese nation as to 
compel it to shut its doors to New Zealand trade. But if these 
intolerable insults are continued, the dignity of the Chinese nation, 
and it is a dignity which that nation will insist upon cherishing, 
will compel it to take such steps as are available to it to ostracise 
New Zealand traders from commercial intercourse with itself. 
It is not necessary here, but the slightest inquiry will reveal, 
to detail the enormous quantities of raw and made-up goods that 
China imports every year; indeed, so vast are the requirements that 
the whole of the meat and wool trade of New Zealand could be absorbed 
by China. 
691. 
Appendix XXIX (Continued) 
FRAMED IN ERROR 
Dealing with some of the other matters mentioned in the petitions, 
we have said that they are framed in error, and in particulatwe 
desire to remark that there are not 6000 Chinese and Indians in New 
Zealand; indeed, there are not more, according to the records of the 
New Zealand Official Year Book, than 2854 Chinese and 1166 Indians. 
It is equally false, as the petitions aver, that the Chinese send an 
average of £100 out of this country to their relatives in China. The 
average is a great deal less than 50 per cent of this amount and the 
petitioners entirely ignore the fact that this is not necessarily a 
loss to New Zealand. It will be probably conceded, for it is the 
truth, that what money is sent to China is sent for the maintenance 
of the families and relations of those Chinese residing in New Zealand. 
If the New Zealand Government allowed the wives and families of these 
Chinese to come to New Zealand none of this money would leave these 
shores. It is as well to record the fact that a great many of the 
Chinese in New Zealand are unable to send any money out of New Zealand. 
The petitioners also al that the Chinese in New Zealand are 
from the lower classes in China. It is regrettable that such a false 
statement should have been so recklessly made. The Chinese in New 
Zealand are drawn from the professional, agricultural, industrial 
and the merchant classes, and to describe these people as anything 
but highly respectable is false and insulting, and this charge is 
most deeply resented by us all. To describe any of the New Zealand 
nationals who are drawn from these particular classes as from the 
lower classes would, we anticipate, be strongly resented by those 
persons. 
To describe the living conditions of the Chinese in New Zealand 
as insanitary is mendacious. It is true that they do not live 
sumptuously and in large houses, but the Chinese culture has always 
regarded industry, thrift, and cleanliness as most important, and a 
comparison of the mode of living of the Chinese with New Zealand 
nationals carrying on similar work would, we are satisfied, reflect 
to the credit of the Chinese. 
It is to be remembered that since 1896 the New Zealand government 
has compelled the payment of a poll tax of (100 by every Chinese 
national on his or her entry into New Zealand. This payment surely 
carried with it an assurance that the Government on its part would 
leave those Chinese in peace and to enjoy the full rights of 
citizenship so long as they respected the law of the land. 
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GROSSLY LIBELLOUS 
An allegation is likewise made in the petition that the 
Chinese in New Zealand are immoral. This is grossly libellous. 
Th~ immorality that is now and then referred to in the newspapers 
is almost invariably referable to the importunities of some 
immoral females who beset the Chinese in their shops and abodes, 
and we are satisfied a reference to the Commissioner of Police 
would nail this lie to the mast. 
It is not necessary for us to review in greater detail the 
grounds on which we resent and oppose the petition. We desire, 
however, that publicity should be given to the other side of the 
case as was given to the petition when it was presented to 
Parliament. We trust that this will be the last time when the 
nationals of the country to which we are proud to belong will be 
insulted, and that for the future the happy relations which have 
hitherto subsisted between the nationals of both great countries 
who have taken the trouble to understand each other and the nations 
themselves will subsist for years to come. We believe that the 
great common-sense and kindliness of feeling which is 
characteristic of all units in a British Commonwealth of Nations 
will surmount any feelings of resentment which may have been 
stirred up by the unfortunate petition that has been presented to 
the House of Parliament in New Zealand. 
Source: Evening Post, 7 November, 1932. 
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Branches of the New Zealand Association 
wellington ___ t f~' t t-
Otago-South land_ ~111~tif1t$J1r 
Auckland )~ ~ t1' 
Canterbury . qt.Jpf)i tJ.t. 
Manawatu JJ~p)i!~.~l .:}-t\ 
,1.' Jot! ~ ...... }.1,\... Wairapa~~ __ J?l..4 ..2.. ~ #'rY 
Gisborne A + ~ /~\.4;' 
Hawkes Bay __ ~ "* tt /1>\-i" 
Hutt valley __ .'t-~: .:fJ ~\~" 
Hami I ton ___ tf; ~~ til jo\-t, 
Timaru _____ ~ "~ 1l.~\ ~~' 
Ohakune ____ ~ -tJ Jt ~\t" 
Wanganui~ ___ 11. ~ "* ~1' 
New Plymouth~ ~ ;JJ(#-fli.~\i' 
Foxton ~~ ± t% y)t" 
Horowhenua-Otaki_t! ,t~ !~\ 1;"1J' 
ohau-Manukau __ ~1'@1J!,~~;l1\~ 
Hawera 13 fi~ .Jp ~\i' 
Levin t ~~ -:0\4;\ 
Nelson .;~ f~ fJ~\-1" 
Taihape 1-. ~ 1Jt: -!:J\f 
Rotorua y~ tJ' ~ /~\-t 
Blenheim ;l). ~'~ ~\~\ 
Dannevirke 1.-\ It ~ ~\t 
Wairoa J~ 1. $1>\t 
Greymouth &.'- ~J )~~\-t 
Oamaru .J ,if,j ~~:Jt 
693. 
694. 
APPENDIX XXXI 
A LETTER TO ALL NEW ZEALAND CHINESE FROM 
OTAGO BRANCH OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE ASSOCIATION 
Dear Compatriots, 
We all remember the day 7th July 1937, when the Japanese imperialists 
invaded China in an attempt to seize China's territory by wholesale 
annexation. We also remember the most glorious day in the history of 
the Otago area's NZ Chinese - 1st of August the same year, when a 
conference of the representatives of the Chinese was convened. At 
that conference the representatives filled with patriotism and 
determination initiated to donate all the possible money to safeguard 
our motherland, and formulated a long term policy of donations. On 
the same day about 90 Chinese in Otago area donated approximately 
1,000 Pounds and on the next day, thanks to the relief organizers' 
hardwork, every Chinese in the area covering about 200 miles fulfilled 
his task of donating. 
Three years have passed since the outbreak of the war. During 
these turbulent years the two hundred Chinese in Otago area have 
donated over 14,000 Pounds. The amount was not spectacular, yet 
our efforts have succeeded in mobilizing the whole Chinese community 
in New Zealand. According to the report of the 5th Congress of 
the General Association the NZ Chinese all have New Zealand have 
contributed ~100,000 to the Chinese government during the past three 
years. We sincerely hope that all of us continue to raise high our 
patriotic and generous spirit to make more contributions in donation. 
The following is a brief account of the financial situation. 
According to Mr. T.S. Youn$, who has been elected one of the four 
finance executives, lyst year~19,056.9.6 were sent to China by the 
General Association t2,580.18.7 are still in hand. The New Zealand 
government grants three thousand foreign exchange per month, namely 
l36,000 a year. 
On receiving the money the Bank of China issues a receipt and a 
duplicate draft. These together with the cheque stub from the 
General Association fully festifies to the fact that the money is sent 
to the Chinese government. Apart from that, every year representatives 
are elected to check the books. What is more, receipts are issued by 
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both the General Assembly and the Chinese government on recelVlng 
the donations. Under such stringent scrutiny no embezzling is 
possible. We hope that now some of our fellow countrymen gain a 
clearer understanding of the situation and adopt a better attitude 
towards the relief work. We hope that they not only hand in the 
money in arrears but also donate the money in advance. We hope all 
our compatriots will scrape every possible to help our motherland 
win the final victory. 
Gisborne Branch was commended at the 5th Congress for its out-
standing achievements in fulfilling the relief work. We should learn 
from them. We should carryon the ethusiasm and patriotic spirit 
displayed when we first initiated the donation in August 1937. 
In order to do the relief work more efficiently 16 people divided 
into six groups will be responsible to collect the money to long 
term donation. 
A resolution was passed at the 4th Congress on the decision of 
publishing a pamphlet listing the figures of the money each branch 
donated, either sent to the General Assembly or remitted directly 
to the Chinese Government. The work has been delayed because of 
the lack of cooperation from some branches. At the 5th Congress it 
was decided that every branch should hand in the data of its donation 
within eight weeks. It is hoped that the pamphlet will be available 
this year. 
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NOTICE FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN WELLINGTON WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE 'STANDARD DONATION MENT METHOD' 
We received the letter from the Ministry of Finance that the National 
Government has stipulated a standard donation payment method on 12 July. 
The following is the detail of this method and it is hoped that all over-
seas Chinese would take note of this. 
Standard Donation Method National Government 12 July 1939 
--------------------~-----------
1. This regulation is applicable to donations from local and overseas 
Chinese for all items such as national salvation donations, monthly 
donations, charity donations cumulative donations, donations for 
pullovers and raincoats, donations for aircraft one dollar debt 
payment donations or other donations which could be converted 
immediately to cash for use such as jewellery, land titles or 
shares etc. 
2. All donations from local and overseas Chinese should be sent to the 
Ministry of Finance which will keep the accounts according to 
different items of donation for appropriation. 
3. The public or private organization in the local country (New Zealand) 
should send the Administrative Council details on their associations 
including the use of donations, and the way they are collected. They 
are not allowed to collect donations if they do otherwise. 
4. The Ministry of Finance has delegated the responsibility of 
collecting all donations to the Four Central China Communication 
and Peasants Banks and these Banks in turn may delegate other banks 
to do the same. The payment procedure is as follows: 
a) For the overseas donations, the overseas association or 
overseas Chinese must keep details on donor's name, address and 
donation amount. The money will be sent via the Bank of China, 
in Hong Kong to the Ministry of Finance which will keep an account 
in accordance with the different items of the donation. Also the 
Bank of China in Hong Kong will, according to the method of 
assignment, issue receipts for different items of donation to the 
donor or association. For certain other donations the Kueyang Int. 
Red Cross Association will issue special receipts. 
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b) For the local donations, the donors of the association should 
write the donor's names, address and amount of donation clearly 
and send to any of the Central Communication and Peasants Banks 
with the donation. The banks will then transfer the money to 
Chungking (Ministry of Finance) where they will keep records in 
accordance with items of donation from donors and 
associations. 
c) The Bank of China in Hong Kong and Central Communication and 
Peasant's Banks in every place should draft reports in accordance 
with different categories of donation respectively. 
d) The Administrative Council will order the Ministry of Finance, 
which received donations from overseas and local areas, to compile 
financial reports in accordance with different categories of 
donations. 
This money which passed through the assigned banks should be 
approved by the Administrative Council. 
5. the donation was not stated for a special purpose or for a 
specific organisation by the donor, it will go the Ministry of 
Finance which keeps as national finance. 
6. For those donations which were stated specifically for special 
purposes or assigned to an organization, the Ministry of Finance 
will collect the money. At the end of each month, the ministry 
will settle the account by transferring the total amount to each 
organization assigned. However, the recipient organization should 
forward another letter to the donor to confirm the payment and 
also to inform the donor in detail about the practical uses of 
the money. 
7. If the donor pays the donation directly to the organization (recipient) 
or public/private association, the the organization or association 
concerned should always keep the record on the donor's name, the 
donation item, amount of donation. The detailed record should be 
sent to the Ministry of Finance so that it can audit the account. 
8. This donation regulation is enforced when it is declared ... 
Source: Chinese Weekly News, 12 September 1939. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE TO 
SUPPORT THE WAR EFFORT IN CHINA: 1937-1944 
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WELLINGTON 2127 30316 320 2390 1662 152 60 234 381 414 21 651 560 81 3 18 119 112 275 39896 
AUCKLAND 19522 310 706 991 20 207 579 22335 
OTAGO-STHLAND 400 24899 375 854 531 216 563 53 23~ . 420 41 13 209 231 67 30 20 146 168 174 29641 
CANTERBURY 10214 191 483 529 39 . '168 100 520 95 351 8 242 87 158 13185 
~IANAWATU 255 8947 46 198 140 36 47 65 3 165 125 13 5 84 34 61 10224 
WAlRARAPA 349 6649 224 45 46 160 5 91 7569 
GISBORNE 203 5451 156 173 367 101 109 196 33 4 52 57 147 7049 
HAWKES BAY 100 5707 58 71 64 93 119 86 141 6439 
HUTT VALLEY 4200 73 275 183 72 40 37 37 4917 
HAMILTON 5 4062 132 229 30 2 116 2 36 17 77 4708 
TI~RU 2964 20 51 63 71 48 43 138 2 20 3420 
OHAKUNE 385 33 303 68 57 3 849 
WANGANUI 197 2672 146 35 1 75 2 1 15 32 3176 
GREYMOUTH 50 1924 88 20 32 4 648 1 2 4 3 20 37 2834 
WAIROA 48 1562 30 64 43 13 17 12 1 7 33 24 1854 
NEW PLY~fOUTH 10 1576 11 103 43 12 1 30 34 1820 
POXTON 1545 9 70 1 22 1647 
HORO-OTAKI 73 2835 61 42 10 2 54 46 3123 
OHAU-~AKAU 76 1406 6 50 1538 
HAWERA 125 1189 47 15 16 8 14 38 1452 
LEVIN 105 1248 6 11 12 30 26 1438 
NELSON 24 1119 40 10 4 37 35 14 1286 
TAIHAPE 24 1003 81 5 12 6 69 8 1208 
ROTORUA 839 56 31 9 6 29 23 995 
BLENHEIM 782 11 5 5 50 36 29 2 35 23 978 
DANNEVIRKE 21 325 346 
OTHERS 50 24 70 28 29 21 222 
TOTALS 4192 143391 1505 5952 4029 482 70 566 5 938 1153 3288 104 1002 30B 29BO 225 71 4 104 822 917 2041 174149 
Q\ 
~ 
Source: NZ China Association Inc., Donations from Branches. 3 August 1937 30 July 1944. 00 
Report 3 July 1944, Well. 
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DISTRICT OF ORIGIN AND NEAREST MARKETS FOR MAJOR 
CHINESE MARKET GARDEN AREAS IN NEW ZEALAND 
Market Garden Area 
Auckland/Mangere 
Pukekohe 
Hamilton 
Gisborne 
Hawkes Bay/Napier 
Ohakune 
Manawatu (Fielding 
and Palmers ton North) 
Levin 
Otaki 
Wairarapa/Masterton 
Oamaru 
Southland 
District of Origin Predominant Auctions 
or Area 
a Jung Sing and Poon Yu(70%) Auckland & Wellington 
Toy San & Sun Wui (30%) 
As above 
Jung Sing (50%), Poon 
Yu (50%) 
Seyip (90%), Jung 
Sing (10%) 
Seyip (30%), Poon Yu 
(50%), Jung Sing (20%) 
Tung Koon (10%), Jung 
Sing (30%), Poon Yu (40%), 
Seyip (20%) 
Poon Yu (90%), Jung Sing 
(10%) 
Jung Sing (40%), Poon Yu 
(40%) , Seyip (20%) 
Seyip (40%), Poon Yu 
(20%), Jung Sing (30%) 
Seyip 
( 40%) 
Seyip 
(20%) 
(60%), Jung Sing 
(80%), Poon Yu 
Po on Yu (100%) 
As above 
Auckland & Hamilton 
Gisborne & Wellington 
Wellington 
Auckland & Wellington 
Wellington, 
Palmers ton North 
Wellington 
Wellington 
Wellington 
Dunedin and 
Christchurch 
Dunedin 
aThe percentages indicate the estimated number from each district 
who are market gardeners in the area. 
Sources: Part edition of the New Zealand Chinese Growers Journal 
APPENDIX XXXV 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NEW ZEALAND CHINESE POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE 1945-1976 
es 
FB MB FB MB FB MB FB FB MB FB MB 
15 and under 666 187 559 184 1055 155 897 131 1589 439 1483 373 2300 2188 
16 and under 21 248 21 117 25 341 28 200 34 433 58 292 61 1075 747 
21 and under 25 130 9 79 15 293 19 187 23 457 33 314 24 1079 660 
25 and under 45 739 35 341 29 664 46 546 44 1435 74 1096 78 2355 1983 
45 and under 65 1088 34 148 14 1029 39 543 19 598 30 625 24 847 774 
65 upwards 248 9 10 5 330 14 58 12 529 25 204 9 452 457 
TOTALS 3119 295 1254 272 3712 301 2431 263 5041 659 4041 569 7576 6809 
(a) Census, 1945 Vol. 8:17-18 * 13 unspecified 
** 11 unspecified (b) Census, 1956 Vol. 7:34 
(c) Census, 1966 Vol. 7:34 
(d) Census , 1976 Vol. 7 :10 
'-J 
a 
a 
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INCOMES FOR ACTIVELY AND NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED CHINESE 
AGED 15 YEARS AND OVER IN NEW ZEALAND 19 1 AND 1976 
1971 
n 
No Income 17 13 886 1489 903 1502 
Under 999 168 279 633 426 801 705 
1,000-2,999 1223 1094 207 124 1430 1218 
3,000-3,999 569 115 6 2 575 117 
4,000-5,999 496 68 6 4 502 72 
6,000 and over 256 22 3 4 259 26 
Not SEecified 310 34 32 19 342 53 
TOTAL 3039 1625 1773 2068 4812 3693 
Source: Census, 1971, Vol. 7:84 
1976 
Income in Actively Engaged Not Actively Engaged TOTAL 
No Income 32 38 920 1506 952 1544 
Under 1,499 260 243 736 623 996 866 
1,500-2,999 254 455 238 150 492 605 
3,000-4,999 849 872 51 68 900 940 
5,000-6,999 1039 474 14 19 1053 493 
7,000-9,999 686 130 2 10 688 144 
10,000 and over 486 64 6 6 492 70 
Not Specified 319 54 21 16 340 17 
TOTAL 3925 2330 1988 2398 5913 4728 
.. _----
Source: Census, 1976, Vol. 7:70. 
APPENDIX XXXVII 
REPORT ON THE WELLINGTON CHINESE 
SPORTS AND CULTURAL CENTRE 
702. 
"THE COMMITTEE FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WELLINGTON CHINESE 
SPORTS AND CULTURAL CENTRE!! 
Its origin, construction and fund-raising activities. 
In 1969 several Chinese Community leaders appealed to the Embassy 
of the Republic of China to arrange the assignment of a Chinese language 
teacher in Wellington so as to keep up cultural bridge between the 
community and the home country. 
In April 1970 the Overseas Commission sent Miss Pearl Szetu to 
Wellington with her monthly allowance and travelling expenses fully paid 
asking the committee and school organisers to arrange for her accommodation. 
A Cultural Renaissance committee was formed and responsible were 
elected to organise a Wellington Chinese Language School. Directors were 
named and the purchase or constructions of school premises began. 
Also in Wellington is the Eastern Chinese Sports Club organised 
many many years ago and supported by most of the younger member of the 
community. The club fields as many as fourteen men and women basketball 
teams at open tournaments and is also in the field of football, 
rugby and other sports and athletic activities. However, the club has 
been using borrowed facilities since the limited size of the Chinese 
community in Wellington prevented it from building its own stadium. 
Meanwhile the Chinese Mu Shut Society has also been operating on 
borrowed sites, with enthusiastic members from among both Chinese and 
European communities engaged in the practice of the Chinese Kungsu as well 
as Oriental Karate and Judo. Needless to say, the community often hires 
halls for largescale gatherings both public and private. 
All in all, a centre for sports and cultural activities was 
urgently required. 
However, in order to build the required facilities the cost of 
land would be between $1-200,000 let alone the construction cost and the 
internal furnishing; Add to this the cost of ground preparation, roads and 
parking facilities, the size of the Wellington community could hardly 
raise the entire amount required. 
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The Embassy was advised that the Wellington City Council had 
hitherto offered the Eastern Chinese Sports Club a piece of land for 
the construction of its club facilities. The land had to be returned 
since Eastern at that time did not think they could raise amount 
required. Now that the community sees the necessity of pool their 
requirements and therefore combined efforts perhaps the Council could 
be approached again for the use of Council land. 
His Worship the Mayor was approached at first. He immediately 
indicated a very favourable reaction, so a delegation of seven community 
members called on the Mayor, who indicated in principle: 
1. The Council could provide public land for the construction 
of such facilities under a lease; 
2. The Council will prepare the ground for such construction, and 
3. The Council may guarantee half the payment of the loan up 
to half the total of the construction cost. 
With this amount of encouraging support community 1 called 
a meeting in September and again in October 1971. Beginning with nine 
and then ten small community organisations supporting this centre a 
committee for the construction of the Wellington Chinese Sports and 
Cultural Centre was organised, byelaws were drafted and passed and officers 
nominated and elected. By this time, the chairman of this committee is 
Mr. Jimmy Louey, the Vice-Chairman Dr R.T.S. Law, secretary Mr. Victor Wu 
and Treasurer Mr Harvey Wu. C.J. Tse & Associates including Mr. B. Wong 
and Brian Young formed the construction sub-committee which launched 
into and drawing for the new centre. 
When the Chinese Language School was being organised, community 
leaders began to pledge amounts of donations for the purchase and 
construction of school premises. Such pledge amounted to as much as 
$1,000 and smaller ones $200. The organisers deferred the collection of 
such fund pending the acquisition of a suitable site. In the meantime 
Chinese film shows, the auction of Chinese water colour paint and 
other activities had taken place to raise funds for this purpose. 
Objects of Chinese art and handicraft have also been donated and brought 
in for a largescale bazaar scheduled for early 1973. The Taiwan 
Fertil Co. donated $US5~000 towards community welfare and the Eddie 
Steamship Company has also pledged longterm support directly and 
indirectly for similar purposes. An appeal was made to the New Zealand 
Lottery Board - the former president of which pledged in principle a 
close to one-quarter of the total construction cost. This 
appeal will be renewed now that a new government has been ushered in. 
Wellington City Council is expected to review and pass a 
request for the use of land at Mt. Albert Park for the construction of 
this centre in the first week of December 1972. Thereafter the 
construction sub-committee will launch into detailed drawings so that 
contractors may estimate in detail the total cost and work schedule. 
The centre will belong to no one, no particular splinter group, 
and will be the property of the whole community. Everybody can use it 
and all who participate may take part in its administration .. 
We wish to express our admiration and respect to all those who 
initiated, organised, pledged or donated money and contributed with hard 
work and warm support to such a purposeful movement. Let us wish the 
centre speedy construction and completion and total success. 
Source: Voice of China. 1 December 1972:3 
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The reputation of the whole Chinese community in Wellington and 
all the Chinese organizations in the capital are at stake. We feel 
that we can no longer remain silent. 
1. The "Sports Centre" has no right whatsoever to c to be the 
representative of the Wellington Chinese, because not all the 
Chinese in Wellington are members of the "Sports Centre". In 
fact, even if all Wellington Chinese were members, it would have 
no warrant of representation. The grounds are: 
A. The "Sports Centre" is merely a sports body. How can we allow 
such an organization to be our representative? 
B. Participation and representation are two issues, e.g. 
members of the United Nations are at the same time members of 
the Olympic Games, but neither may have to speak on 
behalf of any member country - the reason is very obvious. 
C. Participants of the "Sports Centre" include Europeans; therefore 
it is not purely a Chinese organization. What is more, it 
receives a government subsidy at the expense of the organization's 
independence. 
2. The "Sports Centre" has no right to represent all the Chinese 
organizations nor even those organizations which affiliated to 
"the Centre". 
A. Some Chinese organizations take part in the activities conducted 
by "The Sports Centre", because they merely wanted to assist 
the construction of the "Centre". This in no way implies that 
they confer their willingness to be represented by the "Centre". 
B. are more than nine organizations in Wellington. Some of 
nine organizations have already withdrawn from the "Centre". 
More will follow suit. The so-called representative for the whole 
Chinese community is nothing but a fanciful expression. 
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3. The "Centre" is only a newcomer to the Chinese Society. There 
is no fact nor any sign to substantiate its desire to serve the 
Chinese people in the capital. One very important point has 
drawn our attention - the "Centre" is completely void of Chinese 
culture. May we ask, on what merit is the "Centre" to claim the 
representation of the Chinese? It is highly dangerous and 
foolish for the overseas Chinese in New Zealand to put blind 
fai th in the "Centre". 
The "Centre" has borrowed a large sum of money which is to be 
repaid in thirty years. If it claims to be the representative 
of the Chinese community, then has it obtained permission of the 
whale Chinese community to borrow the money? Does it mean that 
the debt be borne by the whole Chinese community? 
We can summarize what we have said into the following points: 
(The "Centre" has no right to claim to be representative of the 
Chinese people in Wellington.) The reasons are as follows: 
l. The "Centre" has made no contribution to the Chinese people. 
2. The "Centre" is completely devoid of Chinese culture. 
3. The "Centre" shows no respect to other Chinese organizations 
nor to the Chinese community as a whole. 
4. The "Centre" is not designed for the convenience of the 
Chinese people. Very often the facilities are rented out. 
5. We declaim against the huge loans by the "Centre" under the 
name of "Chinese". 
6. We recognize the Chinese Association as the only representative 
of the Chinese people in New Zealand. We declare that 
financial involvements of the "Centre" have nothing to do with 
the whole of the Chinese community nor with any other Chinese 
organization. 
In the interest of our club (Tung Jung) , we address this letter to 
the executive committee. We look forward to positive steps taken 
in the near future. 
Yours faithfully, 
A group of Tung Jung members 
(translated from the Chinese) 
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APPENDIX XXXIX 
EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND OVER THE AGE OF IS BY INDUSTRY 1966 AND 1976. 
Industry Division 
and Major Group 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, HUNTING and FISHING 
Agriculture Services 
Agriculture and livestock production 
Forestry and logging 
Hunting, trapping and game propagation 
Fishing 
MINING and QUARRYING 
Coal mining 
Stone quarrying, clay and sand pits 
MANUFACTURING 
Food manufacturing industries except beverage 
industries 
Beverage industries 
Tobacco manufactures 
Manufacture of textiles 
Manufacture of footwear, other wearing apparel 
and made-up textile goods 
Manufacture of wood and cork, except manufacture 
of furniture 
Manufacture of furniture and fixtures 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
PrintinR, publishing and allied industries 
Manufacture of leather. and leather products 
except footwear 
Manufacture of rubber products 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Manufacture of products of petroleum and coal 
Manufacture of plastic products 
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, 
except products of petroleum and coal 
Basic metal industries 
Manufacture of metal products (except machinery 
and transport equipment) 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
Manufacture of machinery (except electrical 
machinery) 
Manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus, 
appliances and supplies 
Banufacture of transport equipment 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
CONSTRUCTION 
ELECTRICITY, GAS, WATER and SANITARY SERVICES 
Electricity, gas and steam 
Water and sanitary services 
COMMERCE 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Restaurants and hotels 
Banks and other financial institutions 
Insurance \ 
Real estate 
TRANSPORT, STORAGE and COMHUNICATION 
Transport 
Storage and warehousing 
Communication 
Business Services 
Machinery and Equipment rental and leasing 
SERVICES 
Government Services 
Community and business services 
Recreation services 
Personal services 
International and other extra-traditional bodies 
ACTIVITIES not ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED 
Totals actively engaged 
Not actively engaged 
GRAND TOTALS 
1966 
Males Females 
630 
627 
2 
1 
7 
5 
:2 
423 
81 
1 
1 
26 
19 
8 
13 
4 
36 
1 
6 
9 
8 
4 
25 
31 
35 
100 
15 
63 
17 
15 
:2 
969 
958 
6 
:2 
3 
255 
236 
1 
18 
375 
37 
151 
7 
180 
9 
2,748 
2,786 
5,534 
224 
223 
1 
195 
21 
2 
31 
94 
1 
1 
4 
3 
.3 
1 
10 
2 
4 
4 
7 
7 
4 
1 
1 
524 
499 
12 
12 
1 
34 
9 
25 
283 
14 
151 
8 
110 
9 
1,274 
3,174 
4,448 
1976 
~Iales Females 
461 
2 
453 
6 
.3 
625 
99 
12 
1 
44 
24 
8 
16 
23 
4!:; 
7 
37 
14 
20 
18 
45 
84 
58 
58 
12 
30 
32 
32 
1204 
733 
377 
30 
49 
15 
666 
437 
285 
2 
282 
1 
382 
44 
1 
3 
52 
139 
1 
4 
8 
22 
6 
2 
16 
2 
10 
3 
1 
6 
15 
26 
11 
10 
5 
5 
881 
509 
276 
51 
37 
8 
204 
54 
49 48 
178 100 
2 2 
603 447 
210 93 
295 301 
15 14 
59 33 
24 6 
78 45 
3,925 2,330 
1,9~8~8 __ ~ ____ ~2~,3~9~8~ 
13 4,728 
Source: Census, 1966, Vol. 7.:40, and 1976" Vol. 7:63-66. 
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G LOS S A R Y 
Districts and Counties: and other Localities: 
Sam 
Poon Yu 
San Oak 
Nam Hoy 
Toy San 
Yun Ping 
Hoy Ping 
San Wui 
(Jung Sing) 
Fa Yuen 
Tung Goon 
Kwangtung 
Peking (Beijing) 
New Zealand 
Shansi 
!II f-
ftr~ -f 
1rr4-
~f rA 
xl-- &.~ ,{~ 'Wl', 
~~ 
)i*~ 
...>--
;Yt:- )1, 
~'f~ fill #j ~$tlf~ 
t1(i3 
Associations 
Tung Jung Association 
Poon Fa Association 
Ch'eung Shin Tong 
Cherishing Virtue Union 
Koumintang (KMT) 
New Zealand Chinese Association 
Auckland Chinese Hall Inc. 
Chinese s Club 
National Salvation Movement 
Chinese Club (Auckland) 
Kwong Chew Club 
Seyip Association 
Anti-Communist League 
Eastern Sports Club 
Anglican Chinese Centre 
Well Chinese Sports and Culture Centre 
Chinese Anglican Church 
Chinese Baptist Church 
Mui Shuit Club 
Dominion Federation of New Zealand Chinese 
Commercial Growers (Inc.). 
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Publications 
Mung Sing Bow 
Mung Kwok Bow 
Chinese Weekly News 
Q-Sing Times 
Central Daily News (Taiwan) 
New Zealand Chinese Growers' 
Monthly Journal 
Auckland Chinese Hall 
Other Terms 
Ching Ming 
Chi I ing Yeung 
Tung-chi 
Fou-tei 
All Souls Festival 
Kite Flying Festival 
Dragon Boat Festival 
Double Seventh 
Double Tenth 
New Zealand Chinese Sports Tournament 
~ 35f ;f~ 
~ t~ 
709. 
f ~*--t~-f~ 
itt *'1 
9' * \i1 tft 
-*1Vb~ 1 tJP'J 
~~fA..r;1 (f'J~) 
-1 ~~ 
j: ~~ 
3t 
1t~ 
~ 13A 11 
~ 1; if 
~11U~tr 
A:jAXJT5l 
15Ct~ Jr t'l7 riJ f /C.{ i,v -t 
Overseas Chinese 
Hakka 
Punti 
Kuan-ti 
Hung 
%~ 
k~ 
~f 
*~ 
710 
711. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Akashi, Yoji, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941, 
1970 International Studies, East Asian Series Number 5, Center for 
East Asian Studies, University of Kansas. 
Alley, G. T. and Rewi Alley, "The Chinese in New Zealand", China Journal, 
1938 Vol. 28, No.2, pp. 70-79. 
Barton, Henry H., George Hunter McNeur, A Pioneer Missionary in South 
1955 China, Dunedin Presbyterian Bookroom. 
Beaglehole, E.and P., Some Modern Maoris, New Zealand Council for Educational 
1946 Research, Christchurch, Whitcombe and Tombs 
Bernardelli, H., "New Zealand and Asiatic Migration", Population Studies, 
1952 Vol. VI, No.1 (July), pp. 39-54. 
Brocklehurst, G.J., New Zealand Royal Commission to Inquiry into and 
1969 Report Upon Social Security: Background Paper, Social Security 
Cash Benefits and the Operations of the Social Security 
Department in New Zealand, Wellington, Social Security Department. 
Burdon, R.M., King Dick, A Biography of Richard Seddon, Wellington, 
1955 Whitcombe and Tombs 
Chen, Han-seng, 
1936 
Problems in Southernmost China Shanghai 
Choi, C.Y., Chinese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Sydney, 
1975 University of Sydney Press. 
Clubb, O. Edmund, Twentieth Century China, New York, Columbia University 
1964 Press. 
Cohen, Abner, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa, Berkeley, University of 
1969 California Press. 
Urban Ethnicity, London, Tavistock. 
Coleman, B.P., "The Effect of Urbanization on Agriculture", in \l.lhitelaw, 
1967 J.S. Auckland in Ferment, Auckland, New Zealand Geographical 
Society. 
Crissman, Lawrence, W., "The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese 
1967 Communities", Man, Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 185-204. 
Don, Reverend Alexander, Annual Inland Toures) Among Otago Chinese, Dunedin, 
1886-1911 Otago Daily Times. 
, "Our Chinese Mission", in The New Zealand 
~~~~~--~--~----~ 1887-1889 Presbyterian, Dunedin, Presbyterian Church of New Zealand. 
712. 
Don, Reverend Alexander, Mission to the Chinese, Dunedin, New Zealand 
1904 Bible Tract and Book Company 
Downie Stewart, William, Sir Francis Bell His Life and 
1937 
Wellington 
Fieldhouse, D.K., British Colonial Policy and New Zealand 1871-1902, Select 
1956 Documents, Vol. I, Canterbury University College. 
Forrest, J., "Population and settlement on the Otago Goldfields", New 
1961 Zealand Geographer, Vol. 18, pp. 64-68. 
Freedman, M., "Immigrants and Associations: Chinese in Nineteenth Century 
1967 Singapore", in Fallers, L.A., s and Associations 
Paris, Mouton. 
Gardner, W.J., A History of Canterbury, Vol. II, Christchurch. 
1971 
Gilkison, Robert, Early Days in Central Otago, Dunedin 
1930 
Gowen, 
1980 
Robert Joseph, "British Legerdemain at the 1911 Imperial Conference: 
The Dominions Defence Planning and the Renewal of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance!!, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 52, No.3, 
pp. 385-413. 
Greif, Stewart William, The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand Singapore, 
1974 Asia Pacific 
Hall, T.D.H., "New Zealand and Asiatic Immigration", The Economic Record, 
1927 Vol. 3, No.5, pp. 228-239. 
"Status of Aliens in New Zealand", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 4, 
pp. 700 710. 
Ingram, C.W.N. and P.O. Wheatley, New Zealand cks 1795-1960 
--------------~------~----------1961 Wellington, Reed. 
James, Anthony, lIFamily Comes First in Office and at Home", National 
1975 Business Review, 18 June, pp. 9 10. 
Johnson, 
1980 
Graham E., "Peasants and Rural Development in the 1970s: A South 
China Case", to appear in R.P. Mishra (ed.), Regional Development 
and Regional Policy, Nagoya, United Nations Center for Regional 
Development 
Kernot, B., People of the Four Winds, Auckland, Hicks Smith and Sons. 
1972 
Lipson, L., The Politics of Equality, New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy, 
1948 Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Long, Reverend F.C., Wellington Anglican Chinese Mission, Fifty Years of 
1950 Christian work amongst the Chinese in New Zealand, Wellington, 4 p. 
Lyman, Stanford, M., The Asian in the West, Social Science and Humanities 
1970 Publication No.4, Nevada, University of Nevada. 
713. 
Lyon, Rosemary, "Chew Chong and the Butter Trade", New Zealand Heri t 
1972 Vol. 4, Part 51, Paul Hamlyn Ltd. 
Matthews, Philip, New Zealand I s Chinese Minority, pamphlet, North Shore 
1947 Gazette, 8 p. 
Mawson, Reverend William and 
1926 Mission of the 
Mawson, Reverend William, "The Chinese Immigrant in New Zealand", Paper 
1927 presented to the Institute of Pacific Relations, Turnbull 
Library Manuscript. 
Mayhew, W.R., Tuapeka - The Land and Its People, Otago Centennial Historical 
1947 Publication. 
McLintock, A.H. and others, Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Wellington, 
Government Printer. 
McNeur, Reverend G.H., Viewing and Visiting the Canton Villages, Dunedin, 
1902 Foreign Mission Committee of the Presbyterian Church of New 
Zealand. 
"New Zealand, her Chinese and Other Immigrants: An 
Before the Canton Missionary Conference". 
"An Awakened China and the Pacific'!, of the 
and Missionary Conference, New Zealand 
Conference Committee. 
The Church and the Chinese in New Zealand Christchurch, 
Mills, C. Wright, The Sociological Imagination, Ha.'f'rIIondsworth, Penguin. 
1970 
Murray, The Very Reverend J.S, A Century of Growth, Presbyterian Overseas 
1969 Mission Work 1869-1969, Christchurch, Overseas Mission Committee. 
Ng, Bickleen 
1959 
Chinese in New Zealand Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
liThe Chinese in New Zealand", Journal of Human Relations, 
No.3, pp. 290-299. 
Ng, Dr. James, "Who are the New Zealand Chinese", Otago Daily Times 
1972 pamphlet, 22 and 29 July, 12 p. 
O'Connor, P.S., "Keeping New Zealand White, 1908-1920", New Zealand Journal 
1968 of Vol. 2, No.1, pp. 41-65. 
Oliver, W.H. and B.R., Williams, The Oxford History of New Zealand, 
1981 Wellington, Oxford University Press. 
Parcell, J. C., Heart of the Desert, Being the History of the Cromwell and 
1951 Bannockburn Districts of Central Otago, Otago Centennial 
Historical Publications. 
714. 
Philpott, H.G., A History of the New Zealand Dairy Industry, 1840-1935, 
1937 Wellington, Government Printer. 
Presbyterian Church of New Zealand: 
Mission Committee Annual 1925-1927. 
Our Fields Afar, Foreign Mission Reports, 1914-1925. 
Price, C.A., The Great WhiteJValls are Built: Restrictive Immigration to 
North America and Australasia 1836-1888 Canberra, Australian 
Reeves, W. P., "Why I Proposed the I Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Bill' ", 
1895 in Review of Reviews, pp. 39-42. 
, "The Exclusion of Aliens and Undesirables from Australia and 
New Zealand!!, in National Review. 
Roy, W. T., "New Zealand's Immigration Policy and External ", 
1966 International Mi Review Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 33-43. 
"Immigration and Policy Legislation", in Thom;,...,son, K.W. and 
A.D. Trlin, in New Zealand Palmerston North, 
Massey 
Salmond, J.D., New Zealand Labour's 
1950 
Schiffrin, Harold Z., 
1970 Berkeley, 
edited by D. Crowley, 
Chinese Revolution 
Scholefield, Dr. G.H. and T.D.H. Hall, "As Immigration in New Zealand: 
1927 Legislative Control and Historical Survey", Hawaii, Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 16 p. 
Schurmann, Franz and Orville Schell, 
1968 
ican China England, Penguin. 
Sedgwick, C.P. and W.E. Willmott, "External Influences and Emerging Identity: 
1970 The Evolution of Community Structure Among Chinese Canadians", 
The Canadian_ Forum, (September), pp. 9-12. 
Siegfried, Andre, 
1914 London, 
Sinclair, Keith, A 
1959 
in New Zealand (trans. by E.V. Burns), 
of New Zealand Singapore, Penguin. 
Skinner, G.W., "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China", Journal of 
1964 Asian Studies, Vol. 24, Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 
Smith, M.G., "On Segmentary Lineage Systems", The Journal 6f the Royal 
1956 Anthropoligical Institutt:)_, Vol. 86, Partll, pp: 39-80. 
Spence, J.R., People of Nanyang, Wellington, Hicks Smith and Sons, Ltd. 
1971 --~----------~--= 
Sue, V.L., Wong, N. Yee, Y.S. Yee and H. Young, Chinese in Christchurch 
1982 Christchurch 
715. 
Sutch, W.B., The 
1966 ----~------------~-
Wellington, Oxford ity Press, 
, Poverty and Progress in New Zealand, Wellington, Reed. 
Taher, M., "The Asians", in Thomison, K.W. and A.D. , Immigrants 
1970 in New Zealand Palmerston North, Massey University. 
Tod, Frank, The 
1977 
of a Madman Lionel Terry, Dunedin. 
Tung, William L., The Chinese in America 1820-1973 New York, Oceana 
1974 Publi 
Wickberg, 
1965 
, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898, New Haven, 
Yale University Press. 
"Some Problems in Chinese Organisational Development in 
1923-1937", Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. XI, No.1, 
pp. 88-98. 
Willmott, W. E., "Chinese Clan Associations in Vancouver", Man, Vol. LXIV, 
1964 No. 49, pp. 33-37. 
1970 
"Congregations and Associations: The Political Structure 
the Chinese Community in Cambodia", 
Studies in Vol.ll, pp. 282-301. 
, The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in 
Cambodia, London, The Athlone Press. 
"Approaches to the Study of the Chinese in British Columbia 
", B.C. Studies, No.4, pp. 38-51. 
Review of, 'The Overseas Chinese in New Zealand', by Stuart 
liam Greif, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No.2, pp. 382-385. 
Wood, F.L.W., The New Zealand People at War, Christchurch, Whitcombe and 
1958 Tombs. 
Wornall-Smith, R., "The Employment of Maori Women by c Market 
1970 Gardeners - An Aspect of New Zealand Race Relations", in 
University of Auckland Historical Society Annual, pp. 1-11. 
Yancey, 
1976 
William 1., Eugene P. Ericksen and Richard N. Juliani, 
"Emergent A Review and Reformation", American 
Yao, Shen 1., A 
1970 
Vol. 41, No.3, pp. 391 
of Chinese Exclusion Abroad Hong Kong (in Chinese). 
Zo Kil Young, "Emigrant Communities in China, Sze-Yap", Asian Profile, 
1977 Vol. 5, No.4, pp. 313-323. 
Author Unknown, Anti-Asiatic League of Palmerston North, Rule Book,Buick 
1907 and Young, Palmerston North 
716. 
Author Unknown, The White New Zealand League, Citizens of the Future are 
1926 the Children of Today, Auckland, 7 p. 
Author Unknown, The Villi te New Zeal and Pukekohe, New Zealand, 
1926 pp. 
Totalisator Agency Board, story and Operation of Off-Course Bettingin 
1958 New Zealand, Wellington. 
Newspapers 
Eastern Suburbs Sentinel 
Quick March (QM) 
The Auckland Star (AS) 
The Bruce Herald 
The Daily Telegraph 
The Dominion 
The Evening Post (EP) 
The Evening Star 
The Lyttelton Times (LT) 
The Maori 1 and Worker 
The National Business Review 
The Nelson Examiner 
The New Zealand Herald (NZH) 
The New Zealand Listener (Listener) 
The New Zealand Mail 
The New Zealand Observer 
The New Zealand Presbyterian (NZP) 
The New Zealand Tablet 
The New Zealand Times (NZT) 
The New Zealand Truth (Truth) 
The New Zealand Woman's Weekly 
The Otago Witness (OW) 
The Otago Daily Times (ODT) 
The People 
The Press 
The Southern Cross 
The Star Sports 
The Sun 
The Sunday Times 
The Timaru Herald 
The Tuapeka Times 
The Voice of China 
The West Coast Times 
Journal 
New Zealand Law Review (NZLR) 
Mi s cellan eous ished Material 
Chan, Christine, "A Study of the Assimilation of Chinese in the Lower King 
1974 Country", Department of Sociology, Victoria University of 
Wellington. 
Submissions to the Honourable F.M. Coleman, Minister of Immigration on Behalf 
of the New Zealand Chinese Association Incorporated, 1973 
(courtesy of Mr. T. Doo). 
717. 
Published Government Material 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (AJHR) 
Board of Health, Drug Dependency and Drug Abuse in New Zealand, 1970, 
Report No. 14. 
New Zealand Census 
New Zealand Customs Department, "Instructions for Taking and Comparing 
Finger Impressions of Chinese Entering and Leave New 
Zealand, 1904". 
New Zealand Gazette 
New Zealand Official Year Book 
New Zealand Parliament, Bills Thrown Out 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) 
New Zealand Statutes 
Otago Provincial Government Gazette 
Votes and Proceedings of the Provincial Council of Otago 
Unpublished Government Documents (Note: All in National Archives 
unless specified) 
Colonial Office, C.O. 209/256; C.O. 418/62 (microfilm) 
Customs Department, 1/1726/3; 1/1386; 1/1726/4; 1/739/4 
Department of Labour, L22/1/81 
Department of Labour, L/22/1/115, Department of Labour 
Internal Affairs, IA 116/7; IA 13/621; IA 13/408; IA 68/12, 
IA 1912/1014; IA 13/35/13; IA 1933/60/50; IA 09/608; 
IA 13/388/6; IA 08/201, Chinese Consul (no designation) 
Names etc., of Alien Friends who have been naturalized in New Zealand, 
1911 and 1949 
Native Minister, Asiatics and Maoris (no designation) 
Petitions, LE 1/1903/11; LE 1/1903/2053; LE 1/1900/9; LE 1/1901/7; 
LE 1/1904/9; LE 1/1889/101. 
Prime Minister's Department, PM 61/6/11; PM 1911/962; PM 6/2661. 
and Archival Material 
Alexander Don, Diary, Ng Collection, Turnbull Library 
Downie Stewart Papers, MS 985/1/44, Hocken Library, University of Otago. 
E.J. Arnold Papers, MS, H-19 (Appointment of Chinese Consulate) Turnbull 
Library 
Lady Stout Collection, Hocken Library, University of Otago 
Rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association 1909 (in Chinese), 
MS 1923/264, Turnbull Library 
Seddon Papers, Series 2, 1904, Item 17, National Archives 
Yue H. Jackson, MS 112, Turnbull Library 
Chinese Material (translated from the Chinese) 
A Letter to the Executive Committee of the Tung Jung Association 
Anglican Chinese Centre Souvenir Brochure for Raising Building Funds, 1973 
Annual Chinese Sports Tournament Programme, 1963 
Annual Chinese Sports Tournament Programme, 1971 
Auckland Chinese Hall, First Edition, 1961 (later became Auckland 
Chinese Journal) 
Auckland Chinese Journal 
718. 
Copy of Notice Against Ko T'ong Hospital issued and circulated by the 
People of P'ong Woo shortly after its Opening in 1909 
(McNeur Collection, Hocken Library) 
Letter from Wang Ta Hsieh to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
18 April 1907, National Library of Australia 
Minutes of the First Meeting of Shareholders of the Yu Kiew Company, 
and List of Shareholders for the Yu Kiew Company, 1950 
New Zealand Chinese Association, Canterbury Branch, Annual Report, 1978 
New Zealand Chinese Association, Gisborne Minute Book 
New Zealand Chinese Association, "Report on Donations from the Branches, 
1937-1944", Wellington 
New Zealand Chinese Double Tenth Tournament, 1972 
New Zealand Chinese Growers' Monthly Journal (NZCGMJ) 
New Zealand Chinese Weekly News, Wellington (C'~) 
"Prohibition of Christianity Adopted and Placarded by the Edlers of Lau 
Clan in Leung T'ien Village, Upper Poon Yue with the Letter 
of the Mo Tak Lei Sy, 1906 (McNeur Collection, Hocken Library) 
Rules of the New Zealand Chinese Association, 1935 
The Annual Chinese Sports Tournament Programme, 1963 
The First Report on the Expansion and Renovation of the Clubroom, 
Executive Committee of the Sun Wui Club of Auckland, 1967 
The Q-Sing Times, Auckland 
The Seventh Annual New Zealand Sports Tournament, 1954 
The Third New Zealand Chinese Annual Sports Tournament, 1950 
The Thirteenth Annual Chinese Sports Tournament, 1960 
The Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre, Program Report 1976 
Tung Jung Association Constitution 
Wellington Chinese Sports and Cultural Centre (Inc.), Proposed Building 
Project, 1973 
Note: All Chinese materials were made available by informants in the 
course of fieldwork unless otherwise specified. 
Theses 
Baldwin, Howard, "Railroad Navvies", B.A. Hons., Otago, 1975 
Buckingham, Peter David, "The Report of the Chinese Immigration Committee 
1871: With respect to some apsects of public opinion in Otago 
Province", Postgraduate Diploma in Arts, University of Otago, 
1974. 
Chin, J.C., "Chinese Families", in Partial fulfilment of the M.B.Ch.B (NZ), 
Otago Medical School, 1954. 
Davie, Owen Robert, "Chinese Immigration into N.Z.: 1878-1881", M.A. 
History, University of Otago, 1969. 
Forgie, Alan, "Anti-Chinese Agitation in New Zealand, 1887-1889: Its 
results and causes", M.A. History, University of Otago, 1969. 
Fraser, J. and Ng J., !fA New Zealand-Chinese Blood-Pressure Survey", 
in partial fulfilment of M.B.Ch.B. (NZ) , Otago Medical School, 
1958. 
Fyfe, Frances, "Chinese Immigration to New Zealand in the 19th Century", 
M.A. History, Victoria University College, 1948. 
Harrison, N., "The Foundation of the Vlhi te New Zealand Policy between the 
years 1890-1907", M.A., Victoria University, 1955. 
Kay, George, "Seddon and Asian Immigration Legislation, 1896-1899", 
Postgraduate Diploma in History, University of Otago, 1973. 
719. 
Law, O.K., "Medicine and the Chinese Community", in partial fulfilment 
of M.B.Ch.B. (NZ) Otago Medical School, 1955. 
Lian, Kwen Fee, "A Study of Identity within the Chinese Community in 
Wellington", M.A. Sociology, Victoria University, 1980. 
Lee, Tong Ling, "Chinese Market Gardening in the Auckland Region", M.A. 
Geography, University of Auckland, 1974. 
McNeur, Margaret, "Chinese in New Zealand", M.A. story, Otago University, 
1930. 
Millar, R. D., "Early Reactions and Attitudes to Chinese Immigrants in Otago, 
1866-1870", History, Otago University, 1972 . 
. ~ Ng, Esther, "The 'Yellow Peril' Myth or Reality, 1878-1881", B.A. Honours 
in History, University of Otago, 1972. 
~ Ng, David, "Ninety Years of Chinese Settlement in New Zealand, 1866-1956", 
M.A. Geography, University of Canterbury, 1962. 
O'Connor, Paul W., "Asian Immigration to New Zealand, 1896-1899", M.A. 
History, University of Otago, 1972. 
Ponton, F.A., "Immigration Restriction in New Zealand, A Study of Policy 
from 1908-1939", M.A. History, Victoria University, 1946. 
Rachagan, S. Sothi, "Asian Immigration into New Zealand. A Survey of 
Attitudes and Legislation", M.A. Geography, Otago University, 
1971. 
-. Scurrah, Vernon H., "Asiatic Immigration into New Zealand, 1870-1920", M.A. 
History, University of Auckland, 1950. 
Shum, K. C., "Environment and Health Hazards in Market Gardening", in partial 
fulfilment of M.B. Ch.B. (NZ), Otago Medical School, 1956. 
Taher, M., "The Asians in New Zealand: A Geographical Review and 
Interpretation", Ph.D., Geography, University of Auckland, 1965. 
Nair, Wanda Fabia, "A Study of Assimilation and Parental Attitudes of the 
Chinese and Indian Community in the Auckland and Metropolitan 
Area", M.A. Education, University of Auckland, 1976. 
Willis, Michael, "The Chinese Question 1896-9", Postgraduate Diploma in 
Arts, 1974, University of Otago. 
Wong, Lawrence, "Chinese Youth in Wellington", M.A. Geography, Victoria 
University, 1973. 
Young, M.L., "The Auckland Chinese: A Community in Transition", M.A; 
Geography, Auckland, 1973. 
